Nam Quốc Sơn Hà
From: Tan Pham <nxb315kio@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, April 8, 2023 3:50 AM
To: Hue-Tam Tai <huetamtai@gmail.com>
Cc: vsg@u.washington.edu
Subject: Re: [Vsg] Nam Quốc Sơn Hà
Thanks, Prof. Hue-Tam,
I agree that the concept of nationhood is a recent idea, but the first line of the poem spells out clearly "The Southern country's [Nam Quốc] mountain[s] and river[s] the Southern Emperor inhabits." The Quốc in this line acknowledges a political entity but does not say that this entity belongs to the ruler. This Southern country i.e. Đại Việt paid tributes to the Song dynasty. It in turn received tributes from Champa.
In the 13th century, historian Lê Văn Hưu criticized the Lý kings for building eight pagodas before the Ancestral Temple [Tông Miếu] and the Earth and Harvest Altar [Đàn Xã Tắc] and suggested the kings could only have done that by stripping off the people's blood and fat. In other words, there were also people in the Quốc and not just the kings.
But this subject takes it further from my original question, and other historians have a better understanding of it than I but thanks for the food for thought, once again.
Kind regards,
Tan Pham (NZ)
Author of a book series on Vietnamese history: A Traveller’s Story of Vietnam’s Past.
Volume One: The Bronze Drums and The Earrings. ISBN: 978-0-473-59804-4.
Volume Two: One Thousand Years - The Stories of Giao Châu, the Kingdoms of Linyi, Funan and Zhenla. ISBN 978-0-473-63527-5.
From: Hue-Tam Tai <huetamtai@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 7, 2023 3:44 PM
To: nxb315kio@gmail.com
Cc: vsg@u.washington.edu
Subject: Re: [Vsg] Nam Quốc Sơn Hà
Note that the first line states "the mountains and rivers of the South are where the emperor of the South dwells." In other words, the country belongs to the ruler, not to the people. Generals and officials were expected to be loyal to the ruler and implement his orders. Commoners were recruited locally and obeyed their (local) leaders. This remained true into the Nguyen dynasty.
I agree with Keith Taylor that regionalism was a motive force in Vietnamese history. There was no sense of belonging to one nation that needed to be defended. People defended their homes, not the country in which they happened to live.
On a related topic, it was the WWI policy of sending each regiment to fight at Verdun in.1916 that created a truly national French army. And its soldiers had been educated since the 1880s thanks to Jules Ferry. A very long time after 1075!
Hue Tam Ho Tai
Harvard UnIversity emerita
From: Tan Pham <nxb315kio@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 7, 2023 3:11 PM
To: Hue-Tam Tai <huetamtai@gmail.com>
Cc: vsg@u.washington.edu
Subject: Re: [Vsg] Nam Quốc Sơn Hà
Thank you Prof. Hue-Tam,
Your mentioning of binh binh trac trac reminds me of my childhood!!
I agree that Đại Việt 11th century soldiers were mainly illiterate, but as to their motivation, one can only speculate without going into a detailed analysis of how they were recruited, trained, and organised. Lý Thường Kiệt and his officers certainly knew why they fought; after all, he decided to preempt Song's plan by invading their garrisons and forts in Guangxi first. Did they motivate their soldiers with Nam Quốc Sơn Hà? Early historical records indicate so.
Thanks for giving me some food for thought.
Kind regards,
Tan Pham (NZ)
Author of a book series on Vietnamese history: A Traveller’s Story of Vietnam’s Past.
Volume One: The Bronze Drums and The Earrings. ISBN: 978-0-473-59804-4.
Volume Two: One Thousand Years - The Stories of Giao Châu, the Kingdoms of Linyi, Funan and Zhenla. ISBN 978-0-473-63527-5.
From: Hue-Tam Tai <huetamtai@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, April 7, 2023 8:04 AM
To: nxb315kio@gmail.com; vsg@u.washington.edu
Subject: Re: [Vsg] Nam Quốc Sơn Hà
On the difference in motivation between Dai Viet and Song forces, it is anachronistic to think that the Dai Viet soldiers fought to preserve their country's independence whereas Song soldiers fought for glory. The Song campaign was instigated by Wang Anshi to gain support for his Single Whip tax system against the opposition of Ssu Maguang. It was unpopular among landowners in southern China, something that Ly Thuong Kiet sought to exploit in his "Van Lo Bo". He also premptively attacked garrisons in.Guangdond, whch greatly reduced the amount of available supplies for the Song troops.
