"North/South-firsters"
From: Pierre Asselin
Date: Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 2:41 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear All:
Putting finishing touches on a book and desperately need advice.
In addressing the intra-VWP debate over revolutionary strategy in the South during the late 1950s/early 1960s, some of us have variously used the "North/South-firsters," "hardliners/moderates," and "pro-Chinese/pro-Soviet" binaries.
I'm proposing "militants/pacifists" to identify the Party’s two rival wings because I find those terms more precise. As we now know, those VWP members who endorsed either Chinese or Soviet revolutionary prescriptions were never actually pro-PRC or pro-Soviet Union. "Hardline/moderate," which I've actually used in the past, now seems to me also inappropriate since it suggests moderates were pragmatic, not ideological, which was not the case. Their methods may have been pragmatic, but their ends were always conditioned by ideological considerations. The "North/South-first" pairing, which Hang most recently used in her excellent _Hanoi's War_, might also be problematic since "South-firsters" were not actually South-firsters, but simply wanted Hanoi to invest as much resources in "liberating" the South as it was in reinventing the North. The fact that "South-firsters" don't abandon the socialist project in the North after they take over VWP decision-making in 1963-64 is evidence of that.
While most will not disagree with my use of the term "militants" in reference to the Le Duan-types, you might object to my use of "pacifists." But I like the term because it captures that ruling faction's stubborn refusal to resume armed struggle after 1954, and its endorsement of peaceful coexistence as a viable policy for Vietnam in the decade or so after the Geneva accords. Pacifists in charge of VWP decision-making did sanction limited armed struggle in the South after 1959, but that was only reluctantly, because they were forced by circumstances to do so (as I understand things).
Any thoughts on this matter? Are there good reasons why I should not use "militants/pacifists"? Any input is appreciated.
And please, don't write to say the binary is too simplistic; it certainly is, but until we find out more from the Vietnamese archives about exactly what was going on internally, it is remains both sensible and necessary.
Aloha & thanks,
Pierre
Pierre Asselin
Associate Professor of History
Hawai'i Pacific University
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From: Tai, Hue-Tam <hhtai@fas.harvard.edu>
Date: Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 2:59 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear Pierre
Like you I am uncomfortable with the various terms currently used to describe different groups and individuals within the North Vietnamese leadership.
I, too, am unsure about the appropriateness of "South firsters" to describe those who wanted to devote more resources to unification than those who wanted to focus them on building Socialism in the North. For either group, it seems to me, it was a matter of timing rather than commitment or fundamental difference in ideology.
But I do not care for the term "pacifist" either. For all, the goal was victory in the Struggle to Win the War and Restore Peace. For some, this goal could be achieved solely by military means and large scale warfare at that (Hang argues that this was Le Duan's line until after the Easter Offensive). For others, it was through protracted guerrilla warfare and negotiations.
Pacifism, especially in South Vietnam, had a totally different connotation. I was thinking of hawks and doves but unfortunately, they convey the same meaning as militant and pacifist.
Maybe others will be able to come up with better language?
Hue Tam Ho Tai
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From: William Turley <wturley@siu.edu>
Date: Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 3:43 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
My problem with the binaries so far advanced is their static character. People are assumed to hold fixed positions for unknowable reasons, when such evidence as we have strongly suggests that over time people shifted positions, alliances changed, views evolved. Politics in the binary world is presented as a factional struggle whose contours never change rather than the fluid process we know it to have been.
How about "risk-averse" / "risk-acceptant"? The risk-averse were those who assigned greater weight than did the risk-acceptant to the potential consequences of alienating great power allies (whether China, the Soviet Union, or both), the physical costs and possibility of defeat if the US were to intervene, and the deferral of socialist development in the North if war in the South resumed. Different calculations of risk produced a clearer cleavage than ideological proclivities, regional origins, affinities with Moscow or Beijing, militant or pacifistic tendencies, though such things were not absent from shaping individual assessments of the costs and benefits of strategic options. And of course alignments and choices changed as calculations of risk changed. In this, party leaders and members were like any other group of decision makers operating under circumstances of great uncertainty about the outcomes of the strategic choices before them.
