Agua

El Balance del Agua y Desperdicio del agua

Israeli-Palestinian Water Conflicta (Haim Gvirtzman, January 1, 2012) - El autor, profesor de hidrología en el  Institute of Earth Sciences de la Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén y miembro del Israel Water Authority Council, además de exponer los acuerdos existentes entre israelíes y palestinos y su grado de cumplimiento, nos informa de que en 2012 el consumo de agua es de 150 m3/año per capita entre los israelíes y de 140/m3/año entre los palestinos de la Ribera Occidental - 170 y 129 en 2006, respectivamente -, y el consumo doméstico en 2006 fue de 84 m3/año per capita entre los israelíes (65 y 115 en Jerusalén y Tel Aviv, respectivamente) y de 58 m3/año entre los palestinos; y ofrece el siguiente cuadro evolutivo de dichos consumos:

 Año

  Israel

 Palestinos en Judea y Samaria

En The Truth Behind the Palestinian Water Libels (Haim Gvirtzman, Feb, 24, 2014) (aquí comentan el artículo), el mismo autor dice:

“La escasez de agua en la Autoridad Palestina es resultado de las políticas palestinas que deliberadamente desperdician agua y destruyen la ecología del agua de la región".

Palestinians lies like water (David M. Weinberg, jul 2013)

Altering the Water Balance as a Means to Addressing the Problems (2011)

Estudio de costes e  implicaciones de transferir agua del Mar Rojo y del Mediterráneo. Su contexto es exclusivamente israelí, aun atendiendo a las limitaciones y necesidades internacionales. 

El Tema del Agua entre israelíes y palestinos

La Autoridad del Agua israelí elabora este documento en 2012: The Water Issue Between Israel and the Palestinians, donde se refiere a los Acuerdos sobre el agua existentes entre las partes y otras diversas circunstancias.

Del Mar Rojo al Mar Muerto

Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Study Program (2008-2010)

Israel, Jordania y la Autoridad Palestina acordaron estudiar la viabilidad de transferir agua del Mar Rojo al Mar Muerto como solución para detener el rápido declive del nivel de agua del Mar Muerto.

El río Jordán

Fuente: Ministerio de AAEE de Israel

Scarcity of water resources is one of the most characteristic features of the terrain that was to constitute the area of the Palestine Mandate entrusted to Britain after World War I. Rain falls only in the short winter, leaving a long dry summer when agriculture depends entirely on irrigation. The neighbouring countries to the north have abundant resources for irrigation, Syria sharing the Euphrates with Iraq and the Orontes with Lebanon, and Lebanon endowed, besides, with the Litani. Palestine was to be dependent almost entirely on the exiguous Jordan. Therefore, when the boundaries of Palestine were to be settled after World War I, Britain, as the prospective Mandatory Power, and the Zionist Organization representing the nascent Jewish National Home, demanded that the Jordan and all its tributaries be included in their entirety in the territory of Palestine and that the Litani demarcate Palestine's northern frontier. But, at French insistence, Palestine's northern boundary with Lebanon and Syria, both placed under French Mandate, was set south of the Litani and west of Mt. Hermon, so that three of the four main tributaries of the Jordan the Hasbani, the Banias and the Yarmuk were to originate in French-Mandated territories, and the Litani would become a Lebanese national river. The matter was further aggravated when Transjordan, containing a considerable section of the Yarmuk river, was separated from Western Palestine.

Water, next to soil, was the most important commodity, a decisive factor determining the future development and absorptive capacity of Palestine. In the beginning of the 1940's, the Jewish Agency enlisted the cooperation of outstanding experts to advise it on a comprehensive plan for the development of the country's water resources, the most distinguished among them the great American soil-conservationist and hydrologist, Walter C. Lowdermilk. In his book, Palestine Land of Promise (1944), Lowdermilk suggested the establishment of a Jordan Valley Authority, on the pattern of the Tennessee Valley Authority, for the purpose of utilizing the deep incline of the Jordan River to generate power, diverting the sweet waters of the Upper Jordan, the Yarmuk and Zerqa in canals and conduits to arable and irrigable lands along the Jordan Valley and in the Negev, and introducing sea-water from the Mediterranean to the Valley to compensate the Dead Sea for the loss of intake that would be due to diversion of Jordan water for irrigation and additional generation of power. Lowdermilk estimated that the adoption of his plan would make possible the absorption of four million newcomers. The American engineer, James B. Hays, in his plan ("TVA on the Jordan, Proposals for Irrigation and Hydro-Electric Development in Palestine", 1948), elaborated the basic ideas of the Lowdermilk plan.

