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David A Biggs david.biggs at ucr.edu
Fri May 4 16:09:18 PDT 2007
there have been several exchanges on the list comparing the american occupation of iraq to american intervention in vietnam, but i wonder if perhaps the better analogy would be to compare american involvement to french involvement in the first indochina war, especially in cochinchina? specifically I am thinking about the role of the French military command in producing a balkanization effect in the mekong delta, encouraging through power-sharing agreements the creation of what bernard fall and others described as "fiefdoms". the french devoted most of their regular forces to fighting in the north and were throughout the war under-staffed and under-supplied in the south. there may be very strong parallels between the ad hoc assembly of the coalition provisional authority in 2003 and french-vietnamese authority in 1945-46 and the fostering of politico-religious fiefdoms (kurdish, sunni, shiite vs. hoa hao, catholic, cao dai, binh xuyen) and associated rounds of ethnic cleansing that followed. has anyone in the vietnamese studies community commented on this yet? americans generally tend to compare themselves with themselves, but with the stories of shortages in body armor, over-extended tours of duty, and widespread partisan chaos, perhaps a comparison with the french is more accurate? -david
Edward Miller Edward.G.Miller at Dartmouth.EDU
Sat May 5 12:37:04 PDT 2007
Hi David: I think the alternative you are proposing to the standard Iraq-vs.-American War in VN has a lot to recommend it. As chris goscha and others have pointed out, the French war in the south was quite different from that in the North. The Viet Minh eventually fielded several divisions in Tonkin/Laos, whereas they never operated units much larger than a battalion in the South. And the parallels between the fragmented sectarian landscape in Cochinchina verus contemporary Iraq are indeed striking. The ethnic/religious/political cleansing that took place in Cochinchina during the First Indochina War seems to be a particularly understudied aspect of the conflict, and one which suggests a lot of points of similarity with today's Iraq. There were even a couple of cases of suicide bombings in Cochinchina! Trinh Minh The's assassination of General Chanson of France in 1951 was conducted via this tactic, as I remember. There is still one point on which the two situations seem different: I don't see any analog in today's Iraq to the Viet Minh in early 1950s Cochinchina. Even though Viet Minh power was *relatively* circumscribed and limited in the South as compared to the North, the VM still seems to be to have been by far the most powerful and most unified of all of the various groups jousting for territory and influence. Neither the Cao Dai nor the Hoa Hao realms were unitary fiefdoms; rather, they were each a patchwork of warlords. The VM, in comparison, were a highly centralized and efficient organization with regards to logistics, intelligence and scope/scale of their military capabilities. From what little I know about Iraq today, there doesn't seem to be any single group or organization there which can claim these kinds of comparative advantages. Ed Miller Dartmouth College
Quang X. Pham quang at qxpham.com
Sun May 6 20:59:26 PDT 2007
The U.S. military did study the French experience and incorporated those lessons into its latest counterinsurgency manual, aka the COIN manual. Except it was not about the French's debacle in Indochina. Former French officer David Galula's 1964 account of the fighting in Algeria heavily influenced the writing of the COIN manual, co-authored by the current commander in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus. C'est la guerre. On another note, I'm currently writing my second book, tentatively titled, "NamRaq: Waging Wars without Winning," with Mike Tharp, a Vietnam vet with a Bronze Star, and former foreign and war correspondent with the Wall Street Journal and U.S. News & World Report. "NamRaq" is a book about the lost lessons of Vietnam for Iraq, with previously untold perspectives by Vietnamese, Iraqi and American participants. Best regards, Quang X. Pham Author, "A Sense of Duty" <http://www.namraq.com> www.namraq.com
Shawn McHale mchale at gwu.edu
Mon May 7 04:56:16 PDT 2007
David, As Ed Miller has said, the comparison between southern Vietnam in the First Indochina War and Iraq makes some sense, and Ed has laid out a lot of the reasons why. I gave a (public) lecture on this exact topic a few months ago. The early years show a civil war being fought at the same time as a war against the French. But I would disagree with Ed on one point. Apparently writing of the period from 1950 onwards, Ed writes that "The VM, in comparison, were a highly centralized and efficient organization with regards to logistics, intelligence and scope/scale of their military capabilities." The Viet Minh did not always show such qualities. In fact, if you restrict the comparison to 1945-49 Cochinchina and Iraq, the comparison is stronger. In the early years, and especiaslly 1945-47, the Viet Minh was riven by divisions and was poorly equipped. General Buyen Binh and others had a tendency to go their bloody way. They used torture excessively on their own people (Mai Chi Tho ruefully admits this, for example) and were adept at the use of assassination squads and small urban attack units against French and Vietnamse.
Edward Miller Edward.G.Miller at Dartmouth.EDU
Mon May 7 19:44:12 PDT 2007
Shawn's point about the difference in Viet Minh capabilities and effectiveness in the South pre- and post-1950 is well taken. Recent work by Goscha in particular shows the validity of this distinction. I still think that the Viet Minh did distinguish itself from its Vietnamese rivals in the South in terms of general capabilities and effectiveness during the early 1950s. It is significant, moreover, that the VM accomplished this as the Bao Dai solution came on line, when all of the other rival forces (Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Binh Xuyen, UMDC) were ostensibly united under the State of Vietnam banner (as they had not been prior to 1949). But I guess that is just further support for Shawn's main point that the most interesting parallels are those between the 1945-1949 period and contemporary Iraq. Ed Miller Dartmouth College
pascal bourdeaux pascalbourdeaux at yahoo.fr
Wed May 9 00:05:28 PDT 2007
Dear David, I agree with Shawn (french military material); I don't know enough to compare the geostategies in Vietnam and Irak. But speaking about Vietnam and French Indochina war, we also have to consider other archives and points of view; in the case of "religious political sects" as a global and anti-Vietminh strategy, contradictions and oppositions were more and more obvious between french military officers, provincial administrators and political representatives, between military and civil authorities, especially when both were not concentrated in one hand (Haut Commissariat de l'Indochine) or when political forces and government were changing in France (IV republic and its weak parlemantarian institutions) If we change the level of analysis, the situation was more complex, for instance "Hoa Hao" can't be used as a singular reality but as a plural one; in the reports coming from Chaudoc, Cantho or Saigon, the descritpions were completety different, and the recommendations too. Pascal
David A Biggs david.biggs at ucr.edu
Tue May 8 10:58:42 PDT 2007
Thanks, Shawn. I'm very interested in this material. It seems that scholars are just starting to take on the military archives for other types of reading beyond military history. Regarding Hoa Hao - French relations, Pascal Bourdeaux's 2003 dissertation "Pays Hoa Hao" is an excellent result of digging through SHD records with HH. -David
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