2007 - Conferencia de Annapolis (27 nov)

Resumen

Fuente:

El golpe de estado del Jamás en Gaza dio fuerza y prestigio al Jamás y debilitá a la Autoridad Palestina y a su presidente, Mahmud Abbas.

Martin Indyk sostiene que la oposición árabe a la nuclerización e intento hegemónico regional de Irán (que Martin Kramer había apuntando adelantándose dos años a lo que luego revelarían los Wikileaks) coadyuvó a la celebración de la Conferencia de Annapolis:

Con ese trasfondo, el 27 de noviembre de 2007 palestinos e israelíes celebran, bajo los auspicios del Presidente de EEUU George W. Bush, la Conferencia de Annapolis, a la que asisten el Primer Ministro de Israel Ehud Olmert (sustituto de Sharón cuando éste entró en coma) y Mahmud Abbas, con sus respectivos cancilleres, Tzipi Livni y Salam Fayyad; también asisten representantes de China, Rusia, las Naciones Unidas, la Unión Europea y la Liga Árabe,.

En Annapolis no se alcanzaron acuerdos tangibles pues se trataba solo de un encuentro para abrir unas posteriores negociaciones intensas; explicaba el presidente Bush: 

“nuestro propósito en Annapolis no es concluir un acuerdo, sino impulsar las negociaciones entre israelíes y palestinos”.

La última vez que palestinos e israelíes se habían encontrado para conversar seriamente había sido en la cumbre de Camp-David en el año 2000.

En su discurso de apertura, el presidente norteamericano hizo guiños tanto a los palestinos como a los israelíes. A los primeros les ofreció la congelación de los asentamientos, el arranque de las negociaciones para determinar el estatuto final previsto en los Acuerdos de Oslo y la creación de “un Estado independiente, democrático y viable”. A los israelíes les prometió el fin del terrorismo, el desmantelamiento de las milicias armadas palestinas y la normalización de relaciones con el mundo árabe, paralela a la paz con los palestinos.

En Annapolis se acordó que el 12 de diciembre del 2007 las partes comenzarían a negociar de forma continua con el ánimo de concluir formalmente el diálogo para finales del 2008. Las partes se comprometían a ejecutar de inmediato los compromisos adoptados al aprobar la Hoja de Rutas. Estados Unidos iba a controlar el cumplimiento del plan. 

La declaración conjunta, forzada por la presión americana, arrancaba con el compromiso de:

“poner fin al derramamiento de sangre, el sufrimiento y las décadas de conflicto entre nuestros pueblos; iniciar una nueva era de paz sustentada en la libertad, la seguridad, la justicia, la dignidad, el respeto y el reconocimiento mutuo; propagar una cultura de paz y no violencia; y confrontar el terrorismo y la incitación al terrorismo, ya sea cometida por los palestinos o los israelíes”. 

Asimismo, anunciaba:

“la puesta en marcha inmediata de negociaciones bilaterales de buena fe a fin de concluir un tratado de paz que resuelva todos los asuntos pendientes, incluidos todos los asuntos centrales sin excepción” con la intención de alcanzar “la meta de dos Estados, Israel y Palestina, que vivan juntos en paz y seguridad” antes del fin de 2008.

Probablemente, el mayor logro de la diplomacia norteamericana fue que israelíes y palestinos aceptasen aplicar la Hoja de Ruta en su conjunto en tan sólo un año. De esta manera, el inicio de las negociaciones sobre el estatuto final (previsto para su tercera fase) pasaba a no estar supeditado al término de la violencia (propósito de la primera fase) ni a la congelación de los asentamientos (medida contemplada en su segunda fase).

La recuperación de dicha iniciativa ofrecía ventajas tanto para el presidente palestino como para el primer ministro israelí, cuyos índices de popularidad rozaban mínimos históricos.

