Dep doi, Tot dao

Dep doi, tot dao – Religious cleavages in Vietnam

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From: Ann Marie Leshkowich

Date: Wed, May 4, 2011 at 7:29 AM

To: vsg@u.washington.edu

Dear colleagues,

I'm writing with a question about a phrase, "Ð?p d?i, t?t d?o" that is used to summarize a key aspect of the party and state's contemporary policy toward religion. It's cited several times by Ð?ng Nghiêm V?n, who explains it as follows: "'Ð?p d?i, t?t d?o,' t?c là làm sao cho b?n thân tôn giáo du?c trong sáng, cung nhu có ích cho T? qu?c, cho dân t?c, cho qu?n chúng tín d?, phù h?p v?i Hi?n Pháp, pháp lu?t” (p.347, Lý Lu?n v? Tôn Giáo và Tình Hình Tôn Giáo ? Vi?t Nam, 2001). [Without diacritics, it's "'Dep doi, tot dao,' tuc la lam sao cho ban than ton giao duoc trong sang, cung nhu co ich cho To quoc, cho dan toc, cho quan chung tin do, phu hop voi Hien Phap, phap luat."]

In the press, the phrase is sometimes rendered as "(s?ng) t?t d?i, d?p d?o." I've found it to be used primarily in profiles praising groups, often Catholic or non-Kinh, who are said to exemplify this ideal.

These instances suggest the phrase to indicate the kind of state functionalist approach toward religion that Shaun Malarney describes. The phrase seems to start to appear in official statements and newspapers in the 1990s, simultaneous with shifts in policies toward religion. I wonder, however, if there's a longer history to this phrase that might also include different versions or interpretations of what it might mean to be d?p d?i or t?t d?o, and how these two domains relate to each other. Finally, given that the phrase is currently a slogan, I'm wondering if there's been a mobilization campaign or official designating of entities meeting certain criteria, as there has been for, say, gia dình/khu ph? van hóa.

As the topic of party and religion can provoke heated debate, please bear in mind that my goal here is simply to learn more about the history of the phrase so as to contextualize its use in official policy. I greatly appreciate your help.

Best wishes,

Ann Marie Leshkowich

Associate Professor of Anthropology

College of the Holy Cross

Worcester, MA 01610 USA

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From: Kim Ngoc Minh :)

Date: Wed, May 4, 2011 at 9:19 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Hi Prof.Ann,

In Vietnam, we often use "T?t d?i d?p d?o" rather than "Ð?p d?i t?t d?o". (You can check and compare results in quote mark of both phrases on www.google.com.vn)

There is an official campaign which has been running by The committee for solidarity of Vietnamese Catholics (website: http://ubdkcgvn.org.vn) since 1999. It could be translated as "The movement of solidarity to create a new (cultural) lifestyle in residential areas while harmonizing the secular lives with the practice of faith." ( or "a good secular and religious life")

(Source: B?t d?u t? nam 1999, phong trào “Toàn dân doàn k?t xây d?ng d?i s?ng van hóa ? khu dân cu, s?ng t?t d?i d?p d?o” do ?y ban Ðoàn k?t Công giáo Vi?t Nam phát d?ng dã dem l?i l?i ích thi?t th?c cho d?ng bào Công giáo. ( http://www.congan.com.vn/?mod=detnews&catid=681&p=&id=176556 ) )

That decree should be here but it is now invisible: http://ubdkcgvn.org.vn/modules.php?name=News&op=viewst&sid=189 (technical problem, I think)

You can see more results of this campaign on Google (in Vietnamese): http://www.google.com.vn/#hl=vi&source=hp&biw=1366&bih=624&q=%22To%C3%A0n+d%C3%A2n+%C4%91o%C3%A0n+k%E1%BA%BFt+x%C3%A2y+d%E1%BB%B1ng+%C4%91%E1%BB%9Di+s%E1%BB%91ng+v%C4%83n+h%C3%B3a+%E1%BB%9F+khu+d%C3%A2n+c%C6%B0+s%E1%BB%91ng+t%E1%BB%91t+%C4%91%E1%BB%9Di+%C4%91%E1%BA%B9p+%C4%91%E1%BA%A1o%22&btnG=T%C3%ACm+v%E1%BB%9Bi+Google&oq=%22To%C3%A0n+d%C3%A2n+%C4%91o%C3%A0n+k%E1%BA%BFt+x%C3%A2y+d%E1%BB%B1ng+%C4%91%E1%BB%9Di+s%E1%BB%91ng+v%C4%83n+h%C3%B3a+%E1%BB%9F+khu+d%C3%A2n+c%C6%B0+s%E1%BB%91ng+t%E1%BB%91t+%C4%91%E1%BB%9Di+%C4%91%E1%BA%B9p+%C4%91%E1%BA%A1o%22&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&gs_sm=s&gs_upl=2764l2764l0l1l1l0l0l0l0l175l175l0.1&fp=1&cad=b

Regards,

Minh Kim.

--

Minh Kim

Postgraduate Student

Gifted Education

University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia.

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From: David Payne

Date: Wed, May 4, 2011 at 10:46 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

By chance I was talking with some Vietnamese colleagues just last

week--none of whom would have a religious affiliation indicated on

their identity card--who referred to "T?t d?i d?p d?o". They were

asking if I could explain for them the origins of the phrase, which

they assumed was a Christian principle coming from outside Vietnam. My

response was that it did not match any particular Bible saying or

specific theological/spiritual movement I was aware of outside

Vietnam, and that my guess would be that it came from the official

campaign in Vietnam to promote solidarity of Christian congregations

with the overall task of nation building as promoted by the Party, the

Fatherland Front, etc.

This guess seems to be confirmed by the posts below. Just for personal

curiosity I'd also be interested in any further information on the

origins and application of the phrase.

Best,

David Payne

Hanoi

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From: David Marr

Date: Wed, May 4, 2011 at 6:21 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

When I saw the phrase `Tot doi, dep dao', my mind went first to Confucius, not Christianity. The word `dao' in East Asian languages has a rich history long preceeding the arrival of Catholic missionaries. As for `Tot doi', it makes me think of the famous passage in the Great Learning Classic: tu than, te gia, tri quoc, binh thien ha.

The question for today then becomes who is borrowing whose ideas and to what purpose?

David Marr

Australian National University

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From: Chung Nguyen

Date: Wed, May 4, 2011 at 10:45 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

I think David is right in terms of the idea, the sense of the phrase. Its linguistic garb, however, is quite different. What distinguishes the phrasing, which is recent, is very much related to/originated from, as David Payne indicates - "the official campaign in Vietnam to promote solidarity congregations with the overall task of nation building as promoted by the Party, the Fatherland Front, etc."

The term Dao could refer to "Dao Ly", the path, and never any particular religion. One could be Buddhist and Confucian, or Buddhist, Confucian and Taoist at the same time. There isn't any conflict.

With the introduction of Catholicism into Vietnam, there appeared sometimes in the early twentieth century a unique use of the term "Dao". That is, i.e. "Co' -da.o" (is Catholic) vis-a-vis "kho^ng co' -da.o" (is not a Catholic). Buddhists, or non-Catholics, were then called "lu+o+ng." This is the first time in Vietnamese history that a religious cleavage appeared, which Father Kim Dinh lamented as a regrettable by-product of the evangelical process.

In 1980 the Church issued an encyclical letter that defined the Church's role and tasks vis-à-vis the socialist government of Vietnam. The Church called on its faithful to "s?ng Phúc âm trong lòng dân t?c" (to live the Gospel in the heart of the people) and "Tích c?c góp ph?n cùng d?ng bào c? nu?c b?o v? và xây d?ng t? qu?c" ("Actively join with the nation to defend and develop the country), etc.

