Kissinger Diaries on US involvement in Vietnam

Mon Oct 12 12:11:03 PDT 2015

See:

The Kissinger Diaries: What He Really Thought About Vietnam

By Niall Ferguson

October 10, 2015

It has long been assumed that Henry Kissinger "supported" the Vietnam War throughout the 1960s-and that this was one of the reasons Richard Nixon offered him the job of national security adviser. This view is incorrect. As his private papers and diaries make clear, Kissinger realized by 1966 at the latest that the U.S. intervention in defense of South Vietnam was a doomed enterprise and that only a diplomatic solution would end the conflict.

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Daniel C. Tsang

Distinguished Librarian

Data Librarian and Bibliographer for Asian American Studies,

Economics, Political Science, Orange County documents (interim)

468 Langson Library, University of California, Irvine

PO Box 19557, Irvine CA 92623-9557, USA

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Shawn McHale mchale at gwu.edu

Mon Oct 12 14:16:05 PDT 2015

This is not really what Kissinger's diaries tell us about his true views on

Vietnam. It is what his diaries seem to say about one trip to South Vietnam

in 1965. Niall Ferguson makes an interesting claim: that "Kissinger

realized by 1966 at the latest that the U.S. intervention in defense of

South Vietnam was a doomed enterprise and that only a diplomatic solution

would end the conflict." This claim raises the question: if Kissinger knew

this in 1966, why did he not convince Nixon to pull out in 1969? If the

enterprise really were so doomed, as Ferguson wants to argue, isn't it even

more damning of Kissinger that so many Americans and Vietnamese died after

Nixon came into office? If the enterprise were so doomed, why did Kissinger

support, then, the invasion of Cambodia? I simply don't buy Ferguson's

argument on Kissinger.

Shawn McHale

George Washington University

Washington, DC USA

Nhu Miller trantnhu at gmail.com

Mon Oct 12 14:19:04 PDT 2015

Kissinger was the eminence behind the completely gratuitous invasion of Cambodia and indirectly responsible for the deaths of millions in the terror that followed. I don't believe for a second that this war criminal was an "idealist" as Ferguson depicts him. He, Nixon et alia should have been prosecuted and tried for what they did in Indochina. Ferguson's attempt to whitewash doesn't wash.

T.T. Nhu

(and don't forget what Kissinger did in Chile.)

Tom Miller milltom at gmail.com

Mon Oct 12 15:00:05 PDT 2015

Tim Weiner's well documented "One Man Against the World: The Tragedy of

Richard Nixon" also does not support Mr. Tsang's view. In any case, if,

like Robert McNamara, he knew the war was doomed, why didn't he do whatever he could to stop the slaughter? McNamara's weak excuse decades later when participating at a UC Berkeley forum on the documentary "The Fog of War" was that, although he knew the war was doomed at the time, he did not want to hurt the morale of the troops. I would guess that the reason for the

inaction is that domestic politics was considered more important that the

lives of Vietnamese and our soldiers.

Tom Miller

Paul Schmehl pschmehl at tx.rr.com

Mon Oct 12 15:29:05 PDT 2015

I would suggest that there was an additional element; ego. To admit defeat

would be to admit their policies were wrong, and that they would not do.

The die was cast very early on. When Kennedy sent Harriman to negotiate

the Laos neutrality agreement, some considered that a masterful stroke. It

may have been if the treaty had been honored, but it was only honored in

the breach. Yet American officials stuck stubbornly to their position that

Laos was neutral and their borders were sacrosanct, despite manifest

evidence that the NVA was in Laos in force. They then commenced a "secret"

air war in Laos, which accomplished little. Even Nixon limited the

incursions of combat troops, but his decisions were heavily influenced by

the political situation in America at the time.

As early as 1962 military planners suggested that three divisions (about

60,000 men) could completely block the HCM trail and prevent infiltration

of men and materiel. The idea was rejected out of hand. Even though it

was repeatedly suggested by the military (in one form or another) it was

consistently rejected due to Laotian "neutrality". So Harriman's

"masterpiece" became an albatross and defeat was just a matter of time and

patience on the part of the DRV, which was willing to sacrifice a quarter

of their population to achieve their goal.

Paul Schmehl (pschmehl at tx.rr.com)

Independent Researcher

David Marr david.marr at anu.edu.au

Mon Oct 12 15:59:56 PDT 2015

I was at the Joint Command HQ in Okinawa in 1960-61 when plans were developed for going into Laos. There was no railroad, only one paved road, and dirt roads were impassable during the summer monsoon. Pathet Lao concentrations were in the northeastern hills. We lacked enough helicopters. Earlier Washington had manipulated the right wing Phoumi Nosavan group into power in Vientiane, but a young officer's group dumped him in favour of an attempt at neutrality. JFK wisely decided not to commit forces to Laos. But that left him vulnerable to charges of being soft on commies, hence escalation some months later in Vietnam.

David Marr

ANU

Mike High mike.high at earthlink.net

Mon Oct 12 17:03:18 PDT 2015

I read the diary excerpts with great interest, because I’ve been wondering for a long time exactly what Nixon and Kissinger had in mind when they took over the war in 1969. The diary entries are fascinating to me—I’m hardly what you would call a Kissinger fan, but I have to give him credit for insight and the ability to see beyond the usual upbeat presentations that visitors regularly received.

I have not yet read the new Nixon book, but I recently completed Dallek’s book (Nixon and Kissinger) and came away with the impression that neither of them thought that a full-blown war in Vietnam made any sense in terms of America’s security interests. (Niether said this in so few words, because that’s not the way public officials talked about things, but that’s what I read between the lines.) As to whether it was “winnable,” they seemed mainly pessimistic, even though there were times when they may have briefly believed that Vietnamization was going to win the day.

It’s also edifying to go back and read Kissinger’s very detailed article for Foreign Affairs in January 1969—written, I believe, just before he secured his appointment from Nixon.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1969-01-01/viet-nam-negotiations <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/1969-01-01/viet-nam-negotiations>

Even though it is crafted for a public forum by someone seeking a high-profile job, it is remarkably candid on many points.

One could probably go on forever trying to figure out what Nixon and Kissinger were really thinking at any given point in time. In their strange personal dynamic, it was almost as if they were carrying on internal arguments that they projected onto each other. There were public statements, confidential statements, and there were things that they avoided saying to each other. You get some of the same thing from the LBJ tapes—where he seems to conducting the entire debate on intervention with himself. Vietnam would certainly do that to you.

If N&K were so pessimistic about the long-term prospects, why did the war go on so long? I think at that point—given the nature of the U.S. political climate, and especially given Nixon’s early declaration to his staff that he would not be the first U.S. President to lose a war—it would have been very difficult for him to move any faster than he did. Looking back at it, I’m actually surprised at the pace of troop withdrawals—which, admittedly, he covered with an astounding tonnage of bombs dropped.

Of course, some of the blame for the prolongation of the war goes to the hardliners in Hanoi. Having dealt with the French, they must have understood the Occidental need to “save face,” but they really gave no room for a negotiated settlement.

And so, seven more years of war, and a tragedy that is almost beyond the comprehension of most Americans.

:: Mike High

Author | Researcher

Great Falls, Virginia