2002 - Aparece el Plan Abdallah o Iniciativa de Paz Árabe (feb-mar)

Resumen

Fuente: Jewish Virtual Library - Midesat web - Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs - The Bitterlemons Guide to the Arab Peace Initiative (Yossi Alpher, Ghassan Khatib y Charmaine Seitz) - The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects (Joshua Teitelbaum, 2009)

En febrero de 2003, poco después de los ataques a las Torres Gemelas de Nueva York del 11 de septiembre de 2001, en los que había involucrados diversos ciudadanos de Arabia Saudí, el Príncipe Coronado de Arabia Saudí Abdallah da una entrevista a Thomas Friedman del New York Times en la que ofrece “retirada plena de todos los territorios ocupados, de acuerdo con las resoluciones de NNUU, incluido Jerusalén, a cambio de plena normalización de relaciones [de los estados árabes con Israel]". 

Sería la base del luego conocido como Plan Abdallah, que la Liga Árabe aprobaría un mes después... aunque la prometida 'normalización plena' por unas más modestas "relaciones normales".

El 27 de marzo de 2002, víspera del Pésaj judío, una terrorista suicida de Jamás mató con una bomba a 30 israelíes sentados a la mesa para el Seder [comida ceremonial de Pésaj] en el Park Hotel de Netanya. El 28, la cumbre de la Liga Árabe, reunida en Beirut, aprobó la Iniciativa de Paz Árabe, conocida como el Plan Abdallah, por su autor principal, el entonces príncipe coronado Abdallah bin Abd al-Aziz  El 29 el gobierno de Sharon decidió lanzar la Operación Escudo Defensivo con la que las IDF volvieron a controlar las ciudades de la Ribera Occidental.

La iniciativa, a la que también se conoce como Plan de Paz Saudita, constituye la primera y hasta ahora única declaración colectiva explícita árabe con una propuesta para una resolución pacífica del conflicto árabe israelí. 

La decisión de la Liga Árabe también fue aprobada meses después por la Organización de la Conferencia Islámica celebrada en Teherán, aunque Irán se abstuvo.

La Liga Árabe se reafirmó en su propuesta, con no pocas modificaciones o interpretaciones, en la cumbre de Riad del 2007. Y, anualmente, suele reafirmarse en la misma durante sus cumbres.

A pesar de las ambigüedades de la declaración, sobre todo en lo relativo a los refugiados palestinos, la misma parece un giro en la posición árabe: desde el rechazo absoluto de los Tres Noes de Jartum de la cumbre de 1967 a la aceptación matizada de la cumbre de Fez de 1982; y en 2002 esta Iniciativa ,con su aparente voluntad de declarar el final del conflicto y establecer relaciones normales con Israel.

Contexto

Entender la Iniciativa requiere ponerla en contexto, como hace Joshua Teitelbaum en The Arab Peace Initiative: A Primer and Future Prospects (2009).

George Bush no era el único en presentar iniciativas de Paz en la arena internacional. El por entonces (2002) candidato al trono saudita, el Príncipe Abdallah, presentaba una propuesta de paz, que terminó siendo aprobada por la Cumbre de la Liga Árabe de Beirut del año 2002 

El luego rey Abdallah de Arabia Saudita presentó sus “intenciones” de paz poco después de los atentados de las Torres Gemelas. Cabe recordar que tras estos atentados, el gobierno norteamericano y parte de la opinión pública criticó duramente a Arabia Saudita por posible ocultamiento de información sobre Al Qaeda y su líder, el ciudadano saudita Ossama Bin-Laden. Además, se sospechaba de una posible implicación de la corona en la financiación indirecta de las actividades terroristas de grupos islamistas. 

Otros especialistas, como el Dr. Gay Bajor,  interpretan su propuesta como un intento (exitoso) de recibir el apoyo de occidente en la contienda interna por la sucesión al trono. Algunos portavoces árabes criticaron a Abdallah por adelantar (a medidos de febrero) su proyecto a un periodista del New York Times, el renombrado Tomas Fridman, judío para más inri.

