2006 - Segunda Guerra del Líbano (jul-ago) o Guerra de Julio o Guerra del Jizbalá
Fuentes: dos buenos libros sobre el tema, The Road to Fatima Gate (Michael J. Totten, 2011), buen libro para entender mejor este momento y la anterior Revolución de los Cedros, y el dominio de Jizbalá en el Sur del Líbano, y The Transforming Fire (Jonathan Spyer, 2010); un tercer enlace sobre la intervención de la Fuerza Aérea de Israel contada por ella misma. Y una entrevista de Martin Kramer (2006) que aborda las razones que llevan al conflicto, destacadamente la fatuidad y el voluntarismo de Jizbalá. Panfletos de guerra psicológica distribuidos durante la Guerra del Líbano de 2006 (en el buscador selecciona la Guerra del Líbano 2006). Crónica de la Guerra de Líbano 2006 (2023), donde el cordobés Rafael López Mercado relata el panorama general y algunos detalles iniciales de esta Guerra. Para ver algunos detalles más, no muchos, sobre esta guerra. En El pensamiento militar israelí: de la Segunda Intifada a la Segunda Guerra del Líbano (2020), Pérez Triana se aparta de la visión negativamente crítica que, sobre todo en inglés, abunda sobre esta guerra.
Los israelíes se suelen referir a esta guerra como la Segunda Guerra del Líbano mientras que los libaneses se refieren a ella como la Guerra de Julio. Algunos también la llaman la Guerra del Jizbalá.
La Guerra del Jizbalá en el sur del Líbano se inicia el 12 de julio y termina el 14 de agosto de 2006 con un alto el fuego logrado por NNUU (CS Res 1701). La guerra responde, inmediata y aparentemente, al secuestro de dos soldados (y el asesinato colateral de otros) hechos por el Jizbalá con la intención de intercambiarlos por algunos de sus terroristas presos en manos de Israel, como ya había hecho en ocasiones anteriores. Como antecedente inmediato, en el Sur, el 25 de junio de 2006 una célula terrorista de Jamás cruzó la valla que separa Israel de la franja de Gaza y atacó una posición de las IDF; en el combate murieron dos soldados y consiguieron capturar vivo al cabo de las IDF Gilad Shalit.
Mediatamente, es consecuencia de la necesidad imperiosa del Jizbalá de 'encontrar un enemigo' para justificar su existencia como un estado dentro del estado libanés, y al servicio directo de los intereses de sus creadores iraníes, para quienes este sirve como primer frente de batalla directo contra Israel.
Durante la Guerra murieron unos 1.200 libaneses, de ellos 500-700 guerrilleros del Jizbalá, y 149 soldados y 44 civiles israelíes. Más de 4.000 civiles en cada bando resultaron heridos; cientos de miles de personas se vieron desplazadas temporal o permanentemente de sus casas.
La fuerza del Jizbalá en la frontera libanesa-israelí en guerra estaba constituida por unos mil combatientes experimentados y plenamente dedicados y unos 15.000 'reservistas' dispersos y confundidos entre la población civil.
Probalemente pueda decirse justamente, con Jonathan Spyer, que se trató de un una nueva guerra, un nuevo tipo de guerra, venida como un torbellino, que de pronto obligó a Israel a replantearse el futuro. Spyer, que luchó en esa Guerra como tanquista reservista, sostiene que el Jizbolá no se esperaba la masiva reacción israelí, aunque estaba bien preparado. En esta guerra, el enemigo de Israel era muy diferente a los ejércitos árabes de otras guerras y también a las fuerzas de la OLP con las que Israel se había visto las caras en el pasado.
Creado por Irán y apoyado por Siria, el Jizbolá es un cruce entre fuerza de combate convencional y guerrilla, pionero, entre otras cosas, en el uso de los bombardeos suicidas como medio de guerra. Compuesto en gran medida por luchadores a tiempo parcial y carente de carros o artillería pesada, pero formado en Irán en el manejo de lo último en sistemas de armas, que usa muy eficazmente. Se distingue de enemigos anteriores también por su inquebrantable compromiso ideológico criado y asentado en una cosmovisión islamista chií, con el Irán de los clérigos como ejemplo y la destrucción de Israel, la 'liberación de Jerusalén', en su médula.
Pero, vuelve a decir Spyer, lo diferente de este momento de 2006 no radica solo en el Jizbolá ni en la contradicción de una guerrilla de tendencia chií (persa) que dice sostener intereses árabes (enemigos tradicionales de aquéllos), para lo que se enfrenta y ataca a Israel. Lo esencial es el cambio de paradigma que supone: el rechazo a Israel vuelve a mutar y encuentra nueva vestimenta, ahora arrebolada de religión fanática.
El islamismo sustituye al nacionalismo, aunque ambos usan una clave común: sostienen la 'artificiosidad' de la judeidad de Israel, ven lo judío como secta religiosa, no como pueblo nación, que se enfrenta a la natural y poderosa presencia de la soberana nación árabe (ahora susitituida por la umma islámica) que, no les cabe la menor duda, acabará 'naturalmente' arrasando a los judíos y lo judío.
Los objetivos que el Gobierno de Israel quiso alcanzar anunciaban el desastre.
