Todo sobre la Flotilla según el Ministerio de AAEE del Gobierno de Israel, muy documentado, con datos, fotos, videos, etc.
Timeline of the Mavi Marmara Incident (video) - Describe con detalle la cronología de los acontecimientos en el Mavi Marmara
Tres fotos de terroristas armados en el Mavi Marmara filtradas un año después (June, 2011)
Israel Was Right (Leslie H. Gelb, May 31, 2010) - Israeli commandos mishandled the situation but Israel was right to storm a ship bound for Gaza. Leslie H. Gelb argues why.
Marmara: Los soldados explican lo que realmente sucedió (video 42' 27'', hebreo subtitulado en español)
The Flotilla Fiasco: A View From Cairo (Mirette F. Mabrouk, June 3, 2010)
The Arab Media Reaction to the Raid on the Gaza Flotilla (Hady Amr, June 7, 2010)
Informe de la Comisión Turkel: Primera Parte (Jan 2011) - Segunda Parte (Feb 2013)
Tras la Operación del Ejército Israelí del 31 de mayo de 2010 para hacer respetar el bloqueo en la costa de la Franja de Gaza, el Gobierno de Israel estableció una Comisión de Investigación, la Comisión Turkel, en la que participaron dos observadores extranjeros independientes, para examinar si Israel actuó copnforme a la ley internacional al ejecutar la Operación, incluso si el mecanismo legal previsto en Israel para examinar las acusaciones de violación de la ley internacional de conflictos armados y de la ley humanitaria se ajusta a lo requerido por la ley internacional.
Attorney-general testifies before Turkel Commission (Ron Friedman, April 10, 2011)
Mideast Briefing: From the Turkel Report to the Palmer Commission (Ed Rettig, June 14, 2011)
The commission of inquiry that the Israeli government established to probe the Turkish flotilla incident released the first of two reports. It deals with the legality of the blockade of Gaza and actions taken against the attempt to run the blockade, and also reports on the conduct of the flotilla’s participants. The second report, expected shortly, will address how Israel handles allegations that its troops violate the rules of war, in order to determine if the mechanisms in place rise to the level demanded by international law. It will also deal with what were described as “questions of Israeli internal affairs.”
(...)
The report addressed two key legal questions that are crucial for the determination of a number of further issues.
First is the legal status of the blockade. The Turkel Commission found that the purpose was primarily to prevent weapons from reaching Hamas by sea, which, it determined, was a legitimate goal under international law. The commissioners rejected the allegation that the blockade is illegal because of the allegedly disproportionate harm it causes to the Gazan civilian population.
Second, and related, is the status of Gaza as “occupied territory.” This is particularly important for determining the level of responsibility that Israelis have for the Gazan civilian population. The Turkel Commission decided that the Israeli withdrawal of all its troops from Gaza ended the occupation. Thus the area now is a hostile entity of hard-to-determine legal status: not a state, not occupied territory, but a geographically defined and violently hostile place run by an aggressive political party that acquired absolute control in a coup. Since the occupation has ended, the commission reasoned, Israel need apply only international humanitarian law, not the higher level of responsibility for the civilian population that the law of occupation would entail. Recognizing that international humanitarian law does require Israel to supply sufficient food, energy and healthcare to meet the needs of the civilian population of Gaza, the commission found that Israel is in compliance, although it called for constant efforts to maintain the appropriate levels.
In short, the commission ruled the blockade proportionate both to the threat to Israel and to the relative damage done to the civilian population. As a result, the commission found that Israel had a legal right to interdict the flotilla in international waters. It also examined the threat to the soldiers who boarded the vessel in question and determined that they acted appropriately in defending themselves against violent, premeditated attack.
