Turquía
Resumen
2012 y el Fethullah Gülen
Behind bars in the Deep State (Arun, Jan 10, 2012)
2011 (12 junio) - Elecciones
Antes
Barry Rubin tiene bastantes artículos relacionados con el tema. El sábado anterior a las elecciones publica un artículo de un amigo suyo turco que se mantiene anónimo: Turkey's Election:Last Exit Before Toll (June 11, 2011) que resume así:
To summarize, a victory by the ruling AKP is likely that would give it tremendous power to reshape Turkey's future in an Islamist and more repressive direction. But that outcome is not inevitable as a number of constituencies may give enough support to the social democratic CHP to block the regime continuing or at least to keep its control of parliament low enough to stop it from unilaterally writing a new contitution for Turkey.
Turkey's Last Free Election (Daniel Pipes, June 12, 2011):
As someone who has been sounding the alarm ever since the AKP won its first election in 2002, I now warn: Elections taking place today are likely to be the last fair and free ones in Turkey.
Uncomfortable Ottomans (Firas Maksad y Soner Cagaptay, June 8, 2011):
If the AKP plays its hand well, the Arab Spring could finally give Turkey the soft power it craves in the Arab world. But Turkey's delicate balancing act between the people and their rulers could also have the opposite result if its ties with despised despots do not keep pace with the aspirations of newly empowered Arab peoples.
Turkey's June 12 Elections (Soner Cagaptay, June 9, 2011):
The ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) is predicted to win for the third consecutive time since 2002, extending its mandate into 2016 and making it the longest-ruling faction in Turkey's seven-decade history as a multiparty democracy. Since 2002, the AKP has dramatically transformed Turkey's foreign policy, creating an environment in which cooperation with the United States has been periodically interrupted by sharp differences, particularly on issues such as Iran's nuclearization and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The party has also built a conservative power base within the country's bureaucracy, media, and business community, challenging their traditional pro-Western nature. Another AKP victory could well accelerate these trends, particularly if the party gains sole control over amending Turkey's constitution.
Last thoughts before Turkey's June 12 elections (Okan Altiparmak, June 11, 2011)
Resultados
Parti
Toplam Oy
Oy Oranı
Parti
Toplam Oy
Oy Oranı
Después
Turkey's Ironic Electoral System (Daniel Pipes, June 13, 2011):
To keep Kurds out of parliament, the military authors of the 1982 Turkish constitution instituted the unheard-of threshold of 10 percent, meaning that a political party that won less than that proportion of the total vote did not gain any seats. This rule has had a huge impact on Turkish political life, especially in 2002, when it transformed the AK Party's third of the votes into two thirds of the seats. It has also caused the ruling AKP party, despite its increasing popular vote, to control a steadily smaller number of the 550 seats. Note in particular the bolded numbers:
(...) Also ironically, as the AKP strengthens on the ground – receiving twice the number of votes yesterday than it did in 2002 – it weakens in parliament. Put differently, the 10-percent ruling that doubled AKP power in 2002 has since then worked against it. Voters have wised up and are not throwing their votes away as once they did. As Jürgen Gottschlich of Der Spiegel notes, this AKP victory "almost seems like a defeat." (June 13, 2011)
Turkish Election: Islamism Triumphant (Barry Rubin, June 13, 2011):
The stealth Islamist party, Justice and Development (AKP), received almost exactly 50 percent of the vote. Under the Turkish system this will give them an estimated 325 members of parliament, or about 60 percent of the seats.
On the opposition side the social democratic Republican People's Party (CHP) got about 26 percent of the vote and 135 seats. The right-wing nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) took 13 percent giving it 54 seats. Eleven parties didn't make the minimum ten percent barrier (they received only about 1 percent or less). There are also 36 independents, many of them Kurdish communalists.
Now is this good or bad? Overwhelmingly bad. (...)
What all this means is that the AKP is entrenched in power and can now proceed with the fundamental transformaiton of Turkey. (...)
This would include:
A constitution that would take the country far down the road to a more Islamist state and society.
A more presidential style of government empowering the mercurial (a nice word for personally unstable and frighteningly arrogant) Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to become the chief executive.
The government can now infiltrate, take over, and transform the remaining hold out institutions, especially the armed forces and courts, along with the reemainder of the media that has not yet been bought up or intimidated by the Islamists.
A government whose policy is to align with Islamists like iran, Syria (not Islamist but part of the Tehran-led alliance), Hamas, Hizballah, and perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood.
A government against U.S. and Western interests.
A government that, to put it bluntly, hates Israel and many of whose members hate Jews.
This is a disastrous day for the United States and for Europe; for the prospects of stability and peace in the Middle East. And it isn't great news for the relatively moderate Arab states either.