Returning to the issue of motivation, let's not inject the idea of " imagined community" Into discussions of 11th century societies whose soldiers were likely not only conscripted ( and serving reluctantly) but illiterate as well. This is why the soldiers might not have understood the deep meaning of the poem. So who was the poem.aimed at? My hunch is at Guo Kui and Wang Anshi.
By the way, during the period of high socialism, North Vietnamese schoolchildren learned "Nam toc" instead of "nam de" in line with the anachronistic interpretation of the poem.
Off topic, Tran Hung Dao's Hich Tuong Si is directed at generals and officers. No.mention of ordinary soldiers.
Hue-Tam Ho Tai
Harvard University emerita
Une armee marche avec son estomac (attributed to Napoleon)
From: Hue-Tam Tai <huetamtai@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 6, 2023 10:17 PM
To: nxb315kio@gmail.com; vsg@u.washington.edu
Subject: Re: [Vsg] Nam Quốc Sơn Hà
In the 11th century, Tang style prosodic rules would have ..ruled (bad pun). It was, after all, not long after the dissolution of the Tang empire.
I was made to learn those rules and still occasionally dream of binh binh trac trac binh binh trac.. etc.. even if I cannot put words to those rhymes ( it was my mother's idea of a properly educated Vietnamese) in this poem, the scansion is binh trac binh binh binh trac binh. The more important question is whether 11th century Vietnamese would have understood the meaning of the poem and agreed with it.
Hue-Tam Ho Tai
Harvard University emerita
From: Tan Pham <nxb315kio@gmail.com>
Sent: Thursday, April 6, 2023 9:20 PM
To: vsg@u.washington.edu
Subject: [Vsg] Nam Quốc Sơn Hà
Dear list,
In 2021, a Vietnamese rap hit by ERIK and Phương Mỹ Chi attracted 12M views. The hit is Nam Quốc Sơn Hà, with the lyrics built around a four-line 11th-century poem, sung during one night to motivate the Đại Việt troops against the Song at the famous battle of the Như Nguyệt river, about 40 kilometres northeast of Hanoi, in the winter of 1077.
This is a famous poem that most Vietnamese have to memorise from schools.
The poem is as follows:
From Đại Việt sử ký toàn thư
南國山河南帝居
截然分定在天書
如何逆虜來侵犯
汝等行看取敗虛
Hán –Việt translation
Nam quốc sơn hà Nam đế cư
Tiệt nhiên định phận tại thiên thư
Như hà nghịch lỗ lai xâm phạm
Nhữ đẳng hành khan thủ bại hư.
Vietnamese translation by Trần Trọng Kim
Sông núi nước Nam vua Nam ở
Rành rành định phận ở sách trời
Cớ sao lũ giặc sang xâm phạm
Chúng bay sẽ bị đánh tơi bời.
English translation by Vuving, A. L
The Southern country's mountain[s] and river[s] the Southern Emperor inhabits,
The separation is natural and allotted in Heaven's Book,
If the bandits come to trespass it,
You shall, in doing that, see yourselves to be handed with failure and shame!
In his book, A History of the Vietnamese (p. 85), Prof. Taylor wrote that the poem “would probably not have been wholly intelligible to Viet soldiers” as “it is written in Literary Chinese following Tang-style prosodic rules.”
My questions, a little esoteric, are:
a. Is Prof. Taylor correct with reference to the understandability and the Tang-style?
b. Today, while Erik sang the hit with the Han-Viet lyrics, I suspect most Vietnamese would not understand the whole poem. So back in the 11th century, assuming Đại Việt soldiers at the Như Nguyệt river, spoke a similar language to the modern Vietnamese, they would not understand the poem wholly either, whether Prof. Taylor is correct or not. What would the verse be sung in for the soldiers to understand if that were the case?
To give the context to these questions, below is a short paragraph about the battle I wrote for the upcoming third volume of my book series.