Bill Turley
William S. Turley
Chemin de Coste Longue
Quartier Notre Dame
Lançon-de-Provence, France 13680
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From: Mark Sidel <sidel@wisc.edu>
Date: Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 6:02 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Three questions that may be very hard to answer but might add some data/perspectives on Pierre's interesting question:
(1) What did these people/groupings call themselves at the times in question?
(2) And what did intellectuals in Hanoi call them, at the time?
(3) And what did some knowledgeable outsiders (ie some Russians, Chinese, Hungarians, others) call these persons/groupings, again at the times in question, if anything?
Mark Sidel
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From: Vuong Vu-Duc <vuduc.vuong@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 7:16 PM
To: sidel@wisc.edu, Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Pierre and Hang raised interesting questions, but mostly from the perspective of the internal struggle of the NVN (VWP) leadership.
Another dimension to understand this period, and the decisions reached by the North, must have to consider the actions and policies of Ngo Dinh Diem and the U.S. advisers.
After 1954, the North left behind in the South a fairly large number of cadres, at first as the foundation to organize for the pending election in 1956. There also existed already many parallel forces in the South: Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Binh Xuyen, etc... and the survivors of older political parties that migrated South like VNQDD or Dai Viet...
What Diem, with the full support of the U.S., did in the late 50's was not only to overthrow Bao Dai, abrogate the 1956 election, but also to deliberately, systematically decimate these forces that he could not control. Many of the Communist cadres and sympathizers were killed or imprisoned during this period, leading the Politburo to decide in 1959 (at the 15th Party Convention) to recapture the South.
There was no doubt that Le Duan and his faction were influential in swaying the policy of NVN, but perhaps even more persuasive were the missed election of 1956 (that HCM had counted on as a more pacifist, and democratic, means to reunite the country) and the real threat of losing most of their cadres in the early years of the Diem regime.
Vu-Duc Vuong
AMERICAN STUDIES CENTER
Ha Noi and San Francisco
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From: Pierre Asselin <passelin@hpu.edu>
Date: Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 8:02 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Bill, Hue-Tam, Kyle: thanks for your very thoughtful responses
Mark, in answer to your questions
(1) What did these people/groupings call themselves at the times in question? Pacifist/moderates called the other guys "leftist deviationists" or "dogmatists," militants called the moderates "rightists" or "revisionists." But in the interest of party unity they never publicly or directly attacked each other using these labels. Their attacks were indirect. To illustrate, militants typically attacked moderates/pacifists in the VWP by denouncing Tito and unnamed other communists.
(2) And what did intellectuals in Hanoi call them, at the time?: No idea, but I would be very curious to know.
(3) And what did some knowledgeable outsiders (ie some Russians, Chinese, Hungarians, others) call these persons/groupings, again at the times in question, if anything?: Foreigners tended to look at the groups as pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet. I'm sure our Hungarian friend who contributes to this list in invariably invaluable ways will tell us more about the labels in the communist camp. Having worked with British, French, and Canadian materials (those countries each had a diplomatic mission in the North at the time), I can tell you that for these guys it was all related to the Sino-Soviet split, and factions were therefore pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet, though such terms as "extremists" and "peace-faction" sometimes figure in their reports.
Bill, you might be spot on with "risk-averse" / "risk-acceptant." Problem is, these labels are rather "clunky." But in terms of accurancy, I think they're better than anything we've proposed so far.
