Dr. Nguyen Ngoc Bich

From: Chau NGUYEN NGOC <yakiribocou@gmail.com>

Sent: Wednesday, July 27, 2022 11:02 PM

To: vsg@u.washington.edu

Subject: [Vsg] An article on Dr Nguyen Ngoc Bich

Dear all,

Please find here attached an article on my father, Dr Nguyen Ngoc Bich, who is unknown to most of you of the new generation.

https://www.academia.edu/42158889/Viet_Nam_1954_A_possible_choice_other_than_that_of_Ng%C3%B4_%C4%90%C3%ACnh_Di%E1%BB%87m

Very truly yours,

Nguyễn Ngọc Châu

Visitez mon site https://sites.google.com/view/nguyenngocchau/accueil

From: Shawn McHale <mchale@gwu.edu>

Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2022 10:31 AM

To: Chau NGUYEN NGOC <yakiribocou@gmail.com>

Cc: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Subject: Re: [Vsg] An article on Dr Nguyen Ngoc Bich

This is an intriguing argument.

But the background to it makes it less likely. In 1954, Phạm Cônng Tắc, the leader of the Tây Ninh branch of the Cao Đài, was himself one of the most significant leaders outside of government, and very active in politics. The only way that Nguyễn Ngọc Bích would have become the candidate for Prime Minister was if he had the approval of the Cao Đài leader. If he didn't, he would have been a weak candidate.

Furthermore, in 1954, Americans, who didn't really understand well the intricacies of Vietnamese politics, lumped together as Cao Đai the opportunist generals and the civilians associated with the religion, not understanding the bitter internal Cao Đài struggle where men of violence -- the generals -- were trying to seize de facto financial and political power from religious leadership, and some Cao Đài generals were being bribed away from control of the Cao Đài itself by the new State of Vietnam. I suspect that to the Americans at the time, this situation looked like a mess. Secondly, Bảo Đại did not choose the Tây Ninh Cao Đài leader or one of his approved candidates, I surmise, because he did not want someone coming into power with a significant powerbase. Diệm, ironically, looked "safer" to him, and seemed to have the attention of the Americans. So in the end, Phạm Công Tắc was not chosen, nor was any deputy of his.

In 1961, Nguyễn Ngọc Bích was in exile. I don't see how an exiled leader with possible links to a strong mass base inside the country could possibly win against Diệm, who controlled the state apparatus.

Shawn McHale

George Washington University

From: Chau NGUYEN NGOC <yakiribocou@gmail.com>

Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2022 11:28 AM

To: Shawn McHale <mchale@gwu.edu>; vsg@u.washington.edu

Subject: Re: [Vsg] An article on Dr Nguyen Ngoc Bich

Please read this article to understand better what was Caodaism in Viet Nam.

https://www.academia.edu/44590508/The_basic_truths_on_Caodaism_2021_07_20_

There is always a big gap between the thoughts of the Vietnamese and the ones of the Americans and the French. And the history of the two Vietnamese wars demonstrates it.

Truly yours,

Nguyễn Ngọc Châu

From: Shawn McHale <mchale@gwu.edu>

Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2022 11:51 AM

To: Chau NGUYEN NGOC <yakiribocou@gmail.com>

Cc: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Subject: Re: [Vsg] An article on Dr Nguyen Ngoc Bich

Is that supposed to be an answer to my post? If so, I don't quite understand the connection.

To understand my position, I suggest you read chapters 3,4, 9, and 10 of my book The First Vietnam War: Violence, Sovereignty, and the Fracture of the South, 1945-56 (Cambridge, 2021). As you will see from that book, I believe that Phạm Công Tắc's significance has been overlooked.