(http://www.hdgmvietnam.org/thu-chung-1980-cua-hoi-dong-giam-muc-viet-nam/216.116.3.aspx <http://www.hdgmvietnam.org/thu-chung-1980-cua-hoi-dong-giam-muc-viet-nam/216.116.3.aspx>

The phrase "T?t d?i d?p d?o" was coined to emphasize the solidarity of the Catholic faith with the all-consuming task of national building. Since it has never appeared in the language before, people might mistakenly deem it a foreign concept, based on some sort of Christian principle.

"T?t d?i d?p d?o" could stand as a secular short hand for "s?ng Phúc âm trong lòng dân t?c" and Tích c?c góp ph?n cùng d?ng bào c? nu?c b?o v? và xây d?ng t? qu?c". This could be, naturally, a contentious issue, viewed from a secular and a non-secular lense.

Chung Nguyen

UMASS Boston

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From: Ann Marie Leshkowich <aleshkow@holycross.edu>

Date: Thu, May 5, 2011 at 7:29 AM

To: vsg@u.washington.edu

Thanks for such detailed replies, which confirm that "t?t ??i, ??p ??o" is largely associated with Catholics and suggest it to be of relatively recent origin.

One issue that I'd like to explore further is whether the party and others have over the past decade tried to expand the implications of the phrase beyond Catholics. Dang Nghiem Van's reference (in the variant dep doi, tot dao that he uses repeatedly) seems to suggest this, as he uses it to describe the general religious policy of dang and nha nuoc.

The phrase also appears in official party documents. For example, Ngh? quy?t H?i ngh? l?n th? b?y Ban Ch?p hành Trung ??ng ??ng khoá IX s? 25-NQ/TW v? công tác tôn giáo (12/3/2003) describes the nhi?m v? công tác tôn giáo as ???y m?nh phong trào thi ?ua yêu n??c, xây d?ng cu?c s?ng ?t?t ??i ??p ??o? trong qu?n chúng tín ??, ch?c s?c, nhà tu hành ? c? s?. Xây d?ng kh?i ??i ?oàn k?t toàn dân t?c th?c hi?n th?ng l?i công cu?c ??i m?i, xây d?ng và b?o v? ??t n??c.? (Source: http://www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/Modules/News/NewsDetail.aspx?co_id=30580&cn_id=40122, see third section, third point.)

Is this indeed a more general policy (hence a broader interpretation of dao) or should it be understood still to refer primarily to Catholics?

Again, I greatly appreciate everyone's help.Worcester, MA USA

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From: Shawn McHale

Date: Thu, May 5, 2011 at 12:46 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Chung Nguyen writes that "With the introduction of Catholicism into Vietnam, there appeared sometimes in the early twentieth century a unique use of the term "Dao". That is, i.e. "Co' -da.o" (is Catholic) vis-a-vis "kho^ng co' -da.o" (is not a Catholic). Buddhists, or non-Catholics, were then called "lu+o+ng." This is the first time in Vietnamese history that a religious cleavage appeared, which Father Kim Dinh lamented as a regrettable by-product of the evangelical process."

The statement that "religious cleavages" only appeared in the 20th century, and only because of Catholic evangelism, beggars belief. It assumes that Vietnamese, unlike (for example) the Chinese, never had vicious arguments over religion, never had Confucians attacking Buddhism, and never had groups attacking each other over their interpretations of religious practice. And it also assumes that whenever Vietnamese came in contact with non-Vietnamese such as the Cham or the Khmer, groups did not articulate differences through a religious idiom. This strikes me as implausible.

The territory of Vietnam has historically been more than the country of the Vietnamese. It is interesting that some modern Cham writing in Vietnamese have used the term "tà d?o" (or heresy/ false religion) when talking about the perceptions that led to conflicts between Muslim and Hindu Cham. And of course it would be interesting to see how far back the term terms "tà d?o" and "chính d?o" were used to describe conflicts over different "ways" (d?o).

Someone on this list can address this better than I, but Emperor Minh M?ng was not exactly lovey-dovey towards Catholics. One might protest that the problem was all caused by the Catholics and their evangelizing, that they brought this upon themselves. That would push back religious cleavages to the 19th century. It would be an intriguing argument. Of course, if one were to follow that argument to its logical conclusion, it would make equal sense to blame the Cao Ðài for causing religious cleavages, as well as the Khát si sect. . . . .

No, the more I think about it, the more implausible it sounds to say that there were no religious cleavages before the Catholics messed things up. . .

Shawn McHale

George Washington University

--

Shawn McHale

Director

Sigur Center for Asian Studies

Elliott School of International Affairs

George Washington University

Washington, DC 20052 USA

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From: George Dutton

Date: Thu, May 5, 2011 at 1:06 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Shawn is absolutely right. I think no matter how one wants to define "religious cleavage" such things have a long history in Vietnam. In my current work on Philiphe Binh, one of the defining elements of his life is a religious cleavage, and this among Vietnamese Catholics themselves. Not surprisingly, given the diversity of nationalities and religious orders and secular missionaries roaming the Vietnamese mission field there were contending interpretations of Catholic doctrine, practice, belief, down to the level of how to pronounce different religious terms. These were bitter disputes, and Binh's trip to Portugal in 1796 was a direct outgrowth of these religious cleavages. As a member of the Portuguese-established Jesuit Catholic community, Binh and his followers absolutely refused to submit to the authority of the French secular bishops of the MEP or the Spanish Franciscan bishops who had been appointed to head the communities in Tonkin. Binh traveled all the way to Lisbon to appeal to the Portuguese ruler for a bishop to support their community, so they would not have to give in to the authority of those who sought to divert them from their "Jesuit way of doing things."

In short, "Catholic" has historically not been a uniform category in Vietnam, and while they may not have introduced the concept of religious cleavage to Vietnam, Catholics/Catholic missionaries certainly contributed greatly to it as early as the 17th century.

George Dutton

Vice Chair and Associate Professor

UCLA Department of Asian Languages and Cultures

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From: Stephen Denney

Date: Thu, May 5, 2011 at 4:12 PM

To: mchale@gwu.edu, Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

A recent article in Asia News, a Catholic publication, discusses a related issue, the problem of "state priests" in Vietnam, that is, Catholic priests favored by the government but divisive within the church. See:

http://www.cbcpnews.com/?q=node/15429

Steve Denney

library assistant

UC Berkeley

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From: Tai, Hue-Tam Ho

Date: Thu, May 5, 2011 at 4:40 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Again, I like to go back to the Tang persecution of Buddhism, the most severe instance of which took place in 845. The ground was very much the same as the one given by Vietnamese rulers later on about Catholicism (and now the Unified Buddhist Church): that Buddhist monks refused to acknowledge the supremacy of the ruler. Claiming that they had withdrawn from society (xuat the) they would not kowtow to the emperor, nor would they comply with his laws, preferring the adhere (quite loosely in many cases) to the vinaya.

The 1662 Canh Tri edict targeted not just Catholics but Taoists and all those who advocated heterodox ideas (ta thuyet) and superstition (me tin) as well, and to a certain extent, Buddhist monks; in other words, anyone who might pose a threat both political and ideological to the supremacy of the ruler.

I don't see religious cleavages as being new or having been introduced by Catholics. And as Shawn McHale suggests, Vietnam has a very diverse religious landscape, far more diverse than Christianity and Buddhism in their various forms.

Hue-Tam Ho Tai

Kenneth T. Young Professor

of Sino-Vietnamese History

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From: Chung Nguyen

Date: Sun, May 8, 2011 at 8:03 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

This is clearly a sensitive issue for there are such diverse opinions about it. Let me first address the point cited by Chi Tam. I agree. Not only in China, but also in Vietnam, there were periods of early Buddhist suppression, though at a much reduced degree. After the golden age of Buddhism in Vietnam during the Ly-Tran dynasties, Confucianism mainly assumed the monopoly of royal ideology; Buddhism moved out of the courtly realm into the sphere of village and individual mandarin's interests. But the state-believer relationship is not the issue I raise. What Father Kim Dinh raises, which I reference, is the believer-believer relationship, which is quite a different matter.