Best,
Pierre
Pierre Asselin
Associate Professor of History
Hawai'i Pacific University
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From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Date: Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 8:14 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear Pierre,
I think that "pacifist" would be a somewhat inappropriate term for persons who opposed a premature resumption of armed struggle in the South but had actively participated in the Viet Minh's long guerrilla struggle against the French. I would rather use the terms "risk-takers" and "risk-avoiders" (or some similar words) to define the difference. In 1954 and early 1955, the policy of peaceful unification was based on the realistic assumption that the elections would be held and the party would probably win if it acted tactfully and wisely. >From mid-1955 on, the likelihood of peaceful co-existence with Diem was going downhill at an accelerating pace. In mid-1955, the leadership, after much debate, still opted for a compromise solution, that is, limited unification with the preservation of both governments and armies. It soon became clear that Diem was utterly uninterested even in such a limited option. After that, I doubt if anyone in the VWP leadership seriously believed in the possibility of peaceful co-existence with the My-Diem clique. Thus the main question was whether Hanoi should take the risk of launching armed struggle in the South in a period when (1) the situation in the North was still far less than satisfactory, and (2) the socialist countries (particularly the Soviet Union) could not be expected to actively support it. Le Duan and his group obviously were of the opinion that it should; others had their doubts. By 1961, Chinese support was finally in the pipeline, but this incurred another risk that HCM and Ung Van Khiem was most unwilling to take, i.e., of alienating the Soviet Union. By 1963, Le Duan came to the conclusion that Hanoi could take that risk, too; Khiem disagreed, and was replaced as a result.
Another possible way to define the differences with the VWP leadership is to identify the following two groups: the patriotic forces (confined to Hoang Van Hoan) and the country-selling pro-Soviet revisionists (the rest). The merit of this classification system is that it is very useful to unmask pro-Soviet revisionists in the field of Vietnamese studies. Anyone unwilling to accept it automatically declares himself/herself a pro-Soviet revisionist.:)
Cheers,
Balazs
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From: Tai, Hue-Tam <hhtai@fas.harvard.edu>
Date: Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 8:32 PM
To: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>, Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
I like the distinction between risk-takers and risk-avoiders (which is marginally less clunky than Bill Turley's formulation. It works better than South-firster). But it would be helpful to specify what risk where people willing to take or wanted to avoid. Was their stance based on calculation of the likelihood of a military victory? fears of alienating this or that ally? concerns over diverting resources from the North?
For instance, the Southern-born Ung van Khiem could be described as committed to reunification, moderate in terms of implementing socialism in the North, concerned about alienating the Soviet Union and cautious when it came to military strategy. Which of these factors predominated in his decions is hard to fathom.
Hue-Tam Ho Tai
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From: Liam Kelley <liam@hawaii.edu>
Date: Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 9:48 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear List,
Finding a term that adequately characterizes a group is important, but in doing so I think we also have to be careful not to use terms that perhaps unintentionally glorify one group over another.
Risk-takers and risk-avoiders might have descriptive value, but isn't it difficult to hear those terms and not identify with the risk-takers?
I'm not entirely happy with this pairing, but "activists" (Le Duan et al.) and "pragmatists" might work. Those two terms do not seem as opposed to me as risk-takers and risk-avoiders. Pragmatism is often the much wiser and more successful course, and activism does perhaps entail more overt risk-taking. . .
Just a thought.
Liam Kelley
University of Hawaii
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From: vu tuong <vhtuong@yahoo.com>
Date: Fri, Aug 17, 2012 at 11:45 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear Pierre,
To answer your question I think we might want to put the war in the context of two other key issues facing the DRV leaders at the time: a strategy for economic development in the North and foreign relations with their big brothers. The focus of debate on those two issues changed over time in complex ways from 1956 to 1963 and beyond.
In 1956, after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, problems with the land reform, the NVGP affair, the inflation and shortage of 1956, and Le Duan’s report from the South seemed to preoccupy the DRV leadership at the 10thPlenum. There seemed to be little disagreement within the Vietnamese Politburo over issues raised in Khrushchev’s speech. Le Duan’s report (he was not present) received positive comments from the Central Committee. We know how they decided to handle the land reform (rectification) and NVGP (crackdown).
By 1958-1959, it was collectivization, “capitalist reform,” and revolution in the South. These issues were related because some in the leadership (not clear who) feared that collectivization and capitalist expropriation would alienate Southern landlords and capitalists, while those who supported those policies argued that they would strengthen the North which would in any case form the rear base for the revolution in the South. The sources show clearly that Le Duan (“South-firster” and after 1960 a “dogmatist”), Truong Chinh (“North-firster” and not a committed “dogmatist” until mid-1963), Bui Cong Trung (later to be labeled a “revisionist”) and perhaps the majority of the Central Committee supported collectivization and capitalist expropriation. Ho Chi Minh (“pacifist”) was a likely supporter as well, evidenced in his various tracts on the topic of collectivization. On the revolution in the South, we know Le Duan, Le Duc Tho, Pham Hung (“South-firsters”), etc. supported revolution. It is unclear who was against revolution at this point. Perhaps none was; only cautious voices about the ramifications of such a revolution. The decision adopted (political struggle and armed struggle just for self-defense) reflected this balance.
