1996 - Operación Uvas de la Ira de Israel contra Jizbolá

Resumen

Fuente: The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group: An Operational Review (Adam Frey, September 1997, The WIFNEP)

Deסde los ָaños 70, la frontera entre Israel y Líbano ha sido zona de casi constante conflicto. Tras la Operación Litani de Israel, en 1978 la comunidad internacional intentó abordar la situación aprobando la Resolución 425 del Consejo de Seguridad de NNUU (CS Res 425) en la que se requiere la retirada de las fuerzas israelíes del Sur del Líbano y se establece la Fuerza Provisional de Naciones Unidas en el Líbano (FPNUL) para controlar la retirada y ayudar a restaurar la autoridad gubernamental libanesa.

A pesar de sus buenas intenciones, la CS Res 425 fracasó a la hora de resolver los problemas entre Líbano e Israel.

Escaramuzas de bajo nivel entre Israel y Jizbolá eran constantes en la zona fronteriza entre Israel y Líbano convirtiéndose en una constante de los eventos diplomáticos de la región. La situación cambia el 11 de abil de 1996 cuando, tras cinco semanas de violencia creciente y del incremento constante de las violaciones del cese el fuego de julio de 1993 entre Israel y Jizbolá, Israel lanza la Operación Uvas de la Iran que, durante 17 días, llevó a Israel a ejecutar más de 2.000 vuelos, lanzar más de 20.000 obuses de artillería para castigar a Jizbolá y forzar a las autoridades libanesas y sirias a evitar ataques contra Israel.

Before and during Grapes of Wrath, Hezbullah fired approximately 400 Katyusha rockets into the security-zone, and seventy others into the Galilee. Even with this increase in violence, however, it was the high number of civilian casualties (over 200 dead and 400 wounded, according to the United Nations) which finally caused the international community to focus on the situation.

The situation reached a climax when Israeli artillery hit a UN refugee base at Qana, killing approximately 100 Lebanese civilians. 

The shelling at Qana brought with it fingerpointing and condemnation on all sides. Israel bore the brunt of international outrage for the incident, and was blamed for firing at a refugee camp. Israel asserted that the shelling was an accident and that the artillery overshot the intended targets. It also maintained that the artillery was responding to a Hezbullah Katyusha attack, and was aimed at the area from which the rockets were fired.

Israel then blamed Hezbullah for putting civilians in danger by firing from villages, purposely using the civilian population as shields. Israel also objected to the UN and UNIFIL provision of refuge for Hezbullah guerrillas, who would run into the refugee camps to avoid Israeli counterfire the moment they finished launching their Katyushas at Israel.

The finger-pointing and condemnation aside, the incident forced the international community to the conclusion that something had to be done to dampen the conflict and protect the civilians on both sides. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and French Foreign Minister Herve de Charette both began intense diplomatic campaigns to find a way to halt the fighting, at least temporarily. Their efforts devolved into competing shuttle diplomacy with the two of them following each other back and forth between Jerusalem and Damascus in an effort to broker an agreement between Israel, Lebanon, and Lebanon's de facto suzerain, Syria. After almost two weeks, all of the involved parties agreed to a cease-fire understanding designed to reduce the level of violence and protect civilians.

El Entendimiento de 1996 o Entendimiento de Abril

A key feature of the resolution of the 1996 fighting in Lebanon is that the cease-fire is, in fact, an "understanding" and not an "agreement" because it was not signed by the parties. It should also be noted that the April 1996 cease-fire understanding (the Understanding) is different from the earlier July 1993 cease-fire agreement because, although the April Understanding was not signed by the parties, it is a written document and not merely an exchange of verbal assurances.

The April Understanding (for the text of the cease-fire understanding, see Reuters, "Restricting the Violence in Lebanon," New York Times, April 27,1996, p. A8) consisted of six main points:

• Hezbullah and it allies in Lebanon are prohibited from carrying out attacks of any kind | on northern Israel.

• Israel and the SLA will not attack civilians \ or civilian targets in Lebanon. The two parties further agreed not to launch attacks from populated areas or other civilian sites.

• Both parties retain the right of self defense for their respective forces.

• A Monitoring Group consisting of the United States, France, Lebanon, Israel, and Syria would be formed to monitor the cease-fire understanding and hear claims of violations from the involved parties. Claims must be submitted within twenty-four hours of the violation and the group would set its own procedures for dealing with the complaints.

• A Consultative Group was established, including the U.S., the European Union and Russia to facilitate the reconstruction of  Lebanon.

The key to the Understanding—recognized by all of the parties involved—is that it is neither a complete and permanent solution to the problem, nor a substitute for a comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon. [leer más]

Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG)

Created after Israel's 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath, the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG) was intended to help prevent another escalation to large-scale military operations. Renewed clashes in Lebanon in 1997 placed the body under considerable scrutiny. This paper provides an overview of the ILMG, its activities, and the participants' views of its contributions. 

Memorandum from NSU to Shaath and Jaber regarding assessment of Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG). The memo provides an update comments on ILMG objectives, composition, structure and procedure in regards to the Mitchell Plan.