La Propuesta

¿Qué dice la Iniciativa de paz de Arabia Saudita?  El plan ofrece una serie de puntos a tener en cuenta: 

Refugiados

La solución al problema de los refugiados palestinos es fuente de gran discordia. El término “una solución justa” despierta muchas sospechas y rechazo entre los israelíes. Se trata de un punto de inflexión en toda negociación. La mayoría de los israelíes no están dispuestos a permitir el regreso masivo de palestinos a la Israel reconocida internacionalmente. No pocos especialistas afirman que el tema de los refugiados palestinos fue fundamental en el fracaso de las negociaciones entre Barak y Arafat en el 2000. Aceptar el regreso de varios cientos de miles de palestinos puede modificar el sentido “judío” y “democrático” del Estado de Israel.

En el 2004, el periódico kuwaití As-Siyasa publicaba una propuesta por la cual los países árabes absorberían dos millones de refugiados palestinos y el resto llegarían a Israel. El ministro de relaciones exteriores palestino Nabil Shaat afirmó entonces que esta propuesta “carecía de sentido”, quedando en la nada.

Por un lado, la declaración dice “alcanzar una solución justa y acordada para el problema de los refugiados palestinos de acuerdo a la resolución 194 de la Asamblea General de la ONU”. (La Asamblea General de NNUU aprobó la Resolución 194 (III) el 11 de diciembre de 1948, estableciendo la Comisión de Conciliación de las Naciones Unidas sobre Palestina y también resolviendo que debe colocarse bajo régimen internacional permanente. La resolución también resuelve que los refugiados que deseen retornar a sus hogares y vivir en paz con sus vecinos podrán hacerlo en una fecha lo más cercana posible y los que no regresen se les pagará una compensación por sus propiedades. En la Resolución 212 (III) del 19 de noviembre de 1948, la Asamblea General establece un fondo especial para ayudar a los refugiados Palestinos.) 

Por otro lado, se anexó una exigencia del Líbano en donde se afirma que los países árabes y el Líbano, en especial, no deben hospedar los desplazados palestinos provocados por la guerra con Israel.

Es importante señalar que, paralelamente a la declaración formal en la propuesta, la Liga Árabe publicó una declaración adicional que enfatizaba que Israel debería permitir que los palestinos gozasen de todos sus derechos, incluyendo la garantía del "derecho al retorno" de los refugiados palestinos en base a legítimas resoluciones internacionales y en base a principios de ley internacional incluyendo la Resolución 194 de la Asamblea General.

En otras palabras, cuando se habla de una "solución justa" se refiere al regreso de todos los refugiados palestinos a Israel.

Jerusalén

El segundo punto de la propuesta trata sobre el futuro de Jerusalén oriental como capital de Palestina. Hay quienes afirman que el uso del término “oriental” y no “árabe” abre una puerta para las negociaciones.

En este sentido, no queda del todo claro si “todo lo que es judío es para Israel y todo lo que es árabe es para los árabes” o por el contrario se aceptaba la “partición de Jerusalén según el mapa de 1967”. La segunda opción implicaría la retirada israelí de barrios como Maalé Adumim, Guiló o Pizgat Zeev.

Normalización con los países árabes

Lo que dice y lo que no sobre la propuesta de normalización con los países árabes provoca dudas.

Líbano

En la declaración, las condiciones para la normalización se establecen con cierta claridad. Sin embargo, en un documento paralelo de la Liga Árabe, los líderes árabes enfatizaron también su apoyo al derecho libanés a utilizar todos los medios legítimos para liberar su territorio en manos de la ocupación israelí hasta la frontera internacional reconocida (o sea, Jizbolá puede seguir actuando hasta liberar todo terreno que supongan pertenece al Líbano).

Armamamento nuclear

Además, en ese documento adicional antes citado, los líderes árabes también afirmaron que para lograr la paz y la seguridad en la región Israel debía firmar el tratado de no proliferación nuclear y abrir sus instalaciones nucleares a la supervisión internacional. 

Esta última exigencia es una posición conocida entre los líderes de Egipto y Siria. Más aún, Egipto amenazó en 1995 con detener el proceso de normalización si Israel no firmaba el Tratado de No Proliferación Nuclear. 

Conclusión

La Liga Árabe acordó que se reconocería la existencia de Israel pero solo después de que Israel cumpliera todas las exigencias árabes. Israel debía pagar todo y, luego, sería reconocida por todos los estados árabes y musulmanes.

