From: Andrew Wells-Dang <andrewwd@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, February 3, 2023 2:17 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Subject: [Vsg] US Institute of Peace public event on Paris Peace Accords

Dear VSG colleagues,

USIP’s Southeast Asia Program will be hosting a public event on the 50th Anniversary of the Vietnam Peace Settlement, on Thursday, February 16th from 9:00 – 10:00 am EST. You're welcome to join online or in-person. The event will be livestreamed in English and Vietnamese.

The event will feature Vietnamese Ambassador Nguyen Quoc Dzung, former U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte, Prof. Lien-Hang Nguyen, and Prof. Carolyn Eisenberg discussing the historical legacy, meaning and lessons of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. Please register at https://www.usip.org/events/reflections-50th-anniversary-vietnam-peace-settlement.

Best regards,

Andrew

Andrew Wells-Dang, PhD

Senior Expert, Vietnam

United States Institute of Peace 

From: Andreas Margara <andreasmargara@hotmail.com>
Sent: Friday, January 27, 2023 7:10 AM
To: Tan Pham <nxb315kio@gmail.com>; Pierre Asselin <passelin@sdsu.edu>
Cc: VSG <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Subject: Re: [Vsg] Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Paris Peace Accords

Dear VSG,

please let me add another perspective regarding the 50th anniversary of the Paris Peace Accords by looking at Germany's role in the Vietnam War. In an interview with Deutsche Welle, I analyzed how Germany's support for Vietnam during the war was divided by east and west, which is also the topic of my recently published book "Geteiltes Land, geteiltes Leid" (Berlin, 2022).

Link: www.dw.com/en/looking-at-germanys-role-in-the-vietnam-war-50-years-later/a-64536732

Looking at Germany's role in the Vietnam War 50 years later

The Paris Peace Accords 50 years ago began the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam. DW looks at how Germany's support for Vietnam during the war was divided by east and west.

www.dw.com

Best

Andreas

--

Dr. Andreas Margara

University of Mannheim, Germany

From: Chau NGUYEN NGOC <yakiribocou@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2023 1:34 PM
To: Vietnam Studies Group <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Subject: [Vsg] Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Paris so-called " Peace" Accords

The Paris Accords were not "Peace" Accords.

They were just Accords for the Americans to leave the country with their soldiers detained in the North Viet Nam prisons. And for Kissinger to receive the Nobel prize and for some people unaware of what happened at these moments or willing to close their eyes to not see reality.

The Paris “peace” agreements

Elected in November 1968, the new President Richard Nixon made no secret of his interest in solving the war in Việt Nam in the best way for the interests of the United States. He and his national security adviser, Henri Kissinger, set themselves the goal of getting the Americans out of Việt Nam, to achieve « peace in honour ». This was not new. France came back to Vietnam in 1945-1946 to regain its « disgraced honour »[1] and left it in 1954 also « in honour ».

The failure of the general attacks on South Vietnam, the bombing of the North and Nixon's meetings with Mao Tse Tung and then with Brezhnev convinced Hà Nội to no longer demand the departure of Thiệu and that the fate of South Vietnam is settled between the government of Sài Gòn and the GPR. And ten days after a meeting with Kissinger, Lê Đức Thọ and he had in their hands a draft of a peace treaty in due form.

The Paris so-called "Peace" accords signed at the Majestic Hotel in Paris on 27th January 1973 - which gave Henry Kissinger (USA) the Nobel Prize, the North-Vietnamese Lê Đức Thọ having refused it - were mainly aimed to allow the United States to withdraw in honour, with the bonus of the release of their captured soldiers. There was a ceasefire on the spot (standstill ceasefire), but it did not in any way settle the presence of the army of the North on the soil of the South. The Americans had to leave, but they had already withdrawn: in December 1972 only 26,000 non-combat soldiers were remaining. The South could receive military aid from the United States but based on a one-for-one replacement. It was said that the communists and the government of Sài Gòn could not « receive » additional troops on the soil of the South and were obliged to withdraw all their troops from Laos and Cambodia, without indicating any deadline. The agreement provided that, upon the announcement of peace, representatives of the GRP and the government of Thiệu would meet in the presence of neutral personalities of their choice to constitute a National Council of Reconciliation and National Concord which would agree on a future government. This unrealistic clause was never taken seriously by any of the protagonists.

Kissinger agreed with Lê Đức Thọ, who had given him, in early October 1972, a draft in Vietnamese « immediately translated into American by David Engel, who speaks Vietnamese as father and mother in all three tones, north, centre and south » [2]. On 8th October, he proposed 31st October for the signing of the agreements.