By 1960-63 and later, the revisionist-dogmatist debate took the front seat, together with serious economic problems (poor harvests, low procurement, exhaustion of foreign aid, rising foreign loans). 1960 was the year when Sino-Soviet conflict went public. There were three interrelated debates. First, on foreign policy, the debate now pitted Bui Cong Trung, Duong Bach Mai, Hoang Minh Chinh, etc. (“revisionists”) against Le Duan and his “militant” or “dogmatist” faction. Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap appeared to be sympathetic with the former faction (no hard evidence exists to my knowledge). The “revisionists” wanted the DRV to follow the Soviet bloc (or at least the majority in the bloc) in its peaceful coexistence and economic competition with the imperialist camp. The dogmatists equated such a policy with surrendering to imperialists. While denouncing Khrushchev, they argued that loyalty to the entire revolutionary camp (not loyalty to the Soviet Union) was “the litmus test of a communist.” Interestingly, they also accepted the Soviet Union’s place to be at the center of the camp (i.e. they rejected China’s effort to displace the Soviet Union); this was to protect the camp from disintegration. Some documents published in 1963-1964 showed their wish that “the traitor Khrushchev” would be overthrown and the Soviet Union would return to the “right” path (their first wish would be granted but not the second).
The second debate was on economic strategy. Here “revisionists” supported the DRV taking full advantage of its tropical climate to participate in trade with the Soviet bloc and developing its economy through trade. They also supported giving peasants and workers more financial incentives to boost production (note that revisionists did not leave behind much writing, but their position can be crudely reconstructed from the criticisms of the “dogmatists”). The “dogmatists” ridiculed the “revisionists” for lacking independent spirit and predicted that their strategy would turn the DRV into a banana republic. They argued instead for autarky--basically a Maoist-like strategy relying on human will and manual labor. They also called for strengthening the “dictatorship of the proletariat” (code word for harsher oppression of dissent, more systematic indoctrination and stricter discipline).
The third debate was on revolution in the South. Here again no figure emerged clearly (or no documents available that pointed to them) as opponents to revolution; only some unnamed “risk-avoiders”. But we can guess who they probably were. Because “revisionists” were ideologically close to Soviet leaders and wanted close cooperation with the Soviet bloc through trade, they must have been cautious about waging revolution. “Revisionists” or suspected ones would later be arrested in 1967 if not earlier, revealing to us who they were.
Now, on the naming question: I have struggled with this issue in my own work, and I would propose using different terms for different debates at different times. For 1958-59, I would use “militant” vs. “cautious” (leaders). After 1960, “revisionists” and “dogmatists” (in quotation marks) would seem fine as those Vietnamese leaders aligned closely with the international debate between Khrushchev and Mao. Alternatives (which I will probably use in my book) are “militant internationalists” vs. “pacifist internationalists” (or moderate internationalists or even Soviet loyalists).
Best,
Tuong Vu
University of Oregon
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From: Shawn McHale <mchale@gwu.edu>
Date: Sat, Aug 18, 2012 at 7:38 AM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Pierre,
If you use the term "pacifist," you will just create new problems. After all, to equate the beliefs of the leaders of the DRV at that time with those of someone (like my wife) who is a Quaker pacifist seems a giant stretch.