Itamar Rabinovich, presidente de la Universidad de Tel Aviv y jefe del equipo de negociadores en el frente sirio en el gobierno de Itzjak Rabin, resume así la propuesta árabe:

"En otras palabras, la Junta de la Cumbre Árabe ofrecía normalización y el 'final del conflicto' con una mano pero con la otra mano sostenía las fórmulas de siempre, que permiten que continúe la lucha aún después que se llegue a un acuerdo…"

El negociador palestino Saeb Erekat afirmaba que la iniciativa Saudita no restaba importancia a las conversaciones directas entre israelíes y palestinos:

"Creo que Israel debería haberla adoptado en el 2002. Esta es la iniciativa más estratégica que aporta el mundo árabe desde 1948. Les animo a que retomen la iniciativa y que la sigan porque acortará el camino hacia la paz."

Oficialmente, Israel rechazó la iniciativa árabe aunque muchos políticos locales la consideraron "una buena base para comenzar a negociar”. 

El ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Israel de entonces, Shimón Peres, afirmó que la propuesta de Arabia Saudita era:

"interesante y positiva. La mayor amenaza para lograr la paz es el terrorismo, y la base para cualquier avance es dar fin al terrorismo". 

El Primer Ministro Ariel Sharón descartó la propuesta con un contundente "los sauditas deben dejar de hablar y empezar a contribuir a la paz".

Quizás, el problema principal de toda la iniciativa se centre en el hecho indiscutible de que los países árabes muestran enfoques muy poco homogéneos. Están las dictaduras pro-occidentales moderadas, los amenazados por el terrorismo islámico, los que fomentan dicho terrorismo, los que gobiernan sus territorios con dificultad, los que todavía no parecen saber lo que quieren… y todos éstos… ¿podrían ponerse de acuerdo para firmar una paz regional con Israel? 

¿Los fundamentalistas Irán o Sudán reconocerían a Israel como afirma la propuesta Saudita? ¿Los fundamentalistas no estatales Jamás, Al Qaida o Jizbolá se sumarían a la iniciativa? 

Sin duda, se trata de una propuesta cuya efectividad despierta no poco escepticismo.

Árabes vs El Plan Abdallah

Sobre el tema es conveniente leer (está en inglés) el artículo que Bruce Maddy-Weitzman publica en el Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2010. Comienza así:

"To understand the underlying inter-Arab context of the initiative, one should begin by taking note of an enduring feature of collective Arab decision-making: seeking consensual resolutions, which necessitate finding the lowest common denominator. The need for consensus is even embodied in the Arab League's founding charter of 1945: Article VII states that decisions taken by the league that are made on the basis of a simply majority vote are binding only on those states that voted for them.[1] In other words, the sovereign rights of individual member states are privileged over the Arab collective. In order for resolutions to carry real weight then, they must have the approval of most, if not all members, and certainly that of pivotal countries.

From the league's inception, Egypt actively sought and usually attained the role of first among equal Arab states. The post-June 1967 Arab system was generally led by a loose coalition of states, centering on the so-called Egyptian-Saudi-Syrian triangle. One peak of cooperation among these three states was the October 1973 Yom Kippur war. Another was the 1991 Kuwait war and the postwar Madrid conference promoting Arab-Israeli peace. This did not mean, of course, that the three countries were like-minded on most issues: For example, Syria's strategic ties with post-1979 Iran and its actions in Lebanon continue to be sources of tension with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Moreover, after the 1991 Gulf war the collective leadership of the Arab system did not build on their cooperative efforts in restoring Kuwait's independence and containing Saddam Hussein. Individually and collectively, Arab states increasingly appeared both to themselves and the outside world as being adrift, weaker than their non-Arab Middle East neighbors (Turkey, Iran, and Israel), and lacking a common vision and the means to advance Arab interests, however defined. The much-heralded Damascus declaration of March 1991 issued by Egypt, Syria, and the six Gulf Cooperation Council states was an effort to translate their wartime alliance against Saddam Hussein into a durable regional security and economic cooperation structure. However, within months, it became clear that it would not take root, as the Gulf states withdrew their support for the stationing of Egyptian and Syrian forces in the Persian Gulf. In the Arab-Israeli sphere, the expressed desire for a "just and comprehensive solution" was not translated into mutual solidarity and support during peace negotiations. Indeed, the absence of Arab backing for Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat during the July 2000 Camp David talks was striking and may have contributed to their failure, setting the stage for the second Palestinian intifada just two and a half months later."

