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From: mac khai via Vsg <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Sent: Sunday, November 17, 2024 1:32 PM
To: VSG <vsg@u.washington.edu>; billhayton <bill@billhayton.com>
Subject: Re: [Vsg] IISS’ Vietnam New Leadership Slate: A Critique
With respect to Bill H.'s eight points below: Chuẩn, không cần chỉnh!
Cheers,
K. Hörst
(unaffiliated)
From: David Brown via Vsg <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Sent: Sunday, November 17, 2024 12:00 PM
To: cthayer@unsw.edu.au
Cc: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Subject: [Vsg] More thoughts on Hayton's "Vietnam's new leadership slate"
Carl, I too appreciate your analysis of Vietnam’s current state. However, some comments.
Re (1) The “security forces” are doubtless not monolithic. I don’t see an entente between Tô Lâm and Phạm Minh Chính. Nonetheless, a substantial number of comrades who performed well in state (rather than party) roles (e.g., Phúc, Huệ, Vũ Đức Đam, Phạm Bình Minh, etc., etc.) have been cast out on dubious pretexts (e.g., not detecting subordinates’ corrupt activity), making room at the top for an unprecedented number of cops and ex-cops who may form ad hoc combinations.
Re (2) Ridding the Party of “political rivals.” As you know, I’ve always considered Trọng a ‘straight arrow.’ What jumps out at me is that in the last months, perhaps a year, of his life, Trọng appeared to be more and more swayed by Cao’s counsel. (This is not a new phenomenon; for example, after Woodrow Wilson suffered a stroke, Ms Wilson was de facto US president for his last two years in office.)
Re (3) I agree that the ’greatest threat’ is not ‘peaceful evolution.’ Regarding the anti-corruption campaign, let’s watch who is targeted and on what grounds. Is throwing Võ Vân Thửơng out of the Party because he failed to report sleazy dealings by, as I recall, his uncles on a road building contract two decades ago, standard punishment or a pretext for Thưởng’s removal from the Presidency?
Re (4). In his Vietnam Weekly, Mike Tatarski has also commented in extenso on the slowdown in disbursement of public funds and its apparent motivation: fear of punishment if a mistake is found to have been committed.
Re (5 thru 7) No comment.
Re (8) Here’s why Vietnam is again building coal-fired power stations, negotiating with the USSR to revive a nuclear power plant project, and has told several European firms specialised in offshore wind power that it will have no need of their services:
After several years while the GVN was negotiating the ‘Just Energy Transition Partnership’ with the US and European firms, and Vietnamese energy NGOs enjoyed easy access to, inter alia, the Prime Minister’s Office, Vietnam’s energy big three (Vinacomin, PetroVietnam and EVN) have been able to re-establish their unholy alliance with the Energy Department of the Ministry of Industry.
Regards, David Brown
From: billhayton via Vsg <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Sent: Sunday, November 17, 2024 11:04 AM
To: VSG <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: [Vsg] IISS’ Vietnam New Leadership Slate: A Critique
Some (rather obvious) points in response...
1. Nowhere in the IISS article does it say that the security forces represent a ‘coherent group’ or a ‘unified faction'. Carl has invented a straw man argument here. In fact the division between the public security goons and the army generals is going to be interesting to watch. But we can be sure that political liberalisation is not on the horizon. There are still a few people who need to be disabused of this assumption.
2. The idea that the blazing furnace was a saintly attempt to remove corruption from the CPV and had nothing to do with intra-party battles for power is touchingly naive. Sure, the campaign took down some very corrupt people, but that was merely one part of the game. We only need to look at who is still around to know that the other part of the campaign was a vicious battle for power, in which some exceedingly corrupt people remained untouched - mainly those with better connections in the Ministry of Public Security. Carl’s assertion that "Perhaps the main motivation of officials in the Ministry of Public Security and party Inspection Commission was to support the party leader in his campaign against corruption” is very sweet. I bet the boys in the MPS are laughing into their bia hoi...
