1997 - Acuerdo de Hebrón (17 ene)

Resumen

Fuente:Ministerio de AAEE de Israel

Transfondo 

Como parte del proceso de paz dentro de los conocidos como Acuerdos de Oslo, Israel y la OLP firmaron, el 28 de septiembre de 1995, el Acuerdo Intermedio sobre la Margen Occidental y la Franja de Gaza. Este acuerdo establece arreglos en la Margen Occidental y la Franja de Gaza durante el período interino, mientras pende la implementación de los arreglos del status permanente. 

Con respecto a Jebrón, el Artículo VII del Anexo de Seguridad de ese Acuerdo establece los lineamientos para el redespliegue de las fuerzas israelíes en la ciudad de Jebrón y la transferencia de poderes civiles y responsabilidades de la ciudad al Consejo Palestino. 

Para el propósito del redespliegue, Jebrón fue dividida en dos áreas: 

Según el Acuerdo Intermedio, el redespliegue debió haber sido completado en seis meses después. Sin embargo, una serie de ataques terroristas demoraron su implementación y la tensa situación de seguridad hizo evidentes las dificultades que podrían surgir en este caso particular, en el que palestinos e israelíes viven en vecindad.

Por ello, ambas partes comenzaron a negociar arreglos que permitieran la implementación sin complicaciones de las disposiciones del Acuerdo Intermedio sobre Jebrón y al tiempo ofrecieran seguridad y redujeran fricciones. 

Así, el 15 de enero de 1997, ya con Benyamín Netanyahu como Primer Ministro, se firma un protocolo referente al redespliegue en Jebrón, fijando acuerdos para para la implementación de las estipulaciones del redespliegue contenidas en el Acuerdo Intermedio. 

Las principales disposiciones del Protocolo de Jebrón son las siguientes:

Aspectos de Seguridad

Redespliegue: el redespliegue de las fuerzas militares israelíes deberá llevarse a cabo a más tardar 10 días después de la firma del Protocolo. 

Poderes y responsabilidades de seguridad: la responsabilidad por la seguridad interna y el orden público en el Area H-1 recaerá en los palestinos; en el Area H-2 en los israelíes. Además, Israel seguirá siendo responsable por la seguridad general de los israelíes en todo Hebrón. El Protocolo confirma la aplicabilidad en Hebrón de los arreglos de seguridad del Acuerdo Interino, que estipulan que Israel tiene todos los poderes para tomar las medidas necesarias para cumplir con sus responsabilidades de seguridad y permiten a las fuerzas de seguridad israelíes conducir actividades de seguridad en las áreas bajo responsabilidad palestina (medidas de confrontación) en casos definidos. 

Medidas conjuntas de seguridad: El Protocolo estipula la creación de Unidades Móviles Conjuntas y Patrullas Conjuntas para operar en áreas especialmente sensibles. Además, un Centro de Coordinación Conjunta, encabezado por oficiales de alto rango de ambas partes, coordinará todas las medidas de seguridad conjuntas. 

Areas especiales: En áreas especialmente sensibles localizadas en el Area H-1, pero cerca al Area H-2, la policía palestina establecerá puestos de control e impedirá la entrada de manifestantes u otras personas que amenacen la seguridad y el orden público. Cualquier actividad de seguridad en este área debe ser notificada al Centro de Coordinación Conjunta. 

Policía palestina: Las estaciones y puestos de control de la policía palestina estarán localizados en el Area H-1, en lugares acordados especificados en el mapa que acompaña el Protocolo. Todos los policías deberán pasar inspecciones de seguridad a fin de verificar si son apropiados para el servicio, tomando en cuenta la sensibilidad del área. Según lo estipulado en el Acuerdo Interino, la policía palestina estará comprendida por 400 agentes con 20 vehículos. La policía estará armada con 200 pistolas. Los rifles son únicamente para proteger las estaciones de policía y sólo podrán ser usados por los equipos de respuesta rápida, designados para manejar casos especiales de seguridad. Estos equipos estarán armados con rifles y podrán entrar solamente en las áreas especificadas cercanas a H-2, con previa aprobación de la parte israelí en el Centro de Coordinación Conjunta. 

Lugares Santos: con respecto a los cuatro lugares santos para el judaísmo en el Area H-1, éstos estarán protegidos y la libertad de acceso será garantizada. Las formas de culto en los lugares serán respetadas y no se impondrán cambios en ellas. Las visitas a estos lugares irán acompañadas por una Unidad Móvil Conjunta.

Arreglos civiles

Transferencia de poderes civiles y responsabilidades: las esferas civiles que aún no han sido transferidas a los palestinos en Hebrón serán transferidas al comienzo del redespliegue. En el Area H-2, los poderes y responsabilidades referentes a los israelíes no serán transferidos, sino que seguirán siendo ejercidos por el gobierno militar israelí. 

Planiciación, construcción y zonificación: a fin de evitar las fricciones que puedan resultar de la actividad de construcción, el Protocolo detalla una serie de situaciones en las que la parte palestina garantizará que la construcción propuesta sea coordinada entre ambas partes en la Oficina Distrital de Enlace Civil. 

Infraestructura y transporte: el Protocolo contiene disposiciones para asegurar que los israelíes en Hebrón sigan recibiendo de manera efectiva servicios de la red de infraestructura y transporte de la ciudad. En especial, Israel será notificado con 48 horas de anticipación sobre cualquier actividad que pueda afectar el tráfico o la infraestructura de servicios en el Area H-2. Las disposiciones de tráfico en el Area H-1 permanecerán sin cambios a menos que se acuerde lo contrario entre ambas partes. 

Inspectores municipales: Según lo estipulado en el Acuerdo Interino, la aplicación de leyes y regulaciones vis a vis los palestinos en el Area H-2 será efectuada por inspectores municipales no uniformados y desarmados. No habrá más de 50 de ellos y portarán tarjetas de identificación oficiales. Se le puede pedir a la policía israelí que asista en las actividades de aplicación de la ley. 

Servicios municipales: la parte palestina seguirá proporcionando servicios municipales a todos los residentes de Hebrón, sin discriminación.

Normalización y prevención de fricciones

Finalmente, el Protocolo contiene una serie de disposiciones ideadas para reducir la fricción entre ambas partes y conduzcan a la normalización de la vida en Hebrón. Entre ellas está el compromiso de ambas partes de tomar todas las medidas necesarias para abrir el mercado de Hasbahe como un mercado de minoristas, cooperar con respecto a la ubicación de las oficinas del Consejo Palestino en el Area H-2, en los casos en que el establecimiento de estas oficinas pueda crear fricciones y afecte el orden público o la seguridad y reabrir la calle Shuhada al tráfico vehicular dentro de cuatro meses. Con respecto a la apertura de la calle Shuhada, una Acta Acordada anexada al protocolo estipula que este proceso comenzará inmediatamente y será completado dentro de 4 meses, si las preparaciones para la reapertura, de acuerdo con un plan norteamericano de renovación y mejora del área de la calle, han sido completadas para esa fecha.