Most of the facts cited by both Shawn and George are all correct: I have no problem with them. For example, I'd agree with George that "'Catholic' has historically not been a uniform category in Vietnam", as there can't be any absolute categorization. But does that mean that one can't draw certain conclusion about the preponderance of certain historical facts, practices, and attitudes? The Church in Vietnam maintains that it had nothing, or very little, to do with the French colonization of Vietnam while other historical works say otherwise (even Nguyen Van Trung admits that it's problematic). Could both be true? Or should we conclude that there should be a "nuanced" position, and all is a matter of interpretation?

For Shawn, I agree that the fact of religious division is a serious matter, and understand why he doesn't see that it could, or has, reached that level of severity. But what if there are evidences that it does?

As I reference Father Kim Dinh, let me quote him directly:

"s? truy?n d?o Thiên Chúa vào Vi?t Nam...dã dua d?n s? chia kh?i dân t?c dang th?ng nh?t thành hai phe luong giáo làm cho s? liên l?c gi?a dôi bên tr? nên nh?c nh?i d?y e dè nghi k?. Ð?y là m?t tai n?n l?ch s? mà th?i gian tuy có gi?m di nhung xem ra không sao xóa s?ch du?c." (Cam Nang Triet Viet, p. 57)

Paraphrase:

"The introduction of Christianity into Vietnam...[has] brought about a division of the then unified people into two groups-Catholics and non-Catholics, which [has] created a pained relationship filled with cautiousness and suspicion. This is a historical accident that has lessened with time but appears to be insurmountable."

Let's just note that Father Kim Dinh, author of over 40 works about the traditional and ancient culture of Vietnam, was one of the most influential Catholic intellectuals in contemporary Vietnam history.

Ly Chanh Trung, another prominent Catholic intellectual, writes in his work "Ton Giao va Dan Toc":

"Trong Giáo H?i Công Giáo thì trái l?i, khuynh hu?ng dóng kín và t? mãn hi?n di?n ngay trên bình di?n t?p th?, vì Giáo H?i dã t? ý th?c mình nhu m?t dân t?c du?c Thiên Chúa ch?n l?a và giao cho s? m?ng c?u r?i nhân lo?i. Giáo H?i là con du?ng d?c nh?t dua t?i Thiên Chúa: "Ngòai Giáo H?i không th? có s? c?u r?i."

H?u qu? c?a quan ni?m ?y là tính cách "b?t khoan dung" (Intolerance) c?a Giáo H?i Công Giáo: Giáo H?i dã du?c Thiên Chúa ban truy?n toàn b? s? th?t c?n thi?t cho s? c?u r?i và ch? Giáo H?i m?i có quy?n gi?i thích ho?c khai tri?n s? th?t dó. T?t c? nh?ng gì ? ngoài s? th?t nói trên ho?c trái v?i l?i gi?i thích chánh th?c c?a Giáo H?i ch? có th? là sai l?m. Mà Giáo H?i có quy?n và có b?n ph?n tiêu di?t s? sai l?m d? b?o v? s? th?t h?u hòan thành s? m?ng c?u r?i c?a mình.... Tuy nhiên, l?ch s? cho th?y r?ng, t? khi Giáo H?i tr? thành "Qu?c Giáo" du?i tri?u Hoàng Ð? Constantine và n?m du?c nh?ng th? l?c l?n lao, thi "cây guom tinh th?n" c?a Thánh Phao-l? dã luôn luôn b? cám d? bi?n thành cây guom thép th?t s?. K? t? dó, m?i khi hoàn c?nh cho phép, Giáo H?i dã không ng?n ng?i dùng th? l?c d? tiêu di?t nh?ng tôn giáo khác, d?p phá các d?n th? "tà th?n". d?t sách v? ng?ai d?o và d?t luôn con ngu?i b? xem là "l?c d?o" n?u không ch?u s?a sai...

S? b?t khoan dung này khi?n cho, trong quá kh?, Giáo H?i không bao gi? ch?p nh?n s? t? do trong n?i b? c?a mình cung nhu trong xã h?i loài ngu?i nói chung. Trong n?i b? Giáo H?i, ngu?i Công Giáo không du?c quy?n có ý ki?n riêng mà luôn luôn ph?i theo l?i d?y c?a giáo quy?n. Có m?t ý ki?n riêng là "l?c d?o", nhu Giám-m?c Bossuet dã vi?t: "Ngu?i l?c d?o" (hétérique) là ngu?i có m?t ý ki?n theo nguyên nghia, m?t tình c?m riêng. Nhung ngu?i Kitô h?u là ngu?i Công Giáo nghia là con ngu?i ph? bi?n (universe), con ngu?i không có tình ý riêng tu mà luôn luôn tuân theo tình ý c?a Giáo H?i không chút do d?". Trong xã h?i lòai ngu?i, Giáo H?i không bao gi? công nh?n cho các tôn giáo khác ho?c cho nh?ng ngu?i không công giáo cái quy?n an nói ngang hàng v?i mình, b?i cái lý do gi?n d? là ch? có Giáo H?i m?i có s? th?t mà ch? có s? th?t m?i có quy?n an nói. Ngu?i sai l?m ch? có m?t quy?n: quy?n s?a sai." (pp. 73ff).

I have referred to this issue before on VSG, that the Vietnamese Church, especially in past and recent history, has been very much in the theological mold of a medieval church, uncompromising in its rejection of all pagan doctrines. In the passage above Ly Chanh Trung enumerates the consequences of such a doctrinaire position - intolerance, dogmatism, and rigidity.

Father Tran Tam Tinh's "Dieu et César: Les Catholiques dans L'Histoire du Vietnam" documents in details the religious practices of the Church, creating self-isolating oases in Vietnamese society, rejecting anything in the culture that does not conform to the Church's teaching.

Much more devastating is Chu Bang Linh's "Dang Can Lao" which, for the first time, reveals the inner working of the Can Lao party under the titular leadership of Ngo Dinh Nhu, Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc and Bishop Pham Ngoc Chi.

Chung Nguyen

UMASS Boston.

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From: Tai, Hue-Tam Ho

Date: Sun, May 8, 2011 at 9:26 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

With due respect to Fr. Kim Dinh, I think he is wrong.

Some Catholics did support French conquest. And many non-Catholics did, too. Should we blame Confucianism in toto because some Confucian scholars and officials collaborated with the French? Indeed, those who did not were in the minority. Scholars have made much of the Can Vuong movement. But it was almost completely regional. The very real persecution of Catholics was used by the French and Spaniards to invade Vietnam. But to the extent that Vietnamese Catholics benefited from French colonial rule, it was largely because of their greater exposure to Western culture rather than because of their religion.

The Vietnamese state has always had an interest in controlling religion, by instituting minh kinh examinations and defrocking those who failed them; limiting the number of monks monasteries could ordain; limiting the amount of land that monasteries could control; and in the 19th century, severely curtailing contacts between Buddhist monks and lay Buddhists and manipulating the distribution of cultic materials in order to enforce orthodoxy, mostly around the capital; one consequence of this policy was the greater prestige of monks from Central Vietnam into the 20th century; another was the looser enforcement of this policy in the South, resulting in a much more diverse religious landscape.

There were many conflicts at the local level between Catholics and non-Catholics, due to the unwillingness--following the Papal Bull of 1742-- of Catholics to engage in ancestor worship or to pay homage to village gods, a sine qua non to public activity. But that is a sign of non-Catholics' intolerance of Catholics, not the other way around. The Catholic peasants who re-settled in Tien Hai (Nam Dinh) were driven out of their original villages by such intolerance.