Texto (español)

Nota: la traducción es del hebreo al castellano, de acuerdo a la interpretación del árabe original, realizada por el profesor Elaai Alón, especialista en islamismo de la Universidad de Tel Aviv; solo están traducidos los 3 primeros apartados, pero el original tiene siete (ver el texto en inglés más abajo)

Iniciativa de Paz de Arabia Saudita

“El Consejo de la Liga de los Estados Árabes, en conformidad con la decisión aprobada en la Cumbre árabe de El Cairo, en el mes de junio de 1996, según la cual una paz total y justa para el Medio Oriente es una elección estratégica de los países árabes, solicita un compromiso paralelo de parte de Israel en este tema.

Tras haber escuchado (los miembros del Consejo) el discurso de Su Eminencia, el Emir Abdallah ben Abed El-Aziz, príncipe heredero del reino de Arabia Saudita, en donde anunció su propuesta que pide la completa retirada de Israel de todas las tierras árabes conquistadas desde 1967 y que llama a Israel a aceptar la creación de un estado palestino independiente cuya capital será Jerusalén oriental a cambio de la implementación de relaciones normales con los países árabes en el marco de una paz general con Israel.

Desde la convicción por parte de los países árabes que una solución militar no traerá la paz y la seguridad para ninguna de las partes del conflicto:

1- El Consejo le pide a Israel que vuelva a examinar su política, se incline hacia la paz, y declare que la paz justa es una decisión estratégica también para ella.

2- Además, exige el Consejo de Israel:

a: Total retirada israelí de los territorios árabes conquistados, incluyendo el Golán sirio, hasta la línea del 4 de junio de 1967, y de los territorios del sur del Líbano todavía conquistados por Israel.

b: Alcanzar una solución justa y acordada para el problema de los refugiados palestinos de acuerdo a la resolución 194 de la Asamblea General de la ONU.

c: Aceptación de la creación de un estado palestino independiente y soberana en los territorios palestinos conquistados desde el 4 de junio de 1967, en Cisjordania y en la Franja de Gaza (el estado) siendo que su capital será Jerusalén oriental.

3- Siendo así suspenderán los países árabes los hechos siguientes:

a: Verán el conflicto árabe israelí como terminado, se procederá a firmar acuerdos de paz entre ellas e Israel, otorgando seguridad a todos los países de la zona.

b: Se establecerán relaciones normales con Israel en el marco de una paz genera

Text

Fuente: Jordan Embassy in the USA - UNSCO

The Arab Peace Initiative

The Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit Level, at its 14th Ordinary Session,

1. Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare that a just peace is its strategic option as well.

2. Further calls upon Israel to affirm:

        a. Full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967 as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon.

        b. Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194.

        c. The acceptance of the establishment of a Sovereign Independent Palestinian State on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza strip, with east Jerusalem as its capital.

3. Consequently, the Arab countries affirm the following:

        a. Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended, and enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all the states of the region.

        b. Establish normal relations with Israel in the context of this comprehensive peace.

4. Assures the rejection of all forms of Palestinian patriation which conflict with the special circumstances of the Arab host countries.

5. Calls upon the government of Israel and all Israelis to accept this initiative in order to safeguard the prospects for peace and stop the further shedding of blood, enabling the Arab Countries and Israel to live in peace and good neighborliness and provide future generations with security, stability, and prosperity.

6. Invites the international community and all countries and organizations to support this initiative.

7. Requests the chairman of the summit to form a special committee composed of some of its concerned member states and the secretary general of the League of Arab States to pursue the necessary contacts to gain support for this initiative at all levels, particularly from the United Nations, the security council, the United States of America, the Russian Federation, the Muslim States and the European Union.