With the establishment of the State of Israel, the changed border alignment, masses of immigrants pouring in, the need for a national water development scheme and its speedy execution became ever more pressing. A Water Department was formed within the Ministry of Agriculture to draw up the scheme, a task subsequently taken over by Tahal (Water-Planning for Israel), a corporation set up and owned by the Government in partnership with the Jewish Agency and the Jewish National Fund. The first national plan, called the Seven-Year Plan and worked out by Israeli experts and foreign consultants, was presented in 1952. In many respects, it was based on the earlier Lowdermilk and Hays proposals. It aimed at integrating all resources in a single, comprehensive countrywide system and distributing the water to the places where it was wanted. A substantial portion of the total available water was to be carried from the relatively rich northern part of Israel to the barren Negev, which constitutes sixty percent of the area of Israel. Utilization of the deep declivity of the Jordan Valley to generate power, and digging of a canal from the Mediterranean to the Jordan Valley, were parts of the design.

In the meantime the Kingdom of Jordan had been developing water plans of its own. In 1949, Jordan engaged the British firm of Sir Murdoch MacDonald to reexamine earlier surveys and recommendations for irrigation in the Jordan Valley. The British firm, in its study, assumed that Lake Kinnereth should serve as a reservoir for surplus water from the Yarmuk River and that canals be drawn from the Lake to irrigate both sides of the Jordan Valley.

The MacDonald Plan was followed in 1952 by a different project prepared by the Jordanian Government in conjunction with the US Technical Cooperation Agency (Point IV). It became known as the Bunger Plan. This plan proposed to store the Yarmuk River waters in a relatively large and costly dam at Makaren to serve Jordan and Syria.

During these years, prospects for water development also engaged the attention of UN bodies concerned with the Middle East. In 1949, the Palestine Conciliation Commission asked Gordon Clapp, Chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) to lead an economic survey mission to the Middle East to examine, among other things, irrigation needs and water schemes.

In 1952, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency contracted with the TVA for a review and analysis of past and existing proposals for utilization of the Jordan River, especially in the Kingdom of Jordan. (TVA in turn assigned the survey to the US firm of Charles T. Main.)

Israel was ready to co-ordinate its plans with the projects of its neighbours, but the Arab States refused to deal or even meet with Israeli representatives. So Israel proceeded with plans for its own needs, bearing in mind the interests of its neighbours.

The B'not Yaakov Project

On 2 September 1953, Israel began work on a hydro-electric project as a first stage in the construction of a south-bound water conduit. The starting point was near B'not Yaakov Bridge (Jisr Banat Ya'qub, Daughters of Jacob Bridge), south of Lake Hula, from where a 13-kilometre-long diversionary canal was to be built to a point near the north-western corner of Lake Kinnereth, where a power station was to utilize the 280-metre drop of the Jordan from the bridge to Lake Kinnereth to generate power and to pump water into a diversionary scheme leading from Lower Galilee to the South.

Syria protested to the United Nations, claiming, inter alia, that Israel was violating the armistice agreement because the projected canal from B'not Yaakov Bridge to Lake Kinnereth would pass through demilitarized zones. On 23 September, the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), General Vagn Bennike, ordered Israel to suspend work until agreement on its continuation was reached. Israel objected, basing itself on General Riley's ultimate decision to approve work on the Hula plan two years earlier (see Section V, subsection 6), but, under pressure by the Powers the United States giving warning that it would suspend economic aid to Israel until compliance with General Bennike's order gave way in the end. A French-sponsored Resolution promising urgent consideration of the matter was accepted by the Security Council on 27 October 1953 (S/3128). The deliberations of the Council dragged on for several months, and finally a compromise draft was proposed by France, the United Kingdom and the United States asking and authorizing the Chief of Staff to explore the possibilities of reconciling the Israeli and Syrian interests (S/3151). The Resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union on 22 January 1954. This was the first time that the Soviet Union had used its right of veto to prevent the adoption of a decision not agreeable to the Arabs; the -precedent would be followed thereafter in all questions that touched on the Arab-Israel conflict. Resolution S/3128 suspending work on the Israeli project remained in force, the promised "urgent consideration" was stalemated, and, on the United Nations level, the issue became inextricably deadlocked.