Minh Mang's decree of 1836 declared open season on Catholics. I don't recall reading about Catholics hunting down non-Catholics.

Just for the record, I am agnostic.

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From: Chung Nguyen

Date: Tue, May 10, 2011 at 5:05 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

In that case, let's agree to disagree. Let me cite a few facts below to indicate the possible source of the differences and make a general comment here. It's interesting to note that these works by Vietnamese authors, some of whom are prominent and highly respected Catholics, the likes of Father Tran Tam Tinh, Ly Chanh Trung, Chu Bang Linh, etc . are rarely mentioned in many Western works on this period of Vietnamese history. Let's suppose that Kim Dinh's view is correct (Not only was he in the best position to draw that judgment, but his view has been confirmed by others, as in the works of Tran Tam Tinh, Ly Chanh Trung, Chu Bang Linh, Do Mau, Vu Ngu Chieu, etc.), then what would have been the implication for US policy in Vietnam? It would mean that the more the U.S. demonstrated support for Ngo Dinh Diem and later Nguyen Van Thieu, the more it created a fundamental crisis in this division, leading to greater opposition of US policy among the majority of the population. Moreover, it's the kind of issue that could transcends politics and ideology. This cleavage, because it was so culturally rooted, superseded many other surface phenomena. And because it's so deeply culturally rooted, its manifestation wasn't, and isn't, so easily captured and analyzed. There is also a tendency to ignore and marginalize it, because it contradicts one's own sense of reality or belief.

In any the historical study, "the focus of primary subject of the work", and esp. "the selection of source material", as Mark McLeod points out in the introduction to his The Vietnam Response to French Intervention, 1862-1874, would pretty much predermine its outcome.

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From: Tai, Hue-Tam Ho

Date: Tue, May 10, 2011 at 6:19 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

We have to remember that there were Catholics well before French colonial conquest. Adhering to a monotheistic religion, they refused to perform certain rituals which they considered idolatrous. I do not consider this introducing cleavages.

Yet, well before colonial conquest, Vietnamese Catholics were persecuted. It would not have been surprising if they saw French invaders as saviors. Some probably did. But the fact remains that most Vietnamese Catholics did not respond to French appeals for them to rise up against their emperor. At the same time a number of non-Catholics actively collaborated with the invaders.

Did Vietnamese Catholics benefit from French colonial rule because of their religion or because of their greater exposure to Western ways? Remember that Vietnamese Catholics were much more likely to go abroad than non-Catholics. Philippe Binh went to Europe to plead for more priests; many Vietnamese Catholics went to the Philippines, including Ngo Dinh Kha in 1870. This is not unique to Vietnam: my colleague Henrietta Harrison is gearing up to write about Lord Macartney's Chinese interpreter: he was, unsurprisingly, Catholic.

That Ngo Dinh Diem favored Catholics is not news. Nor is it in dispute. But this is different from claiming that Catholics introduced cleavages in Vietnam.

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From: Walter james Mc intosh <alohamac@xtra.co.nz>

Date: Tue, May 10, 2011 at 7:18 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

The question of Ngo Dinh Diem favouring Catholics is certainly is dispute just from the facts alone .If such discrimination had been a major factor in the Diem government one would think that Catholics would have dominated key positions in government . that , however , was not the case. Of Diem's 18 Cabinet Ministers only 5 were Catholics , 5 Confucians , 8 Buddhists . The Vice President was a Buddhist as well. Of the Province Chiefs 12 were Catholic and 26 were either Buddhists or Confucians. Of particular note is that of the top 19 Military Officers only 3 were Catholics.

There were of course , other factors that came into play , due to the factors of colonialism , Catholics did tend to have better education and may have travelled more and have more lsanguage abilities.

But Diem's favoritism in appointments had far more to do with his perception of loyality and fealty than any consideration based on religion . And the numbers as shown above tend to bear this out .

Mac McIntosh

Former Intelligence Officer

The Lighthouse- Bluff, NZ

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From: Balazs Szalontai

Date: Wed, May 11, 2011 at 1:13 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

While Diem seems not to have favored Catholics indiscriminately, this did not necessarily indicate that his system of rule was an inclusive one:

"In carrying out policies Diem, distrustful by nature, continues rely heavily on small circle of advisers including members of his family. Diem's rigidity in pursuing goals and brooking no opposition has alienated many able persons. He has antagonized in varying degrees the Chinese and certain Catholic elements and has not yet sought regain loyalty defeated Cao Dai and Hoa Hao [emphasis added]." Telegram from Durbrow to Dept of State, 29 April 1957. FRUS, 1955-57, Vietnam. p. 788.

See also:

"Dissatisfaction with regime apparently exists among some Catholics, who represent great bulk of the refugees. Paradoxically, some of this stems from what they feel is too heavily Catholic leadership of the regime (with potential reaction to follow) and some to regime's failure to bring Catholics particular benefits (e.g., schools). Some of hierarchy also has strong French background. Certain elements have spoken of necessity avoid Communist takeover by changing regime and there is evidence of Catholic refugees having been involved in abortive Aug 19 demonstration." Telegram from Durbrow to Dept of State, 5 September 1960. FRUS, 1958-60, Vietnam. pp. 561-562.

Best,

Balazs Szalontai

East China Normal University

Shanghai

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From: Walter james Mc intosh

Date: Wed, May 11, 2011 at 2:09 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

It is well known that Elbridge Durbrow had no great faith or confidence in the Diem government to the point that Lansdale , after the 1960 coup attempt , not only felt rightly that Diem was going to blame both Durbrow and MAAG for their focus on ARVN training wherein key Army officers were willing to take up arms against the Government but even more damaging that Durbrow had sided emotionally with the coup revolters. Lansdale suggested to Washington that Dubrow be recalled and replaced with someone in whom Diem had confidence . While he may have been hinting that he , himself should replace Dubrow . In January 61 , JFK - Who's 'regime ' was had far more Catholic orientation than did , Diem's did as Lansdale suggested and replaced Dubrow.

Given the above -- I would not place too much faith in carping cables from Elbridge Dubrow , who is neither edecutionaly nor culturally or experience wise in a position to validly second guess Ngo Dinh Diem on what was best for Vietnam , at least IMO .

The Lighthouse- Bluff, NZ

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From: Balazs Szalontai

Date: Wed, May 11, 2011 at 2:50 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

It might not be advisable to dismiss the cited documents solely on the grounds that they happened to be penned by Durbrow, regardness of his abilities or disabilities. The following FRUS document makes it quite clear that Durbrow's skeptical evaluation was not an isolated one, neither were Lansdale's views shared by the entire US intelligence community:

"The consensus of U.S. intelligence is that without prompt, clear and measurable improvement in the quality and direction of Vietnam political leadership, that nation is doomed to collapse. Without such improvement in the quality and direction of Vietnam political leadership, the assistance proposed for FY 1961 may be completely wasted." Memorandum from the Deputy Director for Operations, International Cooperation Administration (FitzGerald), 7 November 1960. FRUS, 1958-60, Vietnam. pp. 673.

While "consensus" may have been an overstatement, the document deserves attention.

Actually, Lansdale also admitted that "Ambassador Durbrow is not entirely to blame for these blunders. The invitation to engage in this badly-timed and demoralizing meddling in Vietnam's affairs was given the Ambassador by the Southeast Asia desk staff in State Message 775." Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale), 15 November 1960. FRUS, 1958-60, Vietnam, p. 668.

Just as Cabot Lodge could not have arranged the 1963 coup single-handedly, Durbrow's actions were not only his own.