El triunvirato israelí en esta guerra lo formaban personas carentes de la experiencia necesaria:
el Primer Ministro, Ehud Olmert,
el Ministro de Defensa, Amir Peretz, y
el Jefe de Estado Mayor, Dan Haluz, proveniente de la aviación y muy mal preparado para dirigir una guerra terrestre como la que se necesitaba.
El Gobierno de Israel aprueba las bases y objetivos de su entrada en Líbano en el consejo que celebra el 19 de junio de 2006:
liberar a los soldados secuestrados y traerlos a Israel sin condiciones ... pero, como luego se supo, esos soldados estaban ya muertos; en todo caso, nunca se ha dicho cómo preveía el gobierno que iba a lograr este objetivo;
acabar con el lanzamiento de cohetes y misiles contra ciudadanos y objetivos israelíes... este objetivo se podía haber logrado, pero solo con un amplio despliegue y avanzada con fuerzas de tierra... que nunca se hizo; más adelante, el triunvirato se acusaría uno al otro de no haberlo hecho;
ejecución completa de la CS Res 1559, incluyendo el desarme de todas las milicias y la imposición por el Gobierno del Líbano de su soberanía sobre todo su territorio, así como el despliegue del ejército libanés en su frontera sur con Israel... esto solo se podía lograr induciendo al Gobierno del Líbano y a la comunidad internacionales a actuar contra el Jizbolá y desarmarlo... pero se ignora cómo se proponía el Gobierno de Israel lograr esto.
Parece que la Guerra fue, en no pequeña medida, un gran fracaso para Israel. El esfuerzo israelí en esta guerra se caracterizó, según Spyer, por su "escasa preparación, mala planificación, incoherencia de objetivos y ejecución desganada." A eso, el claro, conciso y duro informe del Comité Winogard, encargado por el propio gobierno israelí para investigar la decisión, preparación y ejecución de la guerra, lo llamó: "una gran y grave oportunidad perdida."
El Comité Winograd
El 14 de septiembre de 2006 se constituyó el Comité Winograd Committee para examinar los hechos ocurridos durante los 34 días que dura esta Segunda Guerra del Líbano (Julio-Agosto de 2006) así como los acontecimientos anteriores a la guerra, desde que las Fuerzas de Defensa de Israel dejaron el Líbano en el 2000.
The Israel-HezbollahWar And TheWinograd Committee (Raphael Cohen-Almagor and Sharon Haleva-Ami)
Constitución (14 sep 2006)
Fuente: Ministerio de AAEE de Israel
(Communicated by the Prime Minister’s Media Adviser)
The Cabinet will, on Sunday, 17 September 2006, approve the establishment of the Winograd Committee, pursuant to Article 8a of the Government Law. Retired Judge Dr. Eliyahu Winograd will chair the committee; its other members will be Prof. Ruth Gavison, Prof. Yehezkel Dror, Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Menachem Einan and Maj.-Gen. (ret.) Dr. Haim Nadel.
Nahum Admoni, who was due to chair the committee but who recommended that a retired judge do so, has asked to resign from the committee. Given that the committee will also inquire into the security establishment’s role, Admoni and Judge Winograd agreed that a reserve major-general would join the committee in place of the former. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert thanked Admoni for his willingness to serve on the committee.
Attorney General Meni Mazuz has approved all members of the committee.
Informe Provisional (30 abr 2007) (versión desclasificada)
Fuente: Ministerio de AAEE de Israel
On Monday, April 30, the Inquiry Commission into the military campaign held in Lebanon in summer 2006, headed by former Justice Dr. Eliyahu Winograd, submitted to the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense an interim report relating to the time from the IDF's exit from Lebanon to the soldiers' abduction on July 12, 2006 and to the time between July 12 and July 17, when the decision to move into war was taken.
(Government Press Office)
1. On September 17th 2006, the Government of Israel decided, under section 8A of Basic Law: The Government 2001, to appoint a governmental commission of examination "To look into the preparation and conduct of the political and the security levels concerning all the dimensions of the Northern Campaign which started on July 12th 2006". Today we have submitted to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence the classified interim report, and we are now presenting the unclassified report to the public.
2. The Commission was appointed due to a strong sense of a crisis and deep disappointment with the consequences of the campaign and the way it was conducted. We regarded accepted this difficult task both as a duty and a privilege. It is our belief that the larger the event and the deeper the feeling of crisis - the greater the opportunity to change and improve matters which are essential for the security and the flourishing of state and society in Israel. We believe Israeli society has great strength and resilience, with a robust sense of the justice of its being and of its achievements. These, too, were expressed during the war in Lebanon and after it. At the same time, we must not underrated deep failures among us.
3. This conception of our role affected the way we operated. No-one underestimates the need to study what happened in the past, including the imposition of personal responsibility. The past is the key for learning lessons for the future. Nonetheless, learning these lessons and actually implementing them are the most implication of the conclusions of the Commission.
4. This emphasis on learning lessons does not only follow from our conception of the role of a public Commission. It also follows from our belief that one Israeli society greatest sources of strength is its being a free, open and creative. Together with great achievements, the challenges facing it are existential. To cope with them, Israel must be a learning society - a society which examines its achievements and, in particular, its failures, in order to improve its ability to face the future.