Abbas podía vender Annapolis como un éxito ya que además de “congelar toda la actividad colonizadora”, contemplaba la reapertura de las instituciones palestinas en Jerusalén Este e implicaba una generosa ayuda económica internacional de 5.000 millones de euros para el período 2008- 2010, concretada en la reunión de donantes de París, celebrada el 17 de diciembre.

Olmert, por su parte, podía poner el acento en el fin del terrorismo por parte de grupos ligados a la OLP, la salvaguardia de la seguridad y el relanzamiento del diálogo de paz.

La celebración de la Conferencia de Annapolis despertó poco entusiasmo en la sociedad palestina, hastiada de un proceso de paz interminable que no había terminado de asentar las bases para un estado palestino viable. Además, muy pocas personas confiaban en que los esfuerzos de Abbas diesen frutos a corto plazo.

Desde el punto de vista del proceso de paz, la Conferencia de Annapolis no logró concretar lo expresado en las declaraciones formales.

La participación de Israel debilitó a la coalición de Olmert ya que el Ministro Avigdor Lieberman y su partido, Israel Beitenu, decidieron abandonar el gobierno; decía Lieberman: 

"Todo el mundo sabe que ese proceso no conducirá a nada. Cualquier negociación basada en paz por territorios es un grave error que no puedo entender; y que nos destruirá".

Principios de paz presentados por Israel en Annapolis

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

It has always been Israel's greatest desire to make peace with its Palestinian neighbors. The Annapolis meeting marked an important step on the journey towards that goal.

Israel believes that the right way to solve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is to build a shared future of two states for two peoples: a Palestinian state for the Palestinian people and a Jewish state for the Jewish people. It is Israel’s hope that the Jewish, democratic State of Israel, living in security and free from the threat of terror, will exist alongside a peace-seeking, viable, strong, democratic and terror-free Palestinian state. Each state would embody the national aspirations of each people, and provide a homeland for the individuals of that nation, wherever they may be.

Israel also desires to make peace with the entire Arab and Muslim world.

Israel wants to live a life of peace and partnership and to establish normal relations with the entire Arab world. Israel aspires to normalization with those Arab states which eschew radical and extremist fundamentalism, and which seek to give their citizens a more moderate, tolerant and prosperous world.

Israel is willing to make painful territorial compromises for peace.

Not long ago, Israel disengaged from Gaza. Israel left Gaza, dismantled settlements, withdrew its army, and took risks with the understanding that this would not be the last step. Israel is prepared to make painful compromises in its pursuit of peace, provided that it does not endanger the lives of its citizens.

Peace is not merely an agreement in exchange for land. For Israel, peace means ending incitement, ending support of terrorism, actively opposing terrorist activities, ending arms smuggling, and dismantling terrorist bases of operations. It is the central task of the entire world leadership, and especially of the Arab and Muslim world, to cope with extremists and terrorism.

Israel is committed to the peace process, but cannot ignore reality.

The Gaza Strip, which is expected to form part of the Palestinian state, is currently controlled by the terrorist organization Hamas and arms continue to flow into it. Under Hamas rule, Kassam rockets are continually launched against tens of thousands of residents in the south of Israel. To the north, Hizbullah - the long arm of Iran - prevents stability in Lebanon and persists in arming itself in blatant violation of UN resolutions. Iran is threatening the entire region, and extremist entities within many countries are being manipulated from outside by radical organizations. Now, more than ever, Israel and moderate countries must work together to confront these threats.

Annapolis was the beginning of three parallel tracks: the political, the practical, and the regional.

The first, the political track, is an ongoing bilateral dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians in an attempt to reach the agreements that will allow for the realization of the two-state vision.

The negotiations will be based on previous agreements between Israel, UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, the Roadmap and the 14 April 2004 letter of President Bush to the Prime Minister of Israel.

The second track is the practical track, in which the agreements reached by the sides will be implemented on the ground. These concrete steps will be conditional upon the prior implementation of the Roadmap in all its phases and according to its sequence, as accepted by both parties. Consequently, the practical track requires hard and diligent work on the part of the Palestinians, in confronting the terrorist organizations wherever they are. It is a battle against the terrorist leaders, a battle against incitement, and a battle against their patrons. Israel, for its part, will abide by all of its obligations to the Roadmap as well.

