Embedded Files
Romi <wearevn@yahoo.co.uk>
date Dec 17, 2007 1:01 AM
subject [Vsg] Vietnamese rally again over islands disputed with China (AFP)
Dear all,
A second Sunday peaceful demonstration against China's claim over the Spratlys and Paracels archipelagos was held in both Ha Noi and Ho Chi Minh city yesterday. It was spontaneously brought about by online community of several Vietnamese forums. No organization was behind the protest. Police seemed to be strict but no clash happened.
In this clip http://youtube.com/watch?v=Mo5CTJDl46I, a demonstrator in Ha Noi said 'the police have their duty... we protest peacefully...' Another one added 'this is not to oppose the government... we want to raise patriotism among the Vietnamese...' The Chinese-language ATV also put a piece of news in their programme: http://app.hkatv.com/v3/webtv/play.php?video_id=57111.
Some dissidents attempted to incite riot but their scheme failed when facing high vigilance from the people participating in the march.
After the first protest last Sunday, China's foreign ministry expressed their "concern over the matter." They have at least one reason for their concern since other forms of anti-China protest including the anti-Chinese goods campaign and the online petitions are now growing. I have spotted a few T-shirts and helmets carrying anti-China slogans in Ha Noi today.
Best,
Romi
"Sidel, Mark" <mark-sidel@uiowa.edu>
date Dec 18, 2007 8:34 PM
subject [Vsg] CCP (again) demands cessation of Vietnam demonstrations
News reports posted on C-Pol, a China studies listserve.
http://www.bernama.com.my/bernama/v3/news_world.php?id=303376
http://www.ocregister.com/news/vietnam-chinese-islands-1943406-china-communist
Chuck Searcy <chucksearcy@yahoo.com>
date Dec 19, 2007 5:38 AM
subject Re: [Vsg] CCP (again) demands cessation of Vietnam demonstrations
Mark, do you think this is an issue on which the American Viet-kieu and homeland Vietnamese may be joining forces in some unity, or is this a bit of a stretch? -- Chuck
Subject: [Vsg] Vietnamese reactions to China's step in the East Sea
------------------------
From: Mathieu Bouquet <mathbouq@mathbouq.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, Dec 17, 2007 at 1:04 AM
Dear all,
As far as I have seen, there has been no message on the list about the Vietnamese reactions following China's rather aggressive decision to create a Hainan based administration covering the East Sea / South China Sea archipelagoes.
The official reaction of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs abode strictly by Vietnam's international commitments, sticking to the now usual action/protestation process which Vietnam and China experience each time one of them (or any other claimant) touches the archipelagoes issue.
This time, it seems to me that the demonstrations in front of the Chinese embassy and consulate are something quite new: as far as I know, the only previous event -since the 1991 bilateral normalization- which triggered such reactions was the killing of Vietnamese fishermen by the Chinese navy in January 2005 in the Bac Bô. I even read that the demonstration which was planned in 2005 in front of the Chinese embassy was stopped some moments before the demonstrators arrive there.
As for this year, I read that demonstrations reached the embassy and the consulate of the PRC on Sunday 9th, but I am not sure that they effectively came in front of the buildings. Yesterday, as I was having -late- breakfast with some friends near the reunification palace in HCMC, the police blocked Lê Duân street and, progressively, all crossings and many other streets around there, as some groups of young people (maybe 200-300 in total) were singing, shouting, not so far from the PRC consulate, opposite to the Diamond Plaza building. Unfortunately, my Vietnamese is still very poor, and I couldn't understand what they were claiming, but I was confirmed that it was about China's step on the islands issue. Moreover, Vietnamese spectators who were not part of the demonstration seemed rather supportive of the participants. Last year, when China announced it had settled some sovereignty markers on Hoang Sa / Paracels islands, I didn't hear of such public protest, though Vietnamese media talked about the issue (I was then writing my Master thesis about the maritime issue in Chinese-Vietnames relations since 1991, so, I was quite focused on that subject).
As far as I know, Vietnamese media talked about last week demonstrations, but kept quiet about yesterday's event, and I don't know whether there was a similar event in Hanoi yesterday. I guess the government tolerates such demonstrations as long as they don't spread to the whole Vietnamese society, which may endanger the relations with China.
--------
From: Lan PHAMNGOC <lan_phamngoc@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, Dec 17, 2007 at 1:24 AM
Dear VSGers
Thanks for this report and comment from VN, I've read news from AFP, as well as from Vietnamese press in VN and abroad about the demonstrations these last 2 Sundays, but I'd like to hear from our VSG members who are actually in HaNoi and SaiGon.
I wonder if the demonstrations are tolerated by the governement or not.
Pha.m Ngo.c La^n
Aix-en-Provence
Mathieu Bouquet <mathbouq@mathbouq.com> wrote:
Dear all,
As far as I have seen, there has been no message on the list about the
Vietnamese reactions following China's rather aggressive decision to
create a Hainan based administration covering the East Sea / South China
Sea archipelagoes.
The official reaction of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs
abode strictly by Vietnam's international commitments, sticking to the
now usual action/protestation process which Vietnam and China experience
each time one of them (or any other claimant) touches the archipelagoes
issue.
This time, it seems to me that the demonstrations in front of the
Chinese embassy and consulate are something quite new: as far as I know,
the only previous event -since the 1991 bilateral normalization- which
triggered such reactions was the killing of Vietnamese fishermen by the
Chinese navy in January 2005 in the Bac B�. I even read that the
demonstration which was planned in 2005 in front of the Chinese embassy
was stopped some moments before the demonstrators arrive there.
As for this year, I read that demonstrations reached the embassy and the
consulate of the PRC on Sunday 9th, but I am not sure that they
effectively came in front of the buildings. Yesterday, as I was having
-late- breakfast with some friends near the reunification palace in
HCMC, the police blocked L� Du�n street and, progressively, all
crossings and many other streets around there, as some groups of young
people (maybe 200-300 in total) were singing, shouting, not so far from
the PRC consulate, opposite to the Diamond Plaza building.
Unfortunately, my Vietnamese is still very poor, and I couldn't
understand what they were claiming, but I was confirmed that it was
about China's step on the islands issue. Moreover, Vietnamese spectators
who were not part of the demonstration seemed rather supportive of the
participants. Last year, when China announced it had settled some
sovereignty markers on Hoang Sa / Paracels islands, I didn't hear of
such public protest, though Vietnamese media talked about the issue (I
was then writing my Master thesis about the maritime issue in
Chinese-Vietnames relations since 1991, so, I was quite focused on that
subject).
As far as I know, Vietnamese media talked about last week
demonstrations, but kept quiet about yesterday's event, and I don't know
whether there was a similar event in Hanoi yesterday. I guess the
government tolerates such demonstrations as long as they don't spread to
the whole Vietnamese society, which may endanger the relations with China.
--------
From: Anthony Le <leductony@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, Dec 17, 2007 at 2:01 AM
This morning, I went into a chat group participated by
"Vietnamese patriots" and I raised the issue of why is
it so difficult to find news about the demonstrations
in the Vietnamese newspapers. The owner of the room
responded haughtily: Why should the newspapers write
about such silly (vo*' va^~n) things? The government
already as a way to deal with the issue. We don't need
the people to be going out to do things that
jeopardize the economic development of Vietnam, which
progressing smoothly. Vietnam fought China before, and
won, but ended up having to eat "bo bo". This time,
Vietnam has to be more clever than that.
This attitude matches with what I've been reading
about the police's attempt to prevent the
demonstrators from approaching into the vicinity of
the Chinese embassy, demonstrators being arrested on
the way home, and news organizations being prohibited
from reporting the events.
Individuals from inside Vietnam also tell me that
students who want to go demonstrate are in the
thousands, but are prohibited by their university
professors. As a result, only a few hundred dared to
attend the rallies.
It seems that the government is discouraging if not
clamping down on the student rallies. It doesn't seem
that toleration would be the right word to describe
government reaction if it is true that individuals are
being arrested for questioning.
My question is what is the Vietnamese government's
motivation for clamping down (or restricting) on the
student's Anti-China rallies? Is there a fear that
Anti-China rallies could one day turn into Anti-DCSVN
rallies?
Anthony
--------
From: Stephen Denney <sdenney@ocf.berkeley.edu>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Dec 21, 2007 at 9:35 AM
On a related topic, there have also been protests in Phnom Penh against the Vietnamese embassy. A few days ago, about 40 monks clashed with 100 police at that embassy when they tried to present a petition demanding the release of Tim Sakkhorn, a Khmer monk from Vietnam who was deported to Vietnam and is currently imprisoned for his anti-Vietnam activism. See:
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5h0fksieRAMZQQnvLNXE2pqDuZGQQ
and for a letter from PM Hun Sen justifying the arrest:
http://www.khmerkrom.net/?q=node/1076
- Steve Denney
--------
Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
date Jan 5, 2008 10:26 PM
subject Re: [Vsg] Indian-Vietnamese cooperation against China
This tendency of Indian-Vietnamese cooperation against China has a long tradition. As early as the mid-1970s, India supported Vietnam's efforts to join the Non-Aligned Movement (the Chinese, on their part, supported North Korea, which led to competition between Hanoi and P'yongyang within the NAM). In the 1980s, India was one of the few non-Communist countries which recognized the pro-Vietnamese People's Republic of Kampuchea. In 1986-89, as both India and Vietnam were worried by Gorbachev's efforts to achieve a reconciliation with China, New Delhi and Hanoi drew even closer together. Similar considerations induced Indonesia to improve its relations with Vietnam as soon as the VCP leaders made a firm commitment to withdraw their troops from Kampuchea. Remarkably, in 1986 the Indonesians repeatedly warned the Soviets not to trust the Chinese, who, as the Indonesians put it, sought to "milk two cows at the same time."
Best,
Balazs Szalontai
Mongolia International University
Subject: [Vsg] FW: [C-POL] Vietnam contends with China's rise
------------------------
From: Sidel, Mark <mark-sidel@uiowa.edu>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: vsg@u.washington.edu
Date: Sat, Jan 5, 2008 at 9:26 PM
As posted on a China studies listserve.
http://www.business-standard.com/opinionanalysis/storypage.php?leftnm=lmnu5&subLeft=&autono=309692&tab=r
Mark Sidel
mark-sidel@uiowa.edu
--------
From: Shawn McHale <mchale@gwu.edu>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 5, 2008 at 10:51 PM
Dear list,
This analysis of Vietnam--China relations seems off-key -- it seems to miss key pieces of information that would cast the story differently.
First of all, Vietnam and India are rivals as well as partners. The fact that Intel decided to situate a chip plant in Vietnam (in November?), after courting India as well, was big news here and in India. The message to India was, I think, clear. Investment in India will lag unless India's famous bureaucracy doesn't get its act together and move at a faster pace. That being said, it is in India's and Vietnam's interest to collaborate in many domains. Besides, I am sure that the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry has not forgotten India's attempts from the 1940s onwards to promote the interests of the formerly colonized countries against imperialist powers.
But the idea that Vietnam would cozy up to India now to counter China seems, well, like a conspiratorial spin on the obvious. Vietnamese foreign policy over the last 15 years has focused on developing a range of partnerships -- becoming part of ASEAN, joining WTO, maintaining bilateral ties with old friends (Cuba, Algeria, etc . . .) and developing new ones. The whole point seems to be to make Vietnam less dependent on any one country. It is a very smart foreign policy. It means that China will be an important partner, but not excessively important.
As for the "crop of anti-Chinese stories" around Christmas -- well, it is no surprise that there were some, but what was notable, I think, was the *restraint* of the press. Some stories appeared about China's extension of its claims to the Spratleys and Paracels, and then they gradually were relegated to lesser news. The author seems to conflate two issues: being "anti-Chinese" as in being anti Chinese *people* with opposition to Chinese policy. At an official level, I would say that there has been restraint. At a more popular level, sure, funny stories circulate about cats with no tails etc. But this same kind of story circulated 16 years ago when I was in Hanoi. Plus ca change. . .
Finally, the story misses what I think is one of the most interesting aspects of the Spratleys/ Paracels dispute. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam was not the best custodian of Vietnam's claim to these islands. The Republic of Vietnam -- South Vietnam -- was. It was South Vietnamese solders who, up to 1975 (or was in 1974?), tried to defend this claim. South Vietnam has disappeared, obviously, as a country, but its acts in defending various reefs and islands are appreciated by many Vietnamese. Indeed, stories have appeared in the press about South Vietnamese soldiers (marines?) who were stationed in some of these lonely places and "defended" Vietnam. Whatever one thinks of South Vietnam and its leadership, its acts over the Spratleys and Paracels have been, I hazard, a concrete way for the current government to extend a conciliatory hand towards some who served the former government, just as it has been extending a conciliatory hand for some time to Vietnamese abroad.
. . .
Finally finally (!!), I'd love to see a legal analysis of the Chinese claim to these islands. Both sides (China and Vietnam) seem to invoke many weak arguments. Chinese mention that Chinese lived in these islands. Vietnamese make the same kinds of arguments. But this is hardly a claim of *sovereignty*. I would be interested to hear of cases in which either China or Vietnam has denied that it has jurisdiction over these islands. I'vce come across mention that the local government of Guangdong denied that Chinese had a claim over these islands (in a case involving a British shipwreck in the 1800s), but that is not the same thing . . . In any case, I sense that the Chinese claim is quite weak -- weaker than the Vietnamese one.
Shawn McHale
Associate Professor of History and International Affairs
George Washington University
Washington, DC 20052 USA
(on leave, 2007-08, at Vietnam National University --
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam)
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 6, 2008 at 12:11 AM
Dear Shawn (if I may),
I agree with you in that the Indian article recently quoted on the list was fairly strongly rooted in a conspiratorial mentality, but I would not entirely dismiss the possibility of that there is some special element in Indian-Vietnamese cooperation, at least as a potential. While post-1989 Vietnamese foreign policy has indeed been as multilateral as possible, India was a special partner (though not necessarily a close, let alone a permanent ally) in several respects, differentiating it from Thailand, Indonesia, Cuba and many other countries:
1) India is a nuclear power possessing long-range missiles that are able to hit important targets in China;
2) The Indian navy, the fifth largest in the world, is anxious to maintain a presence along the western coast of the South-east Asian mainland, and it also carried out joint exercises with its Vietnamese counterpart on the South China Sea (which, of course, should not be taken out of context, since it also exercised with many other countries, including even China);
3) India hardly, if ever, was in a sharp conflict with Vietnam;
4) India had, and potentially still has, territorial disputes with China;
5) India, unlike Russia, is hardly interested in cooperating with China against the U.S.
