Paracel Islands & Vietnam - A Reexamination By Prof. Balazs Szalontai
From: Chung Nguyen
Date: Thu, Mar 26, 2009 at 6:55 AM
Balaz Szalontai has just published a piece on VN's view re: China's capture of the Paracel Islands in 1974 based on Hungary's National Documents Archive, which I think worth reading.
Contrary to the common view that VN essentially accepted China's right over the isalnds, VN actually opposed it, but due to the international security situation at the time, had to hold off any protest until the military situation in the South could be assured.
Im Lang Nhung Khong Dong Tinh
(Silent But Not In Agreement)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/2009/03/090324_paracels_hanoi_reassessment.shtml <http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/2009/03/090324_paracels_hanoi_reassessment.shtml>
Prof. Balaz Szalontai, please correct me if I misstate your view.
C. Nguyen
UMASS Boston
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From: phuxuan700@gmail.com <phuxuan700@gmail.com>
Date: 2009/3/29
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
During the Vietnam War, there were two “factions” within VCP: pro-Beijing and pro-Moscow. One faction prevailed over another at one time or another.
Even though I have not seen the documents in the Hungarian archive that Balazs Szalontai mentioned, I believe that Le Duan or Nguyen Co Thach did voice their protest over the 1974 Paracel (Hoang Sa) incident.
Such protest however represents the winning faction’s view at a certain time, not VCP’s long standing on territorial dispute between Vietnam and China.
Facts have shown that, VCP is not truthful to the Vietnamese people and places the VCP’s interest above national interest while dealing with China.
A side note on Le Duan and Nguyen Co Thach: Le Duan’s view against Beijing can be seen in his rare memoir; one of Beijing’s pre-conditions for normalization with Vietnam in 1991 talks was the removal of Nguyen Co Thach from his minister of foreign affairs post.
Calvin Thai
PS: Photo of Dr. Balazs Szalontai from the interview seems to indicate that despite of our different views, we do share one thing in common: We are both handsome. J)
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From: Balazs Szalontai
Date: 2009/3/31
Dear Calvin,
thanks a lot for your comments! I must admit am inclined to disagree with this neat classification of VWP/VCP leaders into "pro-Soviet" and "pro-Chinese" factions, because this is applicable only to some members of the leadership. For instance, Ung van Khiem became very anti-Chinese by the 1960s, whereas Truong Chinh cautioned his colleagues against a full break with China as late as 1978. In my view, Le Duan was not really pro-Soviet or anti-Chinese by disposition. After all, in 1963 the Soviets regarded him as the head of the pro-Chinese faction, and not without reason.
Still, your remark highlights how deeply Vietnam's division affected the behavior of the two Vietnamese governments. They were so alienated from each other that in a psychological sense, it would have been as impossible for the DRV leaders to side with the RVN government against China as for Thieu to publicly protest against the Christmas bombing (provided that Thieu had wanted to do so). The other half of the nation was regarded as more distant than a non-Vietnamese "ally." This was a real tragedy, and it has not been overcome yet.
Best,
Balazs
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From: Calvin Thai
Date: 2009/3/31
Dear Balazs,
I completely agree with you on the difficulty of faction classification within VCP.
VCP leaders, for various reasons, did switch sides, one more often than another. Tran Quynh, Le Duan’s secretary and Vietnam’s deputy prime minister, wrote in his memoir that Truong Chinh made “180-degree turn” several times between pro-China and pro-Soviet. I would not be surprised if the same thing is said about Le Duan or other VCP leaders somewhere else.
Two main points I would like to raise is despite of some brief, momentary quarrels, in its long history of dealing with China, VCP has not been truthful to the Vietnamese people and VCP has placed the party’s interest above the national interest.
Consequently, VCP has received China’s support at the expense of Vietnam and her people.
During the Vietnam War, relations between China and Vietnam were always described by their leaders as being as close as “lips and teeth”; millions of Vietnamese were led to believe in that.
Then came February 17, 1979 when hundreds of thousands of Chinese troops crossed the border and inflicted heavy damages to Vietnam’s northern provinces. (See “Chinese War Crimes in Vietnam” or “War Crimes of the Pol Pot and Chinese Troops in Vietnam” published in Hanoi in 1979).
In 1979, VCP for the first time made public an official writing on the truth about Vietnamese-Chinese relations in sharp contrast with the image presented to the Vietnamese people by VCP itself in the previous three decades. (See “The Truth about Vietnamo-Chinese Relations over the Past Thirty Years” or “Van de Bien gioi giua Viet Nam va Trung Quoc (Border Issues between Vietnam and China)” also published in Hanoi in 1979).
After the collapse of the Soviet Unions and the Eastern Bloc in the late 1980s, VCP chose to warm up ties with China. Since 1991 talks, relations between the two countries have been described by their leaders as being based on the motto of “16 golden words”.
However, in the IT age, unlike in the 1949-1979 period, VCP does have a problem keeping things well under wrap.
There were many stories told by VCP recently, i.e. Vietnam-China border treaty, Tonkin Gulf agreement, South China Sea negotiations, bauxite mining, etc.
Based on the information readily available, anyone who cares for the truth should be able to poke holes in these stories.
Should anyone who cares for Vietnam and Vietnamese people wait for another official writing from VCP on the truth about Vietnamese-Chinese relations from 1991 on to learn about it when event, if ever, similar to February 17, 1979 occurs?
(See Vo Nguyen Giap’s letter and concerns on bauxite mining from people with different backgrounds or a series of articles on sea border disputes on www.laodong.com.vn, www.vnn.vn, etc.).
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hVlQsSc13N7xFO1GqnGTElMN88VA
http://www.rfa.org/english/news/vietnam/bauxite-03172009152614.html
Last but not the least, thanks for writing.
Peace,
Calvin
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From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Date: 2009/3/31
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear Calvin,
thanks a lot for your comments! It is indeed true that the VWP/VCP leaders preferred to manipulate Vietnamese public opinion in their dealings with China. I wonder how the South Vietnamese government behaved in the early 1970s. How did Thieu and Ky react to the process of Sino-American rapprochement, such as Nixon's trip to China? Did they criticize it openly, or did they find it advisable to keep a low profile? Could the list members say something about that?
Best,
Balazs
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From: phuxuan700@gmail.com <phuxuan700@gmail.com>
Date: 2009/4/2
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear Balazs,
You may want to read “The Palace File” by Nguyen Tien Hung, Nguyen Van Thieu’s close advisor, on Saigon’s reaction to Nixon's China trip in 1972.
I do not expect leaders to express their feelings publicly on a regular basis. That is not what good leadership for.
I however do expect that a government be run on the foundation of accountability and transparency with national interest first and foremost.
Based on available facts, many from Hanoi’s sources themselves, this is not the case involving Vietnam-China relations.
For anyone interested in the subject, please go over books with titles provided early on.
The document “The Truth about Vietnamo-Chinese relations over the past thirty years” from Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in four languages (Vietnamese, English, Spanish and French). I do have all 4 versions in my library to ensure not any part of the truth lost in the translation. :-)
Combining Hanoi sources will materials from China, the West, and historical publications (prior to 1945), we should have a better picture of the whole thing, i.e. getting much closer to the truth.
Best
Calvin Thai