5. Initially we hoped that the appointment of the Commission will serve as an incentive to accelerate learning processes in the relevant systems, while we are working, so that we could devote our time to study all of the materials in depth, and present the public with a comprehensive picture. However, learning processes have been limited. In some ways an opposite, and worrying, process emerged - a process of ‘waiting’ for the Commission’s Report before energetic and determined action is taken to redress failures which have been revealed.
6. Therefore we decided to publish initially an Interim Report, focusing on the decisions related to starting the war. We do this in the hope that the relevant bodies will act urgently to change and correct all that it implies. We would like to reiterate and emphasize that we hope that this Partial Report, which concentrates on the functioning of the highest political and military echelons in their decision to move into the war will not divert attention from the overall troubling complete picture revealed by the war as a whole.
7. The interim report includes a numer of chapters dealing with the following subjects:
a. The Commissions’ conception of its role, and its attitude to recommendations in general and to recommendations dealing with specific persons in particular. (chapter 2): We see as the main task of a public commission of inquiry (or investigation) to determine findings and conclusions, and present them- with its recommendations - before the public and decision makers so that they can take action. A public commission should not - in most cases - replace the usual political decision-making processes and determine who should serve as a minister or senior military commander. Accordingly, we include personal conclusions in the interim report, without personal recommendations. However, we will reconsider this matter towards our Final Report in view of the depiction of the war as a whole.
b. The way we balanced our desire to engage in a speedy and efficient investigation with the rights of those who may be negatively affected to ‘natural justice’ (chapter 3): The special stipulations of the Commissions of Inquiry Act in this regard do not apply to a governmental commission of Examination, but we regard ourselves, naturally, as working under the general principles of natural justice. The commission notified those who may be affected by its investigation, in detailed letters of invitation, of the ways in which they may be negatively affected, and enabled them to respond to allegations against them, without sending "notices of warning" and holding a quasi-judicial hearing before reaching out conclusions. We believe that in this way we provided all who may be negatively affected by our report with a full opportunity to answer all allegations against them.
c. The processes and developments in the period between the withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon until July 11, 2006 which contributed to the background of the Lebanon War (Chapter 4): These processes created much of the factual background against which the decision-makers had to operate on July 12th, and they are thus essential to both the understanding and the evaluation of the events of the war. Understanding them is also essential for drawing lessons from the events, whose significance is often broader than that of the war itself.
8. The core of the interim report is a detailed examination of the decisions of senior political and military decision-makers concerning the decision to go to war at the wake of the abduction of the two soldiers on the morning of July 12th. We start with the decision of the government on the fateful evening of the 12th to authorize a sharp military response, and end with the speech of the Prime Minister in the Knesset on July 17th, when he officially presented the campaign and its goals. These decisions were critical and constitutive, and therefore deserve separate investigation. We should note that these decisions enjoyed broad support within the government, the Knesset and the public throughout this period.
9. Despite this broad support, we determine that there are very serious failings in these decisions and the way they were made. We impose the primary responsibility for these failures on the Prime Minister, the minister of defence and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. All three made a decisive personal contribution to these decisions and the way in which they were made. Howwever,, there are many others who share responsibility for the mistakes we found in these decisions and for their background conditions.
10. The main failures in the decisions made and the decision-making processes can be summed up as follows:
a. The decision to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike was not based on a detailed, comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on carefull study of the complex characteristics of the Lebanon arena. A meticulous examination of these characteristics would have revealed the following: the ability to achieve military gains having significant political-international weight was limited; an Israeli military strike would inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there was not other effective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the missiles were fired - which would have a high “cost” and which did not enjoy broad support. These difficulties were not explicitly raised with the political leaders before the decision to strike was taken.
b. Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of ‘containment’, or combining political and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the ‘escalation level’, or military preparations without immediage military action - so as to maintain for Israel the full range of responses to the abduction. This failure reflects weakness in strategic thinking, which derives the response to the event from a more comprehensive and encompassing picture.
c. The support in the cabinet for this move was gained in part through ambiguity in the presentation of goals and modes of operation, so that ministers with different or even contradictory attitudes could support it. The ministers voted for a vague decision, without understanding and knowing its nature and implications. They authorized to commence a military campaign without considering how to exit it.
d. Some of the declared goals of the war were not clear and could not be achieved, and in part were not achieveable by the authorized modes of military action.
e. The IDF did not exhibit creativity in proposing alternative action possibilities, did not alert the political decision-makers to the discrepancy between its own scenarios and the authorized modes of action, and did not demand - as was necessary under its own plans - early mobilization of the reserves so they could be equipped and trained in case a ground operation would be required.
f. Even after these facts became known to the political leaders, they failed to adapt the military way of operation and its goals to the reality on the ground. On the contrary, declared goals were too ambitious, and it was publicly states that fighting will continue till they are achieved. But the authorized military operations did not enable their achievement.
11. The primary responsibility for these serious failings rests with the Prime Minister, the minister of defense and the (outgoing) Chief of Staff. We single out these three because it is likely that had any of them acted better - the decisions in the relevant period and the ways they were made, as well as the outcome of the war, would have been significantly better.