PS: If you find the questions boring, the YouTube video of Erik is a lot more exciting
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfNRYqlIsLM
First line of defence breached – the border battles
The stage was now set for a bloody contest between two wily generals of similar ages, Lý Thường Kiệt was 57, and Guo Jui was 54. Both were experienced generals who had fought in numerous wars. The difference was that if Lý Thường Kiệt were defeated, Đại Việt would cease to exist as an independent kingdom. In all possibility, he and his generals would almost certainly lose their heads. However, if Guo Kui were defeated, Song would retreat, and he would be severely punished, beheaded or exiled. Đai Việt troops were fighting for their country's survival, but Song troops were more likely to fight for glory and spoils.
Lý Thường Kiệt and his men knew the terrain they would be fighting on, but Lý Thường Kiệt relied on tribal loyalty to defend the border. On the other hand, Guo Kuo had his trusted generals and men with him even though they would be fighting on unfamiliar territory and a long way from their home base.
After a long pause at Pingxiang, Guo Kui was ready to move. He had secured his left flank on the coast, and now he was looking to protect his right flank by attacking the area around Cao Bằng. He was worried that if he marched straight through Lạng Sơn, Lưu Kỷ ̶ Đại Việt's the commander there ̶ would strike his forces from behind.
.....
Crossing the border in force
A week after Yanda's return to headquarters, on 8 January 1077, Guo Kui ordered the invasion across the entire length of the Đại Việt-Song border. Song cavalrymen in Cao Bằng moved south-east to the present-day Thất Khê and quickly took it because the tribal leaders there surrendered to Song as they had secretly agreed previously. Similarly, Song had no trouble taking the southeastern region because the tribal leaders there surrendered as prearranged. Song's strategy of persuading the tribal leaders at the border to abandon Đại Việt had been successful. All of these leaders had joined Lý Thường Kiệt a year before to sack Nanning and other garrisons, taking much loot in the process. To keep the loot and their heads, they may have decided that surrendering to Song, who arrived in force, was the best course of action.
......
The battle of the Cầu river
Guo Kui was moving quickly after a 70-day pause at the border; it took him only eight days from 10 January, when his forces crossed the border, to 18 January 1077, when he arrived on the northern bank of the Cầu river, a distance of approximately 130 kilometres. The campaign had been successful and relatively straightforward up to this point.
Lý Thường Kiệt had anticipated Song's plan of attacks and had organised the defence accordingly, but the defection of the tribal leaders at the border and his weaker forces were insufficient to stop the march of Guo Kui's armies. He was now facing the full power of the Song expeditionary forces with only a river between Guo Kui and Đại Việt's capital at Thăng Long, a distance of around 20 kilometres as the crow flies.
First battle at the Như Nguyệt ferry – Song lost
Guo Kui was a cautious and methodical commander, his plan had worked out up to this point, and victory was close at hand, except that he did not have any ships to ferry his men across the river. His navy remained on the coast. The river, as shown in Fig xx, was not very wide, but Guo Kui and his generals could see the formidable earthen rampart and the bamboo stakes on the river bank across their camp. So, without the ships, Guo Kui directed his commanders to wait.
People currently cross this stretch of the Cầu river via four bridges: from west to east, these are Mai-Đình Đông Xuyên, Đáp Cầu, Như Nguyệt and Yên Dũng. The first is close to Như Nguyệt ferry in the west, and the next two are close together, with Như Nguyệt bridge is on the main road from Hanoi to Lạng Sơn (today's highway 1A). These two bridges are approximately in the centre of Lý Thường Kiệt 60-kilometre line of defence. The fourth bridge, Yên Dũng, is to the east.
Prior to the construction of these bridges, people crossed the river by boat, and it is reasonable to assume that they would choose the narrowest parts of the river to build a ferry. Presently, there are 12 ferries; however, it is unlikely that there was the same number a thousand years earlier in the 11th century, but based on historical records, there were at least two, one at the present-day Như Nguyệt ferry and one at Đáp Cầu near Như Nguyệt bridge. According to the records, these were the most likely locations where the Song army camped. Guo Kui's headquarters was in the centre, near Như Nguyệt bridge, north of Bắc Ninh city. His left flank to the east was protected by the Nham Biền mountain range, which connects the Cầu and Thương rivers. On his right, about 30 kilometres to the west, he had Zhao Xie and a general named Miao Li (Miêu Lý) commanding a contingent of Song's troops near Như Nguyệt ferry.