3. Of course there is ceiling on cooperation between Vietnam and Western democracies. I’m old enough to remember the days when Western countries were funding all kinds of democracy-promotion activities with Vietnamese partner organisations. That just doesn’t happen any more. The magnificently named 'comprehensive strategic partnerships' with South Korea, United States, Japan, Australia and France are mere pieces of paper. The UK has had such a piece of paper with Vietnam for well over a decade but there is almost nothing to show for it. What has changed in relations between Vietnam and the US in the year since the signing of their 'comprehensive strategic partnership'? Anything?
4. If anyone doubts the connection between the anti-corruption campaign and the slowdown in public expenditure might want to read a few articles in the local press:
'Because of the mindset of waiting for decisions from above, many public assets do nothing'
5. Carl is a bit mixed up on the foreign investment figures. His figures are for FDI disbursed in the period (ie resulting from decisions taken in previous periods). The IISS figures are for FDI pledged in the period and should be disbursed in future periods. In other words, if these pledges become disbursals, China will become the largest source of foreign investment in Vietnam. It’s already the second largest in terms of disbursals.
6. The general definition of a captive market is one where the potential consumers face a severely limited number of competitive suppliers. Currently, one third of all the things that Vietnamese consumers import - come from China. South Korea is the next largest provider of imports at about half that level and Japan is the third largest with just 6.5% of Vietnam’s imports. Vietnam’s market looks pretty captured.
7. Carl claims that there is no evidence that Vietnam has halted its oil and gas exploration in areas in dispute with China. But there’s plenty of evidence. Back in 2020, I wrote about how the Vietnamese government paid around a billion dollars to international energy companies after cancelling their gas drills because of Chinese objections.
https://thediplomat.com/2020/07/chinas-pressure-costs-vietnam-1-billion-in-the-south-china-sea/
Since then Vietnam has chosen not to drill in any areas inside China’s ‘U-shaped line’. None. How much more evidence is required? Meanwhile, Vietnam has built up its bases on the rocks and reefs and not faced any interference from China - unlike the Philippines, for example. China has turned a blind eye to Vietnam’s activities. This looks like a modus vivendi.
8. Anyone who thinks Vietnam’s current leadership is serious about energy transition and green energy needs to explain why the the country is building new coal-fired power stations, why the ‘Just Energy Transition Partnership’ is going nowhere and why climate change campaigners keep getting locked up https://the88project.org/fighting-for-a-greener-future/
Best wishes
Bill
From: Carlyle Thayer via Vsg <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Sent: Saturday, November 16, 2024 10:27 PM
To: via Vsg <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Subject: [Vsg] IISS’ Vietnam New Leadership Slate: A Critique
IISS’ Vietnam New Leadership Slate: A Critique
Carlyle A. Thayer
This IISS Strategic Comments overview of Vietnam’s domestic and foreign policies in 2024 contains at least seven tendentious assertions:
1. Security Forces have taken over Vietnamese Politics
The assertion that Vietnam’s political system has been taken over by the security forces rests on the fact that eight of fifteen members of the current Politburo had careers in or rose through the ranks of the security forces. This assumes that they represent a coherent group in Vietnam’s political system. The author(s) of this report take it a self-evident that a career in the public security has created a unified faction in the Vietnam Communist Party. In other words, it is sui generis. What is the evidence?
A plausible alternate interpretation is that the security forces are divided into factions such as the Hung Yen group, Nghe An-Ha Tinh group, Ninh Binh group, Thanh Hoa group and officials in the Ministry of Public Security who worked with Pham Minh Chinh in the Department of Economic Intelligence, Science, Technology and Environment.
The IISS analysis fails to discuss the powerful party Central Committee and the role of the army bloc and factions of local provincial officials who often act as a brake on the party General Secretary and Politburo. For example, General Secretary To Lam appears to have been over-ruled three times since assuming office. He was unsuccessful in getting Tran Luu Quang appointed to the Secretariat. He had to relinquish the state presidency to an army general. And his attempt to amend the party statutes has been postponed until the 14thnational party congress.
General Secretary To Lam does not have dictatorial powers. If he has ambitions to serve as party leader for a full five-year term, he will have to build a coalition of supporters embracing multiple factions including southerners, sectoral interest groups, provincial officials and the military that extends beyond the fifteen-member Politburo. In short, Vietnam’s political system has not been taken over by a unified bloc of public security officials.
