The Wilson Center Archive, the DRV, and Algeria

Subject: [Vsg] The Wilson Center Archive, the DRV, and Algeria

On May 22, 2017, at 2:07 PM, Paul Schmehl <pschmehl@tx.rr.com> wrote:

I received a note today about this important document uncovered by Pierre Asselin. <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/134601>

He writes about it here: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/le-thanh-nghis-tour-the-socialist-bloc-1965>

It puts the LDP in a context of much greater cooperation with other communist countries than has previously been posited.

"We made careful presentations so that the fraternal countries would understand that we were not using only military measures in our struggle and that we were not rigid and machine-like; instead we made it clear that we have a clear and profound understanding of our nation’s most sacred revolutionary mission, which is also a heavy and glorious international duty for us."

China's Liu Shaoqi is cited: "Vietnam’s revolutionary struggle against the United States is concrete evidence of Vietnam’s great international proletarian spirit."

Hungary's Janow Kadar is cited: "The Hungarian Party, government, and people have a true international proletarian position and attitude toward the Vietnamese people’s struggle against the American imperialists. We view it as our common struggle; we will maintain solidarity with you in this fight and will try to do anything we can to help Vietnam, including sending volunteer army fighters should that be necessary."

I think it is now difficult to argue that the Vietnamese communists were not interested in the international aspect of communism and were somehow more focused on the nationalist aspect of Vietnam.

This evidence argues strongly against that position, in my opinion.

Thoughts? Comments?

"The man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who

reads them, inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer the truth than he

whose mind is filled with falsehoods and errors." - Thomas Jefferson

Paul Schmehl (pschmehl@tx.rr.com)

Independent Researcher

From: Charles High <mikebiking@yahoo.com>

Subject: [Vsg] The Wilson Center Archive, the DRV, and Algeria

Date: May 23, 2017 at 4:08:05 PM PDT

To: Paul Schmehl <pschmehl@tx.rr.com>, Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Paul,

Thanks for pointing us to this interesting archive. I’ve been delving around in it, and find much of interest.

I don’t think that the quotations from Chinese and Hungarian leaders are much more than diplomatic pablum. (For recent variations on the genre, see Trump’s address upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, and Abbas’ address to Trump) It is well known that that the DRV tried to maintain fraternal relations with other members of the Communist world, though it found it increasingly difficult as the Sino-Soviet split widened.

For comparative purposes, one might look at the US “Many Flags” program and the RVN’s belated “More Friends” program. But I think the most interesting topic is the DRV’s outreach to “non-aligned” countries.

Along those lines, I found this interesting document, translated by Merle Pribbenow, in the same archive.

https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110524

First of all, it is interesting that the DRV felt that it could spare machine guns to send to Algeria in 1958, apparently without giving much thought to supplying their comrades in the south.

The DRV’s possible involvement with the Algeria liberation movement has always intrigued me. Hữu Ngọc says that he and his comrades worked with Algerian soldiers captured at Điện Biên Phủ to “revolutionize them.” Did those repatriated soldiers have anything to do with the first manifestation of the Algerian struggle in the fall of 1954?

This also led me to think a bit more about the trajectory of the Algerian War, which took place between the “French” and “American” wars in Vietnam. From very general reading, I gather that the Algerian FLN was getting direct support from both China and Russia (competing with each other), as well as the DRV. Yet the FLN apparently was not tainted by the aid that it was receiving from the communist bloc. In fact, the U.S. encouraged the French to grant independence to Algeria.

At least one account says that de Gaulle was willing to grant independence all along, but was cautious about triggering domestic opposition—which included a failed military coup in 1961 (the “Putsch des généraux”). The U.S. recognized Algeria as an independent country on July 4 (!), 1962, the day after the Algerians had voted on the matter.

So it’s really no surprise that de Gaulle, in turn, counseled Johnson and Nixon to cut their losses and withdraw from Vietnam. Considering that Algeria lay just on the other side of the Mediterranean, was officially a part of metropolitan France, and had a large population of “pieds-noir” who were heavily invested there, he faced much greater challenges in ending that conflict.

:: Mike High

Nhà văn

Great Falls, Virginia

From: "Pierre Asselin, Ph.D" <passelin@hpu.edu>

Subject: Re: [Vsg] The Wilson Center Archive, the DRV, and Algeria

Date: May 23, 2017 at 4:49:53 PM PDT

To: Charles High <mikebiking@yahoo.com>, Paul Schmehl <pschmehl@tx.rr.com>, Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Dear Mike/All:

FYI, on Algeria and the communist camp, including the DRVN, during the war against France, seehttps://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-algerian-revolution-and-the-communist-bloc

Aloha,

Pierre

Pierre Asselin

Professor of History

Hawai'i Pacific University

On May 24, 2017, at 12:14 AM, Paul Schmehl <pschmehl@tx.rr.com> wrote:

You are right.