The Hebron Protocol in the Context of the Peace Process

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

The successful conclusion of negotiations leading to the signing of the protocol regarding Hebron marks, once again, Israel's commitment to the Middle East peace process and the Interim Agreement, and gives testimony to the fact that the peace process continues to move forward. All who truly support peace in the Middle East are called upon to exhibit both patience and faith, especially during crises in the process, and to lend their full support to both sides as they attempt to solve the outstanding issues at hand in the spirit of dialogue and mutual respect.

The Interim Agreement, which was signed in September 1995, contained a separate section entitled "Guidelines for Hebron" (Security Annex 1, Article VII), which delimited two areas in Hebron: H-1 - where all responsibilities are to be transferred to the Palestinians and H-2 - where security responsibilities are to remain in the hands of Israel. The Palestinians, according to the "Guidelines", are to have municipal and civilian responsibilities throughout the entire city. When this section was originally composed, it was formulated in a general manner which made clear the need for further amplification before any actual redeployment could take place.

It should be noted that Israel was to redeploy its forces in Hebron by March 28, 1996. However, the scheduled redeployment was postponed by the Government. The background to this postponement bears repeating. In February and March of this year Israel was subjected to a wave of terrorist attacks in which sixty three (63) Israelis were killed and scores wounded. The Government of Israel was of the opinion that the Palestinian Council had not done its utmost to thwart the terrorist networks of Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. These concerns had major implications for the redeployment of IDF forces in Hebron due to the complex nature of the city.

A major cause for the delay in the negotiations was the egregious violation of the DOP and the Interim Agreement by elements of the Palestinian Police who opened fire, without provocation, on IDF and Border Police units as well as on Israeli civilians. The tragic events of this past September not only hindered the negotiations, but also underscored the need to fashion carefully an agreement which would enhance security in Hebron and minimize conflict, incitement and violence.

The Interim Agreement recognizes the presence of Israeli residents in Hebron, and it was, therefore, necessary to agree upon the modalities for safeguarding their security. The Government of Israel, throughout the months of negotiations, has continued to view the security of the Israeli inhabitants of Hebron as its major concern. This arrangement takes into account the special circumstances which exist in Hebron, adding the necessary and mutually agreed adjustments, without deviating from the Interim Agreement.

All stages in the implementation of the Interim Agreement, including the arrangement in Hebron, must be based on reciprocity. Israel will make a supreme effort to ensure that the protocol is both implemented and safeguarded and we expect the Palestinians to do likewise.

The following points, contained in the protocol, are worth noting:

The Hebron protocol does not "stand alone" and must be viewed within the context of the Middle East peace process. Accompanying the protocol is a "Note for the Record" wherein both sides reaffirm their commitment to the "Oslo peace process" and, on the basis of reciprocity, undertake measures for the implementation of the Interim Agreement.

Israel reaffirmed its commitment to the following measures and principles in accordance with the Interim Agreement:

The Palestinian side reaffirmed its commitment to the following measures and principles in accordance with the Interim Agreement:

With the conclusion of the negotiations regarding Hebron, both sides will have to continue their dialogue. Israel views peace as an interest vital to all of the parties, and therefore all must work diligently to achieve the desired results. The process will be long and arduous and have its share of "ups and downs"; nevertheless, these negotiations have shown that vital interests joined with good faith on the part of all concerned will lead to progress. A corollary derived from this experience is that when good faith and encouragement are replaced by skepticism and veiled threats, then progress will per force be stymied. In order to ensure that negotiations continue in a productive manner, a code of conduct reaffirming the commitment of both sides to the negotiations and detailing the manner in which they are to be pursued is desirable.

The negotiations with the Palestinians, important as they are, cannot be divorced from their regional and social milieu. "People to People" contacts, which are an integral part of the Interim Agreement and are aimed at creating mutual respect and building bridges between Israel and the Palestinians, are of special importance. Progress in the multilateral track is essential, too, for the continued strengthening of the peace process. The multilateral negotiations, especially in the areas of economics, the environment and water resources, hold within them the promise of resolving overarching issues which impact upon all of the inhabitants of the Middle East.>

HEBRON: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND STATISTICS

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

Jerusalem, 28 October 1996 (Communicated by the GPO News Department and the IDF Spokesman's Office, Information Branch)

Basics

Hebron  (Al-Khalil in Arabic) , located south of Jerusalem in the Judean hills, is home to approximately 120,000 Arabs, 500 Jews, and some Christians. An additional 6,000 Jews reside in the adjacent community of Kiryat Arba.

Hebron is the site of the oldest Jewish community in the world, which dates back to Biblical times. The Book of Genesis relates that Abraham purchased the field where the Tomb of the Patriarchs is located as a burial place for his wife Sarah. According to Jewish tradition, the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the Matriarchs Sarah, Rebecca, and Leah are buried in the Tomb.

Hebron has a long and rich Jewish history. It was one of the first places where the Patriarch Abraham resided after his arrival in Canaan. King David was anointed in Hebron, where he reigned for seven years. One thousand years later, during the first Jewish revolt against the Romans, the city was the scene of extensive fighting. Jews lived in Hebron almost continuously throughout the Byzantine, Arab, Mameluke, and Ottoman periods. It was only in 1929 -- as a result of a murderous Arab pogrom in which 67 Jews were murdered and the remainder were forced to flee -- that the city became temporarily "free" of Jews. After the 1967 Six-Day War, the Jewish community of Hebron was re-established. It has grown to include a range of religious and educational institutions.

Hebron contains many sites of Jewish religious and historical significance, in addition to the Tomb of the Patriarchs. These include the Tombs of Othniel Ben Kenaz (the first Judge of Israel) and Avner Ben Ner (general and confidante to Kings Saul and David), and Ruth and Jesse (great- grandmother and father, respectively, of King David). Victims of the 1929 pogrom, as well as prominent rabbinical sages and community figures, are buried in Hebron's ancient Jewish cemetery.

In recent years, Hebron has been the site of many violent incidents, two of which stand out. In May 1980 Palestinian terrorists murdered 6 Jewish yeshiva students and wounded 20 others, who were returning from prayers at the Tomb of the Patriarchs. In February 1994, Dr. Baruch Goldstein opened fire on Muslim worshippers at the Tomb, murdering 29 and wounding 125.

After the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement ("Oslo II"), authority for most civil affairs regarding Hebron's arab residents was transferred from the Israeli Civil Administration to the Palestinian Authority and the (Arab) Municipality of Hebron. Those services which remained the responsibility of the Civil Administration will be transferred following the IDF redeployment from Hebron. The IDF will retain sole responsibility for the security and well-being of Hebron's Jewish community.

Hebron is located 32 km. south of Jerusalem in the Judean hills, and sits between 870 and 1,020 meters above sea level. The city is built on several hills and nahals/wadis, most of which run north- to-south. Hebron's monthly average temperatures are lower than those of Jerusalem. The city receives approximately 466 millimeters average rainfall annually. Its climate has -- since Biblical times -- encouraged extensive local agriculture.