Finally, the IISS article argues that the takeover by the security forces “means that there is little chance of further political liberalization.” This raises the counter-factual question: if Vietnam’s top leadership selected at the 13th national party congress remained in office for their full five-year term what political liberalization would have taken place in Vietnam? There is scant evidence that any of the dismissed officials (Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Vo Van Thuong, Vu Dinh Hue, Truong Thi Mai etc.) were proponents of political liberalization.
2. Ridding Political Rivals or Corrupt Officials?
The late party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong initiated the anti-corruption campaign. One of his statutory responsibilities is to nominate a successor. Trong ‘s anti-corruption drive included holding officials accountable under long-standing party regulations such as Regulation No. 08-QĐ/TW, Ban Chấp hành Trung ương về trách nhiệm nêu gương của cán bộ, đảng viên, trước hết là Uỷ viên Bộ Chính trị, Uỷ viên Ban Bí thư, Uỷ viên Ban Chấp hành Trung ương (25 October 2018) and Regulation No. 37-QĐi/TW, Ban Chấp hành Trung ương về những điều đảng viên không được làm (October 25, 2021).
Since Trong would have retired at the 14th congress if he had lived, leadership dismissals under his watch were aimed at officials that he felt had blemished records and were not qualified under party rules cited above. Trong’s main motivation wasn’t eliminating political rivals so much as clearing the underbrush to make way for cleaner officials.
The IISS article argues that the main motivation of officials who supported General Secretary Trong was to marginalize and expel their political rivals. Perhaps the main motivation of officials in the Ministry of Public Security and party Inspection Commission was to support the party leader in his campaign against corruption and negative phenomena and to leave “no forbidden areas.” The IISS analysis does not provide details of which leaders were seeking to replace General Secretary Trong at the 14th congress. The sub-text is that it is self-evident that there must have been a power struggle among the top political elites.
It is disingenuous to argue that all party officials in Vietnam are corrupt and protected by the system and then criticize Vietnamese leaders for taking action to punish or remove corrupt officials. What is it – okay to remove an official for corruption but not okay if that corrupt official is a potential rival who seeks higher office?
3. Greatest threat to the security of the Vietnam Communist Party
The IISS article argues that the biggest threat to the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) is “peaceful evolution.” No doubt there are officials in some quarters in Vietnam who believe this. But-high level officials prior to past national party congresses identified corruption as the main threat to the legitimacy of the VCP.
Nguyen Phu Trong must be credited with making progress in addressing this issue after his selection as party leader in 2011. Transparency International’s Perceptions of Corruption Index gave Vietnam a score of 31 in 2012 on a scale from 0 (very corrupt) to 100 (very clean). In 2022, Vietnam improved its score rising to 42 but dropped to 41 in 2023 (83rd out of 180 countries). This ranking is just below the global average for state corruption.
The IISS article argues that General Secretary To Lam “will slow the anti-corruption campaign” without providing any basis for this assertion. To Lam has repeatedly asserted that the anti-corruption campaign will continue. For example, To Lam addressed the third meeting of the Documents Subcommittee and the Party Charter Subcommittee on 11 November. The media reported that To Lam “pointed out that it was necessary to… promote the work of preventing and combating corruption, waste, and negativity with the motto of ‘non-stop, non-stop,’ ‘no forbidden zones,’ and ‘no exceptions.’”
4. Threat of Peaceful Evolution Will Put a Ceiling on Cooperation with Western-style democracies
As we know from Politburo Directive 24, there are serious concerns held by the security establishment in Vietnam about the role of foreign governments and non-government organizations` in promoting political reform, human rights and religious freedom. But as Directive 24 makes clear, Vietnam can and will take steps to insulate itself from such pressures.
The argument that there is a ceiling on cooperation with Western democracies is belied by Vietnam’s determined steps from late 2022 to raise its relations with South Korea, United States, Japan, Australia and France to comprehensive strategic partnerships.
5. Vietnam will be a captive Chinese market
The IISS article accurately reports that General Secretary Trong’s anti-corruption campaign led to an opportunity cost in slowing the approval of contracts for economic projects. The article argues this has put downward pressure on growth in recent years. Nevertheless, Vietnam has benefitted from the relocation of companies working in China to Vietnam, an increase in investment from China/Hong Kong and growing trade with the United States.