This combination of factors is quite unique, and thus I think it is worth paying attention to the development of Indian-Vietnamese relations. Since in post-1959 South Asia, China has traditionally been more willing to cooperate with Pakistan than with India, and Indian-Pakistani relations are still very far from complete normalization, there is still a great deal of potential tension in Sino-Indian relations.
As for the Spratley-Paracel issue: I think it does deserve extensive analysis. Here I may mention only that the timing of the Chinese invasion (January 1974) seems quite interesting. Namely, it took place at a time when China's relations with the Soviet Union and the DRV were still bad, but Sino-U.S. relations also started to deteriorate, mainly because of the progress of Soviet-U.S. rapprochement (see, for instance, the revival of the ultra-leftist policies of the Cultural Revolution in 1973-74). The occupation of the Paracels was actually a blow delivered to both Vietnams, and indirectly to their superpower patrons. It was probably not accidental that the Khmer Rouge, having been somewhat neglected by the Chinese in 1972, was given massive Chinese support in 1974. After all, the Khmer Rouge was at the same time anti-American, anti-RVN and, to a lesser extent, anti-DRV.
Best,
Balazs
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 6, 2008 at 12:25 AM
On the context of the Chinese occupation of the Paracels, see this short quotation from "Time" (April 15, 1974) as indicator:
Since the Peking summit of 1972, Chinese leaders have notably muted their anti-American diatribes. But at a banquet last week for General Khieu Samphan, commander of the insurgent Communist forces in Cambodia, Premier Chou En-lai lashed out at the U.S. for having "brazenly made a massive invasion into Cambodia." In an oblique reference to Richard Nixon, Chou contemptuously dismissed the President's oft-stated goals for détente with the comment: "The revolutionary people do not all believe in a so-called lasting peace' or a 'generation of peace.' So long as imperialism exists, revolution and war are inevitable."
Chou's attack on the U.S. and his pointed ridicule of two of Nixon's favorite phrases were not isolated incidents. Two days later, Wang Hung-wen, party vice-chairman and No. 3 man in Peking's Politburo, accused the U.S. of having directly "engineered the reactionary coup d'état" of 1970, which toppled Cambodia's Prince Sihanouk. Wang described "U.S. imperialism" as "armed to the teeth"—a highly belligerent image in Chinese.
In addition to the speeches, there has apparently been a resurgence of anti-imperialism in the provinces. In Szechwan, for example, the provincial radio reported a rally condemning the World War II Chinese American Cooperation Center (which was actually a technical-assistance facility for the Chinese secret police) where, it was said, "U.S.Chiang Kai-shek reactionaries had slaughtered the Chinese people."
--------
Subject: [Vsg] Paracel Islands
------------------------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 6, 2008 at 9:42 AM
Dear All,
I would like to ask for your interpretation of the following document:
On 09-04-1958, the China government declared their territorial waters is 12 nautical miles, applied to all China territory, including Dongsha, Xisha (Hoang-Sa or Paracel Islands), Zhongsha, Nansha (Truong-Sa or Spratly Islands). Ten days later, Pham-Van-Dong, then the Prime Minister of the North Vietnam sent an official message to Chou-En-Lai, Prime Minister of China to confirm that "the Democratic Republic of Vietnam government recognizes and supports the proclamation of the People Republic of China government on 09-04-1958."
Below is the full text of the document:
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam Prime Minister...
....
Dear Comrade Prime Minister:
We would like to inform you that:
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam government acknowledges and agrees to the proclamation of the People Republic of China on 09-04-1958 about the China territorial waters claim.
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam government honors that proclamation and directs responsible departments to ultimately honor that 12 nautical miles territorial waters claim of the People Republic of China in all relations with China on the sea.
Respectfully yours, Hanoi, 09-14-1958
Pham-Van-Dong
Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
http://www.xuquang.com/dialinhnk/hsrinh.html
This is often interpreted as DRV acceptance of PRC claims for the Paracels and Spratlys. However, I think it is also possible to interpret Pham Van Dong's letter in a different way. Namely, he may have recognized only the principle of 12-miles territorial waters, and evaded the definition and enumeration of the areas to which it was applicable. While the Chinese declaration of September 4 seems to have been very specific, describing the territories to which the territorial waters claim was applied, the DRV declaration specified only the extent of the territorial waters. In other words, the DRV probably adopted the same attitude as in 1974: concerned with its conflict with the RVN, it preferred not to disagree with the PRC openly, but it did not openly support the Chinese territorial claims either.
However, I may be mistaken. Could you possibly comment on this issue?
(My private opinion is that the islands in question constitute ancient Laotian territory, but since their navy is not powerful enough, they never dared to make their claim publicly.:)))
Best regards,
Balazs Szalontai
Mongolia International University
--------
From: Mathieu Bouquet <mathbouq@mathbouq.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 6, 2008 at 10:50 AM
Dear Balazs,
I agree with your interpretation, and as far as I know, it is not so far from the official position of SRVN. At least, the White book published in 1979 in Hanoi by the MoFA (English title: The Truth about Sino-Vietnamese relations in the past 30 Years) officially endorses this argument.
I think it is obvious to many that, at that time, whether it be in 1958 or 1974, DRVN could hardly afford a clash with China on the islands issue, as China was still a key support (at least logistically, even in 1974, though bilateral relations had started to deteriorate in the early 1970s) for the war effort. Though the islands were a matter of patriotic interest, they were not worth jeopardizing the achievement of the reunification project.
Nevertheless, in legal terms, the 1958 declaration and the absence of public reaction to China's shift in 1974 (as well as another declaration in 1965) may be insufficient for China to prove anything: from 1954 to 1976, Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes were under the sovereignty of the South Vietnamese state (following the 1954 Paris agreement, which defined the southern half as all Vietnamese territories under the 17th parallel), and the RVN issued an official protest in 1958, as it did in 1974. Moreover, in 1974, the Provisional Revolutionary Government and the press opposed to the southern government, which were largely backed by Hanoi (and which were not as organised in 1958 as they were in 1974), mentioned that the issue of islands were a source of concern for both peoples, and had to be discussed in a timely manner. So, even if they didn't aggressively answer China's shift, they didn't keep silent on the subject, and their reaction dismisses Chinese argument that Vietnam accepted China's move as Hanoi didn't protest: none of the South Vietnamese political forces accepted the Chinese fait accompli.
This argument (South Vietnam's sovereignty on the archipelagoes) is developed by Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, a French specialist in international law, in her numerous publications on the subject (mainly in French), and it is also present in Vietnamese publications, including official white books from the RVN (published in 1975) and the SRVN (1979).
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 6, 2008 at 11:33 AM
Dear Mathieu (if I may),
thanks a lot for your very precise reply! It is very interesting what you say about the standpoint of the PRG. I do agree with that its standpoint most probably coincided with that of Hanoi. In any case, the principle of "silence is consent" is hardly applicable to Communist states. If the North Vietnamese failed to make any comment on Chinese actions with regard to the Paracels, this was as likely to indicate disagreement as agreement. The North Koreans were notorious for their unwillingness to make any public comment on issues which they disliked but could not criticize directly for some reason. The best example was that the North Korean press failed to make a single reference to the great event of man's first landing on the Moon -because the person in question was an American imperialist, rather than a heroic North Korean (or at least Chinese or Soviet) cosmonaut...
All the best and thanks again,
Balazs
--------
Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
date Jan 11, 2008 4:57 AM
subject Re: [Vsg] PARACELS: self-correction
Of course I meant the Paracel Islands:
2) If the PRC did not raise the issue of the Paracels in 1958, this may indicate that its claim for the islands was not as automatic and natural as the Chinese government presented it after 1974. In other words, Beijing may not have resorted to the forceful occupation of the islands if the international situation had been different in 1974.Anthony Le <leductony@yahoo.com>
date Jan 12, 2008 8:02 AM
subject [Vsg] A point of view on PVD's diplomatic note
Hi all,
I made a cursory translation of a Vietnamese article
analyzing the diplomatic note of PVD. I left some
background information out of the translation. I am
also not very confident on my accuracy in the section
on the principle of "estoppel". But here it is
anyways.:
.........................
Situation:
On September 4, 1958 Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai
declared to the world China’s decision regarding the
12 nautical mile territorial waters from mainland
China, which also included a map clearly depicting sea
borders and sea territories (which also included the
two archipelagos Paracel and Spratly or Hoang Sa and
Truong Sa).
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong representing the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
affirmed this declaration from China regarding Chinese
ownership of the archipelagos in the Eastern Sea
(South China Sea). The diplomatic note was written on
September 14 and was publicized on Nhan Dan newspaper
on September 22, 1958.
The content of the letter is as follows:
We would like to inform you so that you may be clear
that the Government of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam has noted and support the September 4, 1958
declaration by the People’s Republic of China
regarding territorial waters of China. The government
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam respects this
decision and will direct the proper government
agencies to respect absolutely the 12 nautical mile
territorial waters of China in all dealings with the
People’s Republic of China on the sea. We would like
to send our sincere regards.
Analysis in Modern Journal:
The above declaration is not valid because before
1975, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North
Vietnam) did not control these islands. At that time,
these islands were under the control of the Republic
of Vietnam (South Vietnam) who always asserted
Vietnamese sovereignty over these two archipelagos.
The Revolutionary Government of the Republic of
Vietnam also made no declaration that jeopardized this
sovereignty. According to the lawyer and author
Monique Chemillier-Gendreau:
“In this context, declarations or any viewpoints given
by the North Vietnamese government is not effective
when it comes to sovereignty. This was not a
government that had authority over these archipelagos.
One may not renounce what one has no authority over….”
A second reason from a legal perspective is that at
that time North Vietnam was not a party in the
conflict. Before 1975, the countries and territories
involved in the conflict included: China, Taiwan,
South Vietnam, and the Philippines. Therefore,
declarations made by North Vietnam may be seen as
declarations of a third party, which had no effect on
the conflict itself.
Supposing that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam
(North) and the Republic of Vietnam (South) were one
country, then based on international law, this
declaration is also invalid. However, some has
espoused the doctrine of “estoppel” in order to argue
that this declaration has validity and Vietnam cannot
go back on its words.
According to international law, there is no other
legal bar that creates obligation for those who make
unilateral declaration other than “estoppel”. Estoppel
is a principle in which a country cannot say or do in
contrast to what was said or done before. In other
words, “one cannot at the same time blow hot and
cold.” However, estoppel does not mean that a country
is obligated to whatever it declares.
The estoppel doctrine had its beginning in English
law, and was later brought into international law. The
main purpose is to prevent countries from benefitting
from its dishonest actions, and hurting other
countries. Therefore, estoppel must meet the following
criteria:
1. The declaration or action must be taken by a
representative of a country in a clear and unequivocal
manner.
2. The country that claims “estoppel” must prove that
based on that declaration or action, there are actions
or inactions being carried out by that country which
constitutes “reliance”, as is called in English and
American law.
3. The country claiming “estoppel” also has to prove
that based on the declaration of the other country, it
has suffered damage, or that the other country has
benefitted when making that declaration.
4. Some judgments demand that this declaration must be
made in a continous manner over time.
In addition, if the declaration has the characteristic
of a promise, which means that the country declares
that it will or will not do something, it must have
true intention of wanting to be obligated by that
promise, and truly wants to execute that promise.
The estoppel doctrine has many precedents in
international courts and countries who have made
certain declarations have found to not be obligated to
follow them because not all the conditions are met.
Applying these criteria of estoppel to the declaration
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, we can see that
conditions 2 and 3 are missing. In the years 1956,
1958, and 1965, China did not have any attitude or
make any changes in its attitude based on North
Vietnam’s declaration. China also cannot prove that it
suffered damage for relying on that declaration. North
Vietnam did not benefit in any way from making that
declaration. At that time, Vietnam and China saw
themselves as close comrades and friends. The
declaration made by PM Pham Van Dong was based on that
friendship. Moreover, the wording of the declaration
does not clearly and unequivocally affirm Chinese
ownership of the Paracel Islands. The letter only
states: “The government of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam respects this decision (the decision to
determine the 12 nautical mile territorial waters of
China), and will direct the proper government agencies
to respect absolutely the 12 nautical mile territorial
waters of China….”
The declaration of PM Pham Van Dong may also be
understood as a unilateral promise, a declaration of
intention. In fact, this is a promise to respect the
decision of China in its determination of sea
territories, and a promise to order national agencies
to respect Chinese territories.
If it is a mere promise, then it is even more
difficult to obligate a country to follow that
promise. The International Court has provided one more
condition to make a promise obligatory: the true
intention of the country making that promise. That is,
whether that country really wants to be obligated to
its promise or not. In order to determine this
intention, the court examines every event surrounding
the declaration, to see in what context and
circumstances was the declaration made. Moreover, if
the court sees that the country can obligate itself
through signing agreements with the other country,
then the declaration is not needed, and the court will
conclude that the country making the declaration does
not truly want to be obligated to that declaration.
Therefore, the declaration does not have an obligatory
characteristic.
In this case, when PM Pham Van Dong declared that
Vietnam will respect Chinese sea territories, he did
not intend to speak of ownership of the Paracel and
Spratly Islands. He made this declaration in urgent
circumstances, in which the war with the United States
was escalating, American Fleet 7 was carrying out
activites on the Taiwan Strait threatening China. He
had to immediately voice support of China in order to
counter against American threat.
The 1965 declaration of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam was in the same manner. The motivation for
that declaration was an urgent situation of danger in
Vietnam. This is a declaration that has political not
legal characteristics.
Even the condition of making declaration continuously
and over time is not satisfied when it comes to the
three declarations of North Vietnam. Estoppel doctrine
is only applied if we consider North Vietnam and The
Socialist Republic of Vietnam as one; and even France
during the colonial period, and the Republic of
Vietnam (South Vietnam) as the same entity as the
present Vietnam. If we consider the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) as a separate
country, then estoppel cannot be applied because, as
stated above, the declaration will be seen as a
declaration made by a country that does not have
authority over territories being disputed. Therefore,
if Vietnam is seen as one single entity from history
until the present, then the three declarations made by
North Vietam are only statements that carry political
meaning during wartimes, compared to the attitude and
viewpoint of Vietnam in general from the 17th century
until the present.
In summary, the declaration that we are analyzing is
missing many factors that allow for estoppel to be
applied. The factors of reliance and intention are
very significant. If the reliance factor does not
exist in order to limit the application of estoppel,
countries will be prevented in making their foreign
policies. They will be forced to follow out-dated ways
to execute their foreign policies. When conditions
change, the foreign policy of the other country
changes, the foreign policy of this country must also
change. It is normal for countries to be friends one
moment and then turn into enemies the next.
As for unilateral promises without true intention of
following, they are no more than empty promises,
similar to those of politicans and candidates in
political elections. In the international arena, the
principle of sovereignty is very important. Outside
international procedures and the articles of Jus
Congens, there is no law that obligates a country
contrary to its wishes, when it is not causing damage
to another country. Therefore, the intention of the
country has a decisive role in determining obligation
of a unilateral promise.