Entrevista con el rey Abdullah

Fuente: Embajada de Jordania en EEUU

His Majesty King Abdullah II

His Majesty King Abdullah II's Interview with 

Randa Habib, AFP

April 10, 2007

AFP: Your Majesty, the Arab Summit decided unanimously to re-launch the Arab Peace Initiative. Does this mean that countries like Syria and groups like Hamas are committed to direct negotiations with Israel? 

HM King Abdullah: The Arab Peace Initiative has gained Arab consensus both at the Beirut Summit in 2002 and the Riyadh Summit in 2007. This indicates the Arabs' sincere desire to reach a just and comprehensive peace that will pave the way for future generations to live in security, stability and peace. It will also enable the entire region's peoples to build a better future. If we are to reach real peace, we need full commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative by all parties. The ball is now in Israel's court. As for Syria and Hamas, we are not aware of any objections on their part to the initiative, and that means they support it. 

AFP: Jordan and Egypt are expected to have a key role in the "working teams" created by the summit, to follow up with Israel on the Arab Peace Initiative. What do you expect to be your first move? 

HM King Abdullah: Naturally, there will be mechanisms to activate the Arab Peace Initiative and maintain the momentum achieved before, during and after the Riyadh Summit. We have been and continue to be active on all fronts to advance it in the international community. I believe this will be the core responsibility of the committees and working teams. We are in constant touch with Arab leaders and the Arab League to ensure the initiative achieves its goals; a comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, a solution to the Palestinian issue - the core conflict in the region - and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, living in security side by side with Israel. The Israeli people should recognize that the Arab Peace Initiative reflects collective Arab will to build a peace that puts an end to years of violence and suffering. They also should acknowledge that this is a unique opportunity in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that it is time they work to convince their leaders of the need to resume peace negotiations in accordance with this initiative that guarantees security and stability for all. 

AFP: Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said peace could be possible within five years, do you think the region can hold out so long? 

HM King Abdullah: Peace can be reached during a much shorter time, if goodwill prevails, and I have frequently warned about the dangers of wasting this opportunity to achieve peace and establish security in the region. Failing to consider the repercussions of the prevalence of violence in the region will not be in anyone's interest. I have urged Israel on many occasions to reach out to the Arab hand that has been extended in peace, if it wants to be part of the region and a partner for peace. Frankly, this opportunity may not come again. For we may find in one or two or more years that the geographic reality has changed in a way that may make it impossible to establish the state aspired to by the Palestinian people, especially in light of the continuation of the construction of settlements and the separation barrier. Hence everyone will lose; primarily Israel. It is in Israel's interest to adopt the peace proposal offered by the Arabs in this initiative. Otherwise we will witness more destruction, chaos, frustration and despair which will inflame extremism and violence and be a breeding ground for terrorism that targets all and excludes none. Here I would like to emphasize that Israel, the European states and the US should realize that the Palestinian issue does not only concern the Palestinians, but also has the sympathy of all Muslims from Indonesia to the Maghreb states. As such, if Israel wants to coexist with more than a billion Muslims, it should end its occupation of Palestinian and Arab lands. 

AFP: Let me follow up on the previous question. How do you view Olmert's offer for a summit with Arab leaders to discuss what he calls the Saudi-drafted peace plan? 

HM King Abdullah: Let me clarify that we have not received any official Israeli response, except for what has appeared in the media. It is crucial here that we choose our words and phrases clearly and precisely. We are speaking of an Arab Peace Initiative endorsed by Arab leaders at the summit in Beirut in 2002. They renewed their commitment to all its articles at the Riyadh Summit. And as I mentioned earlier, the Israelis have to deal with the initiative seriously and clearly and demonstrate their intentions to live in security and stability. If Israeli leaders choose not to, then I think they would neither be serving their people nor contributing to peace efforts and an end to the core conflict. It is important that they revive negotiations and return to the negotiating table with the Palestinians to resolve all pending issues in order to pave the way for real, comprehensive and lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. This will lead to the normalization of ties between the two sides as outlined in the initiative, which I believe is an unprecedented opportunity to break the cycle of violence and chaos and end the core conflict in the region. 

AFP: Israel is clearly opposed to the return of Palestinian refugees. How will this issue be solved? 