The Johnston Negotiations

But, while the issue was still at an early stage of discussion in the Security Council, a fresh initiative developed that seemed to be more constructive. In the light of suggestions expressed already in Secretary John Foster Dulles' report on his visit to the Middle East in the spring of 1953, President Eisenhower envisioned a regional scheme for the utilization of the Jordan waters: he hoped to make thereby a substantial contribution to the solution of the Arab refugee problem and to the development of Israel. He appointed Eric Johnston, Chairman of the International Advisory Board of the Technical Cooperation Agency, as his special representative with ambassadorial rank to consult with Middle Eastern Governments. Johnston arrived in the Middle East in October 1953 and offered, as a basis for negotiations, a plan which had been prepared by Charles T. Main, Inc., at the request of the United Nations, under the direction of the Tennessee Valley Authority. The plan proposed better organization of the headwaters of the Hasbani and in the Hula area, the use of Lake Kinnereth as storage reservoir for the flood flows of the Jordan and Yarmuk, distribution of the water between the riparian States within the Jordan basin according to their needs and their capacity to use it, in the framework of a unified design, and power projects in Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan. Israel would get 33 percent of the total supply of water, the Arab States 67 percent, the main beneficiary being Jordan.

The Main plan provoked criticism from both sides. Israel, while welcoming a regional plan in principle, argued that the proposal contradicted the very principle of regionality by restricting itself to the use of the Jordan waters and excluding the rich and almost untapped waters of the Litani. The second basic objection raised by Israel was to the principle of exclusive in-basin use, which ruled out any possibility of developing the Negev. Israel further pointed out that Jordan had been allotted more water than it could use to advantage. (Israel's reservations and counter-proposals were summarized in "The Cotton Plan for the Development and Utilization of the Water Resources of the Jordan and Litani River Basins", February 1954.)

The Arab League set up a Technical Committee on Water, which, in 1954, presented counter-proposals called "The Arab Plan". It emphasized the political aspects involved, objected to the use of Lake Kinnereth, situated in its entirety within Israel, as the storage reservoir, insisted on the in-basin principle and asked for much higher water allocation for Syria and Lebanon; Israel, the Arab League submitted, would be entitled to only 20 percent of the total supply. Still, for the first time, an authoritative Arab body had accepted the principle of a regional plan with Israel as one of the participants.

In laborious negotiations that lasted two years, Johnston succeeded in reaching agreement on all major issues. He rejected Israel's appeal to include the Litani and limited the project to the Jordan and its tributaries. On the other hand, he dropped the in-basin principle. Lake Kinnereth and a second storage reservoir in Jordan were agreed upon, as well as power projects in Israel and in Jordan. The difficult problem of the quantitative allocations to each of the riparian States he solved by satisfying first the demands of Syria and Lebanon, granting each the full amount called for in the "Arab Plan" (132 and 32 mcm respectively). The requirements of Jordan were endorsed to the full volume needed for all the irrigable land (about 480 mcm). The residue (estimated between 430 and 460 mcm) was allotted to Israel. Israel would thus receive about 40 percent of the total. It was expressly agreed that Israel would divert its share from the Jordan at or near B'not Yaakov Bridge.

The Arab States had been granted the full amounts of water sought by them at points upstream and therefore independent of Israel (with the exception of 100 mcm to be delivered to Jordan by Israel from Lake Kinnereth). Egypt, though itself no riparian State in this context, was indirectly an interested party, because successful implementation of the Unified Plan for the Jordan waters enhanced its prospects of US assistance for its own water projects on the Nile. (The United States was ready to finance two-thirds of the cost involved in the Jordan Valley scheme.) Israel, though getting less out of the Unified Plan than it had asked for (550 mcm), agreed to the plan because it regarded a negotiated accord as conducive to peace. At the end of the last round of his negotiations, in October 1955, Johnston could be confident that he had practically attained full agreement. Indeed, full agreement had been reached, on the technical level, with all parties concerned. But, at that final phase, the project foundered on the political rocks. The Arab League, meeting in Cairo in October 1955, withheld its consent. Under Syrian instigation, the League objected to any scheme involving cooperation with Israel and benefiting the Israeli economy. Already earlier in the year, the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine, headed by the ex-Mufti of Jerusalem, urged the Arab States to reject the project. The chance for regional cooperation in a project that aimed at peace had been wrecked.