Shawn McHale

From: Chau NGUYEN NGOC <yakiribocou@gmail.com>

Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2022 1:27 PM

To: Shawn McHale <mchale@gwu.edu>

Cc: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Subject: Re: [Vsg] An article on Dr Nguyen Ngoc Bich

Pham Cong Tac was only the superior of the caodaist Tay Ninh Branch. He was not respected by all the population and all caodaists. The caodaists have, as all the Vietnamese, their own way of thinking on their role in the war. An example is Trinh Minh The. Dr Bich has nothing to do with him. His father Nguyen Ngoc Tuong who founded the Ben Tre branch with a majority of caodaists was the opposite of Pham Cong Tac, a religious who smoked cigarette by cigarette and who did more politics than religious practice. And the Nguyen Ngoc family was much more respected than Pham Cong Tac.

In 1961, the opposition against Ngo Dinh Diem has already started. The candidature of Dr Bich and Nguyen Van Thoai really bothered him and justified the Saigon authorities to invalid their file for "technical reasons". I was still in Saigon in 1961, and I saw how the population thought at the announcement of their candidature. But you are right. Diem had the power in his hands, even if the opposition was growing and was looking for a leader.

The main problem of the failure of Dr Bich and his group, was that he was ahead the others. When your thoughts are not the ones supported at the right moment by a main power in this war, you can only fail. Pham Cong Tac has nothing to do with it. If Dr Bich's destiny was to fail, he could also fail only after being chosen as Prime Minister in 1954 or as President in 1961. And really his destiny was not to succeed. Ngo Dinh Diem was chosen by Bao Dai after the latter met his brother Ngo Dinh Luyen. For Bao Dai who thought of war, through his conversation with Luyen, he probably believed that Diem had the support of the Americans. Diem destiny was to become the head of South Viet Nam.

The main point to consider in the history of Dr Bich is the solution that he and his group thought for the divided Viet Nam. They were not the only ones in 1954 to think of peace and not of war.

Nguyễn Ngọc Châu

From: Chau NGUYEN NGOC <yakiribocou@gmail.com>

Sent: Thursday, July 28, 2022 11:34 PM

To: Shawn McHale <mchale@gwu.edu>

Cc: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Subject: Re: [Vsg] An article on Dr Nguyen Ngoc Bich

Excerpt from my book :

" In the North, Hồ Chí Minh not only created in 1925 the first Vietnamese communist group, the Thanh Niên Cộng Sản Đoàn (Group of Young Communists), which became in 1930 the Đảng Cộng Sản Đông Dương (Indochina Communist Party), but he also was able, in 1946, to manipulate the French to get rid, with their support, of the Chinese and Vietnamese nationalists, and to buy time to get at the right moment (July 1947) the Communist Chinese help to strengthen militarily his movement, then, from 1949, to take full advantage of the victory of the China Communist Party in China to become powerful against the French military forces.

In the South, the Communists were less successful. The nationalists Hòa Hảo and Cao Đài were faced with the communist vehemence to control by force the resistance after a period of unified alliance against the coloniser: the Hòa Hảo leader Huỳnh Phú Sổ was assassinated, the Bình Xuyên head Bẩy Viển, bothered, and several thousand Caodaists, massacred in Centre Viet Nam. As they could not take refuge in a nearby country in case of difficulty as in the North, they had to ally themselves with the French against the Communists to avoid the danger of being eliminated. The French let them control (with the possibility to raise taxes) the large territories where they were living and where Communists were no more welcome.

The French solution of a State of Việt Nam as part of the French Union, reluctantly accepted by the nationalists as an intermediate step, did not, however, solve the problems. The State of Việt Nam was not credible. It was considered by the Vietnamese population as a creation of France where nothing could be done without its consent. The prestige of the RDVN, which conducted its diplomatic affairs, had its army, and fought for the total withdrawal of the French from the country, remained intact. Most South Vietnamese, like the Caodaist general Trình Minh Thế, did not want French or Communists.

The French who had never understood the Vietnamese struggle for their independence, opened their eyes when they were defeated by the Communists at Điện Biên Phủ on 7th May 1954.

Finally, they had to leave the country after nine years of useless efforts. It could not be otherwise sooner or later: the Vietnamese had already been able to get out of several periods of Chinese domination lasting a total of ten centuries.

Viet Nam – Political History of two wars – Independence war (1858 – 1954 and Ideological war (1945-1975)

Very truly yours,

Nguyễn Ngọc Châu