The categorical refusal of President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu - who, with his team, raised 64 points of disagreement with Doctor Kissinger - was badly taken by the latter. He was particularly hostile to what was said which allowed the North Vietnamese forces to remain in the South after the cease-fire.

A month after the signing of the Paris Accords, reports from the American intelligence services informed Nixon that the Hồ Chí Minh trail was cluttered with trucks bringing equipment and soldiers to the South while the 15 North Vietnamese divisions which had participated in the 1972 attack were still there.

The book Lịch sử Quân Đội Nhân Dân (History of the People's Army) published in Hà Nội in 1994 by the People's Army publish house, indicated that « from January to September 1973, the material sent to “battlefield Bˮ was 140,000 tons, four times that of 1972. It was made up of 80,000 tons of war material (27,000 tons of weapons, 8,000 tons of fuel and petroleum products and 40,000 tons of rice) and 45,000 tons of supplies for the population of the liberated areas. 10,000 tons of weapons were stored along the Annamite Range. More than 100,000 officers and troops comprising two infantry divisions, two artillery regiments, an air defence division, a tank regiment, an engineering regiment, and various units were sent in 1973 to the south to strengthen the troops fighting there »...« From the beginning of 1974 to the end of April 1975, 823,146 tons of material were sent to the South, representing 1.6 times the weight transported during the previous 13 years »...« During 1973 and 1974, more than 150 000 young people had joined the army »...« Compared to 1972, supplies were multiplied by 9, weapons and ammunition, by 6, rice, by 3, petrol and fuel, by 27 ».

The Americans are no more interested in Viet Nam

The Cold War was in “relaxationˮ (“détenteˮ in French). The « Realpolitik » led by Nixon and Kissinger wanted to put aside the ideological dimension of the Cold War and establish a stable geopolitical state of the world. In Europe, under the leadership of Chancellor Willy Brand of the German Federal Republic (RFA, West Germany), as part of his Ostpolitik, relations between the two Germanys were beginning to normalize with the four-party Berlin agreement signed on 3rd September 1971. In Asia, an unexpected friendly encounter between American and Chinese ping-pong athletes in Japan in 1971 paved the way for an American visit to China. The United States and the People's Republic of China had not been in relations since the former's inception in 1949. This event paved the way for a revival in Sino-American relations with the secret meeting between Henry Kissinger and Prime Minister Chou En Lai in July 1971 and the February 1972 visit to China of US President Richard Nixon where he met Mao Tse Tung and signed the Shanghai Communiqué. With Brezhnev, whom Nixon met on 22nd May 1972, numerous agreements were signed in various fields, military (SALT I which deals with long-range nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles) as well as economic and cultural.

The Americans are no more interested in Viet Nam. They were there to defend their own interest, of fear of the communist expansion to all the South-East Asia, then the entire world including the USA. This danger doesn’t exist anymore. They did everything to leave without taking into account the promises given to their former ally.

U.S. Congress leaves South Vietnam to its fate

President Richard Nixon sent several letters to President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu which were the subject of an article in the New York Times of 30th April 1975. These letters dated 14th November 1972, 17th and 20th January 1973 and 5th January 1974, which were held by the former Planning Minister Nguyễn Tiền Hưng, contained the American President's commitment that if the other side violates the Paris Agreements, the United States will come back to help South Việt Nam.

However, at the end of the Watergate affair[3] launched in 1972, a federal law, the War Powers Resolution Act, was passed in 1973 to limit the initiative of the President in the event of military conflict in forcing him to obtain authorization from Congress for an intervention of more than 60 days, and arms exports and aid abroad.

The battles at the level of the divisions between the North and South armies were numerous in 1973 and 1974. The army of the South took back at a high price the territories attacked by that of the North. Sa Huỳnh in Quảng Ngãi, invaded by a North Vietnamese division, was taken over by the 2nd ARVN division after three weeks of intense combat. In June, the North Vietnamese division which had occupied Trung Nghĩa west of Kontum was expelled after three months of fighting with the ARVN. At the end of 1973, the ARVN had 80,000 victims, the highest figure in a year since the start of the conflict.

Army morale, however, was falling apart with scarcer supplies and ammunition becoming rare. The South suffered from cuts in American aid on which it depended economically and militarily. Also, the price of many necessities had more than doubled since the ceasefire. The economic crisis, due to the oil shock of 1971, began in 1973 with the price of a barrel quadrupled and important consequences in the country as in all the economies of the world.