The Lake Kinnereth-Negev Project

In the late 1950's, realizing that a negotiated agreement was unattainable, Israel decided to solve the pressing problem of developing its water resources by a bold change in its diversionary project. It embarked on an alternative plan, abandoning the B'not Yaakov idea and switching the point of diversion to Lake Kinnereth, outside the demilitarized zones: water would be lifted from Eshed Kinroth in the north-western comer of the Lake, 212 metres below sea-level, to 40 metres above sea-level to a reservoir at Beth Netofah, in Lower Galilee, and pass from there through tunnels, pipes and open canals to the headworks of the existing Yarkon-Negev project, and thence to the Negev, completing the overall integrated national water scheme. The quantity of water to be drawn would be kept within the allocation foreseen in the Johnston Unified Plan. The new project could be easily integrated into a regional scheme once there was agreement with the neighbouring States. The Lake Kinnereth-Negev project had obvious and very serious disadvantages. The original B'not Yaakov project was connected with a power project, utilizing the drop of the Jordan to Lake Kinnereth; the new one was dependent on an extraneous supply of power. The water at the new intake at Eshed Kinroth is considerably more saline, the engineering costs are much higher. But all these shortcomings were outweighed by the gain of dissociating the project from the demilitarized zones with all their concomitant political complications.

By the time Israel started the execution of the revised plan, Jordan was already busy with a diversionary project of its own, from the Yarmuk, the East Ghor Canal project. Jordan and Israel were encouraged and financially assisted by the United States on condition that they adhered to the Johnston allocations. Independently of each other, the two States proceeded with their constructive works. The Unified Plan had sunk, but "the Johnston formula", to use a definition of Philip Geyelin, survived.

Arab Diversion Threats

Syria, encouraged by its success in blocking, through the United Nations, Israel's diversionary project from B'not Yaakov, and in denying joint political agreement on the Johnston Plan, now attempted to sabotage the revised Israel plan by cutting off some of its main sources at the headwaters of the Jordan. In November 1960, the Technical Committee of the Arab League adopted a plan to divert the Hasbani and Banias and so prevent their flowing into the territory of Israel. But then Syria withdrew from the United Arab Republic in 1961, Egypt became preoccupied with other areas of the Middle East, and Jordan was intent on going on with the East Ghor Canal project. The "spite" plan of diversion, in the circumstances, was pigeon-holed. But, with Israel's national water carrier on the verge of completion, Syria renewed its campaign. The first Arab "summit" meeting of Heads of State, held in Cairo in January 1964, discussed ways and means of sabotaging Israel's undertaking. Syria's call for instant war against Israel was rejected by the other Arab Heads of State, led by President Nasser. Apart from decisions on the establishment of a unified military command, a Palestinian political identity and a Palestinian army, the meeting endorsed a plan to divert the Jordan headwaters, which would be financed by all Arab States. The official communique published at the end of the meeting only hinted at this plan, but it was divulged by the Secretary-General of the Arab League: it called for the diversion of the Hasbani in part to the Litani, whence its waters would flow into the Mediterranean, and in part to the Banias in Syria, whence the joined waters would flow into a dam to be built on the Yarmuk River and on from there to Jordan-held territory. If accomplished, the diversion would deprive Israel of from 200 to 250 mcm.

Prime Minister Eshkol reacted in the Knesset on 20 January 1964: Israel would act to protect its vital rights. On 5 March, Foreign Minister Golda Meir declared, during a visit to London, that any attempt to divert the Jordan headwaters would be treated by Israel as an act of aggression, "as much an aggression as trying to cut off territory from our country".

The Arab menace could not prevent the completion of Israel's national water carrier in June 1964. Continuous Arab and especially Syrian threats to use force against Israel, on the grounds of its water project, called for a clear and firm position. The problem was frequently discussed between Israel and interested Governments, and especially the US. On several occasions the United States made its position public, as approving of use of the Jordan-Yarmuk River waters within the Johnston allocations and denouncing "spite" diversions and aggression. But Syria started work on the projects of diversion, resulting in armed clashes with Israel during late 1964 to 1966 (see Section X). Owing to Israel's forceful reaction, the work on the diversion was suspended in 1966, but the bellicose designs and campaign of hatred originating in Damascus increased the tensions on the Syrian-Israel frontier, and were a major factor in the build-up that led to the Six-Day War.

Documentos selectos relevantes

Fuente: Ministerio de AAEE de Israel