The third track is the regional track. Israel hopes that Arab participation in Annapolis represents an expression of support for the bilateral process, support for a legitimate Palestinian government and support for the moderate elements in the region. Israel also expects that the process begun at Annapolis will bring with it the beginning of the normalization in stages and in pace with the steps that Israel will take to benefit the Palestinians.

Israel’s strong desire to make peace with its various neighbors does not replace the process of direct negotiation with the Palestinians.

Israel’s final goal is comprehensive peace in the region for all the peoples and all states.

Israel is a tiny country with a small population, but rich in good will and blessed with a capacity to create a partnership which will lead to prosperity, growth, economic development and stability for the entire region.

It has always been Israel's greatest desire to make peace with its Palestinian neighbors. The Annapolis meeting marked an important step on the journey towards that goal.

Entorno y Antecedentes

Fuente: USA Gov - Dpt. of State - CRS Report for Congress - Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Annapolis Conference (Carol Migdalovitz, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division)

El sumario del informe de la fuente dice asÍ:

"At the end of November 2007, the Bush Administration convened an international conference in Annapolis, MD to officially revive the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority (PA) President Mahmud Abbas reached a “Joint Understanding,” in which they agreed to launch continuous bilateral negotiations in an effort to conclude a peace treaty by the end of 2008 and to simultaneously implement the moribund 2003 Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Both leaders are operating under significant domestic political constraints and they continue to disagree on many issues. Thus, their negotiations will be challenging."

Su Background así:

In early 2007, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was said to have promised moderate Arab regimes that the United States would become more engaged in the Israeli-Arab peace process in exchange for their support for countering increasing Iranian influence in the Middle East. The Secretary made eight trips to the region during the year, initially to work with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and Palestinian Authority

(PA) President Mahmud Abbas on developing a “political horizon” that would lead to a resumption of the long-stalled Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, issued by the international Quartet (the United States, European Union, United Nations, and Russia) on April 30, 2003. Each side maintains that the other has not fulfilled its obligations under the three-phase Road Map;

independent observers agree that neither has done so. Phase I calls, inter alia, for Israel to freeze all settlement activity (including natural growth of settlements) and for the Palestinians to confront terrorists and dismantle their infrastructures.

From February until June 2007, a Palestinian unity government included Hamas, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), and Hamas’s participation impeded Rice’s efforts. Olmert refused to negotiate with Abbas as long as Hamas failed to recognize Israel, disavow violence, and accept prior Israeli-Palestinian agreements, i.e., met conditions that the Quartet laid down in January 2006 after Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary elections. In June 2007, however, Palestinian infighting ended with Hamas in complete control of the Gaza Strip, and Abbas reacted by dissolving the unity government. The Bush Administration and the Israeli government viewed the ouster of Hamas as an opportunity to return to diplomacy.

On July 16, President Bush promised to support Abbas in order to lay the foundation for serious negotiations toward the creation of a Palestinian state. The President called for an international meeting “of representatives from nations that support a two-state solution, reject violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and commit to all previous agreements between the parties.” When announced, the meeting was intended mainly to

review progress toward building Palestinian institutions and to look for ways to support further reform, although participants also were to provide support for the parties in their bilateral negotiations on a Palestinian state.

Olmert and Abbas, and later negotiating teams led by Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and former Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Quray (alternate spellings: Qurei, Qureia), met over the next four months to work on a declaration of principles on final status or core issues: Jerusalem, borders, settlements, refugees, security, and water.

Olmert sought to keep the declaration vague in order to avoid concessions that would prompt his domestic political opponents to bring down his government, while Abbas wanted it to address core issues substantively in order to show his people that negotiations could lead to an improvement in the quality of their lives, an end to the occupation, and the establishment of a Palestinian state. They failed to produce a document."