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From: Balazs Szalontai

Date: Wed, May 11, 2011 at 3:12 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

BTW, the MAAG Chief's evaluation of the coup attempt also deserves attention:

"Appears coup not Communist dominated but rather sincere, though misguided, attempt by junior commanders register dissatisfaction and force improvement government's policies, both military and political.[emphasis added]" Telegram from the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (McGarr), 13 November 1960, Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense's Deputy Assistant for Special Operations (Lansdale), 15 November 1960. FRUS, 1958-60, Vietnam, p. 658.

Best,

Balazs Szalontai

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From: Chung Nguyen

Date: Wed, May 11, 2011 at 6:40 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Balazs:

It was well-known that Diem did not get support from Father Le Huu Tu and Hoang Quynh, leaders of the Northern Catholics who were not happy with Diem's totally pro-US alliance. All their life, they had worked closely with the French. They, therefore, didn't think it was wise to put everything into one basket. Vu Ngoc Nha, the sleeper-agent from the DRV exploited this very gulf to be the go-between for the two sides, and ended up with lots of top-notch inside information from the Independence Palace. After the 1954-55 exodus, the Church's intelligence operation that remained in the North would not work with the CIA. The hand-off was eventually made with Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can.

There are a few factors that betray the depth of Diem's pro-Catholics regime:

1) The continuation of the Ordinance #10, passed under Bao Dai, which allowed total freedom for the Catholic Church while allowing Buddhists to form only associations, to be administered and supervised by the bureaucracy. All purchases of land, for example, had to be approved.

2) The establishment of the Catholic-only Can Lao party, the secret organization that controlled everything in the government, esp. in terms of promotion and privileges. This was set up early with the advice and consultation of the State Department. Edward Lansdale strenuously objected to this, but to no avail.

3) The absolute power of the three "branches" of the Can Lao party, one chaired by Ngo Dinh Nhu in Saigon, one chaired by Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc in Hue, and one chaired by Bishop Pham Ngoc Chi cum Ngo Dinh Can in the Central Region. Ngo Dinh Nhu was reported to say that the Church took a few centuries to convert only a small fraction of the population, but his regime could complete the conversion of SVN in 10 years. The first region targeted for wholesale conversion was Central Vietnam (see Organization Chart attached).

To join the Can Lao party, new members had to pledge to: (1) destroy Buddhism, (2) destroy communism, (3) destroy the nationalists (those opposed the Diem regime- Nguyen Bao Toan, Vu Tam Anh, etc.) (see Chu Bang Linh's Dang Can Lao).

The effort had immediate effect: The Buddhist Church in Hue sent a report to President Diem and the National Assembly, documenting in details over 40 cases of forced conversion and discrimination in the Central Vietnam in 1961-1962. There was no response, not even an acknowledgement that the letter had been received. How could any reasonable governement ignore such a petition, representing 80% of the poulation? (Clearly it wasn't a surprise to Ngo Dinh Diem. And since it was policy, there was nothing he could do about it). Archbishop Thuc boasted that there were so many converts, sometime comprising whole villages, that he didn't not have enough priests to meet the faithful's need.

Monk Thich Man Giac later published a full dossier on this in Los Angeles. The forced conversion was much more widespread and methodically organized. Ngo Dinh Can tortured and murdered many prominent Buddhists in Hue by falsely charging with them with the crime of being French agents in order to confiscate their wealth. All of these are well documented in Do Mau's Vietnam Mau Lua Que Huong Toi.

It's often mentioned that there were a number of Buddhists in Diem's government. As the Catholic population in VN was about 7-9%, without Buddhists, Diem would not have enough people to protect him, and an all-Catholic public face would be detrimental to the regime's survival. That's why there was a Can Lao party, all Catholic, and that's why it had to remain a secret party. And since it was the State Department that helped spring it into being, there couldn't, and shouldn't, be any problem.

All of these serve as the causes of the eventual explosion of the Buddhists' protest in 1963, which led to the regime's downfall. How else could we explain the widespread dissatisfaction that began in Central Vietnam and then spread like wild fire through the whole country?

The background information provided by John Cooney's "The American Pope - The Life and Times of Cardinal Francis Spellman" and Avro Manhattan's "Vietnam - Why Did We Go" gave an international cast to the effort of Christianizing South Vietnam. It also helps to explain why John Foster Dulles ordered the establishment of the Can Lao party without informing Edward Lansdale, the US's top intelligence operator in South Vietnam at the time.

Chung Nguyen

UMASS Boston

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From: Balazs Szalontai

Date: Wed, May 11, 2011 at 9:57 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Dear Chung,

thanks a lot for this information! Let me add that Lansdale seems to have partially changed his mind by 1960, because at that time, he strongly opposed State Department proposals to transform the Can Lao from a secret party into an open organization, on the grounds that this would weaken Diem's regime.

With many thanks,

Balazs

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From: Edward Miller

Date: Thu, May 12, 2011 at 5:40 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Dear Balazs:

Can you provide a citation to a source for Lansdale’s change of view on the CL in 1960? My understanding is that his position on the CL was very consistent from the mid-1950s on: he believed that the party should be dismantled. According to this view, his opposition to the proposal to “surface” the CL was based on his conviction that it would be better to get rid of the organization, not to preserve it. I would be very interested to see any source which demonstrates otherwise.

Ed Miller

Dartmouth College

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From: Balazs Szalontai

Date: Thu, May 12, 2011 at 6:21 AM

To: Edward.G.Miller@dartmouth.edu, Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

It is in his September 1960 memorandum, published in FRUS, 1958-60, Vietnam, pp. 582-583. I made a mistake by effectively merging his two statements into one. His standpoint on the Can Lao was not so much that it should be disbanded but rather than that the ideal objective is that every party (including the CL) should surface, and the U.S. should act very tactfully to achieve this aim. On p. 581, however, he expressed strong doubts with regard to the wisdom of proposing a transfer of Nhu, which he considered detrimental and tantamount to amputating Diem's right arm. Since the Can Lao was run by Nhu, and its style of operation reflected Nhu's preferences, I doubt if any meaningful change in the status of the Can Lao could have been achieved if Nhu was to keep his position and influence, nor was it likely that Nhu could be persuaded to surface the party. That is, Lansdale said a strong "no" to Nhu's transfer and expressed theoretical agreement with the surfacing of the Can Lao (he carefully avoided to single it out for criticism by italicizing, twice, the phrase "every/all parties"), but proposed much tact and caution.

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From: Chung Nguyen

Date: Thu, May 12, 2011 at 3:35 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

I think Lansdale's estimation of Nhu's role as crucial to Diem's rule is realistic: without Nhu, Diem would be totally helpless. But his prognosis of the Can Lao party is a bit intriguing: this is well documented in Chu Bang Linh's Dang Can Lao. Of the three "branches" (actually three "parties" for there wasn't much coordination or centralized direction among the three), Nhu's and Thuc's were less savage when compared to Can's. Known as "Hung Than Mien Trung" (the 'Brutal Demon of the Central Region"), Can's own secret police (Doan Cong Tac Dac Biet Mien Trung) and members of his Can Lao party terrorized the region. "Chin Ham", the infamous half underground secret prison outside Hue led to many deaths. It was so bad that Nhu had to plead with Diem to order Can to stop his brutal practices, fearing that in the long run it would fatally damage the regime. But all the top clergies of the region sided with Can, for they thought he had the guts to do what's needed to carry out God's plan on earth. As Diem put a great deal of faith in his trusted clergy, he refused to interfere. Do Mau, head of the Directorate of Military Security, was so incensed by Can's policy that he stopped travelling to Hue in order to avoid having to meet with Can. Do Mau made a full report of the dire situation to Diem. Again, Diem refused to intervene.

The infighting between Nhu and Can reached the point when each side arrested the other's operatives. Chu Bang Linh recounts one of the typical stories of this conflict: Can complained to Bishop Pham Ngoc Chi that Nhu had the ear of the U.S., that the CIA talked to Nhu but didn't know who Can was. Bishop Chi told Can he would fix that. After a whirlwind tour in the U.S. meeting with influential Catholic clergy there, Bishop Chi returned, fulfilling his promise. The U.S. established an Information office in Hue and Can got his wish.