Shawn McHale
--
Shawn McHale
Associate Professor of History
George Washington University
Washington, DC 20052 USA
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From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Date: Sat, Aug 18, 2012 at 7:50 AM
To: "mchale@gwu.edu" <mchale@gwu.edu>, Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Agreed. If there is a guy n da hood whom I'd really love to punch in the snout but I temporarily refrain from doing so because he happens to have a big bully of a brother, I am not necessarily a pacifist.:)
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From: Edward G. Miller <Edward.G.Miller@dartmouth.edu>
Date: Sat, Aug 18, 2012 at 8:29 AM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear Pierre:
Thanks for raising this very interesting topic of discussion. I fully share the reservations that have been raised by several others about the utility of “pacifists.” But I am also skeptical of the “risk averse”/”risk acceptant” alternative. As Bill Turley persuasively argues, any set of binary labels is going to be problematic, because the political situation in Hanoi and inside the VWP leadership was highly fluid, as individual and factional alignments and alliances were constantly in flux. (Tuong Vu’s insightful post confirms this in spades.) Moreover, is it really the case that one group or leader was actually more “risk acceptant” than another? It seems pretty obvious that all VWP leaders in this period believed that the party and the DRV state faced multiple risks, and that they all more or less agreed on what the risks were. The disagreements had to do with how to manage those risks, and especially which risks were most pressing. On the one hand, there was the risk that Diem would wipe out the party in the south and that the chances for national reunification under the party’s aegis would slip away. But any effort to address this risk increased the danger that the recent progress made in the north (or at least the opportunity for new progress) would be squandered. So it does not seem to me that those VWP leaders who favored a go-slow approach on reunification/armed struggle were more risk averse than Le Duan. Rather, they evaluated the array of risks differently, and accepted higher risks in one area in order to reduce risk in another.
This leads me to ask: why do you even need to apply a single set of labels across the entire period that you are studying? It seems to be that one of the great contributions of your forthcoming book is to track the complex twists and turns of VWP politics over time, even as you are also connecting these politics to various “external” developments. (Here I have the advantage of a sneak peek at Pierre’s manuscript, which is excellent!) Given your very textured attention to detail, can’t you just dispense with the labels, and simply describe the shifting array of arguments, policies, and alignments as they unfolded over time? In certain places in the text, this might require you to use the names of particular leaders a bit more frequently, just to be clear about who stood on a given issue at a given moment. But I don’t see this as being a problem—in fact, I think it would make for a clear point of advantage compared with much of the older scholarship on this subject.
Ed Miller
Dartmouth College
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From: Tai, Hue-Tam <hhtai@fas.harvard.edu>
Date: Sat, Aug 18, 2012 at 9:09 AM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Ed brings up a good point, which has also been made by others.
Labels not only mask change over time, they also apply to widely different policy areas. It is quite
conceivable that someone with a radical agenda for transforming northern societ might want to
proceed cautiously in the South, for instance.
I have not had the opportunity to read Pierre's manuscript, so my comments are based on
my just completed reading of the book by Lien Hang.
The main area of difference, it seems to me, was not between the ideologues and the so-called
pragmatists or moderates, or between the north and south firsters but was about strategy.
Le Duan, Le Duc Tho and their allies favored large scale warfare (involving General Offensive
General Uprising) while others favored guerrilla warfare. Which strategy was the more cautious
depends on one's calculus of success and risk.While guerrilla warfare inolved fewer resources,
it also ran the risk of wiping out the southern insurgency and/or allowing to develop outside of
Hanoi's control.While other leaders assessments of risks and opportunities may have altered
over time, Lien Hang suggests that Le Duan hung on to the GO-GU strategy until well after
the Easter Offensive.
If this reading of the major area of difference is correct, it would be helpful to devise terminology
that reflects disagreement over strategy rather than ideology, commitment to reunification,
regional priorities or even personaltraits (such as moderate, cautious, risk averse). It would make it
possible to track changes of opinions by different actors.
If we cannot come up with appropriate labels, perhaps the lesson to be drawn is to not use any.
