Late 1980s, Vietnam, IMF/Paris Club

On Thu, 21 Nov 2002, Jonathan London wrote:

Can some one provide me with some leads on finding a detailed account (in Vietnamese or English) concerning Vietnam's dealings with the IMF in the late 1980s and their precise policy outcomes. In the literature there is commonly vague reference to Nguyen Van Linh's efforts to achieve austerity and the establishment of ties with IMF...followed soon after by the reduced subsidies and the infamous watering down of constitutional provisions for social services.... But these references are almost always too vague to be satisfying... any help would be appreciated

thanks,

Jonathan London

Department of Sociology

University of Wisconsin - Madison

1180 Observatory Drive

Madison WI 53703

TEL (in Madison): 608 260 9473

From: VSG-owner@u.washington.edu [mailto:VSG-owner@u.washington.edu]On

Behalf Of joseph j hannah

Sent: 22. november 2002 19:01

To: Vietnam Studies Group

Subject: Re: Late 1980s, Vietnam, IMF/Paris Club

Jonathan,

I have only two references on the subject, and neither are very detailed. But here they are:

Chapter 8 of Michel Chossudovsky' book, _The Globalization of Poverty: Impacts of the IMF and World Bank Reforms_ is called "The Post-War Economic Destruction of Vietnam" (published by Third World Network, Penang, Malaysia) It lists the negative effects of Doi Moi, including the increase in child malnutrition, concentration of land holding, etc. It is an interesting list (and an important one, given the unchallenged triumphalism surrounding the Doi Moi reforms), but my cursory read did not reveal explicit ties between these policy failures to specific deals with the IMF or World Bank.

(Gabriel Kolko's book _Anatomy of a Peace_ is a similar anti-Doi Moi work, with better references.)

The second article I have is from anti-structural adjustment activists: "Structural Adjustment in the Name of the Poor: The PSRP Experience in the Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam" by Jeninan Malaluan and Shalmali Guttal, in _Focus on the Gloabl South_, January 2002, out of Chulalongkorn University (admin@focusweb.org, www.focusweb.org). This is clearly an activists' document, with a clear "IMF and World Bank as evil empire" slant. But some interesting nuggets in there.

PLEASE if you get references to scholarly articles on this subject, send them my way!

Thank you!

Joe Hannah

Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2002 12:05:17 +0100

From: Pietro P. Masina <pietro@ruc.dk>

Reply-To: vsg@u.washington.edu

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Subject: RE: Late 1980s, Vietnam, IMF/Paris Club

Dear Jonathan,

How big was the direct influence of the IMF in the late 1980s, and particularly in the stabilisation period 1989-1991, still requires more scrutiny. Very important would be a research on role played by Nguyen Xuan Oanh - a former IMF employee, a former prime minister in South Vietnam and an economic advisor to Vo Van Kiet. I paste in the following a brief excerpt from a book I am completing these days and that I hope to publish some time next year.

Best wishes

Pietro

'A certain level of consensus exists among scholars in connecting the positive result of the macroeconomic stabilisation of the late 1980s in Vietnam - contrary to the case of 'big bang' reforms in other 'transition economies' - to a longer-term reform, which started to make 'price matter' already since the late 1970s. This is the view held by Fforde and de Vylder (1996), now largely accepted in the scholarly community (we will return to this soon). More controversial, is the identification of the primum mobile behind the reform package adopted in 1989. In particular, it remains unclear the role played by the IMF and other external actors. A critic of the doi moi process - Gabriel Kolko (1997) - considers that by that time the Vietnamese leadership was strongly influenced by the IMF, whose line was represented in the country by the influential government adviser Nguyen Xuan Oanh. Mr Oanh was a former IMF officer and a former Acting Premier of South Vietnam. At the conclusion of the war, after a brief house arrest, he became an associate of Vo Van Kiet1 and since 1983 a government adviser. Although the IMF did not resume lending to Vietnam until the removal of the American embargo in 1994, contacts were kept between the two sides also through regular IMF staff missions, several of which were conducted in the first half of 1989. However, most scholars seem to exclude the possibility that the IMF played a direct role in influencing Vietnamese decision-making. For instance Riedel and Turley (1999: 22), although maintaining that the policy adopted by Hanoi in 1989 resembled 'pure IMF orthodoxy', stress that the IMF had no material leverage over Vietnamese policy, and that the adoption of the macroeconomic stabilisation was an autonomous decision by the national leadership. The same conclusion is reached by Ronnas and Sjoberg (1991).

These scholars tend to consider the adoption of a bold reform policy as a national decision taken by the Vietnamese leadership in order to cope with a very critical situation.' (From: Pietro P. Masina, Vietnam after the Regional Crisis: an assessment of development strategies.

Pietro P. Masina

Dept. of Social Sciences, Roskilde University

P.O.Box 260 - 4000 Roskilde - Denmark

Tel. +45 4674 2507 - Fax +45 4674 3083

Mobile +45 20219929

Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2002 11:26:18 -0800 (PST)

From: joseph j hannah <jhannah@u.washington.edu>

Reply-To: vsg@u.washington.edu

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Subject: RE: Late 1980s, Vietnam, IMF/Paris Club

Pietro, Jonathan and all,

In his Vietnam chapter in _The Globalization of Poverty_, Chossudovsky cites his own interview with Dr. Oanh in 1994 to claim that in a secret meeting in Paris 1993 (subsequent to the donor conference in November of that year), Hanoi agreed to reimburse the IMF for $140 million owed the IMF by the Saigon regime. This was a condition for future lending by the IMF. Chossudovsky maintains that the US required that these and other "bad debts" incurred by the Saigon regime be paid by Hanoi as a condition of normalized relations with the US, the lack of which was a barrier to IMF lending. According to Chossudovsky (based on his interview with Oanh), Oanh was an important advisor during these negotiations.

What Chossudovsky doesn't mention, as what I only recall but have no documentation for, is that a substantial part of these debts was paid using the assets of the Saigon regime that were frozen in the US at the end of the war.

Pietro -- I am eagerly awaiting your book! Please send out a notice once it is published.

Cheers,

Joe Hannah

Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2002 14:47:28 EST

From: DRA1333@aol.com

Reply-To: vsg@u.washington.edu

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Subject: Re: Late 1980s, Vietnam, IMF/Paris Club

While doi moi economic policies certainly were independent decisions of the national leadership in response to the dreadful state of the economy and the curtailment of Soviet aid in the mid-1980's, I believe you will find that the reforms substantively influenced by outside advice, such as from the World Bank contacts.

D. Avery