I wonder whether Lansdale made any comment on Can's Can Lao, and the need to reign him in? Or did he consider it impolitic, challenging the wishes of the powerful Churchmen and their sponsors?

Douglas Valentine, in "The Phoenix Program," had a chapter related to this issue.

"With the consolidation of power by these three men came a resurgence of what CIA Summary 0387/69, dated September 12, 1969, called "influence by the widely hated Can Lao group of the Diem era." The CIA memo named as members of the neo-Can Lao cabal "Foreign Minister Lam, as well as the ministers of information, economy, finance and legislative liaison." The memo noted that Duong Van "Big" Minh had predicted "that renewed Can Lao influence could lead to a tragic clash between Catholics and Buddhists." And, the memo noted, "apprehension is likely to increase over reports that the new information minister [Thieu's cousin, Hoang Duc Nha] has appointed some 20 cadre from the Nhan Xa Party -- a neo-Can Lao group -- to key subordinate positions.

Indeed, political developments in 1969 mirrored those of 1955, when Ed Lansdale was told that Diem "needed to have his own political party." [3] Likewise, to strengthen Thieu's position, the CIA in 1969 financed the creation of the National Social Democratic Front, described by former CIA officer Frank Snepp as "a pro-government coalition of political parties." And, just as in Diem's day, Snepp writes, "the CIA lavished large sums of money on the Thieu government to be used in cowing and 'neutralizing' its opposition," [4] the opposition being those nationalist parties, like the Dai Viets, that had relations with the Buddhists. With the Americans chasing the VCI, these domestic groups became primary targets of the Special Branch and its stepchild, Phung Hoang. " ( Full excerpt: http://www.american-buddha.com/phoenixprog21.htm <http://www.american-buddha.com/phoenixprog21.htm> )

So, the story repeated itself.

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From: Christoph Giebel <giebel@uw.edu>

Date: Thu, May 12, 2011 at 4:58 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Colleagues,

Anh Chung's detailed descriptions, for which I am grateful, bring up a question I have wondered about for a while. There is a striking parallelism in the state consolidations taking place ca. 1955-1959 in the northern, DRVN-controlled zone of Viet Nam and the southern, mostly RVN-controlled zone (suppression of dissidents, establishment of authoritarian regimes, organized campaigns of political intimidation, denunciation, coercion, terror, violence, and killing).

While we have a fairly substantial body of research on northern developments (land reform, Nhan-Van Giai-Pham affair, intra-party struggles, Maoist influences, etc.), information on southern developments (To Cong, etc.) are more scattered, unsystematic, and episodic. I am aware that Ngo Vinh Long has been working for some time on an accounting of the widespread RVN-sponsored violence in the southern zone against supporters of the DRVN/former Viet Minh (or those labeled, in one way or another, 'Viet Cong'). The preliminary numbers of victims, as I understand, appear staggering, tens of thousands, and likely quite a bit higher than those killed in the northern land reform, making southern state consolidation a bloodier affair than the northern counterpart.

(Lest another unproductive blow-up erupt on VSG, let me hasten to say, although quite unnecessarily, that this excuses nothing and isn't meant in any kind of apologist way, as some might be tempted to charge.)

So my question, is anybody out there working on a systematic study of RVN-orchestrated violence against southern revolutionary supporters prior to the NLF establishment? Or aware of comprehensive studies recently published?

Thank you,

C. Giebel

UW-Seattle

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From: Tai, Hue-Tam Ho

Date: Thu, May 12, 2011 at 5:29 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Christoph raises a good parallel. For a long time, I have been pondering on this parallelism: not just about suppression but also mobilization techniques.

It seems to me that there was a greater range of penalties for those suspected of being Viet Minh. For instance, my aunt and her husband, both of whom had been members of the Viet Minh (the husband had in fact been one of the earliest adherents of the ICP in his Central Vietnamese province) were not allowed to teach in public schools. A distant relative was falsely accused by a neighbor of being a Viet Cong and spent three years in jail without going to trial; his jail cell housed some bona fide members of the Viet Minh. At the other end of the spectrum, there were outright killings, not always of people suspected of Communist sympathies. Just people deemed "inconvenient," like a protege of my father who had stumbled onto the Ngo negotiations with Hanoi in 1963.

I'll be very interested in the results of Long's research. I wonder whether some of the arrests and killings can be correlated with NLF activities and other threats to the Diem regime, such as the 1960 coup and the palace bombings.

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From: Nghia Vo

Date: Thu, May 12, 2011 at 7:48 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Dear Christoph,

1. Unless you have firm data--confirmed by third party and especially not by Ngo Vinh Long--VSG readers would take your above statement as non-scientific to say the least.

2. This leads me to wonder about the reasons behind your wanting to raise the parallelism in the state consolidations of the two Vietnams ca. 1955-59. Scientific curiosity? probably not b/c you seem to have the "answer' in your quote.

3. Even though there was a parallelism in the state consolidations, the "cruelty and savagery" exhibited by the communist side were unmatched by any regime in the past. This is not to say that cruelty and savagery should be condoned, far from it. Courtois in his Black Book of Communism mentioned that 101 million people were killed by the communists worldwide with Hanoi causing at least 1 million deaths. (p 4-5)

Besides the cruelties you have mentioned (suppression of dissidents, killing, coercion...), may I suggest another short list:

-the Hue massacre in 1968, during which 3-5,000 were brutally murdered, beaten to death, and even buried alive (Jamieson p 321 and other refs)

-the random shelling of Saigon at various periods which resulted in the killing of innocent people,

-the "burying alive" of opponents, especially that of Ngo Dinh Kha (Diem's brother) and his son,

-the random shelling of the "Convoy of Tears" in 1973, which caused 300,000 civilian and 40,000 military deaths ...and so on....

4. Therefore, please go ahead with your accounting research. If it is correct and scientific, the result will prove what we have already known: the "brutality and cruelty" committed by hte RVN, if documented, was far less than that caused by the communists.

Nghia Vo,

Independent Researcher.

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From: Walter james Mc intosh

Date: Thu, May 12, 2011 at 8:12 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Another consideration that I think must be taken into account , is that the one and only agreement that came out of Geneva in 1954 was the Cease Fire Agreement wherein in Article One of that agreement Communist North Vietnam promised to withdraw all of their forces to North Vietnam . Instead , the Politburo of the North Vietnam Communist Party coverty ordered circa 10,000 of their best trained cadre to remain in the South in direct violation of the cease fire agreement . They also cached tons of weapons and ammunition and other war material in secret bases in the South.

Did not the government of South Vietnam have every right to seek to arrest these violators of the cease fire agreement ?

The Lighthouse- Bluff, NZ

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From: Chung Nguyen

Date: Thu, May 12, 2011 at 8:31 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Thank you, Christopher. I have had the same question for a while. The William Joiner center has hosted many writers and artists from Vietnam, and I was told the following stories by three prominent writers from the North. The query I have is why very little of these have been written down?

- One, during the period of free movement in 1955, Viet Minh force in the Central region had to give up the areas they held during the Resistance. Like rolling up a straw mat, as soon as they left, the SVN security took over. Because many of the families in these areas had members joining the Viet Minh, or there were Viet Minh members staying, legally, behind, the SVN security force arrested and executed many even when it was forbidden by the Geneva Accords. His uncle was tied up in a bamboo pole, his chest pierced by sharp instruments. Unable to die, he was forced to cry out in pain the whole night, bleeding to death, but no one dared to come out to help. The killing and imprisoning, according to this writer, was widespread in the region at the time. After April 1975, his NLF cousins returned to their village. They found the family that was responsible for his uncle's death, and wanted to take revenge. Only at his insistence that they relented.