This archive has some very interesting documents - like this one: <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118896>

The American side of this conversation is John Kenneth Galbraith.

The Polish Foreign Minister, [Adam] Rapacki, has been visiting here. Last night I got word that he wanted to talk to me about Vietnam. I met him, along with the Secretary-General of the Polish Foreign Office [Jerzy Michałowski], at M.J. Desai’s house. They told me that while we [the United States] probably couldn’t lose in South Vietnam, we couldn’t win. Meanwhile we are forcing North Vietnam to look more and more to the Chinese for protection. This is bad. Why not get a liberal government in South Vietnam which all could support? In return, Ho Chi Minh would call off the insurrection. I had to improvise for, of course, I was without instruction. So I countered by asking why not call off the insurrection for six months and with this manifestation of good faith, we could then withdraw. They said that North Vietnam could not get peace in the south so long as Diem was in charge. They said (approximately), “You know enough of Marx yourself to know about popular movements.”[1] I responded, “But you should be good enough Communists to know about the international leadership of the Communist movement.” They replied that, under present circumstances, given the split between Russia and China, any reference to international leadership was to a myth. I noted that if it were easy to throw out leaders such as Diem, we would have thrown out Castro. But we weren’t that powerful.[2]

[1] The reference is to my American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952, 1956), which is regarded by some Marxian scholars as showing enlightened Marxist influences.

[2] This conversation was, of course, promptly reported. It was ignored by the State Department but picked up from the cables by President Kennedy. He told [Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern W. Affairs Averell] Harriman to have me pursue the matter as he was much interested. By the time his instruction came,

Rapacki had departed.

How many questions does this raise?

1) If Ho could "call off the insurrection" in 1963, then he is admitting he controls it completely. But then he claims unless Diem is gone, he can't do that. So he admits to both ultimate control yet not complete control.

2) If Galbraith knew in 1963 that Ho wanted Diem gone, did that enter in to the coup and assassination thinking in DC? This document is dated 1/22. The coup was in November, just 10 months later.

"The man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who

reads them, inasmuch as he who knows nothing is nearer the truth than he

whose mind is filled with falsehoods and errors." - Thomas Jefferson

Paul Schmehl (pschmehl@tx.rr.com)

Independent Researcher

From: Paul Schmehl <pschmehl@tx.rr.com>

Subject: Re: [Vsg] The Wilson Center Archive, the DRV, and Algeria

Date: May 23, 2017 at 9:20:51 PM PDT

To: Charles High <mikebiking@yahoo.com>, Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

Reply-To: Paul Schmehl <pschmehl@tx.rr.com>

With regard to this document, there is another fascinating one articulating the Soviet view of Galbraith's meeting with the Polish Ambassador. They interpreted it as a desire on the part of the US to disentangle from southeast Asia.

<https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118897>

From: Charles High <mikebiking@yahoo.com>

Subject: Re: [Vsg] The Wilson Center Archive, the DRV, and Algeria

Date: May 24, 2017 at 8:26:57 PM PDT

To: Paul Schmehl <pschmehl@tx.rr.com>

Cc: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>

The Galbraith memo is pretty well known—the Wilson Center has also posted a 2005 paper on the subject, which provides much-needed context.

“Poland and Vietnam, 1963: New Evidence on Secret Communist Diplomacy and the “Maneli Affair””

Margaret K. Gnoinska

Cold War International History Project Working Paper #45,

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/CWIHP_WP_45b.pdf

One must keep in mind that Ho Chi Minh’s name was invoked by Rapacki, probably observing the convention that Ho was “President” of the DRV. However, most accounts agree that by 1963, Ho Chi Minh had been eclipsed by Le Duan, who had championed the guerrilla campaign in the south. (In particular, see Pierre’s book, Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, and Lien-Hang’s book, Hanoi’s War).

Given that the NLF was reliant on support from the north, and mostly followed Hanoi's lead even in the early years, I would assume that the Le Duan faction could have paused the conflict—but that’s just my guess. I’m not sure what kind of a deal would have persuaded the hardliners to do so.

:: Mike High

Great Falls, Virginia

USA