El Informe: Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (July 2011, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, Chair). Sobre la legalidad del Bloqueo naval dice:
71. The United Nations Charter, Article 2 (4) prohibits the use of force generally, subject to an exception under Article 51 of the Charter for the right of a nation to engage in self-defence. Israel has faced and continues to face a real threat to its security from militant groups in Gaza. Rockets, missiles and mortar bombs have been launched from Gaza towards Israel since 2001. More than 5,000 were fired between 2005 and January 2009, when the naval blockade was imposed. Hundreds of thousands of Israeli civilians live in the range of these attacks. As their effectiveness has increased, some rockets are now capable of reaching Tel Aviv. Since 2001 such attacks have caused more than 25 deaths and hundreds of injuries. The enormity of the psychological toll on the affected population cannot be underestimated. In addition, there have been substantial material losses. The purpose of these acts of violence,
which have been repeatedly condemned by the international community, has been to do damage to the population of Israel. It seems obvious enough that stopping these violent acts was a necessary step for Israel to take in order to protect its people and to defend itself. Actions taken by Israel in turn have had severe impacts on the civilian population in Gaza, which we discuss further in Chapter 6.
72. The Panel notes in this regard that the uncertain legal status of Gaza under international law cannot mean that Israel has no right to self-defence against armed attacks directed toward its territory. The Israeli report to the Panel makes it clear that the naval blockade as a measure of the use of force was adopted for the purpose of defending its territory and population, and the Panel accepts that was the case. It was designed as one way to prevent weapons reaching Gaza by sea and to prevent such attacks to be launched from the sea. Indeed there have been various incidents in which ships carrying weapons were intercepted by the Israeli authorities on their way to Gaza. While the attacks have not completely ceased since the time of the imposition of the naval blockade, their scale and intensity has much decreased over time. While this decrease might also be due to other factors, a blockade in those
circumstances is a legitimate exercise of the right of self-defence. Although a block by definition imposes a restriction on all maritime traffic, given the relatively small size of the blockade zone and the practical difficulties associated with other methods of monitoring vessels (such as by search and visit), the Panel is not persuaded that the naval blockade was a disproportionate measure for Israel to have taken in response to the threat it faced.
73. The Panel now turns to consider whether the other components of a lawful blockade under international law are met. Traditionally, naval blockades have most commonly been imposed in situations where there is an international armed conflict. While it is uncontested that there has been protracted violence taking the form of armed conflict between Israel and armed groups in Hamas-controlled Gaza, the characterization of this conflict as international is disputed. The conclusion of the Panel in this regard rests upon the facts as they exist on the ground. The specific circumstances of Gaza are unique and are not replicated anywhere in the world. Nor are they likely to be. Gaza and Israel are both distinct territorial and political areas. Hamas is the de facto political and administrative authority in Gaza and to a large extent has control over events on the ground there. It is Hamas that is firing the projectiles in Israel or is permitting others to do so. The Panel considers the conflict should be treated as an international one for the purposes of the law of blockade. This takes foremost into account Israel’s right to self-defence against armed attacks from outside territory. In this context, the debate on Gaza’s status, in particular its relationship to Israel, should not obscure the realities. The law does not operate in a political vacuum and it is implausible to deny that the nature of the armed violence between Israel an Hamas goes beyond purely domestic matters. In fact, it has all the trappings of an international armed conflict. This conclusion goes no further than is necessary for the Panel to carry out its mandate. What other implications may or may not flow from it are not before us, even though the Panel is mindful that under the law of armed conflict a State can hardly rely on some of its provisions but not pay heed to others.
74. Israel was entitled to take reasonable steps to prevent the influx of weapons into Gaza. With that objective, Israel established a series of restrictions on vessels entering the waters of Gaza. These measures culminated in the declaration of the naval blockade on 3 January 2009. There were a number of reasons why the previous restrictions were inadequate, primary among them being the need for the measures to be legally watertight.
75. As required, the naval blockade was declared and notified. The Israeli authorities issued a “Notice to Mariners” through the appropriate channels, setting out the imposition of the blockade and the coordinates of the blockaded area. In addition, the notice was broadcast twice a day on an emergency radio channel for maritime communications. There is no contest about this. The suggestion that because the blockade was stated to be imposed “until further notice” means that the notification’s content is insufficient and the blockade thus invalid does not seem to us to be persuasive. The notice does specify a duration. Given the uncertainties of a continuing conflict, nothing more was required. Likewise, a limitation to certain groups of prohibited items in the blockade’s notification was not necessary. It lies in the nature of a blockade that it affects all maritime traffic, given that its aim is to prevent any access to and from a blockaded area.