12. Let us start with the Prime Minister.
a. The Prime Minister bears supreme and comprehensive responsibility for the decisions of ‘his’ government and the operations of the army. His responsibility for the failures in the initial decisions concerning the war stem from both his position and from his behavior, as he initiated and led the decisions which were taken.
b. The Prime Minister made up his mind hastily, despite the fact that no detailed military plan was submitted to him and without asking for one. Also, his decision was made without close study of the complex features of the Lebanon front and of the military, political and diplomatic options available to Israel. He made his decision without systematic consultation with others, especially outside the IDF, despite not having experience in external-political and military affairs. In addition, he did not adequately consider political and professional reservations presented to him before the fateful decisions of July 12th.
c. The Prime Minister is responsible for the fact that the goals of the campaign were not set out clearly and carefully, and that there was no serious discussion of the relationships between these goals and the authorized modes of military action. He Made a personal contribution to the fact that the declared goals were over-ambitious and not feasible.
d. The Prime Minister did not adapt his plans once it became clear that the assumptions and expectations of Israel’s actions were not realistic and were not materializing.
e. All of these add up to a serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence.
13. The Minister of Defence is the minister responsible for overseeing the IDF, and he is a senior member in the group of leaders in charge of political-military affairs.
a. The Minister of Defence did not have knowledge or experience in military, political or governmental matters. He also did not have good knowledge of the basic principles of using military force to achieve political goals.
b. Despite these serious gaps, he made his decisions during this period without systemic consultations with experienced political and professional experts, including outside the security establishment. In addition, he did not give adequate weight to reservations expressed in the meetings he attended.
c. The Minister of Defence did not act within a strategic conception of the systems he oversaw. He did not ask for the IDF’s operational plans and did not examine them; he did not check the preparedness and fitness of IDF; and did not examine the fit between the goals set and the modes of action presented and authorized for achieving them. His influence on the decisions made was mainly pointillist and operational. He did not put on the table - and did not demand presentation - of serious strategic options for discussion with the Prime Minister and the IDF.
d. The Minister of Defence did not develop an independent assessment of the implications of the complexity of the front for Israel’s proper response, the goals of the campaign, and the relations between military and diplomatic moves within it. His lack of experience and knowledge prevented him from challenging in a competent way both the IDF, over which he was in charge, and the Prime Minister.
e. In all these ways, the Minister of Defence failed in fulfilling his functions. Therefore, his serving as Minister of Defence during the war impaired Israel’s ability to respond well to its challenges.
14. The Chief of Staff (COS) is the supreme commander of the IDF, and the main source of information concerning the army, its plans, abilities and recommendations presented to the political echelon. Furthermore, the COS’s personal involvement with decision making within the army and in coordination with the political echelon were dominant.
a. The army and the COS were not prepared for the event of the abduction despite recurring alerts. When the abduction happened, he responded impulsively. He did not alert the political leaders to the complexity of the situation, and did not present information, assessments and plans that were available in the IDF at various levels of planning and approval and which would have enabled a better response to the challenges.
b. Among other things, the COS did not alert the political echelon to the serious shortcomings in the preparedness and the fitness of the armed forces for an extensive ground operation, if that became necessary. In addition, he did not clarify that the military assessments and analyses of the arena were that a military strike against Hezbollah will with a high probability make such a move necessary.
c. The COS’s responsibility is aggravated by the fact that he knew well that both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense lacked adequate knowledge and experience in these matters, and by the fact that he had led them to believe that the IDF was ready and prepared and had operational plans fitting the situation.
d. The COS did not provide adequate responses to serious reservation about his recommendations raised by ministers and others during the first days of the campaign, and he did not present to the political leaders the internal debates within the IDF concerning the fit between the stated goals and the authorized modes of action.
e. In all these the Chief of Staff failed in his duties as commander in chief of the army and as a critical part of the political-military leadership, and exhibited flaws in professionalism, responsibility and judgment.
15. Concomitantly we determine that the failures listed here, and in the outcomes of the war, had many other partners.
a. The complexity of the Lebanon scene is basically outside Israel’s control.
b. The ability of Hezbollah to sit ‘on the border’, its ability to dictate the moment of escalation, and the growth of its military abilities and missile arsenal increased significantly as a result of Israel’s unilateral withdrawal in May 2000 (which was not followed, as had been hoped, by The Lebanese Army deploying on the border with Israel.
c. The shortcomings in the preparedness and the training of the army, its operational doctrine, and various flaws in its organizational culture and structure, were all the responsibility of the military commanders and political leaders in charge years before the present Prime Minister, Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff took office.
d. On the political-security strategic level, the lack of preparedness was also caused by the failure to update and fully articulate Israel’s security strategy doctrine, in the fullest sense of that term, so that it could not serve as a basis for coping comprehensively will all the challenges facing Israel. Responsibility for this lack of an updates national security strategy lies with Israel’s governments over the years. This omission made it difficult to devise an immediate proper response to the abduction, because it led to stressing an immediate and sharp military strike. If the response had been derived from a more comprehensive security strategy, it would have been easier to take into account Israel’s overall balance of strengths and vulnerabilities, including the preparedness of the civil population.
e. Another factor which largely contributed to the failures is the weakness of the high staff work available to the political leadership. This weakness existed under all previous Prime Ministers and this continuing failure is the responsibility of these PMs and their cabinets. The current political leadership did not act in a way that could compensate for this lack, and did not rely sufficiently on other bodies within and outside the security system that could have helped it.
f. Israel’s government in its plenum failed in its political function of taking full responsibility for its decisions. It did not explore and seek adequate response for various reservations that were raised, and authorized an immediate military strike that was not thought-through and suffered from over-reliance on the judgment of the primary decision-makers.
g. Members of the IDF’s general staff who were familiar with the assessments and intelligence concerning the Lebanon front, and the serious deficiencies in preparedness and training, did not insist that these should be considered within the army, and did not alert the political leaders concerning the flaws in the decisions and the way they were made.