Vietnam’s economy grew by 8.02% in 2022 and declined to 5.05% in 2023 below the government’s target of 6.5%. This was due not just to a halt in public investment due to the anti-corruption campaign but a slowdown in the global economy (including China).
According to Trading Economics, “Vietnam’s GDP expanded by 7.40% year-on-year in Q3 of 2024, accelerating from an upwardly revised 7.09% growth in Q2 and marking the steepest yearly increase since Q3 of 2022, flash data showed. The latest result also represented the 12th consecutive quarter of yearly growth, despite the impact of the worst typhoon in seven decades, which struck the country in September and halted many business operations.”
The IISS article states that China and Hong Kong are Vietnam’s largest sources of foreign investment. According to Trading Economics, “Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Vietnam rose by 8.8% year-on-year to USD 19.58 billion from January to October 2024, according to data from the Ministry of Planning and Investment… The largest investors were Singapore, China, South Korea, Japan, and Hong Kong, accounting for 76.5% of total FDI over the period. Singapore, China, and South Korea topped foreign investments, with $7.79 billion, $3.61 billion, and $3.56 billion, respectively.
The IISS article erroneously concludes that “the sheer size of China’s economy and its export strength threaten to turn Vietnam into a captive market.” While China is Vietnam largest two-way trade partner, the United States is Vietnam’s largest export market. South Korea and Japan are Vietnam’s second and third largest two-way trade partners. Collectively the EU is Vietnam’s third largest trade partner. The case that Vietnam will be a captive Chinese market is not proven.
6. South China Sea Working Compromise
The IISS article argues that over the least eight years Vietnam retreated from confrontation with China in the South China Sea and worked out a modus vivendi with China to halt oil production within China’s claimed nine-dash line in exchange for Chinese acquiescence in Vietnam’s construction activities in the Spratly Islands. This is sheer supposition not back up by any evidence.
Since 2003, Vietnam has consistently pursued a policy of “cooperation and struggle” with China over the South China Sea not retreat. The IISS article does not explain what it means by confrontation and what risks Vietnam would entail if it resorted to physical force. The China Coast Guard is larger and heavier than the combined coast guards of all states in East and Southeast Asia. It is supported by an armed maritime militia backed up by the People’s Liberation Army Navy. Directly confronting China would play into China’s strengths and would be counter-productive.
The IISS article also argues that “Vietnam will continue to seek support from powers outside the region to help it resist Chinese pressure.” The IISS analysis falls short in leaving unexplained what sort of support Vietnam would seek to stave off Chinese pressure particularly when IISS argues that Vietnam will “adhere to the ‘Four No’s… (no ‘joining any military alliances, siding with one country against another, giving any other countries permission to set up military bases or use its territory to carry out military activities against other countries nor using force or threatening to use force in international relations’).”
Vietnam’s calls for support have been limited to political and diplomatic backing and assistance in maritime law enforcement capacity building. Such support may be necessary but it is not sufficient to deter China from its aggressive behaviour. Vietnam will continue on its course of diversifying and multilateralising external relations and cooperation and struggle in its relations with the major powers.
Conclusion
Vietnam’s political leaders are currently up to their necks preparing for the 14th national party congress set for early 2026. Party subcommittees are busy preparing key strategic policy documents to be presented the congress: Political Report, Socio-Economic Report, Report on Party-Building, and Implementation of the Party Charter. Between now and early 2026, party congresses will be held at all levels to select delegates to the national congress.
During 2025, the party Central Committee will conduct a number of straw polls to determine who will be eligible to stand for election to the new Central Committee. The current Central Committee will also have to determine who if any of the “four pillars” leadership deserves an exemption from the mandatory retirement age of 65 for exemplary service.
It will be up to the nearly 1,400 delegates from central party organs and all fifty-eight provinces and five cities to elect the new Central Committee. They will be given guidelines setting out roughly how many seats should be given to the public security bloc, the military bloc, other sectoral blocs, and provinces and cities. The thirteenth national party congress in 2021 elected a Central Committee of 180 full members including twenty-three members of the military (12.8%) and six members of the police (3.3%). This rough proportion is likely to be reflected in the new Central Committee elected by the 14th congress.