Annapolis Conference Joint understanding and Statements

Fuentes: Ministerio de AAEE de Israel - UNSCO

Joint Understanding on Negotiations

27 November 2007

The representatives of the Government of the State of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), represented respectively by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and President Mahmoud Abbas, in his capacity as Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and President of the Palestinian Authority, have convened in Annapolis, Maryland, under the auspices of President George W. Bush of the United States of America, and with the support of the participants of this international conference, having concluded the following Joint Understanding:

We express our determination to bring an end to bloodshed, suffering and decades of conflict between our peoples, to usher in a new era of peace, based on freedom, security, justice, dignity, respect and mutual recognition, to propagate a culture of peace and non-violence, and to confront terrorism and incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis.

In furtherance of the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security:

The parties also commit to immediately implement their respective obligations under the Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israel-Palestinian Conflict, issued by the Quartet on 30 April 2003 (hereinafter, "the Roadmap") and agree to form an American, Palestinian and Israeli mechanism, led by the United States, to follow up on the implementation of the Roadmap. The parties further commit to continue the implementation of the ongoing obligations of the Roadmap until they reach a peace treaty. The United States will monitor and judge the fulfillment of the commitments of both sides of the Roadmap.

Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the Roadmap, as judged by the United States.

In conclusion, we express our profound appreciation to the President of the United States and his Administration, and to the participants of this international conference, for their support for our bilateral peace process.

Declaraciones

FM Tzipi Livni (18 Nov 2007)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

The idea is to launch negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, to address on the day after Annapolis all the issues that need to be addressed in order to establish a Palestinian state as part of the vision of two states for two peoples. The idea of the meeting is not to address the core issues but to launch the process.

PM Ehud Olmert at the start of Cabinet meeting (19 Nov 2007)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

Early next week, we will leave for the Annapolis meeting. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and Defense Minister Ehud Barak will accompany me; they will participate in the meeting and address it. This meeting, as I have said more than once, is not a conference for negotiations. It is an important meeting, initiated by US President George Bush.

FM Tzipi Livni at Cabinet meeting (19 Nov 2007)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

I hope the Palestinians will understand the importance of the initiation of a substantial and serious process for the first time in seven years. IIf we are able to reach agreements that are acceptable to us, they will be firmly recognized by the international community as acknowledged agreements, especially with regard to security issues.

Israel Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (20 Nov 2007)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

The goal of the Annapolis meeting is to put into motion serious, continuous and thorough negotiations between Israel and the PA that will lead us to deal with all substantive issues on the agenda of our relations with the PA ahead of agreement on a solution of two states for two peoples - a Palestinian state for the Palestinian people and the State of Israel, the national home of the Jewish people.

Statement by US President George Bush (25 Nov 2007):

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

I am pleased to welcome Prime Minister Olmert, President Abbas, and representatives of more than forty countries to the United States for the November 27 Annapolis Conference. The broad attendance at this conference by regional states and other key international participants demonstrates the international resolve to seize this important opportunity to advance freedom and peace in the Middle East.

This conference will signal international support for the Israelis' and Palestinians' intention to commence negotiations on the establishment of a Palestinian state and the realization of peace between these two peoples.

It will also provide an opportunity for the Israelis, the Palestinians, and their neighbors to recommit to implementing the Roadmap, with the U.S. monitoring their progress by the parties' agreement. Finally, the conference will review Palestinian plans to build the institutions of a democratic state and their preparations for next month's donors' conference in Paris.

I remain personally committed to implementing my vision of two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace and security.

The Israelis and Palestinians have waited a long time for this vision to be realized, and I call upon all those gathering in Annapolis this week to redouble their efforts to turn dreams of peace into reality. I look forward to my discussions with Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas this week, as well as to addressing the conference along with them on Tuesday.

Middle East Quartet statement (26 Nov 2007)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

(Resumen)

The Quartet expressed strong support for the November 27 Annapolis Conference. It welcomed the commitment of the Israeli and Palestinians leaders to launch bilateral negotiations toward the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and the realization of Israeli-Palestinian peace.