76. There is nothing before the Panel that would suggest that Israel did not maintain an effective and impartial blockade. Ever since its imposition on 3 January 2009, Israeli authorities have stopped any vessel attempting to enter the blockaded area. At the same time, there is no suggestion that Israel has hindered free access to the coasts and ports of other countries neutral to the conflict.
77. Important humanitarian considerations constrain the imposition of a naval blockade. For one, it would be illegal if its imposition was intended to starve or to collectively punish the civilian population. However, there is no material before the Panel that would permit a finding confirming the allegations that Israel had either of those intentions or that the naval blockade was imposed in retaliation for the take-over of Hamas in Gaza or otherwise. On the contrary, it is evident that Israel had a military objective. The stated primary objective of the naval blockade was for security. It was to prevent weapons, ammunition, military supplies and people from entering Gaza and to stop Hamas operatives sailing away from Gaza with vessels filled with explosives. This is regardless of what considerations might have motivated Israel in restricting the entry of goods to Gaza via the land crossings, an issue which as we have described above is not directly related to the naval blockade. It is also noteworthy that the earliest maritime interception operations to prevent weapons smuggling to Gaza predated the 2007 take-over of Hamas in Gaza. The actual naval blockade was imposed more than one year after that event. These factors alone indicate it was not imposed to punish its citizens for the election of Hamas.
78. Perhaps a more difficult question is whether the naval blockade was proportional. This means to inquire whether any damage to the civilian population in Gaza caused by the naval blockade was excessive when weighed against the concrete and direct military advantage brought by its imposition. As this report has already indicated, we are satisfied that the naval blockade was based on the need to preserve Israel’s security. Stopping the importation of rockets and other weapons to Gaza by sea helps alleviate Israel’s situation as it finds itself the target of countless attacks, which at the time of writing have once again become more extensive and intensive. On the other hand, the specific impact of the naval blockade on the civilian population in Gaza is difficult to gauge because it is the land crossings policy that primarily determines the amount of goods permitted to reach Gaza. One important consideration is the absence of significant port facilities in Gaza. The only vessels that can be handled in Gaza appear to be small fishing vessels. This means that the prospect of delivering significant supplies to Gaza by sea is very low. Indeed, such supplies were not entering by sea prior to the blockade. So it seems unrealistic to hold the naval blockade disproportionate as its own consequences—either alone or by compounding the restrictions imposed by Israel on the entry of goods to Gaza via its border crossings—are slight in the overall humanitarian situation. Smuggling weapons by sea is one thing; delivering bulky food and other goods to supply a population of approximately 1.5 million people is another. Such facts militate against a finding that the naval blockade itself has a significant humanitarian impact. On the contrary, it is wrong to impugn the blockade’s legality based on another, separate policy.
79. This is not to deny or ignore the consequences of the land crossings policy and the state of the humanitarian situation in Gaza. We have reached the view that the naval blockade was proportionate in the circumstances. While we are unable to conclude that the combined effects of the naval blockade and the crossings policy rendered the naval blockade disproportionate, we can make the policy judgment that the procedures applied by Israel in relation to land access to Gaza are unsustainable and need to be changed. This we will discuss in Chapter 6.
80. As a final point, the Panel emphasizes that if necessary, the civilian population in Gaza must be allowed to receive food and other objects essential to its survival. However, it does not follow from this obligation that the naval blockade is per se unlawful or that Israel as the blockading power is required to simply let vessels carrying aid through the blockade. On the contrary, humanitarian missions must respect the security arrangements put in place by Israel. They must seek prior approval from Israel and make the necessary arrangements with it. This includes meeting certain conditions such as permitting Israel to search the humanitarian vessels in question. The Panel notes provision was made for any essential humanitarian supplies on board the vessels to enter Gaza via the adjacent Israeli port of Ashdod, and such an offer was expressly made in relation to the goods carried on the flotilla.