After the delegates elect the new Central Committee, the Central Committee will meet and select the new Politburo and party General Secretary. Vietnam’s new leadership will be reflective of the diversity of party members. Fears that Vietnam’s political system will be held captive by a public security bloc will be proved unfounded
Rather than political liberalization, the Vietnam Communist Party is poised to enter what General Secretary To Lam terms a “new era” of massive reform, streamlining and decentralization of the cumbersome state and party bureaucracies under a “new organizational model” currently being drafted. According to To Lam, now is the make-or-break time “to successfully implement the strategic goals by 2030, Vietnam will become a developing country with modern industry and high average income by 2045.”
The legitimacy of the Vietnam Communist Party rests on successful performance of its socio-economic development plans. Vietnam will leverage all of its comprehensive strategic partnerships (China, Russia, India, South Korea, United States, Japan, Australia, France) to provide assistance in science, technology, innovation to promote digital transformation, green development and energy transformation.
Carlyle A. Thayer
Emeritus Professor
UNSW Canberra
School of Humanities and Social Sciences
The University of New South Wales at the
Australian Defence Force Academy
Canberra, ACT 2610 Australia
Phone: +61 02 6251 1849
Mobile: 0437 376 429
Calling Mobile from overseas +61 437 376 429
From: David Brown via Vsg <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Sent: Saturday, November 16, 2024 10:18 AM
To: billhayton <bill@billhayton.com>
Cc: VSG <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: [Vsg] Vietnam’s new leadership slate
Bill, thanks for sharing your comprehensive assessment of Vietnam's options at the dawn of Trump Era #2. David
From: billhayton via Vsg <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2024 8:27 AM
To: VSG <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: [Vsg] Vietnam’s new leadership slate
Not sure why they illustrated it with a picture of Chinese officials though...
From: billhayton via Vsg <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2024 8:24 AM
To: VSG <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Subject: [Vsg] Fwd: Vietnam’s new leadership slate
This may interest some vsg-ers…
Best wishes
Bill Hayton
Independent researcher
Begin forwarded message:
From: Strategic Comments <Strategic.Comments@iiss.org>
Subject: Vietnam’s new leadership slate
Date: 15 November 2024 at 15:02:56 GMT
To: bill@billhayton.com
FREE READ
Strategic Comments
Vietnam’s new leadership slate
A new state president and party general secretary have been appointed following the death of long-time leader Nguyễn Phú Trọng in July 2024.
Vietnam’s new slate of leaders is finally in post after a tumultuous period this year. On 21 October 2024, General Lương Cường was sworn in as the country’s new president and head of state. He joined two former police generals at the podium: Tô Lâm, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), and Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính. Overall, eight of the 15 members of the current party Politburo began their careers in, or rose through, the security forces. Many more security figures are in influential, if less prominent, positions in the governing hierarchy.
Four further members of the Politburo have spent most of their careers in the party, rather than in state-led organisations delivering government services. This coalition of security personnel and orthodox Leninists at the apex of Vietnamese politics is the outcome of a decade-long campaign led by the party’s previous general secretary, Nguyễn Phú Trọng, to reimpose discipline on the CPV. In that campaign, the party inspectorate worked hand in hand with the Ministry of Public Security to weed out those who might threaten the party’s legitimacy. The ministry describes itself as the party’s ‘sword and shield’. In the process, they also marginalised and expelled figures who were rivals of those now at the top of Vietnamese politics, not least Lâm himself.
Lâm is a very different person to his predecessor Trọng, who served as the party’s general secretary for 13 years until his death in July 2024. Trọng was the éminence grise of Vietnamese politics, a man who laboured in the ideological workshops of the CPV, living a modest and apparently incorruptible life while struggling against the disintegration of the party. Lâm, by contrast, was filmed eating a gold leaf-covered steak at a London restaurant in November 2021. He also seems to enjoy the limelight. He became state president in May 2024 and continued in the role even after becoming general secretary in August. He held on to the presidency just long enough to make an official visit to the United States and address the United Nations in his capacity as head of state. He also addressed a large meeting of students at Columbia University and even took questions from them, something Trọng would not have done.
"The takeover of Vietnamese politics by the security forces has several implications. Most obviously, it means there is little chance of further political liberalisation."