The Quartet welcomed the parties' continuing efforts to fulfill their respective commitments under Phase One of the Roadmap and urged the international community to provide robust support for all the parties' efforts. Principals took note of the broad international support for the Annapolis Conference, and looked forward to the December Paris Donors' Conference to muster international financial backing for efforts to build the foundation for a viable and prosperous Palestinian state.

Briefing by PM Olmert (26 Nov 2007):

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

Annapolis strength lies in absence of Hamas (Ynet): "Annapolis' greatest strength lies in the fact that even though it is taking place without Hamas, there are a great number of Arab nations in attendance. The international community understands that Hamas cannot be a part of this process."

Dinner greetings by US President George Bush (26 Nov 2007)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

We've come together this week because we share a common goal: two democratic states - Israel and Palestine - living side by side in peace and security.

Achieving this goal requires difficult compromises - and the Israelis and Palestinians have elected leaders committed to making them. Achieving this goal requires neighbors committed to peace between Israel and a new Palestinian state - and I'm encouraged by the presence of so many here. Achieving this goal requires the commitment of the international community.

Otras declaraciones del Presidente Bush en la Conferencia

Fuente: The New York Times

Leerlas aquí.

Discurso selectos

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

- Address by US President George Bush

- Address by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas 

- Address by Israel Prime Minister Ehud Olmert

- Opening remarks by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

- Address by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon

- Address by Israel Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni

- Closing remarks by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice

Otros documentos selectos

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

Announcement of Annapolis Conference (US State Dept)

Annapolis Conference participants

Annapolis Conference schedule 

Middle East Quartet statement (26 Nov 2007)

Lecciones sacadas de estas negociaciones por los palestinos

Preliminary Lessons Learned Report; Annapolis Negotiations Round - August 2007 – January 2009 - (Negotiations Support Unit-Negotiations Affairs Department-PLO, Sep 10, 2009) - Documento filtrado entre los PalestinePapers - This memo selects four significant experience areas from the NSU draft report and identifies the lessons learned that could be applied in future negotiations. These vignettes capture relevant experiences during one or more stages in the negotiations, and in turn, highlights significant experiences. The second part is a worksheet, offering negotiators and heads of committees an opportunity to record the experiences they feel were significant during the Annapolis round and identify the accompanying lessons learned.

Has the Palestinian Authority fulfilled its security commitments under the Roadmap? (IICC - 9 Jan 2008)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

After the opening of the Annapolis Conference, PM Ehud Olmert was interviewed on the American media.

From interview with PM Ehud Olmert on NPR - Nov 27, 2007

What exactly we will agree with the Palestinians remains to be seen. I believe that if we are serious in our mutual attempt to make peace, that will require painful compromises from both sides - the Palestinians and the Israelis. And if we reach that stage, and if we will make an agreement, then of course I will come to the Israeli public and I will share with the Israeli public everything, because Israel is a democracy.

We are prepared to make a territorial compromise, even a painful territorial compromise. Exactly what shape it will take, what will be the exact borders and so on - this is something we have to leave for negotiations, and this is too early to say.

At the end of the day, Gaza will have to be part, not only of the agreement, but also of the implementation. In other words, if everything is subject to the implementation of the Roadmap commitments, then the implementation of the Roadmap commitments with regard to Gaza means that Gaza will have to be terror-free, and that will be incumbent on the Palestinians to carry out.

We are first going to negotiate the political horizons, the essential elements that may help create a two-state solution. Implementation will be subject to the implementation of the Roadmap commitments. We are not trying to suggest that it can be done within a week or within a year, but you have to start somewhere. And we are committed, absolutely, to help start it. We don't want to waste time; we don't want to gain time; we want to move forward.

I started to talk with President Abbas a few months ago on a regular basis - very interesting, very revealing discussions which led us into what happened today. This is a landmark; this is not an end of the process. We made a commitment today to carry on these negotiations on a regular basis, continuously, in order to try and reach an agreement within a year. I don't know that we will succeed to do it, but we will definitely and seriously and genuinely try.