Sir Robert Thompson said in his book Peace is not at Hand, (London, 1974) that he was not afraid of the ARVN’s ability to fight, but was rather afraid that the American aid would be cut. And that was what happened, with the efforts of the pacifists and Senator Edward Kennedy. On 6th May 1974, Congress decided to cut US aid to South Việt Nam by $ 233 million, making Sir Robert Thompson say that « the main lesson to be learned from the Việt Nam War is never to consider the Americans as reliable allies » [4]. He was the head of the British Advisers Mission to the Government of the Republic of Việt Nam (September 1961 to March 1965) and an advisor to President Nixon.

After lowering the amount of aid in 1974, the United States Congress reduced that of 1975. Aid for military needs fell from US$ 1 470 million to US$ 700 000 million, which had to take into account the high inflation due to the rise in the price of oil in 1973. Economic aid was also lowered, with the particularity of no longer being able to be used to buy fertilizers for farmers!

On 15th April 1975, Nguyễn Tiến Hưng, the Minister of Economic Development and Planning was sent by President Thiệu to Washington to request a loan of US$ 3 billion repayable in 3 years with the proceeds from the sale of petroleum discovered offshore, the 16 tons of gold that were stored in the basement of the National Bank of Việt Nam building, and the products of exported rice. But it was too late. On 18th April, the Senate Defense Committee voted against any military aid to the RVN, and the Foreign Affairs Committee authorized Gerald Ford to use the US army to bring the Americans out of Việt Nam.

The consequences for the army and its ability to react to combat were significant, as severe savings became essential. No «one by one» replacement as the Americans had the right to do under the Paris Accords was made. South Vietnamese aviation could provide only 50% of the flights required, helicopters could only operate at 70% of their capacity, 200 aircraft had to remain in hangars, 400 pilots undergoing training in the United States were repatriated, aviation forces reconverted into infantry troops, 4,000 cars to be immobilized and their parts used for the maintenance of those that could still be used ...

« Towards the end of 1974, beginning of 1975, [the General] Cao Văn Viên let me know that the ammunition had fallen to 6 months or 9 months of stock if we economize. I told him that his estimate was based on ordinary combat intensity, but after the attack on Phước Long and then Ban Mê Thuột, he would not last more than 3 months. There was nothing more to hope for from the Americans », wrote Nguyễn Xuân Phong, a member of the South Vietnamese delegation to the Paris negotiations, in his letters.

According to General Cao Văn Viên [5], by mid-1975, South Việt Nam would run out of fuel and by June 1975, the ARVN would run out of ammunition. At the end of 1974, ammunition was rationed because it was so scarce, 1.6 bullets per day per rifle, 10.6 bullets per day for machine guns, 0.3 shells per day for mortar, and 6.4 shells per day for artillery 105.

[1]     Conversation in May 1969 between Nixon and C.L. Salzeberd of The New York Times.

[2]    Letters of 28th, 29th and 30th April 2013 by Nguyễn Xuân Phong, a former member of the delegation of the Republic of Vietnam, recounting the Paris Agreements and the fall of Sài Gỏn on 30th April 1975.

[3]    In 1972, burglars were arrested in the Democratic Party premises in the Watergate building in Washington. The ensuing investigation, aided by revelations made by the Washington Post which was informed by a mysterious informant nicknamed Deep Throat, led to the discovery of a listening system in the White House and the involvement of President Richard Nixon. This affair, called the Watergate affair, resulted in the resignation of President Nixon in 1974.

[4]    Nhìn lại Sử Việt (The history of Việt Nam reconsidered), Lê Mạnh Hùng, Ed. THXBMDHK, 2013.

[5]   The final collapse, general Cao Văn Viên, Washington DC, US Army, Centre of Military History, 1983, document on 30th April, 1975 written for the Institute of Military History of the American Infantry. In Nhìn lại Sử Việt (page 270), Lê Mạnh Hùng quoted Strategy and Tactics (Washington DC, US Centre of Military History, 1980) where colonel Hoàng Ngọc Lung wrote that « some regional forces had to buy grenades with their own money in the military zone IV, …»… »

Nguyễn Ngọc Châu

From: Pierre Asselin <passelin@sdsu.edu>
Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2023 6:58 AM
To: VSG <vsg@u.washington.edu>
Subject: [Vsg] Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Paris Peace Accords

Cherished Comrades:

Just an FYI: I'll be part of an event entitled "Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Paris Peace Accords" tomorrow, 26 January, from 10am USPT.  It's organized by the Richard Nixon Foundation and will be streamed live on YouTube.  See https://www.nixonfoundation.org/event/paris-peace-accords-50th/ for details. I apologize in advance if the Nixon Foundation is too "woke" for some of you.