Hue Tam
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From: William Turley <wturley@siu.edu>
Date: Sat, Aug 18, 2012 at 4:01 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
I find myself very much in sympathy with comments by Ed, Hue Tam and Tuong Vu. As for my suggestion of the terms "risk-averse / risk-acceptant," I should make clear that I stole these from prospect theory and behavioral economics (see esp. Tversky and Kahneman). One probably should not use these concepts outside an explicit use of those approaches, and so I have no objections to the search for less clunky terms to use as labels, insofar as it is labels one seeks. But the more important point is that labeling should be a secondary concern. If labels must be used -- and we all use them as shorthand, don't we? -- it would be better if they directed attention toward process (mental or otherwise) rather than groups. Hence the attraction of the concept of risk. That said, dispensing with labels altogether in favor of "textured" (dare I say "thick?") description, as Ed suggests, is one way ahead, and not only for Pierre. A good idea, I would say. That will still leave the challenge of explaining in a systematic way how attitudes to risk shaped individual positions regarding policy options, and how these were aggregated into actual decisions.
Bill Turley
Emeritus, Southern Illinois University
William S. Turley
Chemin de Coste Longue
Quartier Notre Dame
Lançon-de-Provence, France 13680
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From: Pierre Asselin <passelin@hpu.edu>
Date: Sun, Aug 19, 2012 at 6:54 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
dear all:
balazs/shawn: yours is a valid point, but what if one commits to changing their ways, to renounce violence? looking and ho and other "pacifists," it seems to me that they're not simply moderating their views after 1954, but they're actually opting to disavow war as a revolutionary instrument, at least for a period. if we consider the course of events in vietnam, despite all that happens in the south, the VWP/DRVN never sanctioned war as long as they were in command, that is, until 1963-64. admittedly, they authorized insurgent activity in 1959 but, i believe, only because they were pressed into doing so by militants within the party. that might not make them pacifists in the way we understand the term in this country, but then what should we call them? in the american context, so-called "doves" were not entirely opposed to the use of forces in vietnam. i guess what i'm asking is, is there a word one can use in reference to those who renounce war, but not other, "lower" forms of violence?
hue-tam, bill, ed: i would argue that there was an important ideological divide between militants and pacifists: the former suscribed to chinese revolutionary theses on revolution, while the latter followed soviet prescriptions post-stalin (i.e., peaceful coexistence, renunciation of war). they sought to achieve the same aims -- reunification under communist aegis -- but could not agree on the best means for realizing those aims. the militants line was clearly bolder than the pacifist line since it risked compromising relations with moscow, which remained strongly opposed to resumption of war in vietnam, and, more problematically, was likely to precipitate direct US intervention. in retrospect, the pacifists managed to keep the americans at bay, to avoid war with them; the militants were not.
ed: thanks for the kind words about my ms; they're much appreciated. as right as you are about the pitfalls of using a binary, i maintain that it helps trace the evolution of the debate. we all know that the hawk/dove dichotomy in the american context is not accurate, but it helps us frame the debate that was going on over the war in vietnam in the united states. at a minimum, and for the time being at least, the militant/pacifist binary can help non-experts get a better sense of what was happening within the communist movement in vietnam during the war, while making clear that that movement was in no way monolithic, as many who teach the vietnam war in the united states tend to presume about "the other side."
and i'm gald we're addressing these issues now. i'm currently reading ed's ms, and i can tell you it's going to make a gigantic splash when it comes out, on this list and elsewhere.
best,
pierre
Pierre Asselin
Associate Professor of History
Hawai'i Pacific University
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From: Tai, Hue-Tam <hhtai@fas.harvard.edu>
Date: Sun, Aug 19, 2012 at 7:19 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Pierre
I am enjoying this discussion!
I do agree with Shawn about "pacifist" For Americans, it conjures conscientious objectors and Quakers. For southerners like myself, it conjures people who advocated peace (and not negotiating while fighting).
I am still ambivalent about describing disagreement over strategy as "ideological" one might argue that certain individuals advocated reliance on protracted, limited, guerrilla warfare relying mostly on southern elements and local resources because they were committed to a more radical restructuring of northern society than others (they could thus be considered as more "ideological"). Nor do I see any of the northern leaders embracing a long term division of the country (but there were plenty of South Vietnamese who were in no hurry for reunification. So I am not sure that "peaceful coexistence" was something they considered. Disagreeing over strategy and timing seems to me fundamentally different from disagreeing over ideology and vision. But perhaps we mean totally different things.