- In the non-Catholic villages surrounding the Phat Diem area where his family lived, there were many sweeps by Tu Ve Cong Giao (Catholic Self Defense Force) led by Father Hoang Quynh. If they suspected anyone to be Viet Minh or Viet Minh sympathizer, they would arrest, torture, and kill him. One of the killing methods was "bo? ro. tro^i so^ng", bound inside a bamboo net and let it float down the river (very similar to the account noted by Father Tran Tam Tinh cited earlier).

- His village was adjacent to a Catholic parish. The parish had a platoon armed with weapons provided by the French. It would make periodic sweeps of the surrounding non-Catholic villages to ensure that there would be no group capable of attacking the parish. Since no one in the village had any weapon, they had to take whatever that was given. The platoon would arrest anyone they suspected, and killed them if there was any resistance. He was about 8 or 9 years old at the time. The platoon gathered all the non-Catholic children together, first teaching them singing and group dancing. After that they were given candies and a small coin, which to them, poor farmers' children, was a memorable treat. Next they were given a uniform to wear and taught some basic prayers. He fell completely in love with the whole experience. Later the Viet Minh sent cadres into the village to organize the resistance. There were bloody clashes. Then the sweeps stopped. But he missed his singing, dancing, wearing his uniform, and the candies terribly. One time he hid behind the door and recited the prayer he was taught. Unfortunately his grandfather caught him; incensed, he slapped his face hard. These kinds of sweeps, clashes, killings and counter-killings happened in similar locations all over the North.

One of the reasons, I think, was the party's official policy of trying to foster unity and avoiding anything that might create divisions. The retelling of stories and events like the above was discouraged - Chinh Sach Doan Ket Dan Toc. There is, however, a back side to this - many think that they never happened.

Chung Nguyen

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From: Walter james Mc intosh

Date: Thu, May 12, 2011 at 9:27 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Chung Nguyen , I don;t quite understand the second paragraph of your post. Particularly a sentence saying there were Viet Minh who legally stayed in the South as that was impossible . Article one of the Cease Fire Agreement was not a conditional provision . It called for all Viet Minh Forces to regroup to Communist North Vietnam , hence , there were no legal Viet Minh stay behinds in 1955.

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From: Frank Proschan

Date: Thu, May 12, 2011 at 11:29 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group

Mr McIntosh refers to "the Politburo of the North Vietnam Communist Party". Did I (and most others) perhaps overlook the establishment of a second Communist Party in North Vietnam? How strange that there is no trace of such an organization in any of the standard historical works. Surely such an important discovery would warrant some serious research - indeed, it could revolutionize our entire understanding of the region's history if there were a separate Communist Party in North Vietnam.

Frank Proschan

37 place Jeanne d'Arc

75013 Paris

FRANCE

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From: Balazs Szalontai

Date: Fri, May 13, 2011 at 1:39 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

I found some partial data in the Hungarian archives about the number of arrests and killings in the South in 1955. These appeared relatively reliable, because they were quite specific (listing various categories of repression one by one) and, above all, not unreasonably high. I have the data in Hungary and have no access to them at the moment, but I remember that in this period, these figures were perceptibly lower that that of the arrests and executions in the North. I was actually very much interested in the kind of comparative analysis what you suggested, and this is why I counted both sides. As I said, in this particular period the northern figures were higher -not incomparably higher, but significantly so. I must check the data when I return to Hungary next time. In any case, Diem's anti-Communist campaign was not yet in full swing at that time, just as the northern land reform would enter it most violent stage in the next year.

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From: Shawn McHale

Date: Fri, May 13, 2011 at 5:04 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Dear list,

The comparison of DRV and Republic of Vietnam state consolidation IS an interesting topic. At least framing the issues this way gets away from the silly argument that we don't see state formation in the South from 1954 onwards because South Vietnam really was not a country, ergo could not really have a real state.

Yes, there are remarkable parallels between both. But comparing DRV and the State of Vietnam IN THE SAME TIME PERIOD, does not necessarily make sense. The south had fundamentally different dynamics than the north. It was more fractured ethnically, religiously, politically. In fact, the first Indochina War had taken differences, such as over ethnicity, and hardened them into real cleavages. The French spoke of "warlordism" in the Mekong delta. The north had no equivalent warlords. Cleavages were hard to undo. State consolidation in such circumstances is likely to be more difficult.

It really, in such cases, makes much sense to do what political scientists do -- do cross-national comparisons of similar processes.

Is the real intent in this debate to show that the DRV, or the Republic of Vietnam, was more bloody, and therefore somehow better than the other? If so, that strikes me as a less than interesting exercise.

With this being said, one of Nghia Vo's statistics -- such as the 340,000 KILLED in the convoy of Tears shellings in 1973 -- is hardly "scientific." We can't just pull numbers out of a hat and call them true. We can't just take the estimate of deaths we like (because it supports our argument) and call it true.

--

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From: Balazs Szalontai

Date: Fri, May 13, 2011 at 5:26 AM

To: mchale@gwu.edu, Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Agreed. In both North and South Vietnam, there were certain specific regions where political conflicts were more likely to take an armed shape in 1954-55 than in others (e.g., the tribal minorities in Lao Cai province and the Catholic-inhabited areas in the North, and the Cao Dai/Hoa Hao areas in the South), and thus the aggragated number of arrests and killings may produce a somewhat misleading "national average."

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From: <sdenney@library.berkeley.edu>

Date: Fri, May 13, 2011 at 11:46 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

I am not sure if I understand your point here, Chung. Would not both sides

want to report to the ICC any alleged violations by the other side of the

Geneva Accords, including atrocities, or stockpiling of weapons and troops

staying behind? Did the DRV or NLF not publish any literature on

atrocities and other human rights abuses committed by the RVN during the

late 1950s?

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From: Chung Nguyen

Date: Fri, May 13, 2011 at 1:10 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Very good question, Steve. For the violations during the 1955 period, I have no idea whether it was reported to the ICC. There were violations on both sides (though they might differ in terms of degree), and which ones were selected for reporting to gain the most mileage is something one would have to study. The writer who told me was from Quang Nam and his integrity is unquestionable. Fostering unity is something that would apply to the situation in the DRV after 1954-1955. Even now, for example, I don't think, to give an example, translation of the works the likes of Malachi Martin, Avro Manhattan, Michael Martin, Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Bart Ehrman, etc. would be allowed publication in Vietnam.

Chung Nguyen

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From: Walter james Mc intosh

Date: Fri, May 13, 2011 at 2:08 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Chung Nguyen , In regard to the key violation of the Crease Fire Agreement and the covert orders from the politburo to leave behind 10,000 of their forces in the South , although Marguerite Higgins and Bernard Fall did some early on reporting on this event , and the matter of these covert orders for stay behinds is briefly covered in the Pentagon Papers , we must recognize that these were covert orders therefore proofs and evidence were not availble in real time that allowed authoritive reporting of this key violation . However , in post war writings by Communist Officials the stay behind orders have been acknowledged.

BTW: It may be worth noting that International Law holds that if a key provision of an Int'l agreement is violated in a serious manner then the entire treaty/agreement can be deemed to be null and void.

The Lighthouse- Bluff, NZ

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From: Tobias RETTIG

Date: Sat, May 14, 2011 at 8:08 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Dear List,

Brief rejoinder re Shawn McHale’s argument in favour of doing ‘cross-national comparisons of similar processes’, i.e. to compare state-making in the South with state-making and –consolidating efforts in polities other than the DRV?

I was wondering which countries could be considered?

If I recall, David Marr highlighted (in his autobiographical chapter in the book edited by Nicholas Tarling, if memory serves) that a comparison of Vietnam and Korea would make a lot of sense, but what about a comparison of the State of Vietnam and some non-Vietnamese entity?