The Hebrew word "Hebron" is (inter alia) explained as being derived from the Hebrew word for "friend" ("haver"), a description for the Patriarch Abraham, who was considered to be the friend of God. The Arabic "Al- Khalil" -- literally "the friend" -- has a nearly identical derivation, and also refers to the Patriarch Abraham (Ibrahim), whom Muslims similarly describe as the friend of God.

Hebron has approximately 120,000 (Sunni Muslim) Arab residents. Hebron's Jewish population, comprised of 45 Jewish families and around 150 yeshiva students, is about 500. Hebron's three Christian residents are the custodians of the city's Russian church. An additional 6,000 Jews live in the adjacent community of Kiryat Arba.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: BIBLICAL PERIOD TO 1967

Numbers 13:22 states that (Canaanite) Hebron was founded seven years before the Egyptian town of Zoan, i.e. around 1720 BCE, and the ancient (Canaanite and Israelite) city of Hebron was situated at Tel Rumeida. The city's history has been inseparably linked with the Cave of Machpelah, which the Patriarch Abraham purchased from Ephron the Hittite for 400 silver shekels (Genesis 23), as a family tomb. As recorded in Genesis, the Patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the Matriarchs Sarah, Rebecca and Leah, are buried there, and -- according to a Jewish tradition -- Adam and Eve are also buried there.

Hebron is mentioned 87 times in the Bible, and is the world's oldest Jewish community. Joshua assigned Hebron to Caleb from the tribe of Judah (Joshua 14:13-14), who subsequently led his tribe in conquering the city and its environs (Judges 1:1-20). As Joshua 14:15 notes, "the former name of Hebron was Kiryat Arba..."

Following the death of King Saul, God instructed David to go to Hebron, where he was anointed King of Judah (II Samuel 2:1-4). A little more than 7.5 years later, David was anointed King over all Israel, in Hebron (II Samuel 5:1-3).

The city was part of the united kingdom and -- later -- the southern Kingdom of Judah, until the latter fell to the Babylonians in 586 BCE. Despite the loss of Jewish independence, Jews continued to live in Hebron (Nehemiah 11:25), and the city was later incorporated into the (Jewish) Hasmonean kingdom by John Hyrcanus. King Herod (reigned 37-4 BCE) built the base of the present structure -- the 12 meter high wall -- over the Tomb the Patriarchs.

The city was the scene of extensive fighting during the Jewish Revolt against the Romans (65-70, see Josephus 4:529, 554), but Jews continued to live there after the Revolt, through the later Bar Kochba Revolt (132-135 CE), and into the Byzantine period. The remains of a synagogue from the Byzantine period have been excavated in the city, and the Byzantines built a large church over the Tomb of the Patriarchs, incorporating the pre- existing Herodian structure.

Jews continued to live in Hebron after the city's conquest by the Arabs (in 638), whose generally tolerant rule was welcomed, especially after the often harsh Byzantine rule -- although the Byzantines never forbade Jews from praying at the Tomb. The Arabs converted the Byzantine church at the Tomb of the Patriarchs into a mosque.

Upon capturing the city in 1100, the Crusaders expelled the Jewish community, and converted the mosque at the Tomb back into a church. The Jewish community was re-established following the Mamelukes' conquest of the city in 1260, and the Mamelukes reconverted the church at the Tomb of the Patriarchs back into a mosque. However, the restored Islamic (Mameluke) ascendancy was less tolerant than the pre-Crusader Islamic (Arab) regimes -- a 1266 decree barred Jews (and Christians) from entering the Tomb of the Patriarchs, allowing them only to ascend to the fifth, later the seventh, step outside the eastern wall. The Jewish cemetery -- on a hill west of the Tomb -- was first mentioned in a letter dated to 1290.

The Ottoman Turks' conquest of the city in 1517 was marked by a violent pogrom which included many deaths, rapes, and the plundering of Jewish homes. The surviving Jews fled to Beirut and did not return until 1533. In 1540, Jewish exiles from Spain acquired the site of the "Court of the Jews" and built the Avraham Avinu ("Abraham Our Father") synagogue. (One year -- according to local legend -- when the requisite quorum for prayer was lacking, the Patriarch Abraham himself appeared to complete the quorum; hence, the name of the synagogue.)

Despite the events of 1517, its general poverty and a devastating plague in 1619, the Hebron Jewish community grew. Throughout the Turkish period (1517-1917), groups of Jews from other parts of the Land of Israel, and the Diaspora, moved to Hebron from time to time, joining the existing community, and the city became a rabbinic center of note.

In 1775, the Hebron Jewish community was rocked by a blood libel, in which Jews were falsely accused of murdering the son of a local sheikh. The community -- which was largely sustained by donations from abroad -- was made to pay a crushing fine, which further worsened its already shaky economic situation. Despite its poverty, the community managed, in 1807, to purchase a 5-dunam plot -- upon which the city's wholesale market stands today -- and after several years the sale was recognized by the Hebron Waqf. In 1811, 800 dunams of land were acquired to expand the cemetery. In 1817, the Jewish community numbered approximately 500, and by 1838, it had grown to 700, despite a pogrom which took place in 1834, during Mohammed Ali's rebellion against the Ottomans (1831-1840).

In 1870, a wealthy Turkish Jew, Haim Yisrael Romano, moved to Hebron and purchased a plot of land upon which his family built a large residence and guest house, which came to be called Beit Romano. The building later housed a synagogue and served as a yeshiva, before it was seized by the Turks. During the Mandatory period, the building served the British administration as a police station, remand center, and court house.

In 1893, the building later known as Beit Hadassah was built by the Hebron Jewish community as a clinic, and a second floor was added in 1909. The American Zionist Hadassah organization contributed the salaries of the clinic's medical staff, who served both the city's Jewish and Arab populations.

During World War I, before the British occupation, the Jewish community suffered greatly under the wartime Turkish administration. Young men were forcibly conscripted into the Turkish army, overseas financial assistance was cut off, and the community was threatened by hunger and disease. However, with the establishment of the British administration in 1918, the community, reduced to 430 people, began to recover. In 1925, Rabbi Mordechai Epstein established a new yeshiva, and by 1929, the population had risen to 700 again.

On 23 August 1929, local Arabs devastated the Jewish community by perpetrating a vicious, large-scale, organized, pogrom. According to the Encyclopedia Judaica:

"The assault was well planned and its aim was well defined: the elimination of the Jewish settlement of Hebron. The rioters did not spare women, children, or the aged; the British gave passive assent. Sixty-seven were killed, 60 wounded, the community was destroyed, synagogues razed, and Torah scrolls burned."

59 of the 67 victims were buried in a common grave in the Jewish cemetery (including 23 who had been murdered in one house alone, and then dismembered), and the surviving Jews fled to Jerusalem. (During the violence, Haj Issa el-Kourdieh -- a local Arab who lived in a house in the Jewish Quarter -- sheltered 33 Jews in his basement and protected them from the rioting mob.) However, in 1931, 31 Jewish families returned to Hebron and re-established the community. This effort was short-lived, and in April 1936, fearing another massacre, the British authorities evacuated the community.