16. As a result of our investigation, we make a number of structural and institutional recommendations, which require urgent attention:
a. The improvement of the quality of discussions and decision making within the government through strengthening and deepening staff work; strict enforcement of the prohibition of leaks; improving the knowledge base of all members of the government on core issues of Israel’s challenges, and orderly procedures for presentation of issues for discussion and resolution.
b. Full incorporation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in security decisions with political and diplomatic aspects.
c. Substantial improvement in the functioning of the National Security Council, the establishment of a national assessment team, and creating a center for crises management in the Prime Minister’s Office.
17. We regard it is of great importance to make findings, reach conclusions and present recommendations on the other critical issues which emerged in this war. We will cover them in the final report, which we strive to conclude soon. These subjects include, among others, the direction of the war was led and its management by the political echelon; the conduct of the military campaign by the army; the civil-military relationship in the war; taking care of Israel’s civilian population under missile attack; the diplomatic negotiations by the Prime Minister’s office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; censorship, the media and secrecy; the effectiveness of Israel’s media campaign; and the discussion of various social and political processes which are essential for a comprehensive analysis of the events of the war and their significance.
18. Let us add a few final comments: It took the government till March 2007 to name the events of the summer of 2006 ‘The Second Lebanon War’. After 25 years without a war, Israel experienced a war of a different kind. The war thus brought back to center stage some critical questions that parts of Israeli society preferred to avoid.
19. The IDF was not ready for this war. Among the many reasons for this we can mention a few: Some of the political and military elites in Israel have reached the conclusion that Israel is beyond the era of wars. It had enough military might and superiority to deter others from declaring war against her; these would also be sufficient to send a painful reminder to anyone who seemed to be undeterred; since Israel did not intend to initiate a war, the conclusion was that the main challenge facing the land forces would be low intensity asymmetrical conflicts.
20. Given these assumptions, the IDF did not need to be prepared for ‘real’ war. There was also no urgent need to update in a systematic and sophisticated way Israel’s overall security strategy and to consider how to mobilize and combine all its resources and sources of strength - political, economic, social, military, spiritual. cultural and scientific - to address the totality of the challenges it faces.
21. We believe that - beyond the important need to examine the failures of conducting the war and the preparation for it, beyond the need to identify the weaknesses (and strengths) in the decisions made in the war - these are the main questions raised by the Second Lebanon war. These are questions that go far beyond the mandate of this or that commission of inquiry; they are the questions that stand at the center of our existence here as a Jewish and democratic state. It would be a grave mistake to concentrate only on the flaws revealed in the war and not to address these basic issues.
We hope that our findings and conclusions in the interim report and in the final report will not only impel taking care of the serious governmental flaws and failures we examine and expose, but will also lead towards a renewed process in which Israeli society, and its political and spiritual leaders will take up and explore Israel’s long-term aspirations and the ways to advance them.
Informe Final (30 jun 2008) (versión desclasificada)
Olmert receives Winograd Committee Final Report
Fuente: The Jewish Virtual Library
(Government Press Office)
Tonight, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert received the final Winograd Report, and thanks the members of the Committee for their hard work. The Prime Minister has already begun reading the Report, and in the next few days, intends to study thoroughly its contents and the recommendations contained therein.
It should be emphasized that the Prime Minister had and continues to have full faith in the IDF and its commanders and soldiers, as well as their abilities. The IDF continues and will continue to train, improve, grow stronger and be prepared for any challenge and mission.
The Prime Minister views the final Winograd Report, as well as the Interim Report which preceded it, with absolute seriousness, and already in the next few days a serious of discussions regarding the conclusions resulting from the final Report will be held in the Government plenum and in the Ministerial Committee for the Follow-Up on the Process of Implementing the Winograd Report Recommendations.
Report
Fuente: Ministerio de AAEE de Israel
1. About an hour ago we submitted the Final Report of the Commission to Investigate the Lebanon Campaign in 2006 to the Prime minister, Mr. Ehud Olmert, and to the Minister of Defense, Mr. Ehud Barak.
2. The task given to us was difficult and complex. It involved the examination of events in 34 days of fighting, and the scrutiny of events before the war, since the IDF had left Lebanon in 2000. This covered extensive, charged and complex facts, unprecedented in any previous Commission of Inquiry.
3. The fact that the Government of Israel opted for such an examination, and that the army conducted a large number of inquires of a variety of military events, are a sign of strength, and an indication that the political and military leaders of Israel are willing to expose themselves to critical review and to painful but required mending.