I would be curious to learn more.

Best regards,

Tobias

Tobias Rettig

School of Social Sciences, Singapore Management University

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From: Balazs Szalontai

Date: Sat, May 14, 2011 at 9:13 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Having made comparisons between North Korea and North Vietnam in my book and elsewhere, I have been long interested in preparing a comparative analysis of South Vietnam and South Korea, and I would be glad to participate in some sort of joint project that is aimed at placing the RVN into a comparative perspective. Another possible comparison might be made with Pakistan (a country Joanna Kirkpatrick knows far better than myself) on the grounds that Pakistan also used to be a part of an abruptly and traumatically divided entity, and creating an independent economy, let alone a new national identity, from scratch was definitely an uphill task. Plus, Pakistan was a SEATO member and hence a sort of ally of the U.S., though less closely than the RVN.

Best,

Balazs

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From: Tuan Hoang

Date: Sun, May 15, 2011 at 7:54 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Late to this thread, I wish there were more on the earlier centuries as originally discussed. Of course, discussing the twentieth century and the Indochina Wars is good and well. I've learned a lot myself. It is too bad, however, that pre-twentieth-century topics often shift very quickly to post-1945 ones. Sometimes I wish it were the reverse.

I was reading Nguyen Lang's three-volume history of Vietnamese Buddhism - the first volume was published in Saigon in 1974; others in Paris in 1977. Characteristic of South Vietnamese intellectual thought, it was non-Marxist, nationalistic, and conscious of the Buddhist revival. It was also very transnational (to use that now-ubiquitous word), at least to my non-specialist eyes. It emphasized, for example, the role of Indian merchants in bringing Buddhist practices to Vietnam. On the revival, it credited Western interest at the start of the twentieth century as a cause of the international revival that in turn affected Vietnam in the 1920s and 1930s.

Readers of this history might be drawn to the last chapters because they concerned Ngo Dinh Diem. If so, they would miss out on so much else on the early centuries, on which Lang utilized a far richer amount of sources than those on the Diem period. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, for example, there was tremendous control of Buddhism from the court and the mandarinate. Warfare against the Champa led many men to join monastaries in order to avoid forced conscription. With other reasons, it led the state to exert greater control over Buddhist institutions.

Lang cited the Dai Viet Su Ky Toan Thu, for example, that Buddhist and Taoist monks were required to take a national exam in 1429. He considered it "the first act of the Confucianist government to control Buddhism and Taoism," with failure on the exam resulting in forced laicization. Other factors contributed to the decline of Buddhist influence among the elite.

This history is available online at http://langmai.org/tang-kinh-cac/vien-sach/viet-nam-phat-giao-su-luan. It's reproduced from the 2000 Hanoi edition rather than the Saigon/Paris one, whose text (but not footnotes) appears to be faithful to the original.

~Tuan Hoang

University of Notre Dame

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From: Balazs Szalontai

Date: Sun, May 15, 2011 at 8:21 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group

A quite interesting phenomenon was that both in Vietnam and Korea, the control and partial suppression of Buddhism by Confucian rulers started only centuries later than the implementation of such measures in China. On the suppression of Buddhism in China, the following (possibly outdated) article may be of interest:

Kenneth Ch'en, "The Economic Background of The Hui-ch'ang Suppression of Buddhism," in Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 19, Issues 1-2 (JUne 1956), pp. 67-105.

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From: Tai, Hue-Tam Ho

Date: Sun, May 15, 2011 at 8:27 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Nguyen Lang is a pen-name of Thich Nhat Hanh.

For a good study of Buddhism in pre-modern Vietnam, see Nguyen Tu Cuong (aka Cuong Tu Nguyen):

Zen in Medieval Vietnam: A Study and Translation of the Thien Uyen Tap Anh. By Cuong Tu Nguyen. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1997.

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From: Tai, Hue-Tam Ho

Date: Sun, May 15, 2011 at 8:39 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Well, at the time of the great suppression of Buddhism in China--845-- there was no such thing as Vietnam. There was An Nan, a colony of the Tang empire.

The mink kinh exams were instituted by the Ly emperors, themselves devout Buddhist.

Luy Lau, near Hanoi, was a center of Buddhism in the first century CE as Indian and Central Asian monks stopped there on their way to China. At the time, northern Vietnam was more peaceful than southern China (see Wang Gungwu, The Nanhai trade: Early Chinese Trade in the South China Sea); also Kenneth Ch'en, Buddhism: The Light of Asia). Keith Taylor, The Birth of Vietnam, also contains quite a lot of details about Buddhism in Vietnam in the period of Chinese occupation.

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From: Chung Nguyen

Date: Sun, May 15, 2011 at 9:09 AM

To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Thanks, Tuan Hoang, for referring Thich Nhat Hanh's work on the History of Vietnamese Buddhism. The reason we didn't focus on the early history of Christianity in Vietnam is, I think, we didn't discuss the history of Christianity in Vietnam per se but only its relationship to the Vietnam War. The early history of Christianity in Vietnam does not, as far as I know, raise any unresolved issues re: its evolvement, while the introduction of French Catholicism and its later development during the Vietnam War does. To give an example, most historical works on the Vietnam War in the West barely dig into this issue. Mark Moyar is an extreme example, blaming the Buddhists for political interference during the Diem regime. This is what I call an American-centric perspective. To understand Thich Nhat Hanh's view on this question, the best work available is Thich Nhat Hanh's own "Lotus in the Sea of Fire" (Vietnamese version - Hoa Sen Trong Bien Lua).

Nguyen Tu Cuong's work and view re: Vietnamese Buddhism has caused a great deal of controversies in Buddhist circles in Vietnam and abroad. His take is, simplistically summarized, Vietnamese Buddhism is pretty much a carbon copy of Chinese Buddhism, and what has been considered "Vietnamese" is for the most part simply a borrowing from Chinese sources.

Chung Nguyen

UMASS Boston

________________________________

From: vsg-bounces@mailman1.u.washington.edu on behalf of Tai, Hue-Tam Ho

Sent: Sun 5/15/2011 10:27 PM

To: Vietnam Studies Group

Subject: RE: [Vsg] Religious cleavages in VIetnam (was on tot dao . .)

The territory of Vietnam has historically been more than the country of the Vietnamese. It is interesting that some modern Cham writing in Vietnamese have used the term "tà d?o" (or heresy/ false religion) when talking about the perceptions that led to conflicts between Muslim and Hindu Cham. And of course it would be interesting to see how far back the term terms "tà d?o" and "chính d?o" were used to describe conflicts over different "ways" (d?o).

Someone on this list can address this better than I, but Emperor Minh M?ng was not exactly lovey-dovey towards Catholics. One might protest that the problem was all caused by the Catholics and their evangelizing, that they brought this upon themselves. That would push back religious cleavages to the 19th century. It would be an intriguing argument. Of course, if one were to follow that argument to its logical conclusion, it would make equal sense to blame the Cao Dài for causing religious cleavages, as well as the Khát si sect. . . . .

_______________________________________________

Vsg mailing list

Vsg@u.washington.edu

http://mailman1.u.washington.edu/mailman/listinfo/vsg

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From: Walter james Mc intosh

Date: Sun, May 15, 2011 at 1:39 PM

To: Frank Proschan <frank.proschan@yahoo.com>, Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

I recognize that Mr. Proschan is making an attempt at humour in his message , but as the language I used in my posting was very much the same sort of description that Ms. Nguyen T. Lien-Hang used in her : The War Politburo: North Vietnam's Diplomatic and Political Road to the Tet Offensive , I rather doubt that he would attempt such lighthearted humour in any review of her much respected work. I used to follow the signals intelligence on Vietnam with great interest. The fact that the orders and directions to all communist enities in South Vietnam came from radio transmitters in and around Hanoi in North Vietnam made a strong impression on me .

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