As many of you on VSG may have noticed, I've been quite busy this week owing to my earlier work on the Paris Agreement.  My story should be an inspiration and a source of strength for all of you, junior scholars of Vietnam.  If you work really hard for decades and endeavor to publish with reputable presses, maybe one day -- maybe -- you'll get to be just like Uncle Pierre, and every 50 years people will care about your life's work, for a day or two.  If that's not a life worth living, then I don't know what is.

Bác Pierre     

Pierre Asselin

Professor of History - Dwight E. Stanford Chair in US Foreign Relations

San Diego State University

From: Cau Thai <cvthai75@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2023 9:09 PM
To: vsg@uw.edu
Subject: Re: [Vsg] The 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the Demise of a U.S. Ally

Sorry if the sentence "The following is from a Vietnamese American" has caused any confusion! The text is mine.

Best regards,

Calvin Thai

Independent

From: Cau Thai <cvthai75@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, January 24, 2023 4:02 PM
To: vsg@uw.edu
Subject: [Vsg] The 1973 Paris Peace Accords and the Demise of a U.S. Ally

Dear List,

The Paris peace negotiations started on May 13, 1968. After more than 4 years, 202 joint meetings among four sides: the U.S., the DRV, the RVN, the NLF-PRG, and 24 secret talks, only between the U.S. and the DRV, the Paris Peace Accords, consisting of 9 Chapters, 23 Articles, were signed on January 27, 1973.

In the past 20+ years, Western academics have written about the agreement with different perspectives. The following is from a Vietnamese American.

In their 1969 speeches, Richard Nixon and William Rogers discussed the U.S. proposals to end the Vietnam War, starting with the withdrawal of American armed forces and North Vietnamese armed forces from the South simultaneously, following with the end to all military activity in the demilitarized zone and the release of prisoners. (Nixon's "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam", 11/03/69; "Viet-Nam in Perspective; An Address by William P. Rogers", 4/21/69).

When sending Le Duc Tho to Paris to lead talks with the U.S., Le Duan provided Tho with two non-negotiable demands: 1. to withdraw American armed forces from the South, 2. to keep North Vietnamese armed forces in the South, (""Mấu chốt là ở chỗ quân Mỹ phải ra còn quân ta thì ở lại”. Bí thư thứ nhất Ban Chấp hành Trung ương Đảng Lê Duẩn đã giao nhiệm vụ đó cho đồng chí Lê Đức Thọ - Tư lệnh mặt trận ngoại giao đàm phán với Mỹ ở Paris trước khi đồng chí lên đường sang Paris vào tháng 6-1968... Đối với mặt trận ngoại giao ở Paris, Bộ Chính trị và Chủ tịch Hồ Chí Minh đã chỉ đạo thực hiện sách lược “hai là một và một là hai”. Về đối ngoại, ta có hai đoàn tham gia đàm phán: Đoàn của Chính phủ Việt Nam Dân chủ Cộng hòa và Đoàn của Mặt trận Dân tộc giải phóng miền Nam Việt Nam, sau là của Chính phủ cách mạng lâm thời miền Nam Việt Nam. Nhưng thực chất, cả hai đoàn đều do Bộ Chính trị và Bác Hồ chỉ đạo, cùng thực hiện một nhiệm vụ với ưu tiên là buộc quân Mỹ phải rút ra khỏi miền Nam Việt Nam, còn quân ta thì ở lại." Le Trung Nguyet's "Đảng và Bác Hồ từ Điện Biên đến Đại thắng Mùa Xuân 1975", 2015. Nguyet was Tho's daughter). Rogers noted these two DRV demands in his 1969 speech.

Kissinger and Tho met in private sessions between February 21, 1970, and January 13, 1973, before the agreement signing. ("Le Duc Tho-Kissinger Negotiations in Paris", Luu Van Loi & Nguyen Anh Vu, 1996).

The DRV and the NLF-PRG adhered to a single strategy over the entire period, "two but one" in private, "one but two" in public (“hai là một và một là hai”), with the DRV in full control but the NLF-PRG well-informed and in sync. However, the U.S. often kept the RVN in the dark in its negotiations with the DRV.

The demand for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese armed forces from the South was to ensure a lasting peace for tens of millions of Vietnamese. After the U.S. unilaterally dropped the demand, Nguyen Van Thieu rejected the proposed agreement in his speech on October 24, 1972.

Unlike the relationship between the DRV and the NLF-PRG, the RVN and the U.S. were allies. The RVN, as an independent and sovereign state, did not allow any countries to make decisions about its future without its approval. In other words, there were interests of three sides: the RVN, the U.S. and the DRV/NLF-PRG, involved in the Paris peace negotiations.