4. We have included in the classified version of the Report all the relevant facts we have found concerning the 2nd Lebanon war, systematically and in a chronological order. This presentation of the factual basis was an important part of our work. It is reasonable to assume that no single decision maker had access to a similar factual basis. In this task we had a unique advantage over others who have written about this war, since we had access to a lot of primary and comprehensive material, and the opportunity to clarify the facts by questioning many witnesses, commanders and soldiers, including bereaved families.
5. For obvious reasons, the unclassified Report does not include the many facts that cannot be revealed for reasons of protecting the state's security and foreign affairs. We tried, nonetheless, to balance between the wish to present the public with a meaningful picture of the events and the needs of security. We should note that we did not take the mere fact that some data has already been published in the media as a reason for including it in our unclassified Report.
6. We, the members of the Commission, acted according to the main objectives for which the Commission was established - to respond to the bad feelings of the Israeli public of a crisis and disappointment caused by the results of the 2nd Lebanon war, and from the way it was managed by the political and military echelons; and the wish to draw lessons from the failings of the war and its flaws, and to repair what is required, quickly and resolutely. We regarded as most important to investigate deeply what had happened, as a key to drawing lessons for the future, and their implementation.
7. This conception of our role was one of the main reasons for our decision not to include in the Final Report personal conclusions and recommendations. We believe that the primary need for improvements applies to the structural and systemic malfunctioning revealed in the war - on all levels.
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the fact we refrained from imposing personal responsibility does not imply that no such responsibility exists. We also wish to repeat our statement from the Interim Report: We will not impose different standards of responsibility to the political and the military echelons, or to persons of different ranks within them.
8. Let us emphasize: when we imposed responsibility on a system, an echelon or a unit, we did not imply that the responsibility was only or mainly of those who headed it at the time of the war. Often, such responsibility stemmed from a variety of factors outside the control of those at the head. In addition, a significant part of the responsibility for the failures and flaws we have found lies with those who had been in charge of preparedness and readiness in the years before the war.
9. The purpose of this press release is not to sum up the Final Report. Rather, it is to present its highlights. The Report itself includes discussions of many important issues, which are an inseparable part of the Report, its conclusions and recommendations.
10. In the Final Report we dealt mainly with the events of the period after the initial decision to go to war, which we had discussed in the Interim Report. Yet the events of the period covered by the Final Report took place under the shadow of the constraints created by the decision to go to war, with all its failings and flaws.
We want to stress that we stand behind everything we said in the Interim Report, and the two parts of the Report complement each other.
11. Overall, we regard the 2nd Lebanon war as a serious missed opportunity. Israel initiated a long war, which ended without its clear military victory. A semi-military organization of a few thousand men resisted, for a few weeks, the strongest army in the Middle East, which enjoyed full air superiority and size and technology advantages. The barrage of rockets aimed at Israel's civilian population lasted throughout the war, and the IDF did not provide an effective response to it. The fabric of life under fire was seriously disrupted, and many civilians either left their home temporarily or spent their time in shelters. After a long period of using only standoff fire power and limited ground activities, Israel initiated a large scale ground offensive, very close to the Security Council resolution imposing a cease fire. This offensive did not result in military gains and was not completed. These facts had far-reaching implications for us, as well as for our enemies, our neighbors, and our friends in the region and around the world.
12. In the period we examined in the Final Report - from July 18, 2006, to August 14, 2006- again troubling findings were revealed, some of which had already been mentioned in the Interim Report:
We found serious failings and shortcomings in the decision-making processes and staff-work in the political and the military echelons and their interface.
We found serious failings and flaws in the quality of preparedness, decision-making and performance in the IDF high command, especially in the Army.
We found serious failings and flaws in the lack of strategic thinking and planning, in both the political and the military echelons.
We found severe failings and flaws in the defence of the civilian population and in coping with its being attacked by rockets.
These weaknesses resulted in part from inadequacies of preparedness and strategic and operative planning which go back long before the 2nd Lebanon war.
13. The decision made in the night of July 12th - to react (to the kidnapping) with immediate and substantive military action, and to set for it ambitious goals - limited Israel's range of options. In fact, after the initial decision had been made, Israel had only two main options, each with its coherent internal logic, and its set of costs and disadvantages. The first was a short, painful, strong and unexpected blow on Hezbollah, primarily through standoff fire-power. The second option was to bring about a significant change of the reality in the South of Lebanon with a large ground operation, including a temporary occupation of the South of Lebanon and 'cleaning' it of Hezbollah military infrastructure.
14. The choice between these options was within the exclusive political discretion of the government; however, the way the original decision to go to war had been made; the fact Israel went to war before it decided which option to select, and without an exit strategy - all these constituted serious failures, which affected the whole war. Responsibility for these failures lay, as we had stressed in the Interim Report, on both the political and the military echelons.
15. After the initial decision to use military force, and to the very end of the war, this period of 'equivocation' continued, with both the political and the military echelon not deciding between the two options: amplifying the military achievement by a broad military ground offensive, or abstaining from such a move and seeking to end the war quickly. This 'equivocation' did hurt Israel. Despite awareness of this fact, long weeks passed without a serious discussion of these options, and without a decision - one way or the other - between them.
16. In addition to avoiding a decision about the trajectory of the military action, there was a very long delay in the deployment necessary for an extensive ground offensive, which was another factor limiting Israel's freedom of action and political flexibility: Till the first week of August, Israel did not prepare the military capacity to start a massive ground operation.
