Fuente:
Tras comenzar la Intifada de El-Aqsa, se presentaron varias iniciativas para calmar la situación bélica y reconducir a las partes a la mesa de negociaciones.
El 23 de diciembre del 2000, el Presidente de Estados Unidos presenta sus lineamientos para alcanzar la paz. Clinton decía que los bandos podrían rechazar o aceptar su propuesta pero no se permitiría realizar ni ofrecer correcciones. Se trataba de un plan para finalizar el conflicto y no un proceso intermedio para llegar a un acuerdo.
Los lineamientos de Bill Clinton se presentaron tras el fracaso de las negociaciones de Camp David, cuando se avecinaban las elecciones israelíes que, según las encuestas de entonces, daban como triunfador a Ariel Sharón y al Likud. Además, en pocos días culminaba el segundo mandato de Bill Clinton al frente de los Estados Unidos. Para Clinton y Barak se trataba de una última oportunidad para entrar en la historia (Barak lo volvería a intentar en 2023 montando un inicialmente bastante exitoso levantamiento interno contra el gobierno del Likud dirigido por Netanyahu).
Bill Clinton proponía que los palestinos renunciasen al derecho al retorno de sus refugiados y sus descendencias mientras que los judíos debían hacer lo mismo con la soberanía en el Monte del Templo, aunque se respetaría un tipo de control simbólico israelí sobre el lugar en donde estaba ubicado el antiguo templo de Jerusalén. La ciudad vieja de Jerusalén y la ciudad moderna serían divididas.
Se crearía un estado palestino independiente en la mayoría de los territorios de Cisjordania, sin Maalé Adumim, Gush Etzión y demás, o sea, la zona en
donde hay más asentamientos judíos contiguos. El estado palestino tendría el 95% del territorio de Judea y Samaria, siendo que el 80% de los asentados judíos quedarían dentro del estado de Israel y a cambio, Israel cedería ciertos terrenos dentro de la línea verde.
El gobierno de Barak aceptó la propuesta, aunque ésta no comprometía a todos los gobiernos de Israel; de hecho, Ariel Sharón, succesor de Barak, se opuso a estas premisas.
Los palestinos, por su parte, rechazaron el plan porque, entre otras cosas, sabían que Barak no iba a ganar las elecciones nacionales a realizarse el 2 de febrero del 2001.
Unas semanas antes de las elecciones nacionales, Ehud Barak intentó evitar su anunciada derrota electoral reconduciendo a los palestinos a la mesa de negociaciones. Así, impulsó y consiguió reunir a los palestinos, en medio de la Intifada de El Aqsa, en el balneario egipcio de Taba. La conferencia se realizó entre el 21 al 27 de enero del 2001.
Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel
In a last ditch effort to revive the peace process, the United States invited Israeli and PA negotiators back to Washington, D.C. for separate talks with the American peace teams. They came on 18 December and met for two days separately with the American officials. On 20 December, Foreign Minister Ben-Ami and PA negotiator Saeb Erekat met in the White House with President Clinton and Secretary Albright. These talks had not yielded much progress, and at one time the PA walked out. On 23 December, Clinton presented the sides with his parameters for a final status agreement. He asked that the sides respond to him by 27 December if these parameters were acceptable as a basis for further negotiations.
Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel que indica al respecto: "Following are the proposals as given to the Israeli media by various sources"
Territory
Based on what I heard, I believe that the solution should be in the mid-90 percents, between 94-96 percent of the West Bank territory of the Palestinian State.
The land annexed by Israel should be compensated by a land swap of 1-3 percent in addition to territorial arrangements such as a permanent safe passage.
The parties also should consider the swap of leased land to meet their respective needs...
The Parties should develop a map consistent with the following criteria:
80% of settlers in blocks
contiguity
Minimize the annexed areas
Minimize the number of Palestinians affected
Security
The key lies in an international presence that can only be withdrawn by mutual consent. This presence will also monitor the implementation of the agreement between both sides.
My best judgment is that the Israeli presence would remain in fixed locations in the Jordan Valley under the authority of the international force for another 36 months. This period could be reduced in the event of favorable regional developments that diminish the threat to Israel.