The takeover of Vietnamese politics by the security forces has several implications. Most obviously, it means there is little chance of further political liberalisation. The CPV intends to remain the sole legal political force in the country. All analyses of Vietnam’s political and foreign-policy choices must begin from the understanding that the party takes decisions primarily in the interests of its own longevity. From the CPV’s perspective, the biggest threat to its security is the risk of what it calls ‘peaceful evolution’: a loss of domestic political support and political challenges sponsored by foreign powers. Its response to this threat has two aspects: the need both to maintain an elite coalition of security, business and political interests and to preserve legitimacy by delivering rising standards of living to the majority of the population. The idea that another organisation, or the state on its own, could perform these tasks better than the CPV is anathema to it. This will affect Vietnam’s foreign policy because there will always be a ceiling on any cooperation with Western-style democracies. Elites in the CPV and Ministry of Public Security fear that the US and its partners are intent on fostering peaceful evolution and are supportive of the emergence of political pluralism in the country. By contrast, leaders in China and Russia have views on popular sovereignty that are largely aligned with the CPV’s; Beijing and Moscow can therefore be trusted to a much greater degree on issues related to domestic security and stability.
The economy
Economically, Vietnam has been lucky. The impact of Trọng’s anti-corruption campaign, dubbed the ‘blazing furnace’, has been to deter officials from taking decisions and signing contracts on economic projects. This put downward pressure on growth in recent years. But these difficulties coincided with decisions by many globally focused companies to move production away from China; many have redirected investments towards Vietnam, where foreign investment has been rising (with US$20.5 billion invested in the first eight months of 2024, representing a 7% year-on-year increase).
Interestingly, the largest sources of foreign direct investment in Vietnam are now China and Hong Kong. Specifically, China’s investments in Vietnam in the period 2022–23 increased 170% compared with 2018–19. Meanwhile, goods exports from Vietnam to the US have also increased significantly. Chinese companies are seeking lower production costs and a hedge for their operations against the potential impacts of future American tariffs and sanctions. The choices of international businesses have masked the effects of poor policy choices by the Vietnamese leadership.
There are reasons to believe that the new leadership under Lâm will slow the anti-corruption campaign. Firstly, it has already served its two main political purposes: taking down high-profile malefactors (and political rivals) while raising the legitimacy of the party. Just as importantly, however, the campaign has also been effective in marginalising Lâm’s political rivals. He is now secure in the top job, and their political careers have been destroyed. As a result, a truce has been called in the near-permanent battle at the top of Vietnamese politics. The victors can now claim the spoils. Lâm’s network is in a position to secure the economic benefits of power. Meanwhile, some officials at the Ministry of Public Security might themselves be exposed if a continuing anti-corruption campaign were to probe more deeply.
Another reason to think that the economic winds have changed is the surprising reappearance of the country’s former prime minister, Nguyễn Tấn Dũng. During August 2024, he was photographed at the side of Lâm at two events. This is a remarkable rehabilitation for Dũng, who had virtually disappeared from public life after he lost a monumental political battle with Trọng eight years ago. Dũng’s decade as prime minister, from 2006–16, generated rapid economic growth alongside the growth of a large asset bubble and corruption problem that threatened to undermine the legitimacy of CPV rule. The party was sufficiently concerned to elevate Trọng and rusticate Dũng to his provincial home on anti-corruption grounds. Now, however, he appears to be back. Dũng spent part of his career in the Ministry of Public Security and, according to some speculation, he has been quietly working with Lâm to regain power. If so, his reappearance may indicate that an economic loosening is ahead.
Foreign policy
Internationally, the intentions of the new leadership are harder to read. Their political instincts are likely to lead them closer to their comrades in Beijing and away from Western-style democracies. But they must also take account of other pressures. China’s behaviour, most notably in the South China Sea, has damaged Vietnam’s energy security and undermined the CPV’s popular legitimacy. Moreover, the sheer size of China’s economy and its export strength threaten to turn Vietnam into a captive market. All of this stirs up antipathy towards Beijing among the populace and, to a degree, among the leadership, particularly those in state offices and in the armed forces. While its priority is preserving its own political security, the CPV must also be seen to defend the country’s national security.
"Internationally, the intentions of the new leadership are harder to read. Their political instincts are likely to lead them closer to their comrades in Beijing and away from Western-style democracies."