17. As a result, Israel did not stop after its early military achievements, and was 'dragged' into a ground operation only after the political and diplomatic timetable prevented its effective completion. The responsibility for this basic failure in conducting the war lies at the doorstep of both the political and the military echelons.
18. The overall image of the war was a result of a mixture of flawed conduct of the political and the military echelons and the interface between them, of flawed performance by the IDF, and especially the ground forces, and of deficient Israeli preparedness. Israel did not use its military force well and effectively, despite the fact that it was a limited war initiated by Israel itself. At the end of the day, Israel did not gain a political achievement because of military successes; rather, it relied on a political agreement, which included positive elements for Israel, which permitted it to stop a war which it had failed to win.
19. This outcome was primarily caused by the fact that, from the very beginning, the war has not been conducted on the basis of deep understanding of the theatre of operations, of the IDF's readiness and preparedness, and of basic principles of using military power to achieve a political and diplomatic goal.
20. All in all, the IDF failed, especially because of the conduct of the high command and the ground forces, to provide an effective military response to the challenge posed to it by the war in Lebanon, and thus failed to provide the political echelon with a military achievement that could have served as the basis for political and diplomatic action. Responsibility for this outcomes lies mainly with the IDF, but the misfit between the mode of action and the goals determined by the political echelon share responsibility.
21. We should note that, alongside the failures in the IDF performance, there were also important military achievements. Special mention should go to the great willingness of the soldiers, especially reserve soldiers, to serve and fight in the war, as well as the many instances of heroism, courage, self-sacrifice and devotion of many commanders and soldiers.
22. The air force should be congratulated on very impressive achievements in this war. However, there were those in the IDF high command, joined by some in the political echelon, who entertained a baseless hope that the capabilities of the air force could prove decisive in the war. In fact, the impressive achievements of the air force were necessarily limited, and were eroded by the weaknesses in the overall performance of the IDF.
23. The "Hannit" episode colored to a large extent the whole performance of the Navy, despite the fact that it made a critical contribution to the naval blockade, and provided the Northern Command with varied effective support of its fighting.
24. We should also note that the war had significant diplomatic achievements. SC resolution 1701, and the fact it was adopted unanimously, were an achievement for Israel. This conclusion stands even if it turns out that only a part of the stipulations of the resolution were implemented or will be implemented, and even if it could have been foreseen that some of them would not be implemented. This conclusion also does not depend on the intentions or goals of the powers that supported the resolution.
25. We note, however, that we have seen no serious staff work on Israeli positions in the negotiations. This situation improved in part when the team headed by the prime minister's head of staff was established. The team worked efficiently and with dedication, professionalism and coordination. This could not compensate, however, for the absence of preparatory staff work and discussions in the senior political echelon.
26. This fact may have much significance to the way Israel conducts negotiations, and to the actual content of the arrangements reached. In such negotiations, decisions are often made that may have far-reaching implications on Israel's interests, including the setting of precedents.
27. The staff work done in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the adoption of a favorable resolution in the Security Council was, in the main, quick, systematic and efficient. At the same time, for a variety of reasons, it did not reflect clear awareness of the essential need to maintain an effective relationship between military achievements and diplomatic activities.
28. We now turn to the political and military activity concerning the ground operation at the end of the war. This is one of the central foci of public debate.
29. True, in hindsight, the large ground operation did not achieve its goals of limiting the rocket fire and changing the picture of the war. It is not clear what the ground operation contributed to speeding up the diplomatic achievement or improving it. It is also unclear to what extent starting the ground offensive affected the reactions of the government of Lebanon and Hezbollah to the ceasefire.
30. Nonetheless, it is important to stress that the evaluation of these decisions should not be made with hindsight. It cannot depend on the achievements or the costs these decisions in fact had. The evaluation must be based only on the reasons for the operation, and its risks and prospects as they were known - or as they should have been known - when it was decided upon. Moreover, it is impossible to evaluate the ground operation at the end of the war without recalling the developments that preceded it and the repeated delays in the adoption of the Security Council resolution; and as a part of the overall conduct of the war.
31. Against this background, we make the following findings on the main decisions:
The cabinet decision of August 9th - to approve in principle the IDF plan, but to authorize the PM and the MOD to decide if and when it should be activated, according to the diplomatic timetable - was almost inevitable, giving the Israeli government necessary military and political flexibility.
The decision to start in fact the ground operation was within the political and professional discretion of its makers, on the basis of the facts before them. The goals of the ground operation were legitimate, and were not exhausted by the wish to hasten or improve the diplomatic achievement. There was no failure in that decision in itself, despite its limited achievements and its painful costs.
Both the position of the Prime minister - who had preferred to avoid the ground operation - and the position of the Minister of Defense - who had thought it would have served Israel's interest to go for it - had been taken on the merits and on the basis of evidence. Both enjoyed serious support among the members of the general staff of the IDF and others. Even if both statesmen took into account political and public concerns - a fact we cannot ascertain - we believe that they both acted out of a strong and sincere perception of what they thought at the time was Israel's interest.
32. We want to stress: The duty to make these difficult decisions was the political leaders'. The sole test of these decisions is public and political.