HM King Abdullah: Under no circumstances can a real peace be reached without resolving the Palestinian refugee issue. There are numerous international resolutions that address the problem, and as you know, the issue of Palestinian refugees is one of the sensitive and crucial issues. It is addressed in UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 11, 1948. It was also highlighted by the Arab Peace Initiative that called for a solution agreed by both sides and is not imposed by anyone. Direct Palestinian-Israeli negotiations on the issue will constitute a suitable basis for finding a final solution to the Palestinian refugee issue. What is important is that Israel deal seriously with the Palestinian issue and respond to efforts that seek a comprehensive solution and an end to the conflict that can achieve lasting peace enjoyed by all peoples of the region. This peace should be based on international legitimacy and the Arab Peace Initiative, which is the framework for achieving these objectives, including the establishment of a Palestinian state living in peace with Israel. 

AFP: King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia and Iraqi President Jalal Talabani have both called the US presence in Iraq an occupation, at a time when the US Congress is pushing for a timetable for a withdrawal. What is your opinion about that? 

HM King Abdullah: The problem with Iraq is that Iraqis themselves are divided between those supporting US-led coalition forces in their country, those rejecting and resisting them as occupation, and those that seek to disrupt the political process and national reconciliation efforts. This group also seeks to undermine the unity of Iraq by inciting sedition, sectarian strife and carrying out terrorist acts targeting Iraqi civilians. The increased threat of violence, tension and sectarian strife, which already claims hundreds of lives daily, makes it very important to address the critical situation in Iraq. This [[threat]] can only be overcome by helping the Iraqis achieve national reconciliation and involving all sectors of Iraqi society in the political process, and by preserving the unity of Iraq, its territorial integrity and the future of its people over all personal or sectarian interests. Withdrawal from Iraq without setting a timetable and without preparing the necessary conditions that would ensure a strong central government able to run the affairs of the state and an Iraqi force able to ensure security and stability, may only worsen the problem and contribute to increasing violence and conflict among Iraqis. 

AFP: What is the possibility of sectarian violence extending to other countries in the region? 

Today everybody realizes that once you start a sectarian issue it is very, very difficult to pull back. So all responsible regional actors, including Iran, understand that going down this path will be disastrous to the whole region. 

AFP: Saudi Arabia has opened a channel of dialogue with Iran, do you think other Arab countries should do the same, could this help defuse tensions in the region? 

HM King Abdullah: Channels of communication should not be closed to anyone. We believe constructive dialogue is the way to find common ground from which to reach solutions to our problems. Arab states have communication channels with Iran which we hope will be in the interest of the region and its stability. We as Arabs can build strong ties with our neighboring country, Iran, because what ties the Arab and Iranian nations is much more than what divides them. We seek mutual relations based on respect and understanding, not hegemony and interference. 

AFP: Your Majesty, you spoke of Jordan wanting to develop nuclear power for peaceful means. Mr. ElBaradei is coming to Amman. What do you hope to accomplish? 

HM King Abdullah: Jordan has for years sought alternative energy sources that will alleviate the increasing burden of importing energy amid rising fuel prices. In order to address these challenges, we in Jordan feel, as do other countries, the need to secure the transfer and establishment of nuclear energy technology as an alternative to importing oil for generating electricity and water desalination. This will help us fulfill our energy needs. Our pursuit of nuclear energy conforms to international legality concerning the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and requires direct coordination with concerned international regulatory agencies. We will raise the issue with Mr. ElBaradei, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, during his visit to Jordan next week. 

AFP: Ismael Haniya accompanied President Abbas when he called on you at the summit. How would you describe Jordan's relations with Hamas? 

HM King Abdullah: We support the choice of the Palestinian people and will continue to support the Palestinian National Authority's efforts to preserve the unity of the Palestinian people, end the occupation and establish the independent Palestinian state. Let me stress here that Jordan has always dealt with institutions and governments, rather than factions and political powers. When Fatah was in power, we did not deal with it as a movement; we worked with institutions that represented everyone. What matters in the end is that the Palestinian leadership adopts a program that seeks to establish a Palestinian state based on the Arab Peace Initiative, the peace process parameters and international legitimacy.