Miao Li had a tribal leader who surrendered to the Song near Cao Bằng to help him with the direction to Thăng Long. This man advised Miao Li that the quickest way to Thăng Long was to cross the Cầu river at Như Nguyệt ferry. Miao Li, believing that Đại Việt troops were still stuck around Chi Lăng, convinced Guo Kui to agree to a daring plan to take Thăng Long by telling him that Đại Việt troops had fled. Guo Kui reluctantly agreed.
We have no information on how wide the river was at Như Nguyệt ferry in the 11th century, but according to Google Maps, it is currently about 113 metres as the crow flies. Song constructed a pontoon at the ferry and crossed the river at night. The commander of the vanguard, Wang Jin (Vương Tiến), went across first. Miao Li also crossed the river with his guide. Five hundred elite troops rowed over on rafts while the rest, about 1,000, crossed on the pontoon. However, Đại Việt soldiers were waiting for them on the southern bank, protected by the earthen rampart and the bamboo stakes. The defenders shot fire arrows “like rain” at the rafts and the pontoon bridge, killing many Song soldiers. The attackers put up the shields and charged up the bank, intending to cut and burn the bamboo stakes, but the stakes were too large, and many more were killed or captured. The situation deteriorated as the attackers could not return the rafts for reinforcement, and at least 300 of them were dead, captured or fled, possibly within the first few hours of landing.
The landing was a failure, and Wang Jin was worried that Đại Việt would counterattack across the pontoon, so he ordered it cut; many Song soldiers did not get off the pontoon in time, fell into the river and drowned. He counted 500 surviving troops, and together, they fought their way through the Đại Việt line and rushed towards Thăng Long; some got as far as 15 li (about seven kilometres from the capital). They were still north of the Red river at this distance on the current map, with Thăng Long on the other side. Đại Việt troops fought them fiercely, killing another 300 of Wang Jin's men. By now, out of the original number of 1,500; Miao Li and Wang Jin only had 200 men left.
The situation was desperate, Zhao Xie, still on the northern bank of the river, sent reinforcements in rafts, but as they approached the southern bank, they were met with arrows and lances and could not land. One can imagine the chaotic scene of smoke, rafts and pontoon on fire, and dead men in the river as viewed from the northern bank. In any event, Guo Kui concluded that Song's attempt to rush to Thăng Long and establish a “beachhead” had failed. He ordered Miao Li and his men to retreat, which they did safely. Guo Kui accepted the blame for the failure and was about to behead Miao Li for going against his orders not to attack, but Zhao Xie defended Miao Li, and he was condoned. Afterwards, Miao Li was granted a title, and 200 of the survivors were also rewarded. Wang Jin and his subordinates were found guilty of cutting the pontoon too soon but were spared the beheading because they fought well at Cao Bằng.
We do not know how long the battle lasted, but based on the sequence of events described above in the Chinese historical record, it could not have lasted more than two or three days. However, the fighting was intense, and it could have gone either way at some point. According to legend, Lý Thường Kiệt ordered a man disguised as the river god to cite the following poem during the night to motivate his troops:
The Southern country's mountain[s] and river[s] the Southern Emperor inhabits,
The separation is natural and allotted in Heaven's Book,
If the bandits come to trespass it,
You shall, in doing that, see yourselves to be handed with failure and shame!
The poem elated the spirit of Đại Việt soldiers and struck fear into Song troops that they were “scared to death, did not fight and scattered”. This poem has become one the most famous historical poems that all Vietnamese children have to memorise in their studies.
This battle was not large in scale but was critical in the Song campaign. Up to that point, once they crossed the border, Song had overcome Đại Việt's defences with relative ease. At Như Nguyệt ferry, they knew that they were now facing a tough enemy behind formidable defence works.
Kind regards,
Tan Pham (NZ)
Author of a book series on Vietnamese history: A Traveller’s Story of Vietnam’s Past.
Volume One: The Bronze Drums and The Earrings. ISBN: 978-0-473-59804-4.
Volume Two: One Thousand Years - The Stories of Giao Châu, the Kingdoms of Linyi, Funan and Zhenla. ISBN 978-0-473-63527-5.