1930-1931 - Hogar Nacional y Restricciones a la inmigración y compra de tierras - Informe Hope-Simpson y Libro Blanco de Passfield - Carta Mac Donald

Antecedentes

Los antecedentes inmediatos de estos documentos son en el Libro Blanco de Churchill de 1922 y los Disturbios de 1929.

Hope-Simpson Report (datado el 1 oct 1930; publicado el 21)

Texto del Hope-Simpson Report - Comentario sobre el Hope-Simpson Report

El Informe Hope-Simpson Report dice:

"Los árabes estaban siendo sacados gradualmente del territorio por las compras de tierra hechas por judíos y al no permitir el Fondo Nacional Judío el empleo de árabes en los negocios judíos."

Sin embargo, hay grandes discrepancias en cuánto al número de fellahin que fueron desahuciados.

Según la Jewish Virtual Library:

"Upon the recommendation of the Shaw Commission, the British authorities conducted an investigation into the possibilities for future immigration to and settlement of Palestine. The investigation was headed by Sir John Hope-Simpson, who spent a relatively short amount of time in Palestine reviewing the situation.

Hope-Simpson's main concern was that there was not sufficient land to support continued immigration. According to his report, Arab farmers were suffering from severe economic difficulties. Many were tenant farmers who owed large amounts of money and lacked the means to ensure successful agricultural endeavors. Others were simply unemployed. The report indicated that the Jewish policy of hiring only Jews was responsible for the deplorable conditions in which the Arabs found themselves.

Due to these conditions, Hope-Simpson recommended the cessation of Jewish immigration. Only after new agricultural methods would be introduced in Palestine, would room be made for an additional number of immigrants.

In response, Jewish leaders in the yishuv argued that Hope-Simpson had ignored the capacity for growth in the industrial sector. Stimulating economic growth through increased demand would most likely benefit the Arab economy as well. Hope-Simpson disagreed, seeing the future of Palestine in agriculture, not in industry. Jews also claimed that since they had made a principle of using Jewish labor only, the cessation of immigration would in fact have no effect on Arab unemployment.

The Hope-Simpson Report was published in October, 1930. At the same time, the Passfield White Paper was issued, clarifying British intentions in Palestine."

Libro Blanco de Passfield (oct 1930)

Texto del Passfield White Paper  - Comentario sobre el Passfield White Paper

Este Libro Blanco reitera el carácter cultural de Hogar Nacional tal y como lo definió en el Libro Blanco de Churchill de 1922 y propone más restricciones a la inmigración judía y a su compra de tierras. Se adhiere a la idea de un mandato bipartido con iguales obligaciones para judíos y árabes y niega que las estipulaciones en salvaguarda de las comunidades no judías fueran meramente secundarias matizadoras de las que buscaban el establecimiento del Hogar Nacional; también propone la creación de un consejo legislativo conforme al modelo sugerido en 1922, lo cual era especialmente intragable para los judíos. 

Sobre el Passfield White Paper, la Jewish Virtual Library dice:

The Passfield White Paper, issued by the colonel secretary Lord Passfield (Sidney Webb), was a formal statement of British policy in Palestine made in the aftermath of the 1929 riots. The Hope-Simpson Report had recommended that such a statement be made, in the hopes of clarifying unresolved questions concerning the British Mandate for Palestine and the Balfour Declaration. The paper was issued in October, 1930, and like the Hope-Simpson Report, was considered very favorable for the Arabs.

Contrary to Zionist claims, the White Paper stated that the development of a Jewish National Home in Palestine was not considered central to the mandate. However, the paper claims that the British did intend to fulfill their obligations to both Arabs and Jews, and would resolve any conflicts that might surface as a result of their respective needs.

Although not considered central to the mandate, the White Paper did commit the British to continuing their support for a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The paper's tone, however, was decidedly anti-Jewish. Several Jewish institutions were severely criticized, among them the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) and the Jewish Agency. Both the Histadrut and the Jewish Agency promoted Jewish employment of only Jewish labor. Like the Hope-Simpson Report, the Passfield White Paper found this policy damaging to the economic development of the Arab population.

The White Paper also devoted some attention to the issue of agricultural development. According to the paper, there was simply not enough cultivable land to support new immigrants. Jews who had purchased considerable tracts of land would be allowed to develop them, but would thereafter need to secure permission of the British authorities before acquiring additional land. When determining whether or not to grant a particular request for land, the British would look at unemployment levels of both Arabs and Jews.

As a result of the Passfield White Paper, Jewish immigration was limited to a much greater degree. Vigorous protests on the part of Jewish organizations worldwide and British opponents of the paper led to yet another clarification of British policy as formulated in the MacDonald Letter. In it, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald wrote to Chaim Weizmann that he would encourage further settlement while at the same time safeguard the interests of other groups in Palestine.

Carta del Comité Ejecutivo Árabe al Alto Comisionado (5 ene 1931)

Carta del Comité Ejecutivo Árabe al Alto Comisionado

En ella, solicita del Gobierno británico, básicamente:

La Carta de Mac Donald (13 feb 1931)

Para hacer frente a la oposición judía que provoca este Libro Blanco, el 13 de febrero de 1931 se publica la carta del primer ministro británico Ramsay Mac Donald a Jaim Weizmann que, aunque de menor rango que el Informe Passfield, lo interpreta oficialmente de manera que virtualmente diluye el intento de limitar la inmigración y la compra de tierras; también sostiene que las cláusulas mandatarias protectoras de los derechos árabes no debían interpretarse como congelación de las condiciones existentes. 

La carta reconoce la obligación del Mandato de "facilitar la inmigración judía y animar el asentamiento cerrado de judíos en la tierra [palestina]," y sugiere que se pongan tierras públicas a disposición tanto de judíos como de árabes. La carta reafirma el derecho del gobierno a controlar la inmigración y a vincular ésta con la capacidad de absorción económica.

Aunque la carta aplaca algo a los judíos, en la misma medida indigna a los árabes.

Así fracasa el segundo intento importante de arreglar Palestina.