For the past eight years under Trọng, Vietnam retreated from confrontation with China in the South China Sea. In 2019 and 2020, Chinese pressure caused the Vietnamese government to cancel the development of natural-gas fields off its southeastern coast. Since then, Vietnam has not developed any offshore resources inside China’s claimed ‘nine-dash line’ that encompasses most of the South China Sea. Over the same period, however, Vietnam has reinforced its positions on the small islands and reefs it controls in the southern part of the sea. It appeared that Vietnam had come to a working compromise with China: in exchange for setting aside its sovereign rights to develop offshore oil and gas fields in its claimed exclusive economic zone (a legal regime created by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), China permitted the development of island bases by Vietnam without interference.
The only challenge to this apparent modus vivendi was an agreement between Vietnam and Indonesia, announced in December 2022. After decades of discussion, the countries settled their maritime boundaries. A few days later, an international energy consortium announced plans to develop the gas field located in the ‘Tuna’ natural-gas block in Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and pipe the gas to Vietnam. China protested because the Tuna block lies in an area within China’s nine-dash line. Development of the Tuna block has also been delayed by the involvement of a Russian company, Zarubezhneft, in the consortium, but the British partner, Harbour Energy, says the sale of Zarubezhneft’s stake is well advanced. Meanwhile, China has been continuing to pressure Vietnam to halt its development.
China appears to have miscalculated regarding the importance of the Tuna block to Vietnam. It is becoming a matter of vital energy security. Research by the ratings agency S&P Global, published in September 2024, indicates that Vietnam will likely face a domestic shortage of natural gas for power generation in 2025. Supplies will be one-third less than in 2024. This is a direct result of China’s success in preventing Vietnam from developing offshore gas fields. This will likely contribute to electricity supply shortages in Vietnam in the coming year – and greater reliance on power production via coal – a major handicap for the country’s otherwise booming economy. Inward investment may suffer, along with job creation and economic growth. This has the potential to become a source of popular discontent and is a source of uncertainty for manufacturers considering investing in the country.
In early October 2024, Vietnam’s foreign ministry was unusually outspoken about an incident near the disputed Paracel Islands during which members of the Chinese Maritime Militia attacked a Vietnamese fishing boat and severely beat its crew. The government’s handling of the issue was significantly different to that of the general tenor of media management of South China Sea issues when Trọng was general secretary. It is possible that the Vietnamese leadership felt obliged to make a statement because the Vietnamese media had already begun to cover the story. Nonetheless, the new CPV leadership seems more willing to publicly air its disputes with China than its predecessor.
Outlook
The CPV leadership will take decisions on domestic and foreign policy that best protect the party’s interests. Appointing a general secretary with a background in the security services hardly guarantees party-state stability – the Soviet Union’s elevation of Yuri Andropov in 1982 is an example of this. But the leadership will gain strength from what his often referred to as Vietnam’s ‘bamboo diplomacy’, which retains flexibility in response to external pressure without breaking. Indeed, Vietnam will continue to practise multi-alignment internationally and adhere to the ‘Four No’s’ articulated in its 2019 national-defence white paper (no ‘joining any military alliances, siding with one country against another, giving any other countries permission to set up military bases or use its territory to carry out military activities against other countries nor using force or threatening to use force in international relations’).
"When China’s behaviour poses a threat to the interests of the CPV, most notably in the South China Sea, Vietnam will continue to seek support from powers outside the region to help it resist Chinese pressure."
When China’s behaviour poses a threat to the interests of the CPV, most notably in the South China Sea, Vietnam will continue to seek support from powers outside the region to help it resist Chinese pressure. This instinct gave rise, for example, to Hanoi’s decision under Trọng in September 2023 to upgrade its relations with Washington to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’. In April 2025, coinciding with the 50th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War, Lâm and President Cường must decide if any new deliverables will be added to the agenda for this partnership.
The new CPV leadership has already made several surprising moves. Lâm’s openness on his trip to the US was unexpected, as was the directness of official statements regarding the Paracel Islands fishing incident. The rehabilitation of former prime minister Dũng also suggests that a significant transition has taken place. Yet, given their backgrounds, the new leaders likely think that their most trusted friends are in Beijing and Moscow.
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