Following the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, and the invasion by Arab armies, Hebron was captured and occupied by the Jordanian Arab Legion. During the Jordanian occupation, which lasted until 1967, Jews were not permitted to live in the city, nor -- despite the Armistice Agreement -- to visit or pray at the Jewish holy sites in the city. Additionally, the Jordanian authorities and local residents undertook a systematic campaign to eliminate any evidence of the Jewish presence in the city. They razed the Jewish Quarter, desecrated the Jewish cemetery and built an animal pen on the ruins of the Avraham Avinu synagogue.

III. HEBRON SINCE 1967

The Re-established Jewish community

Israel returned to Hebron in 1967. The old Jewish Quarter had been destroyed and the cemetery was devastated. Since 1968, the re-established Jewish community in Hebron itself has been linked to the nearby community of Kiryat Arba. On 4 April 1968, a group of Jews registered at the Park Hotel in the city. The next day they announced that they had come to re- establish Hebron's Jewish community. The actions sparked a nationwide debate and drew support from across the political spectrum. After an initial period of deliberation, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol's Labor-led government decided to temporarily move the group into a near-by IDF compound, while a new community -- to be called Kiryat Arba -- was built adjacent to Hebron. The first 105 housing units were ready in the autumn of 1972.

Today, Kiryat Arba has approximately 6,000 residents. Its built-up area comprises some 6,000 dunams, and is located about 750 meters from the Tomb at its nearest point. Kiryat Arba has its own elected local council, schools, religious and community institutions, clinics, and industrial/commercial zone. It draws its water from mains coming from the Etzion Bloc and the Herodion area to the north. About half of its residents work in Jerusalem and its environs; 30% are employed in local education, health, and administrative services, and the remaining 20% are employed in local tourism, industry, and commerce.

The Jewish community in Hebron itself was re-established permanently in April 1979, when a group of Jews from Kiryat Arba moved into Beit Hadassah (see page 2 above). Following a deadly terrorist attack in May 1980 in which six Jews returning from prayers at the Tomb of the Patriarchs were murdered, and 20 wounded (see Annex I below), Prime Minister Menahem Begin's Likud-led government agreed to refurbish Beit Hadassah, and to permit Jews to move into the adjacent Beit Chason and Beit Schneerson, in the old Jewish Quarter. An additional floor was built on Beit Hadassah, and 11 families moved in during 1986.

Since 1980, other Jewish properties and buildings in Hebron have been refurbished and rebuilt. Today the Hebron Jewish community comprises 19 families living in buildings adjacent to the Avraham Avinu courtyard (see page 2 above), the area also houses two kindergartens, the municipal committee offices, and a guesthouse; seven families living in mobile homes at Tel Rumeida; twelve families living in Beit Hadassah; six families living in Beit Schneerson; one family living in Beit Kastel; six families live in Beit Chason; Beit Romano, home to the Shavei Hevron yeshiva, is currently being refurbished.

Local administration and services for the Hebron Jewish community are provided by the Hebron Municipal Committee, which was established by the Defense and Interior Ministries, and whose functions are similar to those of Israel's regular local councils. The Ministry of Housing and Construction has established the "Association for the Renewal of the Jewish Community in Hebron," to carry out projects in the city. The Association is funded both through the state budget and by private contributions. It deals with general development of, and for, the Jewish community.

In addition to the Tomb of the Patriarchs, Tel Rumeida, the Jewish cemetery, and the historical residences mentioned above, other Jewish sites in Hebron include: 1) the Tomb of Ruth and Jesse (King David's father) which is located on a hillside overlooking the cemetery; 2) the site of the Terebinths of Mamre ("Alonei Mamre") from Genesis 18:1, where God appeared to Abraham, which is located about 400 meters from the Glass Junction (Herodian, Roman, and Byzantine remains mark the site today); 3) King David's Pool (also known as the Sultan's Pool), which is located about 200 meters south of the road to the entrance of the Tomb of the Patriarchs, which Jews hold to be the pool referred to in II Samuel 4:12, 4) the Tomb of Abner, Saul and David's general, which is located near the Tomb, and 5) the Tomb of Othniel Ben Kenaz, the first Judge of Israel (Judges 3:9-11).

Security, Hebron and the Peace Process

According to the Oslo accords, the IDF has sole responsibility for the security of the Jewish community of Hebron. However, it is the Israel Police which is responsible for investigating instances of possible violations of the law by Hebron's Jewish residents. Providing security for Hebron's Jewish residents is a particular challenge since Hebron's is the only Jewish community in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza which is situated directly in the midst of a city with a large Arab population. Moreover, the community is not concentrated in a single area or bloc, but is, rather, comprised of dispersed and separated sites. Terrorists could thus threaten one individual site, or isolate one site from the others by creating pressure on the roads (traffic jams, etc.) and thus impede the arrival of Israel security forces should one site be attacked, or could attack the roads joining the sites. Additionally, some of the sites are situated lower than the surrounding areas, and thus face clear threats.

Responsibility for security at the Tomb of the Patriarchs -- in accordance with the recommendations of the committee which investigated the massacre of 29 Muslim worshippers and the wounding of 125 by Kiryat Arba resident Baruch Goldstein on 25.02.94 -- is shared by the IDF (outside the Tomb) and a special Israel Police/Border Police unit (inside). Following the massacre and the publication of the committee's findings, it was decided to establish new prayer procedures which would enable both communities to exercise their religious rights as fully and freely as possible and would provide for the complete separation of Jewish and Muslim worshippers. In this context, a schedule of the religious holidays of both Jews and Muslims was established in which each community was allocated 10 days annually in which it would have exclusive access to the Tomb.

Following the signing of the Interim Agreement on 28 September 1995, authority over most civilian matters concerning Hebron's Arab residents was transferred from the IDF Civil Administration to the Palestinian Authority and/or the (Arab) Municipality of Hebron. Those services which remained the responsibility of the Civil Administration will be transferred to the Palestinian Authority and the Municipality following the IDF redeployment in Hebron.

The Interim Agreement provides for the stationing of a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), whose sole function is to monitor and report on events. On 10 October 1996, Israel and the Palestinian Authority signed a joint letter requesting the Norwegian government to extend the operation of the current TIPH, composed of 30 Norwegian citizens.

TERRORIST ATTACKS AND VIOLENT INCIDENTS IN HEBRON SINCE 1929

(The following list is intended to provide a representative -- not exhaustive -- summary of terrorist attacks and violent incidents which have occurred in Hebron since 1929.)

Texto del acuerdo en hebreo

Text (english)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron

January 17, 1997

In accordance with the provisions of the Interim Agreement and in particular of Article VII of Annex I to the Interim Agreement, both Parties have agreed on this Protocol for the implementation of the redeployment in Hebron.

Security Arrangements Regarding Redeployment in Hebron

Both sides reiterate their commitment to the unity of the City of Hebron, and their understanding that the division of security responsibility will not divide the city. In this context, and without derogating from the security powers and responsibilities of either side, both sides share the mutual goal that movement of people, goods and vehicles within and in and out of the city will be smooth and normal, without obstacles or barriers.

Civil Arrangements Regarding the Redeployment in Hebron

Done at Jerusalem, this 17th day of January 1997.