Subject: [Vsg] Do Be Careful: TWO Different PRC documents, 4 and 9 Sept 1958
------------------------
From: Lady Borton <Lady@frognet.net>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: vsg@u.washington.edu
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 1:16 AM
Dear friends and colleagues,
There's lots of great information on the Web. It's the library of the
world for those of us living in developing countries. However, there is
also plenty of "creativity." So, yes, as Balazs Szalontai implies, it
seems to me it's always a good idea to ask for the full, original text and
check translations. I don't have any skills in Chinese, so I'm afraid I
can't help out on that score.
In addition, it is also important to check dates.
Do be careful:
We are talking about TWO different PRC documents, both in English and both
English versions from official Chinese sources:
1. Peping Radio (official) 6 September 1958 broadcast in English,
transcript in NEW YORK TIMES on 7 September was attached to my first
message. That document does NOT mention the Paracels and Spratlys.
2. Peking Review (official) text available kindness of Matthieu Bouquet's
posting can be found at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/ls043.pdf. That
document is dated 9 September 1958. It is far longer. That document DOES
mention the Paracels and Spratlys in a separate section where the PRC
makes claims for islands outside the twelve-mile rule.
Nations (like scholars) sometimes write different documents about the same
topic, a second version having more and/or different content from the
first.
Pham Van Dong's letter of 14 September specifically references the Chinese
statement of 4 September 1958. It's easy to flip the dates around -- I
confuse myself in my own notebook! The Vietnamese version of Pham Van
Dong's letter attached to my first message is clear: "ngay 4 thang 9 nam
1958". That translates as: 4 September, NOT 9 September.
Do be careful. Pham Van Dong is NOT responding to the longer and larger
statement of 9 September 1958 that includes the Paracels and Spratlys.
If you reference the statement of 9 September in relation to Pham Van
Dong's letter, then you are taking that letter out of context. Pham Van
Dong is referencing a specific document dated 4 September 1958 and only
that.
We need to remember that there can be different versions of the same idea
and different drafts of the same version. To be sure, it would be useful
to have from those of you who have studied this question deeply in concert
with Vietnamese colleagues inside Viet Nam a copy of THE version dated 4
September 1958 that the PRC DELIVERED TO THE DRVN. Not a version "created"
for the Web but the version ACTUALLY delivered to the DRVN Government.
It's conceivable, I suppose, that there could be two different "official"
PRC versions dated 4 September, one sent to Viet Nam and one broadcast to
the wider world.
But for sure, rule out that one dated 9 September when discussing Pham Van
Dong's letter.
And, regardless, Pham Van Dong cites only the 12-miles rule, where "twelve
miles" refers to distance from a mainland. The Spratlys and Paracels are
more than twelve miles from ANY mainland.
Hope that helps!
Lady
Lady Borton
Box 94
International Post Office
Ha Noi, Viet Nam
Phone: 84-4-8-325-229
Fax: 84-4-8-325-819
Lady@frognet.net
--------
From: Matt Steinglass <mattsteinglass@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 1:53 AM
Like Liam Kelley, I am getting increasingly confused here.
Lady Borton wrote:
" Pham Van Dong's letter of 14 September specifically references the Chinese
statement of 4 September 1958."
This is the declaration by the PRC of 4 September, as issued in Peking
Review on 9 September, as supplied in Mathieu Bouquet's posting at
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/ls043.pdf and also
available at http://datviet.free.fr/archive/0,,701,00.html :
" DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ON THE
TERRITORIAL SEA
(Approved by the 100th Session of the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress on 4th September, 1958)
The People's Republic of China hereby announces:
(1) This width of the territorial sea of the People's Republic of China is
twelve national miles. This provision applies to all Territories of the
People's Republic of China, including the mainland China and offshore
islands, Taiwan (separated from the mainland and offshore islands by high
seas) and its surrounding islands, the Penghu Archipelago, the Dongsha
Islands, the Xisha islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha Islands and
other islands belonging to China."
Is the idea that this translation from Peking Review may not be accurate?
Best,
Matt Steinglass
[Quoted text hidden]
--------
From: dan hoang <hoangdanlieu@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 2:04 AM
Dear Lady,
Thank you for this message.
In my eyes:
- If the distance from mainland to two Islands are longer than 12 miles, the Lai's claim China's sovereignty on these islands has no legal basis. That why Vietnamese soldiers can be on these islands.
I don't know how far from Vietnamese land and from Chinese land to these islands?
- I reread Dong's letter in Vietnamese and the translation in English - the tranlation had been done honestly: Dong's letter did not mention the two islands in his letter, only recognize 12 mile offsore control power of China.
- If Vietnam recognized these two islands belong to China, we (students at 1960-1970s) could not be taught these two islands are Vietnamese property.
We hope, Vietnamese Government and Chinese Government will resolve this problem peacefully based on historical,legal and humantarian bases.
Lieu
--------
From: Mathieu Bouquet <mathbouq@mathbouq.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 9:40 AM
Dear Lady,
I am sorry to insist, but the written and more complete document which you are writing about is dated from the 4th of September. The 9th of September is the date of its publication in Beijing Review, but it was first approved on the 4th of September by the National People Congress (as seems to be stated in the Chinese version posted by Matt Steinglass). I agree that we still have to check in the NPC's log that this approval was effective on the 4th of September 1958, but I have little doubt about it as, as I told before, no Vietnamese official document arouses this point (and I trust all Vietnamese governments much for doing such a check).
I am not defending PRC's position at all, and I have a lot more to say against China's highly contestable argumentation and actions related to all its maritime disputes (not only towards Vietnam, even if Vietnam was the first victim of Beijing's maritime aggressivity these last decades), but the ambiguities you arouse seem to me, on the contrary, very clear, as they seem to be to many scholars who wrote on this subject (some names have already been quoted, I would recommend Stein Tonnesson's articles, as well as Mark Valencia's, Nguyen Hong Thao's, Zou Keyuan's and Ramses Amer's among others).
Once again, I guess that if there were any doubts like the ones you evoke, Vietnamese official argumentation would, for sure, seize the opportunity to contest China's current position on Pham Van Dong's letter. It doesn't.
I have never heard anything about your hypothesis (one version sent to Vietnam on the 4th of September 1958, which would differ from the one issued to the whole world later), but once again, if it were true, Vietnam would surely use it today, which would definitively close the sino-vietnamese debate over Pham Van Dong's letter. And once again, it doesn't.
About your last paragraph ("And, regardless, Pham Van Dong cites only the 12-miles rule, where "twelve miles" refers to distance from a mainland. The Spratlys and Paracels are more than twelve miles from ANY mainland."), I am sorry again to say that this is pointless.
1. The 12 nautical miles (reminder: one mile is 1,652meters, one nautical mile is 1,854 meters) doesn't refer to the distance only "from mainland". UNCLOS defines the territorial sea "from mainland or from islands" (article 13, paragraph 1). So, states holding sovereignty over an island are entitled to claim a territorial sea from this island. And in fact, declaring a territorial sea from an island is also an act which emphasizes one's claim to sovereignty over this island.
2. The territorial sea doesn't allow any state to automatically get any sovereignty over the islands situated within the 12 nautical miles limit from "mainland". Just have a look at the Persil/Leila islet (Spain-Morocco dispute): the islet is not in any Spanish claimed territorial sea originating from a Spanish "mainland" (in the legal meaning of this term), and it is 200 meters away from Moroccan shores, but it is claimed by Spain (with the support of at least 13 EU countries, in 2002). See the map here: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/7/75/Perejilfr.png/800px-Perejilfr.png
I don't know if I am clear enough: the territorial sea limit does not define the limit beyond which all islands are "unclaimable" by any state (this would undermine any US sovereignty claim over Hawai, for instance...) and within which all islands are "claimable". The territorial sea definition relates to the legal regime of sea surface, not of islands.
Regards,
Mathieu
--------
From: Mathieu Bouquet <mathbouq@mathbouq.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 10:14 AM
Sorry, in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, the definition of the low tide elevation (and not the territorial sea itself), which is used as the starting point of the territorial sea, is in article 11. When I mentioned article 13, it was in fact in the current UNCLOS, which was adopted in Montego Bay in 1982, and which, in fact, is exactly the same as article 11 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea of 1958.
--------
Subject: Re: [Vsg] PARACELS: What about the Guomindang?
------------------------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 9:21 PM
Dear Thach Nguyen,
thanks a lot for your comment and your agreement with my interpretation! As for the historical background of the Chinese-Vietnamese dispute over the Paracels: I woould like to ask whether you or other list members could provide us with some information about the Guomindang's standpoint on this issue? Formally, Taiwan's claims are identical with that of the PRC, and thus I wonder whether this territorial dispute ever strained relations between Taiwan and the RVN, or between the Republic of China and French Indochina. After all, in the early 1930s the Guomindang government laid claims on certain border areas of British-ruled border on historical grounds, and in the 1950s Taiwan consistently vetoed Mongolia's UN membership on the grounds (or pretext) that Mongolia was not an independent country but only a renegade province of China.
Best regards,
Balazs
Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com> wrote:
Dear Calvin,
I don't agree with your point. Pham Van Dong made it
very clear that he supported the PRC's 12 miles claim.
There is no word about his support on the Chinese
claim on the islands listed in the Chinese
declaration. He said only about what he agreed and
silenced on the other part.
We know well the context of the statement. This is
understandable that PVD tried to avoid showing the
difference between the PRC and the DRV at the time.
In fact, Balazs and Mathieu made the poit already
before and I share with their analyses.
Best,
Thach Nguyen
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: vsg@u.washington.edu
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 9:28 PM
Since my previous message, written in a haste, contained several errors, hereby I resend it. Please ignore the previous version.
Dear Thach Nguyen,
thanks a lot for your comment and your agreement with my interpretation! As for the historical background of the Chinese-Vietnamese dispute over the Paracels: I would like to ask whether you or other list members could provide us with some information about the Guomindang's standpoint on this issue. Formally, Taiwan's claims are identical with that of the PRC, and thus I wonder whether this territorial dispute ever strained relations between Taiwan and the RVN, or between the Republic of China and French Indochina. After all, in the early 1930s the Guomindang government laid claims on certain border areas of British-ruled Burma on historical grounds, and in the 1950s Taiwan consistently vetoed Mongolia's UN membership on the grounds (or pretext) that Mongolia was not an independent country but only a renegade province of China.
Best regards,
Balazs
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 8:37 AM
Dear Balazs,
I read quite a few on the Spratley, but never
discovered a source on strained relations between the
RVN and Taiwan over the islands. I could miss
something, but at least this is my exprerience.
I think it's understandable as KMT did not make a
statement like the one by Chou Enlai. Secondly, Taiwan
is not the US in relation with the RVN as China for
Vietnam at the time. In case there was an identical
KMT document the RVN could have reacted differently.
Best,
thach
--------
From: Mathieu Bouquet <mathbouq@mathbouq.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 9:22 AM
Dear Balazs,
A PhD thesis was written in Paris some years ago about "nationalist China"'s (I don't know whether English speaking people use this term to evoke KMT's government, it is a direct translation from the French standard expression) policy towards Paracel and Spratly islands. It is in French, and I don't know about any electronic version of it, but I give you the reference, if it can be of any help:
*
Chen Hsin-chih*, /Les îles Paracel et Spratly vues de la Chine nationaliste. Revendications de souveraineté pendant les années 1930-1950 dans la mer de Chine méridionale/ (The Paracel and Spratly islands seen from nationalist China. Sovereignty claims during 1930's-1950's in the South China Sea -my translation) (Thèse de doctorat – Université de Paris 1), 2001, 2 vol.
Chen Hsin-chi is from Taiwan and, as far as I know, he lives there know, and doesn't work on this subject anymore.
As far as I have seen, his thesis is mainly based on some Chinese and French official archives which, my director told me, had never been studied before. And, of course, it evokes the disputes between French Indochina and nationalist China. It seemed to be really interesting, but, as my focus was on the last 15 years, and I didn't have much time to have an in-depth reading, I didn't read the whole work, only some (short) parts of it.
Best regards,
Mathieu
--------
From: Tobias RETTIG <tobiasrettig@smu.edu.sg>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 13, 2008 at 3:26 AM
Hi,
French Ph.D. theses can often be requested in print or in microfiche form through the ANRT, or Atelier national de la reproduction des theses (e.g. http://www.sup.adc.education.fr/bib/Acti/these/theses.htm).
So far, my experience with them was good.
Good luck!
Tobias
PS Regarding the law of the sea, the concept 'continental shelf' is another important concept that needs to be taken into account too. As mentioned before, also by John Kleinen and Oscar Salemink, there is an entire legal and 'strategic studies' / 'maritime studies' literature out there focusing on such issues.
[Quoted text hidden]
--------
Subject: [Vsg] PARACELS: Chou En-lai Misquoted; Pham Van Dong Misinterpreted
------------------------
From: Lady Borton <Lady@frognet.net>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: vsg@u.washington.edu
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 1:42 AM
Dear friends and colleagues,
I have no point of view on the Paracels and/or Spratleys. I don't know
enough to have a point of view, and I don't expect ever to study the issue
sufficiently to have any point of view.
That said, it might be helpful to point out that recent postings on VSG
misquoted Premier Chou En-lai's statement of 4 September 1958 (aired on
Radio Peiping on 6 Sept). The Radio Peiping text is attached. You will see
that Premier Chou En-lai mentions four islands or groups of islands, in
this order: 1) Taiwan 2) Penghu (Pescadores) 3) Quemoy and 4) Matsu. All
these islands are in the Taiwan Strait. No mention is made of the Paracels
or Spratleys.
Further, from the attached documents, you will see that Pham Van Dong's
quotation has been taken out of context. He refers to the LAW OF THE SEA
and its 12-mile limit in reference to the islands in the Taiwan Strait
only.
The piece that follows was written in response to the "chat" on the Web
here among young Vietnamese. With apologies to VSG friends and colleagues
for the byte-weight of this message, I've taken the liberty of including
relevant documents, including the LAW OF THE SEA, 1956, the law germain at
that time and the one to which both Chou En-lai and Pham Van Dong refer.
I'm aware that the compressed images from NHAN DAN may be hard to read but
hope this helps.
Those of us up in years, our hair turning silver remember "Quemoy" and
"Matsu" quite well...!
Warmly,
Lady
Premier Pham Van Dong Misinterpreted
Recently, a Vietnamese friend told me that, years ago, Prime Minister
Pham Van Dong had made a “declaration” where he “gave away” the Paracels
to China.
“What!!” I said. “Are you sure?”