81. The Panel therefore concludes that Israel’s naval blockade was legal. In this regard, the Panel reaches a different conclusion to that of the Turkish investigation into the incident. The legal arguments in the Turkish report were also clearly and extensively put to the Panel by the Turkish Point of Contact, and were supported by the Turkish member of the Panel. Those arguments differed from the conclusions of the Panel on several key matters of interpretation on the facts, most significantly: whether there can be considered to be an international armed conflict between Israel and Hamas; whether the extent and duration of the naval blockade were adequately notified; whether the naval blockade was a proportionate military measure, and in particular whether it had a disproportionate impact on civilians in Gaza; and whether it amounted to collective punishment. On these two latter points, the conclusions reached in the Turkish report mirror those of the fact-finding mission established by the Human Rights Council. The Panel notes, however, that the reasoning of both reports rested on an analysis that the naval blockade formed an indivisible part of Israel’s land restrictions policy, a factual conclusion that the Panel does not share for the reasons described above. In addition, the Panel notes that the Human Rights Council fact-finding mission did not receive any information from Israel and did not have the opportunity to consider the Israeli report or the additional material that has been made available to the Panel. In reaching its conclusion, the Panel emphasizes, however, the fundamental importance of the principle of the freedom of navigation, particularly in areas such as the eastern Mediterranean, and recommends that this be borne in mind by Israel with respect to the ongoing application and enforcement of its naval blockade.
82. The fundamental principle of the freedom of navigation on the high seas is subject to only certain limited exceptions under international law. Israel faces a real threat to its security from militant groups in Gaza. The naval blockade was imposed as a legitimate security measure in order to prevent weapons from entering Gaza by sea and its implementation complied with the requirements of international law.
En agosto de 2010, NNUU eligió al exprimer ministro de Nueva Zelanda, Geoffrey Palmer, y al expresidente de Colombia, Álvaro Uribe, como presidente y vicepresidente, respectivamente, de la Comisión encargada de investigar los incidentes ocurridos durante la detención israelí de los buques de la Primera Flotilla a Gaza. La Comisión comenzó sus trabajos el 10 de agosto del mismo año. En julio de 2011 publica sus conclusiones.
Comisión Palmer: El bloqueo naval de Israel a Gaza es legal (7 jul 2011):
La comisión de las Naciones Unidas que investiga los eventos de la flotilla a Gaza, de mayo de 2010, encabezada por el ex primer ministro de Nueva Zelanda, Geoffrey Palmer, acaba de concluir su informe.
Report Finds Naval Blockade by Israel Legal but Faults Raid (Neil MacFraquhar y Ethan Bronner, September 1, 2011)
A long-awaited United Nations review of Israel’s 2010 raid on a Turkish-based flotilla in which nine passengers were killed has found that Israel’s naval blockade of Gaza is both legal and appropriate. But it said that the way Israeli forces boarded the vessels trying to break that blockade 15 months ago was excessive and unreasonable.
The report, expected to be released Friday, also found that when Israeli commandos boarded the main ship, they faced “organized and violent resistance from a group of passengers” and were therefore required to use force for their own protection. But the report called the force “excessive and unreasonable,” saying that the loss of life was unacceptable and that the Israeli military’s later treatment of passengers was abusive.
Palmer Report Conclusion: Israel’s blockade of Gaza is LEGAL & consistent with international law (CIF Watch, Adam Levick, Sep 1, 2011)
The Great Gaza Scape-Boating Incident (Mark Anspach, Sep 2, 2011)
UN Flotilla Report Backs Israeli Policy (IPT News, Sep 2, 2011
Israel has nothing to apologize for (Jonathan Kay, Sep 2, 2011)
UN Palmer Report Affirms Legality of Israeli Naval Blockade of Gaza (Steven Stotsky, CAMERA, Sep 2, 2011)