D. Shomrom                                                                    S. Erakat

For the Government of                                                    For the PLO

the State of Israel

Appendix 1 Hebron Redeployment Map

Appendix 2 (Article 5) Agreed Adjacent Area

The Agreed Adjacent Area ("AAA") shall include the following: 

Appendix 3 (Article 12) List of Locations

Otros documentos selectos relevantes

Agreed Minute (Article 7)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

The leaders agreed that the process of reopening the Shuhada Road will begin immediately, and will be fully completed within four months based on the premise that the preparations agreed between the two sides have been completed in accordance with the American plan.

AMERICAN PLAN ON AL-SHUHADA STREET (January 7, 1997)

As part of its ongoing support for the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians, the United States intends to finance and supervise preparations to improve and facilitate the complete reopening of al-Shuhada Street in the City of Hebron. This work will take place in conjunction with the implementation of the "Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron" concluded between the two sides.

Description of Activity:

USAID intends to fund and manage the upgrading of utilities, primarily potable water lines and sanitary sewers, in the area of al-Shuhada Street to improve access to service. In conjunction with these improvements to utilities, USAID will direct renovation of the area within al-Shuhada Street to provide a safe and attractive environment for local businesses, pedestrians and vehicular traffic. The existing street will be completely reconstructed for a distance of approximately 700 meters including Gross square and also along a 200 meter spur of Rahme Road and a 100 meter spur leading to the Old City Gate. Major elements of this proposed activity as currently envisaged include:

This plan also includes the widening of the al-Shuhada Street in the vicinity of Beit Hadassah and Beit Schnerson. The details of this aspect of the plan include the following elements: the road in front of Beit Hadassah and Beit Schnerson will be widened to 13 meters; there will be sidewalks on each side of the street; each sidewalk will be separated from the street by a low stone wall with iron railings, no more than 1.25 meters high and 30 meters long; there will be equal roadways 3.55 meters wide in each direction; the two roadways will be divided by a security wall no more than 0.40 meters wide, 1.50 meters high and 30 meters long; there will be ten parking spaces on the northeast side of the street.

USAID expects that the renovation of al-Shuhada Street will commence in mid-January 1997 and will be completed as quickly as technical considerations permit. All activities will be subject to applicable laws and regulations. Continuing consultation will be held to address technical issues that may arise during the implementation of this plan.

Nota Oficial ("Note for the record"): Acuerdo entre las partes sobre temas no relacionados con Hebrón

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Isreael

En su reunión del 15 de enero de 1997, en la que el Protocolo de Hebrón fue firmado con iniciales, el primer ministro Netaniahu y el presidente Arafat pidieron a Dennis Ross, el coordinador especial del Medio Oriente por parte de Estados Unidos, que prepare una Nota Oficial sobre temas no relacionados con Hebrón. La nota confirma los siguientes acuerdos entre las partes:

Compromisos mutuos:

Ambas partes convinieron en la necesidad de hacer avanzar el proceso de paz y resfirmaron su compromiso a implementar el Acuerdo Interino en base recíproca.

Compromisos israelíes:

La nota especifica los siguientes compromisos israelíes: 

La primera fase del redespliegue adicional será llevada a cabo en la primera semana de marzo: esto representa un acuerdo entre ambas partes de enmendar el cronograma incluido en el Artículo XI del Acuerdo Interino, según el cual la primera de las tres etapas del redespliegue adicional debió haber sido llevada a cabo seis meses después de la inauguración del Consejo; es decir, el 7 de septiembre de 1996. 

Los temas sobre la liberación de prisioneros serán tratados de acuerdo con el Acuerdo Interino: el acuerdo estipula en el Anexo VII que, además de las dos etapas de liberación de prisioneros que ya fueron implementadas, habrá una tercera etapa en la que prisioneros de las categorías especificadas serán liberados durante las negociaciones del status permanente. 

Serán conducidas negociaciones sobre los temas pendientes del Acuerdo Interino: la nota especifica seis áreas en las que se conducirán paralelamente negociaciones: acuerdos de paso seguro entre la Margen Occidental y la Franja de Gaza; el Aeropuerto de Gaza; el Puerto de Gaza; cruces; temas económicos, financieros, civiles y de seguridad; y el programa "pueblo a pueblo", ideado para elevar el nivel del diálogo y las relaciones entre ambas partes. 

Las negociaciones sobre el status permanente serán reanudadas a más tardar dos meses después de la implementación del Protocolo de Hebrón: estas negociaciones tratarán sobre los temas del status final y los resultados de las negociaciones serán implementados al final del período interino de cinco años.

Compromisos palestinos:

La nota especifica los siguientes compromisos palestinos: 

El proceso de revisación de la Carta Constitucional Palestina será completado: una resolución aprobada por el Consejo Nacional Palestino en abril de 1996 representó la primera etapa en el cumplimiento del compromiso palestino de cancelar las provisiones de la carta constitucional que niegan el derecho de Israel de existir o son de otras maneras inconsistentes con el proceso de paz. La parte palestina se compromete a completar el proceso de enmienda de la Carta Constitucional. 

Combatir el terrorismo y prevenir la violencia: la nota establece compromisos específicos en seis áreas: fortalecer la cooperación en el área de la seguridad; impedir la incitación y la propaganda hostil; combatir sistemática y efectivamente las organizaciones terroristas y su infraestructura; aprehensión, procesamiento y castigo de terroristas; cumplimiento de los pedidos de transferencia de sospechosos y acusados a Israel en las áreas de su jurisdicción; y confiscación de armas ilegales. 

El tamaño de la policía palestina estará de acuerdo con el Acuerdo Interino: el Artículo IV del Acuerdo Interino estipula que el número total de policías palestinos en esta etapa no excederá de 6.000 en la Margen Occidental y de 18.000 en la Frnaja de Gaza. En el curso de los siguientes redespliegues el número de policías en la Margen Occidental puede aumentar a 12.000. Los nombres de todos los agentes deben ser notificados a Israel, que tendrá el derecho de presentar objeciones al reclutamiento de cualquier agente en particular. 

La actividad gubernamental palestina y sus oficinas se adherirán a lo estipulado en el Acuerdo Interino: el Artículo I del Acuerdo Interino estipula que las oficinas del Consejo Palestino, sus Ra'ees y sus diferentes comisiones estarán localizadas en áreas bajo jurisdicción territorial palestina. El Artículo XVII estipula que la jurisdicción del Consejo en la Margen Occidental incluye las áreas A y B. Por ende, las actividades gubernamentales y las oficinas del Consejo Palestino sólo podrán estar localizadas en estas áreas y no en el Area C, en Jerusalem u otras partes.

Texto original de la nota en inglés

NOTE FOR THE RECORD 

The two leaders met on January 15, 1997, in the presence of the U.S. Special Middle East Coordinator. They requested him to prepare this Note for the Record to summarize what they agreed upon at their meeting.