“The Declaration is on the Web. There’s lots of ‘chat’.”
“Can you give me the exact date?” I said. “Let’s check.”
Vietnamese friends, Chinese friends, international friends— Let’s put
this to rest once and for all: Pham Van Dong’s declaration never gave
away the Paracels. Never. Never. Never.
Let me explain.
The declaration in question is dated 22 September 1958. Since Ho Chi Minh
was alive, I checked the chronology of President Ho’s life. The day
before, 21 September 1958, Ho Chi Minh wrote an article in NHAN DAN under
the pseudonym T. L. There, he quoted a statement made on 11 September by
American President Dwight Eisenhower.
Next, I checked the Web archives of THE NEW YORK TIMES, an
American newspaper of record. President Eisenhower’s statement was
about Quemoy (Kinmen or Jinmen) and Matsu (Mazu), which are
islands in the Taiwan Strait. These islands are about eight miles
off the Chinese mainland, that is, within the traditional
twelve-mile limit for territorial waters. However, in 1949, Chiang
Kai-shek’s forces had retained control of these islands after
Mao’s forces took control in China. In September 1958, China and
the United States (through Taiwan) openly fought each other over
Quemoy and Matsu. Each side threatened wider war.
The location is clear: The Taiwan Strait, not the Paracels.
Premier Pham Van Dong’s letter to Chou En Lai dated 14 September 1958
“acknowledges and approves of” the statement made by Premier Chou En Lai
on 4 September and affirms China’s twelve-mile limit. THE NEW YORK TIMES
carried the full text of Premier Chou’s statement, which begins (English
text by Peiping radio):
“On Sept. 4, 1958, United States Secretary of State Dulles, under
the authorization of United States President Eisenhower, issued a
statement openly threatening to expand United States aggression
against the People’s Republic of China in the Taiwan (Formosa)
Strait area and carrying out war provocation, thereby aggravating
the tension in this area created by the United States and
seriously jeopardizing the peace of the Far East and the world.”
The location is clear: The Taiwan Strait, not the Paracels.
Secretary of State Dulles’ statement of 4 September mentioned by Premier
Chou begins: “I have reviewed in detail with the President the serious
situation which has resulted from aggressive Chinese Communist military
actions in the Taiwan (Formosa) Strait area. The President has authorized
me to make the following statement….”
Once again, the location is clear: The Taiwan Strait, not the
Paracels.
Premier Pham Van Dong’s letter to Premier Chou En-lai and the articles by
Pham Van Dong and Ho Chi Minh in NHAN DAN supported China in the
September 1958 brushfire battle between China and the United States over
control of islands in the Taiwan Strait.
Please, let’s put this to rest: Pham Van Dong’s letter of 22 September
1958 refers only to islands in the Taiwan Strait. This letter is not
about the Paracels.
--
Lady Borton
Box 94
International Post Office
Ha Noi, Viet Nam
Phone: 84-4-8-325-229
Fax: 84-4-8-325-819
Lady@frognet.net
--------
From: Lady Borton <Lady@frognet.net>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 2:20 AM
Let me add a minor correction. The two documents by Pham Van Dong are:
Signed and Stamped Letter, 14 September 1958
Contens of Signed and Stamped Letter in NHAN DAN, 22 September 1958
Both documents are attached to the mega-byte message.
With apologies,
Lady
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 2:49 AM
Dear Ms. Borton,
thanks a lot for your valuable contribution! This presentation of the story indeed sounds very credible, since in 1958 the PRC was busy enough with the Taiwan Straits crisis and presumably little to gain by picking up a quarrel with the RVN (and potentially by the DRV, too). Such a situation would easily explain why the DRV leaders were ready to give public support to Beijing. After all, relations between Taiwan and the Diem regime, though not entirely free of tension (see the issue of the Chinese minority in South Vietnam), were remarkably close, and both regimes were allied to the U.S. anyway. Still, this interpretation raises two questions:
1) Did the persons who created the website http://datviet.free.fr/archive/0,,701,00.html as well as similar websites intentionally falsify or mistranslate documents? Since my knowledge of Chinese is below zero level, I cannot check whether the Chinese document published there was identical with the one presented by you (in which case the English translation was wrong), or it was a somewhat different text. I would be grateful if you could compare the two texts.
2) If the PRC did not raise the issue of the Pescadores in 1958, this may indicate that its claim for the islands was not as automatic and natural as the Chinese government presented it after 1974. In other words, Beijing may not have resorted to the forceful occupation of the islands if the international situation had been different in 1974.
All the best and thanks again,
Dr. Balazs Szalontai
Mongolia International University
Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia
L
--------
From: Tobias RETTIG <tobiasrettig@smu.edu.sg>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 3:05 AM
Dear All,
I have been following this without reading every single word and do not claim to have any expertise in this issue.
In terms of maritime issues, however, there is an entire community of maritime security scholars 'out there' who are active in online forums and who publish in academic journals specialising in security and other issues. I am quite confident that they would provide an additional perspective to this issue. One of the more well-known such scholars is Mark J Valencia, e.g. see http://www.nautilus.org/admin/staff/Valencia.html
I assume that there also should be lawyers specialising in maritime claims and public international law - again they might provide their own insights to this issue.
Best wishes,
Tobias
--------
From: Mathieu Bouquet <mathbouq@mathbouq.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 4:53 AM
The originating point of Zhou Enlai's declaration is PRC's official statement of 4th of September 1958 better known as "PRC's Declaration on the Territorial Sea". This governmental statement claims the islands and groups of islands listed on air by Zhou Enlai _PLUS_ the Paracels and the Spratlys (Hsisha and Nansha in Chinese, mentioned among others in the 4th paragraph of the official declaration). You can find an English translation of the declaration here: http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/LimitsinSeas/ls043.pdf (I guess you can find it on some more "official" websites as the UN's, but I don't have much time tonight to look further, sorry). So, the official claim is the traditional expanding Chinese one, even if Zhou's declaration on the radio on the same day doesn't perfectly match it.
As for Pham Van Dong's letter, of course, Pham Van Dong never acknowledged officially that the whole East Sea belonged to China. Webistes or articles which provide such an interpretation of that letter generally don't quote it (as it would unveil their dishonesty), and they most often are managed by anti-communists, who try to discredit Vietnamese government.
About Pham Van Dong's letter, as the copy posted by Lady Borton shows (file name: Pham Van Dong Letter 14 Sept 1958_signed_stamped.JPG), Pham Van Dong's letter is an answer to PRC's governement official statement and not to Zhou Enlai's radio declaration, so it could effectively be interpreted as an acknowledgement of China's claim. In fact, even Vietnamese official documents on the subject which were published during the late 70's and the 80's acknowledge the ambiguity of this letter, which could weaken Vietnam's position. I guess that if our reading of all these documents were wrong because of any "misquotations", Vietnam's official position would use this argument, which is not the case...
--------
From: Khoa Le <khoa.le2@verizon.net>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 11:48 AM
Dear Lady,
Thank you for your clarification on the Paracels and Spratleys issue. I don't know why the Vietnamese government has never raised this point to correct the misinterpretation of Mr. Pham Van Dong's letter. In any case, there is an ambiguity in PVD letter: he recognized China's sovereignty over the four islands (Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu) while refering to the Law of the Sea 12-mile limit which, as you said, is "in reference to the islands in the Taiwan Strait".
I have forwarded your message to Duong Trung Quoc, Vietnamese historian in Hanoi, and urged him to write an article on this issue. I hope you don't object to my doing this.
Le Xuan Khoa
--------
From: Liam C Kelley <liam@hawaii.edu>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 1:12 PM
Dear list,
This conversation is getting me very confused. Where in the official exchange between Zhou Enlai and Phan Van Dong do we only find them talking about "the four islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu"? According to the Chinese document which Balazs Szalontai provided a link to (http://datviet.free.fr/archive/0,,701,00.html), the PRC unambiguously declared on 9/4/58 that the Spratly (Nansha) and Paracel (Xisha) islands were Chinese territory (the 1st article states that, and then the 4th says that articles 2 and 3 apply to the Spratlys and Paracels too).
The 9/14/58 letter from Pham Van Dong to Zhou Enlai (on the same webpage, and provided by Lady Borton in a file) says that his government accepts the 9/4/58 PRC declaration, period.
So where is the ambiguity? Who has been misquoted and how? Where is the official document which only makes reference to the "the four islands of Taiwan, Penghu, Quemoy and Matsu"? I confess that I know precious little about this issue, and perhaps that is why I am unable to follow this conversation which as far as I can tell does not match what is contained in these official documents. Any clarification would be appreciated.
Liam Kelley
U. of Hawaii
[Quoted text hidden]
--------
From: Hoang t. Dieu-Hien <dieuhien@u.washington.edu>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 3:49 PM
Dear list,
Like Lady, I do not know enough about the issues surrounding the Paracels and Spratlys to have an informed opinion, nor do I have enough skills to evaluate the authenticity of documents put on the internet regarding these issues, particularly the ones in Chinese, but I would hazard to put Pham van Dong's letter into context and offer these thoughts.
In 1958, the DRV was a young government which had just suffered a serious set back having lost the chance to achieve one of its major objectives -- unifying Viet Nam -- only two years before. Around the same time, internally, it must have been shaken and were still coping with the aftermath of its Land Reform policies. With all of the land south of the 17th parallel lost to a faction supported by a world supper power, in the minds of the DRV leaders, would it be wise to pick a fight with another super power to the North over a set of islands off shore?
The history of Viet Nam is full of concessions made by great and not-so-great emperors to various dynasties to the north to buy peace and sovereignty: the "offerings" of Ly Ong Trong, the great warrior, or Tue Tinh, the great healer, to China are but a few examples. Should these historical diplomatic actions be deemed as unpatriotic and "ba'n nu*o*'c" as claims about Pham van Dong's letter in September 1958 to Zhou En-Lai?
What could the DRV have done if its leadership was to challenge China's claim of the Spratlys and Paracels? Send a couple of navy fleets to defend the islands? Did it have a couple of navy fleets to spare? Not being the expert in DRV military prowess of the time, or anytime, I can only guess not.
In my opinion, another interpretation of Pham van Dong's letter could be as follow.
The paragraph which began "The government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam acknowledges..." serves to appease the PRC government, which could have become a foe that threatened the existence of the DRV or a powerful ally against the American, another super power. The statement in the next paragraph which explicitly called out "absolute respect for China's 12 nautical miles maritime territory" without mentioning specific geographical names might be an attempt at deliberate ambiguity for possible dispute with the PRC when the DRV was in a better position for concrete actions in that dispute. The statement could have read "absolute respect for the aforementioned declaration..." but it did not. The author(s) chose to specifically mentioned the 12-mile limit instead.
I am not arguing that that this was in fact Pham van Dong's intention in writing the letter. (I doubt that he alone drafted it.) I am only saying that there exists at least one other plausible interpretation of his letter and that the letter did not necessarily convey acceptance of "the 9/4/58 PRC declaration, period." I believe there is room for interpretation in this short text.
I see few black and white facts and many shades of gray surrounding these issues.
Respectfully,
Hien
--------
From: Mathieu Bouquet <mathbouq@mathbouq.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 6:08 PM
Dear all,
As I wrote yesterday, there has been no "misquotation", and I am sorry to say that Lady Borton's message has missed a very important point which led her to a wrong interpretation of these events. The original Chinese declaration, which Pham Van Dong's letter is answering to, is the PRC government's official declaration on the same day as Zhou Enlai's radio statement. The official declaration, as I emphasized yesterday and as Liam repeats today, lists both Hsisha and Nansha in "Chinese" islands.
Though I am not a specialist of this period, I still know this issue quite in detail as I wrote my master thesis on the sino-vietnamese relations and the maritime dispute last year (mainly about the last 15 years, though). I interviewed Vietnamese scholars and diplomats on this subject, and raised Pham Van Dong's letter issue at least in three interviews. I read some official documentation, and the original sources of the letter and Chinese (translated) declaration, and if you read all these texts carefully enough, the ambiguity that Lady Borton raised yesterday doesn't exist. She just didn't start her study from the beginning, which undermines all her argument.
Mathieu
--------
From: Khoa Le <khoa.le2@verizon.net>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 6:41 PM
Dear list,
After reading comments and attached materials from Balazs Szalontai, Mathieu Bouquet and Liam Kelley, it is clear to me that the PRC declaration on 9/4/58 did include the Spratlys and Paracels. The ambiguity is in PVD's letter.
Le Xuan Khoa
--------
From: phuxuan700@gmail.com <phuxuan700@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 6:50 PM
Attachments: Declaration_5809Islands.pdf
Dear list,
I agree with Mathieu that there has been neither "misquotation" nor "misinterpretation" with respect to China's September 1958 declaration and Pham Van Dong's letter.
Beijing is justifiable in claiming Paracel and Spratly islands as theirs based on Dong's letter and subsequent statements from Hanoi's high ranking officials as shown in section 5. Vietnam below:
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3754/t19232.htm
Luu Van Loi, a Hanoi career diplomat, in his book, "The Sino-Vietnamese Difference on the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes" (pp. 74-75) provided a spin to Dong's letter. However, his reasoning is weak if not amusing!
Monique Chemillier-Gendreau, an international law expert in her book, "La souverainete sur les archipels Paracels et Spratleys" shed more light to the issue as some folks already mentioned in VSG.
Among other things, Dong or his government could not give China something that did not belong to them!
Paracel and Spratly islands belonged to South Vietnam until 1975. It's that plain and simple.
China's 1958 declaration is attached for reference.
Calvin Thai
--------
From: dan hoang <hoangdanlieu@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 7:04 PM
Dear List,
Many people here in VN are concerning this issue.
Myself- not a historical researcher and not a lawyer so I don't understand the issue very much.
But I double:
1) If Mr.Pham Van Dong's letter still expired, how Vietnamese soldiers can be on these islands after that, especially after VN has been unified? Whether this letter is considered a legal document for resolving the issue?
2) Accodring to the International Law on the Sea, how many kilometers one country can have the right to control the offsore territory?
Can someoone help me with my questions?
Thanks,
Lieu
Khoa Le <khoa.le2@verizon.net> wrote:
Dear list,
After reading comments and attached materials from Balazs Szalontai, Mathieu
Bouquet and Liam Kelley, it is clear to me that the PRC declaration on
9/4/58 did include the Spratlys and Paracels. The ambiguity is in PVD's
letter.
Le Xuan Khoa
--------
From: phuxuan700@gmail.com <phuxuan700@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 7:25 PM
Dear Lieu,
Per my previous post, China is justifiable in making the claim based on Dong's letter.
However, since there is no legal basis for Dong's letter, China's claim should not have any merit.
I believe 12 miles offshore is the sea border.