On early warning stations, Israel should maintain three facilities in the West Bank with a Palestinian liaison presence. The stations will be subject to review every 10 years with any changes in the status to be mutually agreed. (According to the Israeli version of the minutes, Clinton said the stations would be subject to review after 10 years).
Regarding emergency developments, I understand that you will still have to develop a map of the relevant areas and routes. I propose the following definition: imminent and demonstrable threat to Israel's national security of a military nature that requires the activation of a national state emergency. Of course, the international forces will need to be notified of any such determination
On airspace, I suggest that the state of Palestine will have sovereignty over its airspace but that the two sides should work out special arrangements for Israeli training and operational needs.
I understand that the Israeli position is that Palestine should be defined as a "demilitarized state" while the Palestinian side proposes "a state with limited arms." As a compromise, I suggest calling it a "non-militarized state."
This will be consistent with the fact that in addition to a strong Palestinian security force, Palestine will have an international force for border security and deterrent purposes.
Jerusalem
The general principle is that Arab areas are Palestinian and Jewish ones are Israeli. This would apply to the Old City as well. I urge the two sides to work on maps to create maximum contiguity for both sides.
Regarding the Haram\Temple Mount, I believe that the gaps are not related to practical administration but to symbolic issues of sovereignty and to finding a way to accord respect to the religious beliefs of both sides.
I know you have been discussing a number of formulations.... I add to these two additional formulations guaranteeing Palestinian effective control over the Haram while respecting the conviction of the Jewish People. Regarding either one of those two formulations will be international monitoring to provide mutual confidence.
1. Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over a) the Western Wall and the space sacred to Judaism of which it is a part or b) the Western Wall and the Holy of Holies of which it is a part.
There will be a firm commitment by both not to excavate beneath the Haram or behind the Wall.
2. Palestinian sovereignty over the Haram and Israeli sovereignty over the Western Wall and shared functional sovereignty over the issue of excavation under the Haramand behind the Wall such that mutual consent would be requested before any excavation can take place.
Refugees
I sense that the differences are more relating to formulations and less to what will happen on a practical level.
I believe that Israel is prepared to acknowledge the moral and material suffering caused to the Palestinian people as a result of the 1948 war and the need to assist the international community in addressing the problem.
The fundamental gap is on how to handle the concept of the right of return. I know the history of the issue and how hard it will be for the Palestinian leadership to appear to be abandoning the principle.
The Israeli side could not accept any reference to a right of return that would imply a right to immigrate to Israel in defiance of Israel's sovereign policies and admission or that would threaten the Jewish character of the state.
Any solution must address both needs.
The solution will have to be consistent with the two-state approach - the state of Palestine as the homeland of the Palestinian people and the state of Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people.
Under the two-state solution, the guiding principle should be that the Palestinian state should be the focal point for the Palestinians who choose to return to the area without ruling out that Israel will accept some of these refugees.
I believe that we need to adopt a formulation on the right of return that will make clear that there is no specific right of return to Israel itself but that does not negate the aspiration of the Palestinian people to return to the area.
I propose two alternatives:
Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to 'historic Palestine' or
Both sides recognize the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland.
The agreement will define the implementation of this general right in a way that is consistent with the two-state solution. It would list the five possible homes for the refugees:
The State of Palestine
Areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine in the land swap
Rehabilitation in host country
Resettlement in third country
Admission to Israel
In listing these options, the agreement will make clear that the return to the West Bank, Gaza Strip and area acquired in the land swap would be right to all Palestinian refugees, while rehabilitation in host countries, resettlement in third countries and absorption into Israel will depend upon the policies of those countries.
Israel could indicate in the agreement that it intends to establish a policy so that some the refugees would be absorbed into Israel consistent with Israeli sovereign decisionn.
I believe that priority should be given to the refugee population in Lebanon.
The parties would agree that this implements Resolution 194.
The End of Conflict
I propose that the agreement clearly mark the end of the conflict and its implementation put an end to all claims. This could be implemented through a UN Security Council Resolution that notes that resolutions 242 and 338 have been implemented and through the release of Palestinian prisoners.
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