Mutual Undertakings

 The two leaders agreed that the Oslo peace process must move forward to succeed. Both parties to the Interim Agreement have concerns and obligations. Accordingly, the two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to implement the Interim Agreement on the basis of reciprocity and, in this context, conveyed the following undertakings to each other:

Israeli Responsibilities

The Israeli side reaffirms its commitments to the following measures and principles in accordance with the Interim Agreement: 

Issues for Implementation

Palestinian Responsibilities

The Palestinian side reaffirms its commitments to the following measures and principles in accordance with the Interim Agreement:

Other Issues

 Either party is free to raise other issues not specified above related to implementation of the Interim Agreement and obligations of both sides arising from the Interim Agreement.

Prepared by Ambassador Dennis Ross

at the request of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Ra'ees Yasser Arafat

Israel's Cabinet Approves Hebron Protocol (19 Jan 1997)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

Cabinet Communique 

(Communicated by Cabinet Secretariat)

January 16, 1997 - 00:30 AM

At a special Cabinet meeting held on Wednesday, 15.01.97, the Cabinet decided as follows:

The Cabinet decision was adopted by a vote of 11 to 7. Upon the adoption of the decision, Minister Benjamin Begin announced his resignation from the Government.

Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on the Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron (16 Jan 1997)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

Jerusalem, January 16, 1997

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of Knesset,

These are difficult days. Every step that we take in the city of the patriarchs and the matriarchs is difficult, even when we redeploy in Hebron. We are not leaving Hebron, we are not redeploying from Hebron. In Hebron, we touch on the very basis of our national consciousness, the bedrock of our existence. Everyone whose heart beats with national feeling, with Jewish feeling, cannot help but feel the weight of the responsibility placed on our shoulders, and the supreme obligation to preserve our heritage.

At the same time, we cannot ignore reality. I must say to the Members of the Knesset and the citizens of Israel, that we inherited a difficult reality. The agreements signed by the previous governments are binding upon the Government of Israel. We said this in the election campaign, we said this after the election campaign, before the establishment of the government and afterwards. These agreements which we inherited were framework agreements, full of breaches, and we criticized them - and rightly so - because they did not take into proper account the problem of security; they did not take into account the full significance of the agreements for our national security; they did not demonstrate sufficient concern for the fate of the settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, including the fate of the Jewish community in Hebron.

We inherited difficult agreements. This is the reality. One could try to ignore it. We chose not to ignore this reality. These agreements comprised written texts; but worse, was the "oral law". At least part of the previous leadership - I do not wish to include them all - sought to use these agreements to bring about objectives and goals which in my view are dangerous - potentially disastrous for our future. This was true both with regard to Hebron and with regard to the permanent status arrangements.

With regard to Hebron, we inherited a framework agreement full of holes. I want to clarify that this is an agreement of two-three pages, which comprises a list of general instructions. This is the "written law". I say that there was also an "oral law", in which at least part of the coalition - an important part - had the courage and the integrity to openly state their intention, their goal - in placards posted on streets and in buses. Part of the coalition did conceal its intention was to uproot the Jewish community in Hebron, to remove it. Some of the Labor ministers of the previous government did not conceal that this was their opinion, and the goal of the government.

I want to make this clear, not in order to indulge in polemics but to clarify a fundamental point: We are committed to the written agreements. We are not committed to the "oral law". Our viewpoint and our objectives are completely different. We do not want to remove the Jewish community from Hebron. We want to preserve and consolidate it. We do not want to remove ourselves from Hebron; we want to remain in Hebron. From this different objective are derived those items, those paragraphs, those components which were inserted into the agreement as a result of the negotiations. The agreement today is of course much broader, much more detailed.

But the major point that I wish to convey to the Members of Knesset with regard to our policy is that it is our different objective, in this case to remain in Hebron, that dictates in the details in the agreement before you. From this different objective, we saw to it that there would be areas of separation, we removed the rifles, we saw to it that there would be an IDF presence in the territories overlooking the Jewish community and the major routes, through joint patrols. We saw to it that the Jewish community would be protected from high Palestinian buildings that could threaten or encroach on Jewish homes. We saw to improved and more numerous security mechanisms between us and the Palestinian security forces in order to make possible a reality of security, a reality of living, a reality of development and consolidation for the Jewish community.

I can therefore say with confidence that this is an agreement that is better, more secure, more responsible than that which we inherited. But above all, I would like to appeal to the residents of Hebron. I know that you are fearful today, and I would like to say to you, brothers and sisters, that we are concerned for you, that we do not see you as an insignificant appendage. We see you are dear brothers. We are concerned for each and every one of you. We do not see you as 400 insignificant Jews, but as our representatives.

I do not say today that there are no dangers. I do not say that this is a perfect agreement - it cannot be. We received it in its crude form as a flawed agreement. But neither do I say that we did not act to distance ourselves from dangers and to limit them. This is what we did. But in the last analysis, every agreement is dependent upon the goodwill of the signatories. I call from this podium upon the Palestinians and our Arab neighbors to support the agreement, to fulfill all its provisions, in order that security should be preserved. A better, more secure agreement is important to both sides. An agreement that will not be upheld, security that will founder will be bad for both sides.

Until now, Hebron has been a symbol of division and conflict because of the hostility between Palestinians and Israelis. Now we have an opportunity to prove that Hebron can also serve an opposite example - one of cooperation, of co-existence, a paradigm of peace.

With the signing of the Hebron agreement, we are embarking on a fateful course, which will not be simple, whose final goal, on the conclusion of the negotiations on the permanent status arrangements, is to bring peace with security between us and the Palestinians.

I want to say again to the Members of Knesset. In this agreement, too, under the general framework of Oslo, we inherited an agreement which was not to our liking. The agreement were divided into a written text, which is binding, and an "oral law" whose purpose, at least for part of the leadership, a considerable part, would have produced negative results: withdrawal to the '67 lines, or almost; the establishment of a Palestinian state; and even the division of Jerusalem.

We are committed, of course, to the written agreements. We have demonstrated today that we are fulfilling our commitments. But our goals are different. We are using the time interval in the agreement to achieve our goals: to maintain the unity of Jerusalem, to ensure the security depth necessary for the defense of the state, to insist on the right of Jews to settle in their land, and to propose to the Palestinians a suitable arrangement for self-rule but without the sovereign powers which pose a threat to the State of Israel.

This is the mandate which the government which I head received from the voters. With this, we will go forward. In following this course, not only is our goal different but also the way to achieve this goal, as is the way to move forward, to conduct negotiations.

We insisted on three fundamental principles in the course of the negotiations, both on Hebron and on the agreement to follow Hebron.

The first is the principle of reciprocity. We established the principle of reciprocity - in an official document - as a basic principle for the continuation of the process of the permanent status negotiations. This is now an integral part of the agreement. Both sides agreed on a list of mutual undertakings and clarified that the fulfillment of the agreement, the fulfillment of the undertakings of one side will be dependent upon the fulfillment by the other side. I do not know any other interpretation of the word "agreement". An agreement that obliges only the Israeli side, where only the Israeli side gives and the Palestinian side takes, is not an agreement. An agreement in which both sides accept the mutual commitment to fulfill obligations - this is an agreement. What we have today in the documents before you is the anchoring and formalization of the principle of reciprocity, for the first time since the Oslo agreements.