Calvin Thai
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 7:45 PM
Dear Calvin,
I don't agree with your point. Pham Van Dong made it
very clear that he supported the PRC's 12 miles claim.
There is no word about his support on the Chinese
claim on the islands listed in the Chinese
declaration. He said only about what he agreed and
silenced on the other part.
We know well the context of the statement. This is
understandable that PVD tried to avoid showing the
difference between the PRC and the DRV at the time.
In fact, Balazs and Mathieu made the poit already
before and I share with their analyses.
Best,
Thach Nguyen
-
--------
From: dan hoang <hoangdanlieu@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 11, 2008 at 9:34 PM
Dear Calvin,
Thank you for helping me with my questions.
The difference between Dong's letter in Vietnamese and his translation in English leads me to understanding that:
China has been accepted the English letter of Dong without meantioning Dong's ignorance about two islands. Thefore, Lai's claim has value only within China.
What do you and other people think?
Lieu
--------
From: Grace Cheng <gcheng@hpu.edu>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 7:43 AM
Attachments: winmail.dat
Hi, everyone: This is very interesting. Although I haven't had time to research this case yet and there are many other cases regarding islands I don't recall in detail now, this discussion made me think of some int'l legal aspects of this issue.
1) In the 1958 law, the territorial seas was to 3 nautical miles. It was then extended to the present 12 nautical miles in the 1982 Law of the Seas Treaty. This does not mean states could not or cannot claim uninhabited territories beyond the existing legal limit to their territorial seas based on historical documentation/maps or effectivités (sustained state presence, formal state management, or state assertion of jurisdiction over any civilian including commercial presence, etc.).
2) Although their distances from land mass vary, in other disputed islands cases--the Liancourt (Takeshima/Dokdo Islands between Japan and Korea) and Pulau Ligitan & Pulau Sipidan Islands (between Indonesia and Malaysia)--the lawyers in the former case cited historical documentation simply referring to/naming the islands going many centuries back, while in the latter case the ICJ considered Indonesia's claim on the basis of Dutch naval activities on the islands in 1921. The ICJ established Malaysian sovereignty over the latter islands based on the earlier date of Malaysia's Turtle Preservation Ordinance (1917) as evidence of effective state presence. (Korea refused ICJ jurisdiction as unenforceable.)
3) Accordingly, the legal status of a "state" with sovereignty over a territorial nation does not change with regimes (although diplomatic recognition by other states may not be extended, such as with US and Cuba after 1959). Legal matters tied to territories also remain effective beyond changes in regimes (i.e., Guantanamo Bay, which I think was an agreement by US and Panama, which then had jurisdiction) unless specified by new treaties with the affected states. Therefore, any claims to territories, including islands, by "the state" stands even with transition to a new regime, i.e., from imperial to modern, colonial to postcolonial or, in the case we are discussing, ROC/GMD to PRC/CCP.
Again, I haven't had a chance to look into the case between China and Vietnam more closely and I'm sure there is more to add re: establishing sovereignty in cases of disputed islands, but hopefully this might be of some clarification for those who know the details of this issue.
Best,
Grace Cheng, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Political Science
College of International Studies
Hawai`i Pacific University
--------
From: John Kleinen <kleinen@uva.nl>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 7:58 AM
It might be a good idea to consult some literature:
"*The Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Law of the Sea: An Analysis of Vietnamese Behavior within the Emerging International Oceans Regime *by Epsey Cooke Farrell, 1998 or recently a number of Chinese/Asian authors like Li Dinming and Li Dexia (Xiamen University) or Zhou Keyuan from the NUS. See also the work by Stein Toenneson. It gives you a clearer vision than the sheer distribution of documents when the sources are not clear.
John Kleinen (MARE)
--------
From: Oscar Salemink <OJHM.Salemink@fsw.vu.nl>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 8:41 AM
In addition: Ramses Amer http://www.pol.umu.se/personal/Amer_Ramses/ or http://www.pcr.uu.se/personal/anstallda/amer_ramses.htm published quite a bit on China - Vietnam relations, including on the dispute over the South China (?) Sea.
Oscar Salemink
--------
From: phuxuan700@gmail.com <phuxuan700@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 12, 2008 at 11:44 AM
Dear Thach,
Unlike being a "loner" most of the time last year, I've found a little bit of comfort knowing this time 1.2-plus billion people agree with my view. :-)))
All kidding aside, it is correct to say that Dong's letter did not specifically support China's claim over Paracel and Spratlys islands.
However, as Monique Chemillier-Gendreau pointed it out in her book, "La souverainete sur les archipels Paracels et Spratleys" (pp. 120-125), silence in Dong's letter, i.e. no reference to China's claim, can also be considered as acceptance or agreement.
This interpretation gains much more weight if we look at surrounding facts:
According to
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3754/t19232.htm
1. On 6/15/56, two years prior to Dong's letter, "Vice Foreign Minister Dung (sic) Van Khiem of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam received Mr. Li Zhimin, charge d'affaires ad interim of the Chinese Embassy in Viet Nam and told him that "according to Vietnamese data, the Xisha and Nansha Islands are historically part of Chinese territory." Mr. Le Doc, Acting Director of the Asian Department of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, who was present then, added that "judging from history, these islands were already part of China at the time of the Song Dynasty." ". (Also see Chemillier-Gendreau's, p. 122 and "China's Indisputable Sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands", Beijing Foreign Languages Press, p. 17)
2. In Hanoi's statement made on 5/09/65 regarding "combat zone", or in a Nhan Dan article on 5/13/69 regarding "air space", Hanoi clearly recognized Paracel and Spratly islands as China's territory. ("China's Indisputable Sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands", pp. 19-20).
I truly appreciate it that you or anyone else on the list could provide us anything from Hanoi's side prior to 1979 to dispute these facts, i.e. Hanoi's rejection of China's claim.
Otherwise, I have to interprete Dong's letter as viewed by Beijing and Chemillier-Gendreau.
Best regards,
Calvin Thai
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, Jan 14, 2008 at 8:21 AM
Dear Calvin,
I think China population is much more than 1.2
billion, not to say about Taiwan population and the
Chinese overseas. Congratulations for your broad
support! But you may know majority is not equivalent
to the rightness.
Your mention about Monique's definition of silence as
acceptance/agreement gives you one more vote! But do
you really think her definition is non-arguable, and
it should be taken for granted? If yes, we don't have
anything more to debate.
As for the PRC information on the statements by some
DRV officials, first it's only PRC source. Secondly, I
don't see any case where sovereinty claim is resolved
based on some civil servants' statements althought how
high their positions are.
I understand that sovereinty claims should be based on
HISTORICAL facts. I don't have here with me but a 1995
research of the Chinese historical maps done by a
friend of mine (with my advice) in the Australian
National University showed very clearly how the
Chinese were very late in including Nan Sa (Truong Sa)
and Xi Sa (Hoang Sa) in their administrative maps
compared to the Vietnamese.
For the time being, you can read how historically
chinese are not the ones who discovered and
administered these two islands in the following
website:
http://www1.thanhnien.com.vn/Xahoi/2008/1/3/221260.tno
and many other sites
Best,
Thach
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Wed, Jan 16, 2008 at 4:00 PM
Hi all,
This article is close to a research I mentioned on the
previous msg. Anyone on the list who is interested in
the topic can read it at:
http://www.talawas.org/talaDB/showFile.php?res=11981&rb=0302
best,
Thach
Subject: [Vsg] Key questions re: Pham Van Dong's letter and new documentary evidence (1)
------------------------
From: vu tuong <vhtuong@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Thu, Jan 17, 2008 at 9:15 PM
Attachments: IMG_1583.JPG
Dear List,
On Pham Van Dong (hereafter PVD)’s letter, the
discussion on this list thus far has focused on three
main questions:
1) Which version of Chou En-Lai’s letter of September
4, 1958 (as published by many sources or as read on
radio) was PVD referring to in his own letter?
2) There seems to be ambiguity in PVD’s letter: he
seemed to refer only to the Chinese claim on 12-mile
rule without mentioning their claim on “Xisha,”
“Nansha” and others. The questions are: (a) How much
of the ambiguity in PVD’s letter was deliberate? (b)
Can the Vietnamese government today argue (in front of
an imagined international court) that PVD only
supported the 12-mile rule but not Chinese sovereignty
on the Vietnam-contested archipelagoes?
3) What was the historical context of the letter? Was
the North Vietnamese government forced by
circumstances to support China even if it did not
really want to?
I happened to be doing research at Vietnam’s National
Library in Hanoi last week during this exchange, and
decided to take a brief detour to read Nhan Dan daily
published through August-September 1958 on this issue.
The attached articles were photographed from Nhan Dan,
and it’s easy for those who want to verify their
authenticity (the call number of Nhan Dan at the
National Library is JV3). Because these articles are
large files, I have to send them separately in three
messages.
Let me take on three issues above one by one in the
light of my documents.
1) I found out that Nhan Dan on September 6, 1958
published a news item from Vietnamese News Agency
(Viet Nam Thong Tan Xa or V.N.T.T.X.) (see attached
file #1583 from Nhan Dan, September 6, 1958). This
news item was basically Chou En-Lai’s announcement
made on September 4, 1958 and translated into
Vietnamese.
The translated document was published 8 days before
PVD wrote or signed his controversial letter on
September 14, 1958 (see file #1603 from Nhan Dan,
September 22, 1958 which reprinted PVD’s letter;
attached in my second post). This official translation
is most likely what Pham Van Dong had in front of him
and referred to when he wrote or signed his letter.
Either VNTTX must have fetched him a copy, or he
couldn’t have failed to read the translated statement
which had appeared on the first page of Nhan Dan, the
Vietnamese Workers’ Party’s newspaper, 8 days before.
There should be no further confusion here.
2) When the two attached documents (#1583 and #1603)
are placed side by side, they also illuminate
questions 2a and 2b above. Reading Chou En-lai’s
statement in Vietnamese, PVD must have had no
confusion about what Chou meant by “12-mile Chinese
maritime territory.” Let me translate the first
paragraph of Chou’s statement for those who don’t read
Vietnamese:
“1. The width of the Chinese maritime territory is 12
nautical miles (more than 22 km). This claim applies
to the entire territory of China, including mainland
China and all the islands surrounding China’s coast,
including Taiwan and the islands sourrounding Taiwan,
the archipelagoes of Penghu, Dongsha, Xisha, Zhongsha,
Nansha and all the other islands belonging to China
far from the mainland and from the islands along the
Chinese coast.” (attached file #1583 copied from Nhan
Dan, September 6, 1958)
PVD could have worded his letter in at least two
following ways (if he had had strong reservations
about Chinese claims on Paracels and Spratlys but
supported the rest of Chinese claims):
“The Vietnamese government approved the Chinese claim
on their 12-mile maritime territory that applies to
the islands along the coast of mainland China.” (a
more specific version)
“The Vietnamese government supports China and
denounces US imperialists for backing the reactionary
clique of Chang Kai-shek on Taiwan and violating
Chinese territorial waters.” (a more vague version)
I do not rule out the possibility that PVD
deliberately left out “Xisha” and “Nansha” because he
disputed the Chinese claims on these islands. Even if
we accept this possibility, the wording of his letter
showed he made a big mistake (compared to alternative
wordings suggested above). In the Chinese announcement
(as translated into Vietnamese), the 12-mile claim was
not separate from, and in fact was defined by, the
subsequent sentence, which included “Xisha” and other
islands. In other words, logically speaking, he could
not have accepted the first sentence and rejected the
second sentence while referring to the same
announcement.
Hoang Thi Dieu Hien argued as follows in her message
dated January 11, 2008 for possible interpretations of
PVD’s letter: (1) (quoted) “The paragraph which began
"The government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam
acknowledges..." serves to appease the PRC government,
which could have become a foe that threatened the
existence of the DRV or a powerful ally against the
American, another super power;” and (2) “The statement
in the next paragraph which explicitly called out
"absolute respect for China's 12 nautical miles
maritime territory" without mentioning specific
geographical names might be an attempt at deliberate
ambiguity for possible dispute with the PRC when the
DRV was in a better position for concrete actions in
that dispute. The statement could have read "absolute
respect for the aforementioned declaration..." but it
did not. The author(s) chose to specifically
mentioned the 12-mile limit instead.” (unquoted)
This is an interesting interpretation, but PVD could
have easily appeased China with my suggested wordings
above. Furthermore, “support” [tan thanh] and
“respect” [ton trong] are sufficient to convey the
Vietnamese position; “absolute support” or “absolute
respect” is unnecessary. If PVD indeed had tried to
keep a deliberate ambiguity, he failed.
3) On the historical context of PVD’s letter, Hoang
Thi Dieu Hien speculated as follows in the same
message dated January 11, 2008:
(quoted) “In 1958, the DRV was a young government
which had just suffered a serious set back having lost
the chance to achieve one of its major objectives --
unifying Viet Nam -- only two years before. Around
the same time, internally, it must have been shaken
and were still coping with the aftermath of its Land
Reform policies. With all of the land south of the
17th parallel lost to a faction supported by a world
supper power, in the minds of the DRV leaders, would
it be wise to pick a fight with another super power to
the North over a set of islands off shore?
The history of Viet Nam is full of concessions made by
great and not-so-great emperors to various dynasties
to the north to buy peace and sovereignty: the
"offerings" of Ly Ong Trong, the great warrior, or Tue
Tinh, the great healer, to China are but a few
examples. Should these historical diplomatic actions
be deemed as unpatriotic and "ba'n nu*o*'c" as claims
about Pham van Dong's letter in September 1958 to Zhou
En-Lai?
What could the DRV have done if its leadership was to
challenge China's claim of the Spratlys and Paracels?
Send a couple of navy fleets to defend the islands?
Did it have a couple of navy fleets to spare? Not
being the expert in DRV military prowess of the time,
or anytime, I can only guess not.” (unquoted)
This interesting speculation is not supported by
historical evidence. The North Vietnamese government
did not appease or support China reluctantly (because
they could not fight China militarily or because they
thought it was unwise) as she argued. Besides PVD’s
letter, the North Vietnamese government orchestrated a
mass demonstration of 50,000 people to support China
(see file #1603) and numerous other activities. An
editorial published on Nhan Dan on September 21, 1958
even complained that the “Vietnamese expression of
support for China against the US was still “lagging
behind” and “not yets meets our need to fight the US
and support China,” and called for more protests (“Mo
rong phong trao chong My va ung ho Trung quoc giai
phong Dai Loan,” see file #1602 attached in my third
post).
The true context of PVD’s letter was this (and I have
more documented evidence available if requested): the
socialist camp was going to bury the capitalist camp
soon. There were good reasons for PVD and his comrades
to believe this: The Soviet Union just succeeded in
launching Sputnik in late 1957 (while the US failed in
the space race), and China would seem to overtake
Britain and the US soon with its Great Leap Forward
campaign which many top Vietnamese leaders
wholeheartedly supported until around mid-1959).