33. At the same time, we also note that:
We have not found within either the political or the military echelons a serious consideration of the question whether it was reasonable to expect military achievements in 60 hours that could have contributed meaningfully to any of the goals of the operation;
We have not found that the political echelon was aware of the details of the fighting in real time, and we have not seen a discussion, in either the political or the military echelons, of the issue of stopping the military operation after the Security Council resolution was adopted;
We have not seen an explanation of the tension between the great effort to get additional time to conclude the first stage of the planned ground operation and the decisions not to go on fighting until the ceasefire itself.
34. A description of failures in the conduct of war may be regarded as harming Israel. There will be those who may use our findings to hurt Israel and its army. We nonetheless point out these failures and shortcomings because we are certain that only in this way Israel may come out of this ordeal strengthened. We are pleased that processes of repair have already started. We recommend a deep and systematic continuation of such processes. It is exclusively in the hands of Israeli leaders and public to determine whether, when facing challenges in the future, we will come to them more prepared and ready, and whether we shall cope with them in a more serious and responsible way than the way the decision-makers had acted - in the political and the military echelons - in the 2nd Lebanon war.
35. Our recommendations contain suggestions for systemic and deep changes in the modalities of thinking and acting of the political and military echelons and their interface, in both routine and emergency, including war. These are deep and critical processes. Their significance should not be obscured by current affairs, local successes or initial repairs. A persistent and prolonged effort, on many levels, will be needed in order to bring about the essential improvements in the ways of thinking and acting of the political-military systems.
36. For these reasons we would like to caution against dangers which might upset plans and delay required change processes, and thus produce dangerous results:
Fear of criticism in case of failure may lead to defensive reactions, working by the book, and abstention from making resolute decisions and preferring non-action. Such behavior is undesirable and also dangerous.
In a dynamic complex reality, one should not prepare better for the last war. It is also essential not to limit oneself to superficial action, designed to create an appearance that flaws had been corrected.
It is also essential not to focus exclusively on coping with dangers, but to combine readiness for threat scenarios with an active seeking of opportunities.
When speaking on learning, one should take into account that enemies, too, are learning their lessons.
37. The 2nd Lebanon War has brought again to the foreground for thought and discussion issues that some parts of Israeli society had preferred to suppress: Israel cannot survive in this region, and cannot live in it in peace or at least non-war, unless people in Israel itself and in its surroundings believe that Israel has the political and military leadership, military capabilities, and social robustness that will allow her to deter those of its neighbors who wish to harm her, and to prevent them - if necessary through the use of military force - from achieving their goal.
38. These truths do not depend on one's partisan or political views. Israel must - politically and morally - seek peace with its neighbors and make necessary compromises. At the same time, seeking peace or managing the conflict must come from a position of social, political and military strength, and through the ability and willingness to fight for the state, its values and the security of its population even in the absence of peace.
39. These truths have profound and far-reaching implications for many dimensions of life in Israel and the ways its challenges are managed. Beyond examining the way the Lebanon War was planned and conducted; beyond the examination of flaws in decision-making and performance that had been revealed in it - important as they may be; these are the central questions that the Lebanon war has raised. These are issues that lie at the very essence of our existence here as a Jewish and democratic state. These are the questions we need to concentrate on.
40. We hope that our findings and conclusions in the Interim and the Final Reports will bring about not only a redress of failings and flaws, but help Israeli society, its leaders and thinkers, to advance the long-term goals of Israel, and develop the appropriate ways to address the challenges and respond to them.
41. We are grateful for the trust put in us when this difficult task was given to us. If we succeed in facilitating rectification of the failings we have identified - this will be our best reward.
Lecciones de esta Guerra
En octubre de 2012, el especialista Benjamin S. Lambeth escribe un interesante artículo - Israel’s War in Gaza: A Paradigm of Effective Military Learning and Adaptation - sobre la efectiva adaptación militar de las IDF durante la Operación Plomo Fundido en Gaza de 2008-2009 a las lecciones aprendidas durante la Segunda Guerra del Líbano de 2006.
The Lessons of the THIRD Lebanon War (Yagil Henkin, IDF Command and General Staff College, 2014):
"The Lessons the IDF has learned from the Second Lebanon war are way too similar to the lessons from the First Lebanon War (1982) and even many of the lessons of the Yom-Kipur War (1973). One can convincingly argue that the IDF can start to learn the lessonf of the third lebanon war even though of course no such war happened - because it's probable that many lessons would have to be learned again. This suggest the problem is not learning the lessons, but implementing them. The article tries to seperate the useful from the useless and establish few guidelines for commanders to make sure...
On Swarming: Success and Failure in Multidirectional Warfare, from Normandy to the Second Lebanon War (Yagil Henkin, IDF Command and General Staff College, 2014)
In recent years, the idea of ‘swarming’ – that is, simultaneous multidirectional attack or maneuver by large number of independent or semi-independent small units – became a subject of a heated debate. Some believe this is the future of warfare, while others see this belief as ridiculous and dangerous. In the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), specifically, swarming was heralded as the new way of war before the 2006 Second Lebanon War. But during and after the war, the word itself was turned into a derogatory term, symbolizing all that was wrong with the IDF’s performance: relying on new,...