The second important issue that was clarified in the agreements and documents achieved in the course of these negotiations is that the implementation of the redeployments will be an Israeli decision that will not be a matter for negotiation with the Palestinians. This decision must comply with Israel's security considerations, as Israel sees fit. It is Israel that will define the security zones. But before this, it is Israel that will determine the nature and scope of the three redeployments - not only the first and second, but also the third. This is also the way in which the United States interprets the agreement. And I believe this is very important distinction. For us, for the entire Knesset, there must be absolute consensus on the supreme importance that Israel will be able to define, accord to its own understanding, the security needs of the State of Israel and to carry out the further redeployments according to this understanding.

The third achievement, beyond the reciprocity and to Israeli definition of the redeployments, is the timeframe. I believe that this is not something that stands alone. Rather, it allows us room for maneuver, room to test reality, room to test reciprocity in the fulfillment of the agreement.

These three elements are a significant change, and a change for the better, compared to our situation not long ago, only a few months ago. We were in the midst of an almost uncontrolled dash to the '67 lines. Nine months from today we might have found ourselves almost at these borders, with the only subject in effect remaining on the agenda - Jerusalem. This situation - I say to both the opposition and the coalition - we have changed completely. We will conduct negotiations with the time, the ability and the freedom for political maneuver that we did not enjoy before. We will conduct the negotiations carefully, responsibly, with discretion. I am convinced that our goals of preserving Jerusalem, preserving the security depth, preserving Israel's ability to defend itself, and a suitable arrangement with the Palestinians - I am convinced that these are goals which the large majority of the Israeli people support, and that the large majority of the people support the course which we have set, insisting on reciprocity and security.

In practical terms - not in the Hague court, but in the court of international opinion, and not only international opinion - it was until recently self-understood, almost an axiom, that the only item on the agenda was an agreement in which Israel must fulfill all its commitments and in which the other side owes nothing. All its commitments were ignored. What we have today in the international community, signed with an official seal, is an agreement which is binding, in which the principle of reciprocity is clear.

These agreements contain important improvements as well as the time in which we will be able to bring to completion the goal which we seek to attain, which I believe is shared by all Members of Knesset. I believe that the large majority of the people supports this course. I believe with all my heart that this is the only way to achieve the aspiration which we all share: peace with security, peace for generations and not for one year, peace for our children and also for our grandchildren. After the arguments will end, and after the smoke and dust will settle, I believe that we will achieve these goals.

Letter to be provided by U.S. Secretary of State Christopher to Benjamin Netanyahu at the time of signing of the Hebron Protocol

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I wanted personally to congratulate you on the successful conclusion of the "Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron." It represents an important step forward in the Oslo peace process and reaffirms my conviction that a just and lasting peace will be established between Israelis and Palestinians in the very near future.

In this connection, I can assure you that it remains the policy of the United States to support and promote full implementation of the Interim Agreement in all of its parts. We intend to continue our efforts to help ensure that all outstanding commitments are carried out by both parties in a cooperative spirit and on the basis of reciprocity.

As part of this process, I have impressed upon Chairman Arafat the imperative need for the Palestinian Authority to make every effort to ensure public order and internal security within the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I have stressed to him that effectively carrying out this major responsibility will be a critical foundation for completing implementation of the Interim Agreement, as well as the peace process as a whole.

I wanted you to know that, in this context, I have advised Chairman Arafat of U.S. views on Israel's process of redeploying its forces, designating specified military locations and transferring additional powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority. In this regard, I have conveyed our belief, that the first phase of further redeployments should take place as soon as possible, and that all three phases of the further redeployments should be completed within twelve months from the implementation of the first phase of the further redeployments but not later than mid-1998.

Mr. Prime Minister, you can be assured that the United States' commitment to Israel's security is ironclad and constitutes the fundamental cornerstone of our special relationship. The key element in our approach to peace, including the negotiation and implementation of agreements between Israel and its Arab partners, has always been a recognition of Israel's security requirements. Moreover, a hallmark of U.S. policy remains our commitment to work cooperatively to seek to meet the security needs that Israel identifies. Finally, I would like to reiterate our position that Israel is entitled to secure and defensible borders, which should be directly negotiated and agreed with its neighbors.

Further Redeployments (FRD) The Next Stage of the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement Legal Aspects (19 Jan 1997)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

Prepared by the Legal Division of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Background

The Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed between Israel and the PLO in September 1993, sets out arrangements to govern Israeli-Palestinian relations for an interim period of five years. During this period, the two sides are to conduct negotiations on the permanent status issues, including the issues of Jerusalem, settlements, Israelis, military locations, borders etc., and to implement the results of these negotiations at the end of the five year period.

The DOP provides for a number of stages to take place during the interim period. The most significant of these was the redeployment of Israeli forces throughout the West Bank, in accordance with the Interim Agreement signed in September 1995, followed by the election of a Palestinian Council in January 1996. Following this redeployment, the West Bank comprises three types of area:

Area A comprises the cities of Jenin, Nablus, Tulkarem, Kalkilya, Ramallah, Bethlehem and Jericho and contains 26% of the Palestinian population. In these areas the Palestinian Council has full responsibility for internal security and public order as well as full responsibility for civil affairs. (The City of Hebron is subject to special arrangements set out in the Interim Agreement and the Protocol Concerning Redeployment in Hebron.)

Area B comprises the Palestinian towns and villages in the West Bank. In these areas, which contain some 70% of the Palestinian population, the Council has the responsibility for maintaining public order, while Israel has overriding security responsibility to safeguard its citizens and combat terrorism. The Council has full civil authority as in Area A.

Area C comprises the largely unpopulated areas of the West Bank, areas of strategic importance to Israel, and the Jewish settlements. In these areas Israel retains full responsibility for security and public order, and civil responsibilities related to territory (planning and zoning, archeology etc.). The Council has civil responsibility with regard to all other civil spheres.

Further Redeployments (FRD)

The Israel-PLO agreements provide that, in addition to the redeployment effected by Israel prior to the Palestinian elections, there will be further redeployments of Israeli forces in the West Bank. In particular, the Declaration of Principles provides:

"Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police." (DOP Article XIII)

This provision was repeated and amplified in numerous provisions of the Interim Agreement.* Summarizing these provisions, it can be said that the Interim Agreement provides that Israel is required to implement further redeployment in the West Bank in three phases to take place at 6 month intervals. During these phases Israeli forces are to be redeployed to specified military locations and civil powers and responsibilities relating to territory, currently retained by Israel in Area C, are to be transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction. At the conclusion of the FRD process, the Palestinian Council's jurisdiction will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations.

A Note for the Record, prepared at the conclusion of the Hebron Protocol negotiations by the US Special Middle East Coordinator Dennis Ross, records the agreement of the two sides that the first phase of further redeployments will be carried out during the first week of March 1997. As regards the subsequent phases of the FRD, in a letter to Prime Minister Netanyahu at the time of the signing of the Hebron Protocol, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated the US belief that the FRD process should be completed within twelve months of the implementation of the first phase, but not later than mid-1998.