Euphoria was sweeping through North Vietnam over a
future socialist paradise to come for the communist
bloc and the world. The problem facing PVD and his
comrades in 1958 was not whether to pick a fight with
China. The problem to them was how to isolate and
ultimate defeat for “the US imperialists and the Ngo
Dinh Diem clique in South Vietnam who were selling the
country.” In the long run (by 1975), PVD achieved his
goal. In the longer run (the 21st century), his
mistake comes back to smear his name and haunt his
successors.
Tuong Vu
National University of Singapore
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 9:11 AM
Dear Tuong,
let me draw attention to a certain aspect of the Chinese claim. Namely, the PRC has always considered Taiwan a province of China, rather than a sovereign nation. From this perspective, there cannot be any territorial dispute over islands between Beijing and Taipei, since such a dispute would imply that Taiwan is a sovereign nation which has a right to at least some areas. In other words, the PRC government, when specifically mentioning the Paracels and the Spratleys, raised the issue in a way that was no longer a bilateral dispute between Beijing and Taipei. After all, some of the islands in question were held, or claimed, not only by Taiwan and South Vietnam but also by the Philippines (in 1956, Manila laid claim on a few islands on the basis of proximity, whereupon the Chinese Foreign Ministry lodged an official protest) and potentially by newly independent Malaysia. For this reason, I think that a DRV statement referring only to the PRC-Taiwan conflict would have been "off the mark," since the Chinese government seems to have larger issues in mind.
PS: I cannot understand why those Great Han chauvinists are so unwilling to recognize Laotian sovereignty over the Paracels and the Spratleys. Since Laos also constituted a part of French Indochina, it is also entitled to lay claim for at least a few islands.:)))
All the best,
Balazs
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 10:28 AM
A minor correction: the 1956 claim for some of the Spratleys was made by a private individual named Cloma, not by the Filipino government, and when Beijing protested, Manila did not support Cloma's claim. However, on other occasions, both before and after 1956, the Filipino government did express an interest in controlling some of the Spratleys.
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 11:33 AM
Dear Tuong,
A short comment:
Mr. X made an announcement: "Ms A and B and C are my
wives; and wife's money is husband's money". Mr Y
agreed with Mr X's point that wife's money is
husband's money. Does this mean that Mr Y agreed that
Ms A,B,and C are Mr. X's wives?"
cheers,
Thach
--------
From: dan hoang <hoangdanlieu@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 6:13 PM
Hi everyone!
We had two days working with Chinese Friends on Education economics on Jan. 16 and 17 at our Institute. They are very nice, friendly and smart although they don't speak English very much. We talked through interpreters and with the help from some of our faculty who learn Chinese.
We have similar views on many issues and we hope to expand our relation.
I don't have much time to study the Paracels and the Spratleys history, the law documents that related to them or to territorial sovereign and the studies have been doing by many experts in this issue and the articles written about it in different newspapers. But I have done very quick looks on the aguments and the literature the List Members have provided. All are very interesting to me and I want to continue to talk a little bit of what I think.
I believe that nobody can make a good decision on a issue based solely on one fact. When someone make a decision, she/he must study carefully on many different facts to see different aspects of a problem and then make the decision that can help solve it objectively and usefully. And moreover, the Pacacels and Spratleys are national and even international issue that impact on people of both Vietnam and China and maybe of other countries.
So if there is an International Court to decide this issue, I think it will not base its decision on only PVD's letter or on only one historial fact. These Islands have very long historical process as showned in different studies that provided by different VSG members and from the other sources.
And I always try to understand why both Vietnamese and Chinese soldiers can be on these islands if PVD's letter has legal value for China to take these islands for them and VNam has no reasons to keep them.
Both China and Vietnam have the same right on using UNLOS - and they have many discussions and negotiations on these islands and on water control near their borders.
It is a very sensitive moment for both countries and any small flames can blow a big fire.
And again, as many Vietnamese citizens, I wish nothing bad can happen for us!
Lieu.
Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
--------
From: will pore <willpore@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 8:24 PM
Dear List,
In addition, aren't we forgetting something? Are there people who
live on the Paracels and Spratleys? What about the indegenes, if there
are any? What do they feel about the problem of who owns/controls
these islands?
Will Pore
Subject: Re: [Vsg] Laotian oceanic ambitions
------------------------
From: frank.proschan@yahoo.com <frank.proschan@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 4:27 PM
Perhaps Laos had such territorial ambitions in mind when it ratified the International Whaling Convention in May 2007 (although others speculate it had something to do with a large bilateral aid agreement with another Member State--or with the Mekong River dolphins).
Frank Proschan
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 9:48 PM
Attachments: Chinese dolphin.jpg, Mekong River Dolphin.jpg
Well, if the Laotians indeed ratified the IWC because of the Mekong River dolphins, they proved more generous to these poor riverine creatures than the Chinese, whose Three Gorges Dam has been quite a catastrophe for the Yangtze River dolphins. Dolphins of the world, unite!
Balazs
--------
Subject: [Vsg] Another China-Vietnam incident
------------------------
From: Sidel, Mark <mark-sidel@uiowa.edu>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: vsg@u.washington.edu
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 10:57 AM
Forwarded from a China listserve
http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hL8Or6_CLWVnqJjACQVXY_3xXwfw
--------
From: Anthony Le <leductony@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 12:42 AM
Many VIetnamese people are questioning why it took 10
days for the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson to
make public statements about the incident, which took
place on the 7th of January?
It is even more strange because the statements came
out merely 2 days after a Vietnamese boat was sunken
near Spratly Islands in which 10 people have gone
missing and are deemed to have died. The boat which
caused the VIetnamese boat to sink was reported by
Tuoi Tre as "a strange" boat. Vietnamese people
usually take this as meaning "Chinese."
Many people are describing China's action as: Calling
for help while robbing at the same time.
--------
Subject: [Vsg] Key questions re: Pham Van Dong's letter--File #1603
------------------------
From: vu tuong <vhtuong@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Thu, Jan 17, 2008 at 9:19 PM
Attachments: IMG_1603.JPG
Attached is File #1603 (see my previous post).
Tuong Vu
--------
From: Hao Phan <A132754@wpo.cso.niu.edu>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 7:39 AM
Hello Tuong
Co le anh nen dich cai bai nay nay ra tieng Viet va dang tren talawas.
Hao
--------
From: vu tuong <vhtuong@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 6:07 AM
cam on. toi se co gang.
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 6:26 AM
Was hatten Sie gesagt?:))
--------
Subject: Re: A fundamental question\Re: [Vsg] Todd C Kelly's article.
------------------------
From: dan hoang <hoangdanlieu@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 9:41 AM
Dear Balazs,
Thanks so much for making another comment on the issue.
Firstly, I would like to sound again what written in the article
Vietnamese Claims to the Truong Sa Archipelago [Ed. Spratly Islands]
by Todd C. Kelly for afirming VN's possession on these islands regarless the time our country had been devided into South and North.
Clearly, Vietnam has had a long historical relationship with the Truong Sa Islands. The Vietnamese history of occupation, exploitation of resources, and administrative control over the archipelago has its earliest recordings in the 1600's, but Vietnam's contact with the chain likely began well before this documentation. This centuries-old exercise of authority over the Truong Sa gives rise to one of Hanoi's legal claims to the features under the principle of terra nullius, or "land belonging to no state."[83] According to international law, a state can occupy and therefore own such territory, which is exactly what Vietnam claims it did at least as far back as the 17th century: "The state of Vietnam took effective possession of the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagoes long ago when they were not under the sovereignty of any nation."[84]
Secondly, I agree with you that the problem is not so easy to solve. And I think you know more than I do because I am not a person in this field and also I have tried to argue based on my own understanding. But I think Chinese people can know how to solve it as you see Hongkong and Taiwan had been sold to Britain by Chinese Mother King Tu Hi and then China asked Britain to return Hongkong to China as Hongkong and Taiwan were Chinese properties long time ago and always are Chinese lands. (Although our case is not the same).
I don't know whether my thought is right, but I think nowadays people in the world can solve any problems rationally based on laws, on history and humanity. If someone want wars because they never suffered from the pains of loosing dearest people, from the death of trees, animals includ. the pets and the fear of becoming a disable person. They never seen how blood run and made the land become red, they never heard the cry even in the very nice nights when the war had gone...
Without this article and some other resources provided by other VSGers I could not know the history of these islands and what have happened with them in the past. I am bad at history of our country. The South people had fought for the islands during 1954-1974 and in the North we were taught Paracels and Spratlys are VN's possession so I think we have the same heart to our land and we have been told the truth.
Lieu
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 10:41 AM
Dear Lieu,
thanks a lot for your reply! May I ask you to write a bit more about the following issue?
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
in the North we were taught Paracels and Spratlys are VN's possession so I think we have the same heart to our land and we have been told the truth.
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
When and at which grade did you learn this in North Vietnam? This is an extremely important point, since in state-controlled education systems, such as the North Vietnamese one, the curriculum closely follows what the political leadership thinks about historical and political issues. If North Vietnamese children were taught that the islands belonged to Vietnam, then this was, in my opinion, a more accurate reflection of the real views of the top VWP leadership than those statements which were probably made with the purpose of avoiding a debate with China. Communist regimes were always reluctant to provide the masses with "sensitive" information, and if they did so, they did it only when they thought that some decisive point had been reached. For instance, relations between North Korea and North Vietnam turned from bad to worse between 1971 and 1978, yet Hanoi did not inform the Vietnamese public about these disagreements until 1979 when P'yongyang's pro-Chinese standpoint on the Vietnamese-Kampuchean and Sino-Vietnamese conflicts was finally considered intolerable by the VCP leaders. This is why I would be very interested in learning when did you learn this at school. A copy of a DRV history or geography textbook, or rather several copies from different years, would be most helpful if any list member could get one.
All the best,
Balazs
--------
From: dan hoang <hoangdanlieu@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 6:18 PM
Dear Balazs,
It is in my memory and I need to have time to go to the old textbooks stores or libraries to find the textbooks we had learned 35-40 years ago. I also will ask someone to help me with your and list members' request because I don't know where the old texbooks are available for me to get.
Thank you anyway for your and list questions and discussions and materials.
I am going out today.
Lieu
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 10:08 PM
Dear Lieu,
thanks a lot in advance for your efforts! If you learned this in the DRV 35-40 years ago, it must have been in the textbooks years before the Chinese occupation of the Paracels, i.e., in the early 1970s or late 1960s. At that time, Sino-DRV relations already started to deteriorate. I wonder what was written in the textbooks in the late 1950s and early 1960s, i.e., when Chinese-North Vietnamese relations were rather good.
All the best and thanks again,
Balazs
dan hoang <hoangdanlieu@yahoo.com> wrote:
--------
From: dan hoang <hoangdanlieu@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 20, 2008 at 1:29 AM
Dear Balazs,
Maybe you are true - I learned in 70s and finished my school in 1980. But some my elder friends told me that they had taught the same things as we were. So I need to check the fact and let you and list members know later.
I also read this afternoon the article Calvin Thai sent to the list. And what Calvin Thai contributes about Chemillier is very important for us to confirm VN's right on Paracels and Spratlys.
Chemillier-Gendreau was professor of International Law at University Paris VII-Denis Diderot, France. As an expert on the Paracel-Spratly conflict, her view was often quoted by other researchers as well as Vietnam officials.
(See http://hoithao.viet-studies.info/1998_LMNghia.htm ).
In her book, "Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands", 2000, (an English translation of "La souverainete sur les archipels Paracels et Spratleys", 1996), in reference to Dong's letter, Chemillier-Gendreau wrote "…it is incorrect to assert that Vietnam had also "reaffirmed its recognition of China's claim" to the archipelagoes. Nevertheless, its silence on the affirmation of Chinese sovereignty over the islands can be interpreted as acquiescence …" (pp 129-130)
I am a Vietnamese citizen so I have responsible to present mine and other Vietnamese citizens' pointview and desire.
Thank you for all of you.
Lieu
Subject: [Vsg] Sovereignty claims -- China/ Vietnam
------------------------
From: Shawn McHale <mchale@gwu.edu>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: vsg@u.washington.edu
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 9:09 PM
Dear list,
The focus in the debate on the VSG over the Paracels and Spratlys has been over the details of statements made, and over parsing these statements -- which is exactly what diplomats and lawyers do when trying to work through these claims. But neither diplomats nor lawyers are historians, and sometimes their notion of what constitutes *sovereignty* seem anachronistic. In the modern world, we tend to work on the assumption that states should have clear borders, and if they don't, then these borders should be clarified. Anything outside this norm is seen as an anomaly.
But first of all, there are lots of anomalies in the borders of the world -- e.g. enclaves on the Nethelands-Belgium borders and India-Bangladesh borders, the Neutral Zone between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, with its de facto but not de jure internal boundary).
Vietnam and China did not work out the large issues related to its land borders with China till the 1990s, and the Vietnamese and Chinese have been hard at work delimiting its land border with China -- up to this year. See:
http://www.vnagency.com.vn/Home/EN/tabid/119/itemid/230114/Default.aspx
Should we really expect, then, that the issue of the Paracels and the Spratlys would be unproblematic?
But more importantly, the legal rationale used today to delimit borders *did not exist*, or only partially existed, in pre-1860 Vietnam or in 19th century China. The *evidence* used today as proof of sovereignty often had no such meaning in, say, 1820. An excellent example of this fact is that the area around Dien Bien Phu -- now seen as an essential place in the construction of the modern Vietnamese nation -- once had tributary relations with, if I remember it correctly, three other political entities (one of which was the Vietnamese court).
Now, it is commonplace to argue, after Thongchai's work Mapping Siam, that in Southeast Asia, frontiers and borders had a radically different meaning that they do today, and that it took an epistemic shift for new concepts of border, frontier, and sovereignty to take hold. At the same time, I think that many individuals may assume that East Asia is radically different. All one has to do is look at Chinese administrative borders -- they seem more "fixed" in the past than, say, Javanese ones.
But were *maritime* borders really so fixed in East Asia? No. The Ryuku Islands (i.e. what we often refer to as Okinawa today) were, I believe, dual tributaries to China and Japan, only formally annexed by Japan in 1879. Much further south, Sulu did not officially become part of the Philippines until the late 1800s -- again, it had been a tributary. The PRC's claim to all of Taiwan today is based on past control of a *part* of the island of Formosa.
This is the reason why I think many of the arguments today made by Vietnam and China are flawed. Fundamentally, they assume that evidence from the 19th century or earlier can be marshaled to show, conclusively, that one country has sovereignty(in the modern sense) over a particular and delimited space and the other country has none. If one looks at official Chinese sites for "evidence" in support of their modern claim, we find such things as evidence that Chinese fished in the area, that the Ming and Qing marked these areas on maps, etc. Vietnam makes similar claims.