Declaraciones jordanas sobre la iniciativa

Fuente: Embajada de Jordania en EEUU

The initiative adopted by the Arab leaders at the Beirut Summit last March offers a unique opportunity and a fresh basis for movement in the peace process. It extends for the first time in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict a comprehensive offer for full peace and normal relations between Israel and all the Arab states in return for Israel’s withdrawal from territories occupied after June 4th 1967, as well as an agreed solution to the refugee problem and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Jordan had been a critical and vocal player in bringing forward this resolution in the Arab Summit and in advancing it in all future steps in the peace process.

Declaraciones del Dr. Marwan Muasher, Ministro de AAEE de Jordania

"The Arab initiative unanimously endorsed in Beirut in March of this year is a very serious attempt to squarely face the needs of both sides, and to satisfactorily address them. Consider the language of the Arab initiative regarding Israeli needs:

“Consider the Arab-Israeli conflict ended”: For the first time, Arab states commit to a collective offer to end the conflict with Israel. This is probably one of the most important demands of the average Israeli citizen--the knowledge that the conflict is terminated, and that no further claims on Israel or its territory will be put forward by Arabs--all Arabs.

“Enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and provide security for all states of the region”: The security of Israel, according to this article, would be guaranteed through one collective peace agreement with full security provisions, and would be assured not only by neighboring Arab states, but by ALL Arab states, none excluded. This has always been a key Israeli demand. Despite Arab fears of Israel, brought about by Israel’s occupation of parts of three Arab states, one cannot deny the existence of a genuine fear on part of the average Israeli regarding his or her own safety. The above article assures Israel that its security fears are understood, and will be addressed by all Arab states.

“Establish normal relations with Israel”: This signals full recognition of Israel and the establishment of normal relations, such as those between an Arab state and any other state in the world.

“Achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem TO BE AGREED UPON in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194”: For the first time, the Arab world commits itself to an AGREED solution to the refugee problem, thus addressing Israel’s concern that the demographic character of the Jewish state not be threatened. To be sure, the initiative calls for achieving a just solution of the problem in accordance with UNGA Resolution 194, but it points out that the implementation of that resolution has to be agreed. The key point here is that Arabs understand well that the implementation has to be both fair and realistic, and certainly agreed upon. In other words, there is no possibility of a solution that will lead to the changing of the character of the Jewish state. Fortunately, there have been many suggested solutions, at Taba and elsewhere between Palestinian and Israeli interlocutors that point to the possibility of reaching a pragmatic settlement to this problem. It is true as well that the Arab initiative also addresses Arab needs: Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital. But previous negotiations between Israel, Palestinians and other Arab states have shown that these goals are well within reach. 

These are powerful pledges by all Arab states which should not be ignored. To those who are skeptical of Arab intentions, let me point out a seldom mentioned point. Notwithstanding all the violence of the past year, and the hardening of positions in the Arab world (as well as in Israel), not one Arab state has asked to withdraw its signature from the Arab Initiative, though there were many opportunities to do so. The Arab Initiative is proving its resilience day in, day out. 

There has been another new and positive element despite this bleak environment: The emergence of a pro-active, pragmatic Arab diplomacy, led by three Arab states that are key to the conflict: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. One should not underestimate the positive contribution that Saudi Arabia has brought to the process. With their huge Arab and Islamic credentials, the Saudis have consistently signaled a willingness to play a very pro-active role in the process, bringing along with them the consent of most of the Arab and Islamic worlds. Here we should remember that Jordan and Egypt have already signed peace treaties with Israel. The involvement of Saudi Arabia, which does not have any territorial disputes with Israel, should not be underestimated.

Arab diplomacy has not stopped with the launching of the Arab initiative, however. Ever since President Bush made his speech on June 24, 2001, committing the United States to a two-state solution in three years as a solution to the conflict, key Arab states have tirelessly worked with the US and the Quartet to develop a realistic plan to see this vision implemented. It is a plan that fully realizes Israel’s security needs, and deals with them. The plan should be strong enough to guarantee that children can board a bus for school without fear. It should also be strong enough to guarantee children under the age of five a life free of malnutrition. Jordan has made clear its opposition to suicide bombings on moral and political grounds. But while we understand the emphasis on security FIRST, it cannot be security ONLY. We need to give people hope that they will live free of occupation, and that their children will not only survive, but prosper as well. 