A series of letters between Nixon and Thieu took place in the following 10 weeks. Below are the excerpts from three of them:
1. "I understand from your letter and from General Haig's personal report that your principal remaining concern with respect to the draft agreement is the status of North Vietnamese forces now in South Vietnam. As General Haig explained to you, it is our intention to deal with this problem first by seeking to insert a reference to respect for the demilitarized zone in the proposed agreement and, second, by proposing a clause which provides for the reduction and demobilization of forces on both sides in South Vietnam on a one-to-one basis and to have demobilized personnel return to their homes." (Nixon's November 14, 1972 letter to Thieu).

2. "Over the last two months—through my personal letters, through my extensive personal discussions with your emissary, through communications via Dr. Kissinger, General Haig, and Ambassador Bunker, and through daily consultations in Paris—I have kept you scrupulously informed of the progress of the negotiations. I have sought to convey to you my best judgment of what is in our mutual interest. I have given you every opportunity to join with me in bringing peace with honor to the people of South Vietnam.
General Haig's mission now represents my final effort to point out to you the necessity for joint action and to convey my irrevocable intention to proceed, preferably with your cooperation but, if necessary, alone.
...
You are also aware of certain military actions which will have been initiated prior to General Haig's arrival. As he will explain to you, these actions are meant to convey to the enemy my determination to bring the conflict to a rapid end—as well as to show what I am prepared to do in case of violation of the agreement, I do not want you to be left, under any circumstances, with the mistaken impression that these actions signal a willingness or intent to continue U.S. military involvement if Hanoi meets the requirements for a settlement which I have set.
If the present lack of collaboration between us continues and if you decide not to join us in proceeding now to a settlement, it can only result in a fundamental change in the character of our relationship. I am convinced that your refusal to join us would be an invitation to disaster—to the loss of all that we together have fought for over the past decade. It would be inexcusable above all because we will have lost a just and honorable alternative." (Nixon's December 17, 1972 letter to Thieu). Operation Linebacker II, aka the Christmas Bombings, was conducted from 18 to 29 December 1972.

3. "There is nothing substantial that I can add to my many previous messages, including my December 17 letter, which clearly stated my opinions and intentions. With respect to the question of North Vietnamese troops, we will again present your views to the Communists as we have done vigorously at every ether opportunity in the negotiations. The result is certain to be once more the rejection of our position. We have explained to you repeatedly why we believe the problem of North Vietnamese troops is manageable under the agreement, and I see no reason to repeat all the arguments.
We will proceed next week in Paris along the lines that General Haig explained to you. Accordingly, if the North Vietnamese meet our concerns on the two outstanding substantive issues in the agreement, concerning the DMZ and type method of signing and if we can arrange acceptable supervisory machinery, we will proceed to conclude the settlement. The gravest consequence would then ensue if your government chose to reject the agreement and split off from the United States. As I said in my December 17 letter, “I am convinced that your refusal to join us would be an invitation to disaster-to the loss of all that we together have fought for over the past decade. It would be inexcusable above all because we will have lost a just and honorable alternative."
...
Should you decide, as I trust you will, to go with us, you have my assurance of continued assistance in the post-settlement period and that we will respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam. So once more I conclude with an appeal to you to close ranks with us." (Nixon's January 05, 1973 letter to Thieu).

After receiving the pledge from the U.S. President to "respond with full force should the settlement be violated by North Vietnam", Thieu agreed with the terms in the proposed agreement.

According to John Erlichman, he posed a question to Kissinger on January 23, 1973, “How long do you figure the South Vietnamese can survive under this agreement?" and Kissinger answered, "I think that if they're lucky they can hold out for a year and a half". "When Kissinger's assistant John Negroponte opined that the agreement was not in the best interests of South Vietnam, Kissinger asked him, "Do you want us to stay there forever?"" ("Witness to Power: The Nixon Years", John Erlichman, 1982. Erlichman was the White House Counsel and Nixon's Assistant; "No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam", Larry Berman, 2001).

Two years and three months after the agreement signing, the RVN was taken over by North Vietnamese armed forces. Le Duan's demand to maintain his 200,000+ troops in the South was obviously not intended for the peacekeeping mission. When American armed forces left and the U.S. failed to live up to its word, the demise of the RVN was inevitable.

In his 1969 "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam", Nixon stated, "A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends."

What the U.S. did in the Paris peace negotiations and the aftermath led to the death of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese at sea and in re-education camps, and the fall of the entire country into an authoritarian regime. It left a dark stain in American history.

Calvin Thai

Independent