But let's push this further. Let us assume that the weak evidence for the pre-1880s period from both the Vietnamese and Chinese side would serve as a good basis for a modern sovereignty claim. We would have to remember that, as Li Tana has put it, much of maritime SE Asia was a "Chinese water frontier" with notable populations of Chinese. We would have to catalogue all the Chinese settlements scattered all over the map: Ha Tien, of course, but many others now lost to history. We would probably discover that all along the coasts of Vietnam, in the Malay world, Cambodia, etc. we could "establish" Chinese claims. And I assume we would think this exercise a bit absurd -- after all, even though Ming loyalists settled Ha Tien, do we really believe that Ha Tien should belong to China? That Okinawa become Chinese?
I conclude that if we really do want to use this evidence from the far past to justify such claims, the most rational thing to do would be for parts of the South China sea to become a zone of shared sovereignty.
Shawn McHale
Associate Professor of History and International Affairs
George Washington University
Washington, DC 20052 USA
(on leave, 2007-08, at Vietnam National University --
Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam)_
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 10:07 PM
Dear Shawn,
this is an excellent point. I may add only that the Chinese standpoint stressing that Hanoi "consent by silence" confirmed the legality of the Chinese occupation of the Paracels appears of a questionable validity to me, for the simple reason that it is extremely unlikely that an official DRV protest would have persuaded the Chinese to leave the islands they had just acquired by military means. I doubt if the Chinese ever said that "had you protested, we would have returned the islands to you."
Best,
Balazs
--------
From: Tobias RETTIG <tobiasrettig@smu.edu.sg>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 20, 2008 at 4:28 AM
Hi,
From a customary international law perspective, if I remember my classes in Public International Law classes at the LSE in 1993/4 correctly, contested claims to territory, including islands, are ascertained according to several criteria.
One of them would be effective occupation (in this case the Chinese).
Another one would be acts asserting the claim to the island (i.e. if they Vietnamese do not protest, they would be seen as acquiescing in the Chinese act of occupation).
Other criteria would be historical usage of the claimed territories (e.g. erecting a lighthouse on the said islands and occupying it with one or two men, or fishermen regularly passing by, or landing to get fresh water, mapping of the territory, having had the territory on official maps, etc).
There may be other criteria that I may not remember.
It's all a specialised field of study.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_international_law
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sources_of_international_law
--------
From: Hoang t. Dieu-Hien <dieuhien@u.washington.edu>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 20, 2008 at 6:23 AM
Thank you for this list of criteria. I do agree with Shawn that historians and lawyers and politicians approach these kinds of issues very differently.
On the criteria below, what happens if more than one parties can meet all of the same criteria?
Again, not being an expert, I have no idea who should have legitimate claims over these sets of islands. I do know that many Vietnamese official maps include quan dao Hoang Sa and Truong Sa. I have also seen on Vietnamese television, as infrequently as I watch it, news stories said to be filmed on some of the islands, talking to "local" fisher folk describing their lives there, etc. They spoke flawless Vietnamese, looked Vietnamese, and acted like Vietnamese. I also remember in the early 70s, one of my teachers showed up to class after Tet one year wearing mourning garbs. She had lost her fiance in one of the battles "defending Viet Nam's sovereignty" over one of the islands.
These are just anecdotal experiences of an uncommitted and not-so-interested casual observer. I wonder what official "proofs" the Vietnamese government might have. I would not be surprised that China, the Philippines, and others can do the same. By law, then, which of the disputing nations would have "legitimate" claims over these lands? Who have the authority to decide and how?
I beg your pardon for these ignorant questions. Although I am very interested in the discussions, I am equally uninterested in the issues themselves, hence my continuing ignorance on the topics.
Thank you all for an interesting discussion.
Hien
2008/1/20 Tobias RETTIG <tobiasrettig@smu.edu.sg>:
[Quoted text hidden]
--
Hoang t. Dieu-Hien
Country Project Manager
International Training & Education Center on HIV (I-TECH)
University of Washington
901 Boren Ave, Suite 1100
Seattle, WA 98104-3508
Tel.: 206-543-3151
Fax: 206-221-4945
www.go2itech.org
--------
Bill Hayton <bill.hayton@bbc.co.uk>
date Jan 20, 2008 6:55 PM
subject [Vsg] Meanwhile: Vietnam, China continue talks on Tonkin gulf
Vietnam, China continue talks on Tonkin gulf
The Vietnam-China joint working group on the delineation of the sea area off Bac Bo (Tonkin) Gulf held its fourth round of talks in Beijing from January 17-18. The two sides exchanged views and reached consensus on a number of issues, creating a basis for further negotiations to define sea territories between the two countries. Officials of the two countries agreed that the fifth round of talks would be held in Vietnam later this year.
Source: VNA
http://www.thanhniennews.com/politics/?catid=1&newsid=35181
http://www.bbc.co.uk
Subject: A fundamental question\Re: [Vsg] Key questions re: Pham Van Dong's letter and new documentary evidence (1)
------------------------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 11:59 AM
Dear list,
I'd like to ask people who interprets PVD's statement
as recognition of chinese claim over the Paracels and
Spratlys a very fundamental question: why PVD did not
make it very simple like the DRV supported the PRC's
claim over the islands...? why he chose making an
ambiguity statement instead of a simple and clear one?
Why he stated his approval over PART of the PRC's
statement?
Best,
Thach
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 1:12 PM
Well, an explicit DRV statement in favor of China's claims would have clearly benefited the RVN in the old game of "depict-the-other-Vietnam-as-a-puppet-of-a-big-power-and-claim-that-you-are-the-only-genuine-nationalist." I wonder whether PVD's statement was preceded, or followed, by an official RVN protest (if I am not mistaken, Saigon did protest against the Chinese claims). Supporting the Chinese standpoint after Saigon had opposed it would have been quite counterproductive for Hanoi; and even if PVD made his statement before the South Vietnamese reaction, he could expect Saigon to oppose the Chinese claim.
BTW, I wonder whether the Soviet Union gave explicit support to China's specific territorial claims in 1958. Does any of the list members know something about that?
All the best,
Balazs
Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com> wrote:
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 6:30 PM
Dear Balazs,
Your point may have a sense if there was a statement
from the RVN, but to my best knowledge there was no
such a statement.
best,
Thach
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 10:08 PM
Sorry, I forgot to add the website:
http://www.hawaii.edu/cseas/pubs/explore/todd.html
Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com> wrote:
Dear Balazs,
Your point may have a sense if there was a statement
from the RVN, but to my best knowledge there was no
such a statement.
best,
Thach
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Fri, Jan 18, 2008 at 9:58 PM
Dear Thach,
the website mentioned below says that Filipino and Malaysian claims on the Spratleys, both before and after 1958, invariably evoked official protests from Saigon. Thus it is reasonable to assume that China's claim in 1958 provoked a similar RVN reaction, though the website in question does not cover this particular case. More information is needed. By any chance, does any of the list members have access to South Vietnamese newspapers published in 1958?
Best,
Balazs
Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com> wrote:
--------
From: dan hoang <hoangdanlieu@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 2:10 AM
Dear Balazs,
Thank you for this article.
Even the islands have no any resources, I believe, Vietnamese people always consider them as our descended land when they are first dicovered and claimed sovereignty by our Ancestors before any international laws and before any other nations' claims.
Even South Vietnam and North Vietnam before 1975 were different, but Vietnamese people are always the ones.
I think the Lawyers and Historicans will use this study to solve the problem.
Lieu
Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
[
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 3:44 AM
Dear Lieu,
you made an important point here. Namely, the fact that Vietnamese sovereignty over the Paracels and Spratleys preceded the division of the country implies that despite South Vietnam's actual control over the islands from 1954 to 1974, the DRV, in a strict legal sense, may have been similarly entitled to lay claim on the islands as the RVN, since both Vietnams were successor states of the empire ruled by the Nguyen dynasty. In other words, the question of RVN/DRV rights for the islands could not be easily resolved unless it was clarified whether any of the two states was the sole legitimate successor of the Nguyen Empire (as both claimed to be).
Best,
balazs
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 20, 2008 at 7:16 AM
Dear Balazs,
I mean the RVN reaction over Zhou's statement.
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 20, 2008 at 9:27 AM
Yes, I understand. This is why I wrote that more research is needed. If the Filipino and Malaysian claims evoked RVN protests, then it is reasonable to assume that the RVN reacted to Zhou's statement in a similar way. I do not claim that it did; I merely think that the likelihood of such a protest was great enough to investigate whether it really protested or not. Alas, Ulaanbaatar is not the best place to start such an investigation.:))
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 20, 2008 at 4:42 PM
This is a moment where someone can argue that
nationalists (quoc gia) are more patriotic than the
communists. there are many attacks on communists over
PVD's statement but none offered an opposite statement
of RVN at the time. I have read quite a few and have
not confronted such a statement too. So theoretically
we can assume that there was NOT such a statement.
A conclusion is that your answer to my fundamental
questions is not very convincing. Your theory of the
patriotic game seems to be not very fit in this
situation. but sure you can keep it as an explanation.
We enjoy freedom of imagination. :)
But there was another way of thinking and judgement;
more importantly there were reasons for its existence.
The Sino-Vietnamese relations were very good at the
time, at least in some consideration. In 1956, the PRC
returned Bach Long Vi island to the DRV, which they
controled since 1949. In the then understanding Bach
Long Vi was much more significant to the DRV then
islands 300-400km away. If the Chinese returned to
vietnamese BLV what are the reasons for concerns over
Spratly and Paracels?
it's up to you to choose what is more convincing.
best,
thach
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, Jan 21, 2008 at 1:53 AM
Dear Thach,
thanks a lot for this precious information! I think that your explanation and mine are actually compatible. Yours explains very credibly and logically why the DRV did not protest at all against the Chinese declaration of September 1958; mine is aimed to explain why PVD's declaration did not explicitly support the specific and concrete claims which the PRC declaration made for the Paracels and Spratleys. In fact, you made a very good point by raising the issue of Bach Long Vi, because the return of this island by the PRC in 1956 makes it somewhat more likely that Khiem did make a statement acknowledging China's historical rights for the Paracels and Spratleys in the same year. The return of Bach Long Vi fits very well into the general picture of Chinese foreign policies in 1956, i.e., a sophisticated combination of generous offers and concessions on the one hand and territorial demands on the other. For instance, the CCP leaders secretly asked the Soviets to let them re-annex Mongolia, and simultaneously tried to woo the Mongolian government away from Moscow by offering it greater opportunities to cooperate with Inner Mongolians (e.g., a Mongolian consulate was opened in Huhhot).
All the best and thanks again,
Balazs
Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com> wrote:
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, Jan 21, 2008 at 7:36 PM
Dear Balazs,
Sorry if I misunderstood you. I have only one thing to
disagree with you. That's the theory of patriotic game
over the PVD statement. I think you argued that PVD
made concession to the chinese but he did not make it
explicit in order to avoid being criticized for
concession by the Saigon government. I argued that PVD
avoided the question of Chinese claim and voiced his
support only on the question of 12 miles economic
zone.
You made a good point on Chinese complicated foreign
policy, giving one thing but taking another. I don't
know the story of Mongolia. It's interesting.
Best,
Thach
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, Jan 21, 2008 at 10:39 PM
Dear Thach,
I also meant that PVD evaded the question in 1958, rather than making a concession to the Chinese (see my very first post on this issue). My use of the concept of patriotic game referred mainly to that from the perspective of anti-Diem propaganda, it would have been counterproductive for the DRV to adopt an explicitly pro-Chinese standpoint in a Sino-RVN debate over a territorial (i.e., ultimately all-Vietnamese) issue even if its leaders had otherwise wanted to do so. After all, the term "My-Diem clique" was a fairly effective one in delegitimizing the Diem regime, and it would not have suited Hanoi to let Saigon use the same kind of weapon against it.
Best,
Balazs
Subject: Re: [vsg] "NO Gulf of Tonkin incident!" ???
------------------------
From: ryan nelson <sociolgst@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, Jan 22, 2008 at 8:33 AM
In regards to the statement, "BTW, recently we know by sure there was NO Tonkin Gulf incident!"
Yes, from statements I've read from SOD McNamara it is clear the second attack did not take place.
However, the first attack McNamara says did happen. In an interview he states,
"We were certain at the time that the first attack took place. I believe the date was August 2nd, 1964. We made every effort to be certain that we were right, one way or the other -- it had occurred or it hadn't occurred. And it was reported that there were North Vietnamese shell fragments on the deck of the U.S. destroyer Maddox. I actually sent a person out to pick up the shell fragments and bring them to my office, to be sure that the attack did occur. I am confident that it did; I was confident then, I am confident today. That was the August 2nd attack."
I am aware politicians are not always the most trustwothy of individuals. By no means am I saying his statements are true and that you are misinformed. However it is my understanding that there was an "incident" on the 2nd.
According to 1995 Associated Press article, "McNamara asks Giap: What happened in the Tonkin Gulf,"
"When former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara met the enemy's leading strategist Thursday, he raised a question he'd saved for 30 years: What really happened in the Tonkin Gulf on Aug. 4, 1964?
"Absolutely nothing," replied retired Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap.
Both sides agree that North Vietnam attacked a U.S. Navy ship in the gulf on Aug. 2 as it cruised close to shore. But it was an alleged second attack two days later that led to the first U.S. bombing raid on the North and propelled America deep into war."
Might you, or other helpful members of VSG, be able to provide me some scholarly evidence that verifies the first attack did not take place.
For clarification, if by "NO G.O.T. incident!" you are refering only to the alleged events on the 4th, my mistake. Not sure.
Thanks
Peace in Viet Nam
Ryan Nelson
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, Jan 22, 2008 at 2:44 PM
Hi Ryan,
General Giap said "nothing" happened on Aug 4 as he
knew what he happened and what did not. But Mr.
McNamara was not sure if there was the incident.
That's why he asked Giap to provide him the
information. Or he still pretended that there was an
accident on that day? Either case discredits him and
the american war machine. Either he or the "war
machine" lied.
In the last two weeks there were reports based on
newly declassified NSA docements asserting that there
was NO accident.
http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/01/09/6264/
I understand that there was an "incident" on Aug 2,
but can we call it "incident" when the the Americans
fired first?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_of_Tonkin_Incident
The Tonkin Story is very relevent in our disscusion of
the Spratly conflict.
One beautiful day, another "incident" could happen
again around the Spratlys islands and 40 years later
declassified documents will confirm that Vietnamese
did not fire first.