One of the insights I gained from reading Lien Hang's book was the connection between Le Duan's all-out strategy and the creation of a police state, In many other studies, northern repression is linked to the implementation of socialism rather than the prosecution of the war.
And I can better understand comments made by Hanoi acquaintances about Le Duan.
Hue-Tam
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From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Date: Sun, Aug 19, 2012 at 10:08 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear Pierre,
I must say I doubt if HCM or even Khiem disavowed war as a revolutionary instrument after 1954. The VWP leadership's stance on Laos in 1955-56 clearly reveals how Hanoi defined the conditions under which violence should or should not be used. At that time, North Vietnam gave the following guidance to the Pathet Lao: (1) do not attack Katay & Co. unless they attack first; (2) if they try to intrude into the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua (which had common borders with the DRV and China), fight back; and (3) do not start fighting in southern Laos, even though the revolutionary movement had a much wider mass support there than in the two northeastern provinces. This was a cautious and moderate stance indeed, but it was too much influenced by the principles of spheres of interest and Realpolitik to call it pacifist.
Cheers,
Balazs
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From: Martin Großheim <Martin.Grossheim@uni-passau.de>
Date: Mon, Aug 20, 2012 at 2:57 AM
To: vsg@u.washington.edu
Dear all:
I think Tuong Vu has presented a good analysis of the issues involved in the debate between "revisionists" and the "militant" faction. A few additional remarks on the sources.
1. It is true "that revisionists did not leave behind much writing", so we have to rely on a close reading of periodicals such as "Hoc Tap" etc.
2. A few persons who were involved in the "campaign against modern revisionism" in 1964 and/or the "vu an xet lai chong Dang" in 1967 have written memoirs. The most important are:
Tran Thu (1996). Tu tu xu ly noi bo, Westminster, Cal.: Van Nghe.
Vu Thu Hien (1997). Dem giua ban ngay: Hoi ky chinh tri cua mot nguoi khong lam chinh tri, Westminster, Cal.: Van Nghe.
3. Some members of the "revisionist" faction such as Duong Bach Mai had quite close contacts with socialist embassies and news agencies in Hanoi. Therefore, there is a lot of interesting information in reports of the GDR embassy (see my article "Revisionism in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: New Evidence from the East German Archives", in Cold War History, Vol. 5, No. 4, Nov. 2005: 451-477) or the Soviet embassy (see Mari Olsen (2006). Soviet-Vietnam Relations and the Role of China. Changing Alliances, London and New York: Routledge).
Anything from "your embassy", Balazs?
4. There is an interesting discussion of some of the issues of our debate in Russell Heng's unpublished Ph.D. diss.:
Heng, Russell Hiang-Khng (1999). "Of the State, For the State, Yet Against the State: The Struggle Paradigm in Vietnam's Media Politics.", Ph.D. diss., Australian National University.
Best,
Martin
PD Dr. Martin Grossheim
Dept. of Southeast Asian Studies
University of Passau
Innstrasse 41
94032 Passau
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From: Tuan Hoang <tuannyriver@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 7:36 AM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
From a teaching point of view, labels are useful to have, at least as starting points. This discussion has focused on labels as end products rather than starting points. But perhaps it should be the other way around. Labels are helpful for students. They are helpful for lecturers, as long as they are accompanied by clarifications and detailed explanations. Researchers write primarily for other researchers, and rightly right to keep in mind the limits and problems of labels: reductionism, simplistic binaries, etc. But having an eye towards the classroom may help us appreciate labels a bit more.
What counts most, ultimately, isn't labels but the details. When a historian has a substantial body of details to show, the question of labels may likely become moot. In The Global Cold War, Odd Arne Westad wants to come up with a new term for the noncommunist and anticommunist nationalists. He ends up labeling them "nativists" rather than "nationalists" - an implicit acknowledgement that communists could be nationalists too. This new label has never caught on, probably with good reasons. Yet the book remains magisterial and influential because of the fine details and strong arguments it offers. Pierre will have to make choices on labels and explain for them. But it's going to be the rest of the book that counts. Just my two cents...
