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From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Date: 2008/8/1
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear All,
excuse me for pestering you in summertime, but I would like to have
a question to you. There is extensive literature on President Nixon's
decision to invade Cambodia in 1970, but the works I saw mostly
focused on the strictly military aspects of the issue, namely,
the problem of NVA/NLF sanctuaries. To be sure, the intention to
"clear out" these sanctuaries was indeed an integral element of Nixon's
"Vietnamization" strategy. Still, I wonder whether the summit
of Indochinese (North Vietnamese, NLF, Pathet Lao and Cambodian)
leaders in China (24-25 April 1970), during which both Hanoi and
Beijing committed themselves to give armed support to the
exiled
Sihanouk, may have been the final push to Nixon's decision.
After all, he made his decision right after the summit. To your
knowledge, was this simply a parallel development (i.e., he
would have done the same without the summit), or did the summit
produce an effect on his decision? Of course, this may be already
well known to scholars familiar with U.S. archival documents,
but unfortunately I often lack access to the latest publications
on such topics.
Best regards,
Dr. Balazs Szalontai
Mongolia International University
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From: ryan nelson <sociolgst@yahoo.com>
Date: 2008/8/1
To: vsg@u.washington.edu
In general, the majority of the literature (most from a non-U.S. perspective) I’ve viewed mentions the summit but reveals little or nothing about its impact on U.S. foreign policy in Indochina. Why I’m not sure. One might assume from this that the summit played only a background role in the invasion. Surely some U.S. Cold War minded political science scholars will share their thoughts or literature.
John M. Shaw’s The Cambodian Campaign does not mention the April summit. From what I gather from the literature, had deep division (“pussyfooting about” according to Agnew) between CIA, MACV and other planers over what to do about the sanctuaries (take no action; attack the Fishhook or Parrot’s Beak but not both; use ARVN troops but not Americans) and Syd Barret like paranoia regarding military leaks to the press not existed the invasion would have happened much sooner.
Jussi M. Hanhimaki’s The Flawed Architect brings up the summit. Though ambiguous about its impact on Nixon’s decision to invade, Zhou Enlai’s call “for the Indochinese people to join forces against [the American] foe” surely must have played some role – right? Had it not, a clue may be provided by Stephen J. Morris’ Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: “No formal body was set up to coordinate the activities of the three revolutions. At that time the Chinese also floated the idea of establishing a ‘United Front of Struggle of the Peoples of China, Korea, Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.’ But this balloon never even got off the ground. Hanoi opposed such plans.” So, by this perspective, it sounds like the summit’s bark was worse than its bite. If true, one may gather the summit (which Pao-min Chang in Kampuchea between China and Vietnam says resulted in a “shotgun wedding” between the North Vietnamese and the Khmer resistance movements) to not have been a significant impetus to the invasion.
Breaking with the trend of triviality, according to a May 11, 1970 Time magazine article, “Raising the Stakes in Indochina,” [t]he pressure to act increased measurably with word of the Indochinese summit of Communist leaders . . . . The talks at the South China summit of forming an “Indochinese People’s Army” convinced the Nixon Administration that the Communists in Cambodia seriously intended to establish a puppet regime in Phnom-Penh. It was one thing,
White House officials reasoned, for the Communists to be operating out of privileged sanctuaries that were tolerated by a neutralist Sihanouk government. It would be quite another for the enemy to enjoy a completely free run of the border regions under a Sihanouk regime totally beholden to Hanoi and Peking.” <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,878205-1,00.html>
Hope this helps, Balazs
Peace
Ryan Nelson
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From: ANG Cheng Guan (HSSE) <chengguan.ang@nie.edu.sg>
Date: 2008/8/3
To: sociolgst@yahoo.com, vsg@u.washington.edu
My own research also confirms that the summit’s bark was indeed worse than its bite because of the differences amongst the Chinese, Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge. I found a good concise account of US decision-making during this period in Kenton Clymer, The United States and Cambodia, 1969-2000: A troubled relationship (RoutledgeCouzon, 2004), although Clymer too does not mention the summit.
Cheers,
Guan
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From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Date: 2008/8/5
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear Guan,
thank you so much for your kind assistance! It is indeed true that cooperation between Beijing and Hanoi was troubled from the very start, as the Chinese sought to set up a broad international front including China, the DRV, the PRG, the Pathet Lao, Cambodia, and North Korea (under Chinese leadership, of course), whereas the North Vietnamese wanted to confine the "revolutionary alliance" to Indochina (where, of course, they were the dominant power). On the other hand, this may not have been evident for Nixon in April 1970, nor did it help Lon Nol too much. After all, the net result was only that the Chinese and the North Vietnamese assisted the anti-Lon Nol forces along parallel lines, rather than in a coordinated way, but both Beijing and Hanoi remained hostile to Lon Nol.
All the best and thanks again,
Balazs
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From: ANG Cheng Guan (HSSE) <chengguan.ang@nie.edu.sg>
Date: 2008/8/5
To: aoverl@yahoo.co.uk, Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Dear Balaz,
You are indeed right that the extent/depth of the differences/cracks within the group (in this case, China, DRV, Khmer Rouge) may not be evident to American decision makers at the time.
I have not come across any account of American decision-making during the Nixon administration which gives much attention to this summit. But we do know that there were those in Washington (particularly in the military) who had for some time strongly believed/advocated that the US should move more aggressively into Cambodia to flush out the Vietnamese communists. I guess this was an opportunity/another reason to strengthen their case. Also, the summit probably did not come as too much of a surprise as cooperation amongst the communists in Indochina and with Beijing and Moscow was well known.
Having said that, scholars working on the Nixon and Kissinger decision-making with regards to the Indochina War may find something pertaining to this in the future when they are able to read more documents and listen to more tapes.
You would recall that around this time, the Indonesians were cobbling together, what became known as the Jakarta Conference, comprising the ASEAN countries, Australia, NZ, Japan, S. Korea and a few others (invited but did not attend) in response to the coup against Sihanouk. Interestingly, there was little mention of this summit too.
I found this contemporary account useful. You may be familiar with it: Peter A. Pool, Expansion of the Vietnam War into Cambodia: Action and Response by the Governments of North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Cambodia and the United States (Ohio University Center for International Studies, SEA Program 1970, Athens, Ohio)/Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series Number 17.
Best regards,
Guan
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