Israel is committed to peace. Israel is prepared for a compromise. The majority of Israelis understand this compromise will be serious, will be meaningful, and will be painful. And our desire for peace and the end of terror and the build-up of new relationships with our neighbors is so fundamental in the hearts of Israelis that we are ready to go a long way in order to achieve it.

From interview with PM Ehud Olmert on PBS Online Newshour - Nov 27, 2007

The most fundamental difference today is that there is a different type of relationship between the leadership of the Palestinians and the Israelis. There is a greater trust. That in itself is not sufficient, but it's a very good foundation upon which you can build meaningful negotiations.

The goal of these negotiations is to reach a two-state solution, that there will be a Palestinian state - viable, strong, democratic - with all the necessary ingredients that will make life so much better for the Palestinians. We already removed checkpoints and roadblocks, and we will continue to do it, of course, all depending on whether the Palestinians will be capable of effectively fighting terror. If they will effectively fight terror, as we hope they will, then everything will change. There is a different Palestinian leadership today, which is committed to fight terror. They say they are making the necessary preparations now to move towards it.

We aren't building new settlements in the territories, and we are not going to confiscate any land in order to build settlements. That is part of the negotiating agenda. We are going to sit with the Palestinians and discuss the necessary accommodations in order to allow them to have a Palestinian state and for Israel to contribute to this.

The whole idea is of a two-state solution, which means a Palestinian state for the Palestinian people and the state of Israel, which is the homeland of the Jewish people. No one seriously can think that there will be two states, one Palestinian and one in which the Palestinians will become a majority, if all the Palestinians will be brought back into the State of Israel. So the idea is to have two nation-states separated, living alongside each other. The State of Israel will be Jewish and, of course, as it is. And the Palestinian state will be the natural place for all the refugees of the Palestinians to be resettled in.

There are differences, but there is a basis for talk. There is a basis for understanding, and I believe that there is a basis for compromise. 

There are genuine fears in the State of Israel based on the past experiences we had with the Palestinians. We made concessions in the past, and they didn't necessarily help. We pulled out from Gaza entirely, and they keep shooting some rockets on tens of thousands of Israelis living in the south part of Israel. So there is risk-taking here. There are uncertainties which we will have to deal with. My conviction is that Israel is strong enough to try carefully to move forward in spite of these risks.

But, of course, we will not compromise on the security of the people of Israel. No one can expect Israel to do it. I don't believe that any country in the world would have acted in the same kind of restraint as we do now, when we have these Kassam rockets falling on the heads of civilians in the south part of Israel. And we restrain our reactions, but we will not compromise on the security of the people of Israel. That I can guarantee you.

The Annapolis Conference: A Malevolent View from the Arab and Muslim World

Fuente: ADL

In the days surrounding the United States-hosted international conference in Annapolis, Maryland, editorial cartoons printed in newspapers from across the Arab world and Iran exhibit a malevolent view of Israel and attribute nefarious motivations to its participation in the conference. 

These caricatures have a basic theme: that while Israel may be attending theAnnapolis meeting, Israel has no intention of making peace. Rather, these caricatures depict Israel as using the conference in Annapolis to manipulate the Arab world and the international community to further its own belligerent agenda. The caricatures appeared in newspapers in countries participating in the Annapolis conference, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman and Jordan, and in papers from Iran and those controlled by Hamas who are opposed to Arab-Israeli reconciliation. 

Many of the caricatures include blatantly anti-Semitic images and motifs of Jewish control of the United States and the world and of conniving Jews hoodwinking the Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, the Arab world and the international community.

Ver las caricaturas aquí.

Otros documentos selectos relevantes

Fuente:

"Los estados árabes sunistas e… Israel se encontraron repentinamente en el mismo bando contra los iraníes. Y así crearon una oportunidad estratégica que la administración [Bush] acabó por reconocer y esto es, más que nada, lo que alienta el camino a Annapolis."