Cheers,
Tuan Hoang
Adjunct Lecturer
Department of History
CSUSB-PDC
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From: Pierre Asselin <passelin@hpu.edu>
Date: Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 3:14 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
dear all:
what are your thoughts on the term "temporizers" as a substitute for pacifists, moderates, risk-avoiders, etc? shawn, balazs, and others who have contributed to this discussion have almost convinced me that "pacifists" might be inappropriate. as bill pointed out, that wing of the party was clearly more risk-averse. but arguably what really set them apart from their militant, hardline counterparts was their apparent willingness to exercise patience vis-a-vis the south, to give peace a very long chance, to wait on events below the seventeenth parallel and elsewhere before making high-risk decisions (e.g., resolution 15). militants, on the other hand, seemed intent on achieving reunification expeditiously, and for that reason favored armed struggle/war irrespective of debilitating short- or long-term consequences.
by the way, i have to submit my ms on tuesday....
aloha,
pierre
Pierre Asselin
Associate Professor of History
Hawai'i Pacific University
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From: Tai, Hue-Tam <hhtai@fas.harvard.edu>
Date: Tue, Aug 21, 2012 at 3:29 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
"Temporizers" sounds better to me than the alternatives listed.
I would argue, though, that most of the temporizers favored one form of armed struggle over another, to wit protracted guerrilla warfare over all-out large scale military confrontations (what Lien Hang terms GO-GU),
It's a bit like deciding whether to gamble a small amount, perhaps repeatedly (" have a flutter") or risk all of your savings in one fell swoop in the hope of getting huge returns as opposed to deciding whether to gamble high or not gamble at all.
I have not heard of any northern leaders who considered a permanent division of the country. Their support of guerrilla warfare was a fairly low cost way of keeping control of the southern insurgency and thus avoiding the risk of long term, if not permanent division. Southerners in The Hanoi leadership cannot have forgotten French attempts to stoke southern separatist feelings in the late 1940s ("Nam Ky Quac").
Hue-Tam Ho tai
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From: David Marr <david.marr@anu.edu.au>
Date: Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 5:18 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
I'm coming late to this very interesting exchange, due to book copyediting. One important ingredient seems to have been left out: the Army. One can't just assume that the generals and colonels waited for orders from the Politburo. The General Staff would have game-planned every scenario, with vigorous internal debate. From the late 1940s there were two tracks for promotion in the army: commisariate or combat command. Not surprisingly, they did not always see eye-to-eye. All the policy options mooted so far in our discussion would have been argued out within the military, but what do we know about the individuals and groups involved? Up until 1954 Hoang Van Thai plays a key role, but I'm not sure how influential he was after that.
David Marr
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From: William Turley <wturley@siu.edu>
Date: Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 12:18 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
I second David's comment. Years ago in writing about the military I noticed what appeared to be doctrinal, experiential, organizational and idiosyncratic differences within this institution, but without access to individuals and better documentary sources it was impossible to be very precise about them. I can tell you that there never was a unified military point of view, and that Hoang Van Thai played a key role in the second war as well as the first, but identifying other "individuals and groups involved" would be a tricky thing even with better sources because of lessons learned and generational succession. A snapshot of alignments at T1 is one thing, tracking alignments over time is quite another. But if I were going back to this project now -- thank god I don't have to -- I'd try to organize it around a universal trait…..like risk-taking propensities.
Bill Turley
William S. Turley
Chemin de Coste Longue
Quartier Notre Dame
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From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Date: Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 10:28 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear Pierre,
I do think that "temporizer" would be a better term than "pacifist". Still, I am somewhat afraid that in English, it has possible negative implications that you would not intend to suggest. See this description from a certain bourgeois playwright (which Le Duan would have heartily applied to Khiem):
LEONTES
It is; you lie, you lie:
I say thou liest, Camillo, and I hate thee,
Pronounce thee a gross lout, a mindless slave,
Or else a hovering temporizer, that
Canst with thine eyes at once see good and evil,
Inclining to them both: were my wife's liver
Infected as her life, she would not live
The running of one glass.
"Winter's Tale", Act 1, Scene 2