The road map offers all that. It outlines a series of mutual commitments by both parties, targets to meet these commitments, and a monitoring and assessment mechanism by the Quartet to ensure that commitments are being fulfilled in time. To be sure, it is not perfect. All sides have reservations about parts of it, but it does have all the elements for a successful resolution of the conflict if it is adhered to, and accepted as a package. It does offer a tunnel, bumpy at times, but one that leads to light. 

This road map should also lead to a successful conclusion not only on the Palestinian-Israeli track, but on the Syrian and Lebanese tracks as well. We do not view comprehensiveness as a concession to Arabs, as some have attempted to do. Comprehensiveness means the ability to trigger all the elements of the Arab initiative, in particular the ones I outlined above. We hope, therefore, that the three-year framework will apply to the Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese tracks with Israel in a way that can bring a permanent, comprehensive peace by mid-2005. 

Optimistic, maybe, but certainly doable. Today, we have a clear international consensus on how to solve the conflict, going further than UNSC Resolution 242 did. It offers a two-state solution within a fixed time period, two elements missing from that famous resolution. More importantly, we have a willingness, and a contractual commitment, from all Arab states, to see an end to the longest conflict of the twentieth century. "

Observaciones del Dr. Marwan Muasher, Ministro de AAEE de Jordania el 29 de septiembre de 2003 durante la 58ª Asanblea General de NNUU 

on behalf of Jordan, all stakeholders, especially members of the Quartet, to pursue their efforts towards a scrupulous implementation of the Road Map without any modifications and in a way that ensures the establishment of a Palestinian state by the year 2005, with Jerusalem its capital, and the termination of the Israeli occupation of all. the Arab territories occupied in 1967. All this will be in line with the United Nations resolutions and the Arab peace initiative, both of which constitute a key component of the Road Map and provide a framework for peace. A peace that is acceptable to all peoples of the region. A peace that fulfills their long-standing aspirations.

Observaciones del Dr. Marwan Muasher, Ministro de AAEE de Jordania el 13 de mayo de 2003 durante una conferencia de prensa con el Secretario de Estado de EEUU Colin Powell.

Jordan's position, in particular, in support of the road map emanates from the road map adopting the Arab Initiative as one of the bases for a solution and thereby defining the outlines of the end game, adopting a three-year framework. This is the first international document that adopts a specific timeframe for the end of the occupation and adopts a monitoring mechanism to ensure that all the parties are meeting their commitments on time.

Observaciones del Dr. Marwan Muasher, Ministro de AAEE de Jordania el 23 de septiembre de 2002 en el Council on Foreign Relations.

"For the first time since this conflict started, the whole Arab world is promising Israel collective security measures. The whole Arab world is promising Israel a collective peace treaty and normal relations -- not with neighbor Arab states, but with every single one of them."

"The whole Arab world is promising an agreed solution to the refugee problem, therefore assuring Israel that its demographic nature will not be threatened by any solution. And the whole Arab world is promising an end to the conflict -- not further claims."

" And let me add also that the Arab initiative has already proved its resilience. Despite all the difficult conditions of the past year, not one single Arab country said it wants to withdraw its signature." [ver texto completo]

2013 - EEUU intenta apoyarse en el Plan Abdallah

En 2013, el Secretario de Estado de EEUU, John Kerry, intenta relanzar el diálogo AP-Israel con base en esta Iniciativa de 2002, ligeramente ajustada al hablar de que a lo mejor serían aceptables pequeños y equitavivos intercambios de territorios; a este respecto conviene recordar lo que nos dicen los embajadores israelíes Dore Gold en ‘Land Swaps’ and the 1967 Lines (junio 2011) y Alan Baker en The fallacy of the 1967 ‘borders’ (2010); también en el apartado sobre Fronteras de este sitio. Y esto es lo que opina Barry Rubin: Why the "Arab Peace Initiative" is Both a Good Thing and a Scam (Apr, 30, 2013).

Israel rechaza implícitamente el Plan

Israeli Rejection of the Arab Peace Initiative: Political Climate and Public Perceptions ( Mathias Erwin Zeumer, 2014)