What I describe is not a tale. Last week, we read
chinese reports that Vietnamese fired at the chinese
fishing boats, which certainly we rightly denied. A
second "firing" can happen any time and the Chinese
will not make statement. They will use force to
"defend" their fishing boats.
best,
Thach
Subject: [vsg] North Vietnam 1956 Statement
------------------------
From: phuxuan700@gmail.com <phuxuan700@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 9:14 AM
Dear List,
I would like to share my $.02 on Pham Van Dong letter discussion.
On 9/04/58, China made a declaration on the territorial sea.
Both the English and Vietnamese version are available, online and offline.
http://law.hku.hk/clsourcebook/10033.htm
On 9/14/58, Pham Van Dong sent Chou En-lai a letter whose content is now well known.
What was Dong's intention in his letter?
Let us look at two opposing viewpoints from Luu Van Loi and Monique Chemillier-Gendreau.
Loi was assistant to Vietnam Foreign Affairs Minister and was head of Vietnam Border Commission from 1978 to 1989.
In his book, "The Sino-Vietnamese Difference on the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa Archipelagoes", 1996, Loi wrote "…Pham Van Dong had no intention of tackling a juridical question, the question of territory or sovereignty, nor spoke of the Hoang Sa and the Truong Sa. He was thinking only of one thing: the bellicosity of US imperialism and the activities of the 7 th fleet in the Taiwan straight which were threatening China…" (pp. 74-75).
Chemillier-Gendreau was professor of International Law at University Paris VII-Denis Diderot, France. As an expert on the Paracel-Spratly conflict, her view was often quoted by other researchers as well as Vietnam officials.
(See http://hoithao.viet-studies.info/1998_LMNghia.htm ).
In her book, "Sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands", 2000, (an English translation of "La souverainete sur les archipels Paracels et Spratleys", 1996), in reference to Dong's letter, Chemillier-Gendreau wrote "…it is incorrect to assert that Vietnam had also "reaffirmed its recognition of China's claim" to the archipelagoes. Nevertheless, its silence on the affirmation of Chinese sovereignty over the islands can be interpreted as acquiescence …" (pp 129-130)
To find out where the truth lies, we turn to an unlikely source, China's.
In "China's Indisputable Sovereignty over the Xisha and Nansha Islands", Beijing Foreign Languages Press, 1980, (pp. 17-20), China cited four different cases where Vietnam recognized China's claim to Paracel and Spratly islands.
1. Vietnam Vice-Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem's statement on 6/15/56
2. Dong's letter on 9/14/58
3. Vietnam's statement on the US "combat zone" designation on 5/09/65
4. Nhan Dan article on Chinese airspace on 5/13/69
While focusing on Dong's letter, we have overlooked an equally important if not more important fact: It is the existence of the 6/15/56 statement.
To fully understand its significance, we need to look at some surrounding facts leading to the statement.
Prior to 1950, there were minor frictions between the French in Vietnam and the Chinese over the control of Paracel islands.
On 10/14/50, France officially transferred the island control to Bao Dai Government of Vietnam.
On 9/07/51, at the San Francisco Conference, Vietnam declared Paracel and Spratly islands as Vietnam territory.
Things were quiet for a while until May of 1956.
On 5/19/56, the Philippines issued a claim over Spratly islands on the proximity basis.
On 5/31/56, China responded with a statement, reasserting that these islands were China territory.
Vietnam by this time was divided into two regions according the Geneva Accord: North Vietnam and South Vietnam. Paracel and Spratly islands were under the administrative control of South Vietnam.
On 6/08/56, South Vietnam Foreign Affairs Minister Vu Van Mau, in a communiqué, insisted that Paracel and Spratly islands had "always been a part of Vietnam".
Under this circumstance, North Vietnam Vice-Foreign Affairs Minister's statement arrived on 6/15/56 as quoted:
"Vice Foreign Affairs Minister Dung [sic] Van Khiem of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam received Mr. Li Zhimin, charge d'affaires ad interim of the Chinese Embassy in Viet Nam and told him that "according to Vietnamese data, the Xisha and Nansha Islands are historically part of Chinese territory." Mr. Le Doc [sic], Acting Director of the Asian Department of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry, who was present then, added that "judging from history, these islands were already part of China at the time of the Song Dynasty." "
(See http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/3754/t19232.htm)
Despite of South Vietnam's effort to protect Vietnam sovereignty, there was NO ambiguity in North Vietnam's stand on the Paracel-Spratly dispute.
The 6/15/56 statement, in other words, set a clear path for North Vietnam to take in the following decades.
Reading China's 1958 declaration carefully, we should notice one thing. What's new in the declaration was not China's claim to Paracel and Spratly islands. China had made the claim before. What's new was the 12-mile width of the territorial sea.
That was the very essence of the declaration.
Dong's letter was not vague but precise, well written, in responding to the essence of China's declaration. The letter was never intended as a deviation from North Vietnam's path on the Paracel-Spratly issue, as supported by the other two cases in 1965 and 1969 respectively from China list above.
Presented facts therefore have clearly indicated that truth does not line up with Loi's argument.
Instead, the truth lies on the path where North Vietnam first set foot on in June of 1956.
Calvin Thai
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 10:22 AM
Dear Calvin,
I must admit that is still a bit difficult for me to believe this story about Ung Van Khiem's alleged statement, because Khiem was probably the most outspokenly anti-Chinese of all high-ranking VWP leaders in the 1960s (and paid dearly for his conviction). His early standpoint on Sino-DRV relations is less clear, but we have some circumstantial evidence indicating that he may have developed a critical attitude of Chinese policies as early as the mid-1950s. In the summer of 1956, it was Khiem and Bui Cong Trung who were the most eager to inform the Hungarian diplomats about the negative effects of North Vietnam's Chinese-inspired land reform campaign, and, remarkably enough, both were criticized for their anti-Chinese views in 1963. In 1957, the Hungarian charge d'affaires complained to Khiem about his activity being restricted and monitored by the DRV authorities, whereupon Khiem apologized and said that "we learned these methods from the Chinese."
Best,
Balazs
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sat, Jan 19, 2008 at 10:55 AM
BTW, I agree with you in that Luu Van Loi's statement should not be taken at face value. Such a seasoned diplomat as PVD could not have overlooked the broader implications of the Chinese statement. If the Chinese wanted to bash only U.S. imperialism and the Jiang Jieshi clique, why on earth they raised the issue of the Paracels and the Spratleys at all? They could have said that "all territories currently illegally occupied by the puppet clique should be liberated," which would have made it clear that this was a strictly bilateral dispute between Beijing and Taipei (with some U.S. meddling, of course). Yet they worded their statement in a very different way.
--------
From: phuxuan700@gmail.com <phuxuan700@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 20, 2008 at 7:45 AM
Dear Balazs,
I think North Vietnam Vice-Foreign Affairs Minister Ung Van Khiem did not make the Paracel-Spratly statement based on his personal view.
Khiem was ordered what to say in June 1956 and he did his job.
Considering the surrounding facts, is it safe to say that the 1956 statement and following incidents have proven one thing: VCP traded Vietnam's sovereignty for China's support ?
Calvin Thai
--------
From: phuxuan700@gmail.com <phuxuan700@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 20, 2008 at 8:41 AM
Dear Balazs,
On the last part in my previous post, it should read as follows:
Considering the surrounding facts, the 1956 statement and following incidents have proven one thing: VCP traded Vietnam's sovereignty for China's support.
Calvin Thai
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Sun, Jan 20, 2008 at 9:44 AM
Dear Calvin,
there is a possible compromise solution between the two opposing viewpoints, namely, that in the 1950s and early 1960s the DRV indeed refrained from raising the issue of the islands, because Sino-DRV relations were in general good enough not to risk a friction over a seemingly minor issue (after all, the islands were out of reach for Hanoi for the time being), but when Sino-North Vietnamese relations started to deteriorate in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Hanoi was no longer willing to make this concession.
Still, I continue to have doubt about Khiem's alleged statement, since presently the sole evidence for it is that the Chinese Foreign Ministry (hardly an unbiased side in the dispute) says so. For instance, do you think that there is anything on this website about that the CCP leaders repeatedly asked the Kremlin to let China re-annex the whole of Mongolia? Yet they did so, in 1949, 1954 and 1956, revealing quite a bit about how they interpreted China's legitimate territorial claims. For understandable reasons, today they prefer not to talk about this issue. For the same reason, post-1974 official Vietnamese statements about Hanoi's previous attitude also should be treated with caution.
Best,
Balazs
--------
From: phuxuan700@gmail.com <phuxuan700@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, Jan 21, 2008 at 6:48 PM
Dear Balazs,
I'd like to summarize a chain of events in 1956 relating to Paracel and Spratly islands:
On 5/19/56, the Philippines issued a claim to Spratly islands as Philippines territory
On 5/31/56, China RE-issued a claim to Spratly islands as China territory
On 6/08/56, South Vietnam RE-issued a claim to both Paracel and Spratly islands as "always been a part of Vietnam"
On 6/15/56, North Vietnam Vice Foreign Affairs Minister Ung Van Khiem told Chinese diplomats that "... according to Vietnamese data, the Xisha and Nansha Islands are historically part of Chinese territory."
Refraining from raising the island issue is one thing, recognizing China's claim and directly going against South Vietnam's claim is another thing.
Please note that South Vietnam personnel were present at these islands at the time.
Also, let us get the fact straight here: the island Bach Long Vy was returned to North Vietnam in 1957, not 1956!
Last but not the least, as if to ease your concern over Ung Van Khiem's 1956 statement, Luu Van Loi did confirm 3 out of 4 cases that the Chinese brought up. The one Loi left out was the 1969 Nhan Dan article. That should not be difficult to verify.
In short, there is no better term than saying what North Vietnam did in 1956 and in the following decades was to trade Vietnam's territory for China's support!
Best regards,
Calvin Thai
PS: BTW, I wonder when Ho Chi Minh said the now famous "Vietnam is one, Vietnamese people is one" ?
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, Jan 21, 2008 at 7:47 PM
Officially the DRV got back the island on 1/1/1957 but
the process started long before in 1956.
Pls read at
http://www.dangcongsan.vn/english/specials/seasandislands/details.asp?topic=68&subtopic=167&leader_topic=280&id=BT2570780789
If someone wants to close eyes to the facts they
cannot see the reality. For them, only their
imagination is real life.
--------
From: David Marr <dgm405@coombs.anu.edu.au>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, Jan 21, 2008 at 7:53 PM
As an historian, I shouldn't be saying this, but haven't we raked over the 1956 Paracel and Spratly coals long enough? China has the power today to humble Vietnam on offshore control, and 10 years from now that capacity will have increased. Vietnam has tried to gather support elsewhere, with limited success. Looking ahead, I think the Paracels are gone to Vietnam, but the Spratlys (or a portion thereof) will be defended resolutely by Vietnam, not just for the oil, but the manner in which China's continental shelf claims make almost the entire Vietnamese coastline hostage to Beijing. I'd appreciate hearing from experts on that continental shelf question, as my assertion is based on a map I saw somewhere years ago. Shawn McHale argues that parts of the South China Sea (aka Eastern Sea) should become a "zone of shared sovereignty". That has been mentioned in earlier diplomatic discussions, I think, but who believes Beijing and Hanoi can resolve their differences that way?
David Marr
--------
From: Balazs Szalontai <aoverl@yahoo.co.uk>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Mon, Jan 21, 2008 at 11:15 PM
Dear David,
thanks a lot for your mediating proposal! I think that those of us who are interested in continuing this discussion over some specific points over the territorial debate may do it by CC-ing each other, rather than flooding the entire list. Such a flooding would benefit solely the eternal and incorrigible Great Han enemies of Vietnamese social progress and national independence, who seek to divide our patriotic pro-Vietnamese scholarly community and make it a lame Beijing roast duck with the sinister ultimate aim of swallowing it up.:))
As for the likelihood of resolving Sino-Vietnamese differences: I may make a comparison with the Japanese-South Korean debate over the Dok-do islands. The area around these islands also constitutes a good fishing ground (though fortunately there are no oil reserves:)), and the strategic importance of the islands is also comparable to the ones in the South China Sea. Tokyo and Seoul have been quarrelling over them for decades, and there is absolutely no solution in sight for the time being. Yet the problem always remained a relatively minor irritant in high politics (nationalist intellectuals constitute a different case), mainly because the two countries usually had at least one common enemy (mainly North Korea, but also China and the USSR) against which they had to cooperate, willy-nilly. In other words, it is also possible to regard the Sino-Vietnamese territorial debate as more a symptom than a primary cause of bilateral discord. That is, we may say that sharp and constant conflicts over the islands are not predetermined by history, but if there is no common enemy against which Hanoi and Beijing must cooperate (or if their diplomatic priorities start to diverge in a marked way), the debate is highly likely to re-emerge after a temporary lull. What do you think of that?
All the best and thanks again,
Balazs
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, Jan 22, 2008 at 7:14 AM
Dear David,
You remind me the first lesson you gave me a decade
ago, what is the difference between politics and
history. You may not remember it but I always keep it
in mind.
there is no other way to solve Spratley conflicting
claims, but it takes time for parties and "peoples" to
realize and to digest that.
However, in a not very far future, China can
fabricate an incident in the sea and take other
islands by force. BTW, recently we know by sure there
was NO Tonkin Gulf incident! But the war was over for
35 years, and 44 years passed since that fabricated
event!
Another example: What Argentina can do after Great
Britain took over Malvin island?
Vietnam and the pulic opinion has to prepare for that
turn of history.
Here I mixed again between history and politics?
Best,
Thach
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, Jan 22, 2008 at 7:34 AM
Dear Balazs,
You may know my 300 pages of Sino-Vietnamese-American
analysis arrived at a conclusion that Vietnamese need
not be divisive to avoid be exploited by the
outsiders. I was surprised by myself arriving at a
conclusion I never imagined when I started.
Unfortunately, we still ARE. I hope that some
sociologists can help us to explain the phenomenon.
Best,
Thach
--------
From: phuxuan700@gmail.com <phuxuan700@gmail.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, Jan 22, 2008 at 7:50 PM
Dear Thach,
I would never consider disagreement in a discussion "divisive".
It is boring not to have challenging or opposing views, as in the saying "noi voi dau goi" (talking to one's knee). ;-)
Therefore, as always, I like to hear from others on the facts presented.
Best,
Calvin Thai
PS: There is one thing I hope you would agree with me that personal attacks do not get those involved very far in any discussion!
--------
From: Thach Nguyen <nh_thach@yahoo.com>
Reply-To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Date: Tue, Jan 22, 2008 at 9:07 PM
Dear Calvin,
I TOTALLY agree with you that it's interesting and
useful to argue with opponents.
My context of Vietnamese divisiveness is different.
Best,
thach
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