It is the end of the republic as established by Kamal Ataturk in the 1920s and modified into a multi-party democracy in the 1950s.
Turkish election: instant analysis (Arun, June 13, 2011) - Hace un análisis muy diferente a Rubin:
If Erdoğan wants to revise the constitution, he’ll have to get the support of the MHP, or maybe peel off some its deputies. The MHP, which was a neo-fascistic party until recently—nowadays it’s merely right-wing nationalist and not too far from the AKP in many respects—, may like the idea of a strong presidency but has no interest in Erdoğan or the AKP leading it. And after the pre-election sex scandals—likely an AKP put up job, to push the MHP under 10%—, it probably won’t be too eager to facilitate Erdoğan’s presidential ambitions.
(...)
As the AKP is more than an Islamist/Islamic party, the chances that Erdoğan & Co will try to push an overtly Islamist agenda are minimal. Apart from removing remaining restrictions on Islamic headscarves, further raising taxes on alcoholic beverages, and small time stuff like that, it’s hard to see how much further they can go in an Islamist direction. Sharia law will not come to Turkey, women will not be forced to veil, and rakı and beer will not be banned.
Erdogan wins third term with nearly 50 percent of vote (Reuters, June 13, 2011) - Turkish Prime Minister's party takes election but will need to seek consensus; Syria, economy likely to be primary focus; critics fear Erdogan may use election to limit freedoms andcement power.
Crisis con Israel
Actualidad Crisis Turquía-Israel (Hatzad Hasheni, Sep 2011)
Estrategias en Oriente Medio y el Levante: Turquía e Israel, donde las dan las toman (FS, 28 ago 2011)
Fuentes de información sobre Turquía en inglés
English-Language News About Turkey: A Tour (Claire Berlinski, Jan. 20, 2012) - Muy interesante comentario sobre las distintas fuentes de noticias sobre Turquía, y desde Turquía, en inglés. De ella extraigo la mayoría de los siguientes enlaces, salvo los de Istanbul Calling e Istanbul Notes.
Hürriyet Daily News - el periódico turco en inglés más antiguo, propiedad del grupo mediático Doğan, al que el AKP casi ha llevado a la ruina mediante impuestos cuasi selectivos. Ahora procura no meterse en camisa de once varas al tratar las cosas de los poderes del gobierno y del partido en el poder.
Today's Zaman, parte del imperio mediático Gülen, es casi el portavoz del movimiento Gülen y así debe leerse, aunque también contiene a veces buenas noticias: hay que aprender a distinguir unas de otras.
Kamil Pasha blog de Jenny White: los comentarios a sus posts suponen un excelente lugar de debate sobre Turquía.
Istanbul and Beyond de Jeffrey Gibbs, muy bien escrito. El autor dice "I am a swamp cracker from rural Florida living in Istanbul where I'm trying to write a book comparing the South with Turkey. I also do stuff on the side. And sometimes things."
Istanbul Notes de Aengus Collins, aunque ahora, comienzos del 2012, ha dejado de escribir; igual vuelve.
Istanbul Calling de Yigal Schliefer, preciso pero no siempre osado.
James in Turkey, muy creíble, conoce el país muy bien.
Istan6ul Altı, que parece estar desmembrándose en varios blogs.
Erkan's Field Diary, merece especial atención; como él mismo dice "[it] evolved from a dissertation project on Turkish journalism and the European Union. In addition to the original topic, the blog monitors socio-cultural happenings and cybercultural emergences in Turkey."
Changing Turkey in a Changing World, es una razonablemente buena guía sobre lo que ocurre en la investigación académica en inglés sobre Turquía.
Turkey Etc. de Alexander Christie-Miller, muy recomendable.
Borderlands de Jim Meyer, bastante interesante, especialmente su Borderlands Classix, abajo a la derecha
Istanbul Musing gestionado por Hans A.H.C. Dewitt, que conoce Turquía tan bien como cualquier expatriado.
Tarlabaşı Istanbul, se centra en un barrio en Istanbul: sigue sus historias en el tiempo y con profundidad.
Turkish Politics in Action de Ragan Updegraff, merece mucho la pena.
Turkey Emergency, anónimo, como muchos blogs de Turquía. Parece ser muy atinado con frecuencia, lo que no deja de ser sospechoso.
CASILIPS, anónimo también, es una guía bastante equilibrada sobre las actividades del movimiento Gülen en EEUU, pero por alguien hostil al movimiento (escuelas). Como contraste, en este blog las defienden.
Emre Kızılkaya, blog del editor jefe de noticias extranjeras del Hürriyet. Su blog es mejor que su periódico.
Letter from Turkey, escrito por un americano que lleva en Turquía toda la vida: estupendo. Su Twitter.
Carpetblogger, el más divertido.