Nature of "Redeployment"

Neither the DOP nor the Interim Agreement contains a definition of the terms "redeployment" or "further redeployment". However, the use of the term "redeployment" must be distinguished from "withdrawal", as used for example in the context of the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area. Unlike "withdrawal", which required the removal of the majority of forces from the areas in question, "redeployment" relates only to the location of the forces; it places no restriction on the number of forces and military equipment or the possibility of introducing further forces and equipment if necessary.

Conditions for Implementation of FRD Provisions

The commitment to effect further redeployment is described, in both the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement, as being "commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police". The intention of this provision is to ensure that, in a situation in which the Palestinian side is incapable or unwilling to enforce its security responsibility, Israel will not be obliged to endanger itself by transferring additional territory to the Palestinian jurisdiction. In other words, the further redeployments are expressly stated to be a mutual obligation: only if the Palestinian side proves itself capable and willing to comply with its security responsibilities is Israel obliged to transfer additional areas of the West Bank to Palestinian jurisdiction.

Extent of Further Redeployments

The DOP and the Interim Agreement are not specific as regards the extent of the territory to be transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in the FRD process. With regard to the first two redeployments in particular, there is no indication whatsoever of the areas concerned. Moreover, attempts by the Palestinian side in the Interim Agreement negotiations to introduce specific provisions in this regard were not accepted. With regard to the first two stages of redeployment, it is left to Israel to determine in what areas and to what extent to redeploy.

As regards the third stage of redeployment, the Interim Agreement does give some guidance as to the extent of this redeployment. In particular, Article XI.2 provides:

"The two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner, to be completed within 18 months from the inauguration of the Council, as specified below."

It should be noted that the provision refers to "West Bank and Gaza Strip territory"; the omission of the definite article (e.g. "the territory of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip") is deliberate and clearly intended to leave open the possibility that there will be areas of the West Bank, in addition to those connected with the permanent status issues, which will not fall under the jurisdiction of the Council. This is in contrast to the Gaza-Jericho arrangements which referred to "withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area" (see, for example, DOP Articles V and VI), and so required withdrawal from the entire area except for those areas connected with the permanent status issues.

Permanent Status Issues

In those areas of the West Bank in which the further redeployment process is to take place, the Interim Agreement provides, in Article XI.2, that the redeployment will not cover those areas which are "issues that will be negotiated in the final status negotiations". Article XVII of the Agreement contains a list of issues to be dealt with in these negotiations; the issues that have a specific bearing on territory are settlements, military locations and borders. None of these issues are defined in the agreements and again it seems that it is for Israel to determine the number, location and extent of these areas.

In addition to the permanent status issues, the Interim Agreement indicates that there are also additional areas in which redeployment shall not take place. Article XIII.2.b.(8) defines the exceptions to the FRD process as follows: "except for the issues of permanent status negotiations and of Israel's overall responsibility for Israelis and borders" (emphasis added).

The addition implies that, not only will those areas connected with permanent status issues be retained by Israel, but also those areas required for the exercise of Israel's overall responsibility for Israelis and borders will be excepted from the FRD process.

Accordingly, the provisions of the redeployment in the Interim Agreement provide that the further redeployment process will take place in territory of the West Bank (but not necessarily all the West Bank) and that, in those areas in which it will take place, it will not include settlements, military locations and borders, nor those areas required for the implementation by Israel of its overall responsibility for Israelis and borders. The extent and location of these areas is to be determined by Israel in the light of its security concerns.

Location of Israeli Military Forces

The Interim Agreement provides that, in the FRD process, Israeli military forces will redeploy to "specified military locations". These locations are not defined in the Agreement, but rather are to be determined by Israel. This is apparent from Article XI.2.f which states that the specified military locations "will be determined in the further redeployment phases ... and will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations" (emphasis added). This provision emphasizes that the specified military locations are only to be the subject of negotiations in the context of the permanent status negotiations. Prior to these negotiations they are to be determined by Israel. This understanding was confirmed by Warren Christopher, Secretary of State of the United States, in his letter to Prime Minister Netanyahu following the signing of the Hebron Protocol, in which he wrote of Israel's process of redeploying its forces and "designating specified military locations".

It should also be noted that redeployment to specified military locations, does not restrict the activity of Israeli military forces to these areas. Under the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area, Israeli forces were still permitted to enter these areas when operating in accordance with the security provisions of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement. In the FRD context, where Israeli forces are not required to withdraw but merely to redeploy, it is even more evident that they will be able to move freely outside the areas to which they have redeployed when exercising security responsibility in accordance with the Interim Agreement.

Status of Territory in which FRD Takes Place

As noted above, following the redeployment of Israeli forces in the West Bank in January 1996, the areas of the West Bank under Palestinian jurisdiction fall into two areas: Area A, in which there is Palestinian responsibility for both internal security and public order; and Area B, in which the responsibility for public order is Palestinian, while Israel has overriding security responsibility.

The Interim Agreement does not require that all areas transferred in the course of the FRD process will be transferred to the status of Area A. Area B, in which Israel retains overriding security responsibility, is also considered by the agreement to be land transferred to the jurisdiction of the Council. Thus Article XI.1, describing the redeployment which took place prior to the elections, states that "Land in populated areas (Areas A and B) ... will come under the jurisdiction of the Council" (emphasis added), indicating that Area B is also considered, like Area A, to be territory transferred to the jurisdiction of the Council. Similarly, Article XIII.2.a describes the redeployment which took place in Area B as a "complete redeployment", indicating that no FRD in these areas is required. It follows that, at the conclusion of the FRD process, the distinction between Area A and Area B will still remain.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the FRD provisions of the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement provide that Israeli forces are to be redeployed in the West Bank in three phases. The redeployments are to be effected alongside, and are dependent upon, the Palestinian police proving itself capable of exercising its security responsibilities. As agreed in the Hebron negotiations, the first phase of FRD is to take place in the first week of March 1997, and the FRD process should be completed not later that mid-1998.

The extent of the first two stages of the redeployment is left to be determined by Israel, while at the conclusion of the third and final phase the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council is to cover some, but not necessarily all, West Bank and Gaza Strip territory. In those areas in which the FRD takes place, permanent status issues - among them settlements, military locations and borders - will remain under Israeli jurisdiction, as will other areas required for the exercise of Israel's overall responsibility for Israelis and borders.

Following the completion of the FRD process, Israeli forces in the FRD areas will have redeployed to specified military locations to be determined by Israel. The Interim Agreement places no restriction on the number of forces in these areas, or their ability to move outside these areas while fulfilling security responsibilities in accordance with the Agreement.

The Interim Agreement does not require that areas transferred to Palestinian jurisdiction in the FRD process will enjoy the status of Area A. The FRD provisions of the Agreement indicate that there will still be areas with the status of Area B, i.e. Israel will still have the overriding responsibility for security in these areas.

* Article X.2 sets out the Israeli commitment to effect the FRD process:

"Further redeployments of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will commence after the inauguration of the Council and will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police to be completed within 18 months from the date of inauguration of the Council."

The timetable for this process of further redeployment is set out in Article XI.2.d which provides:

"The further redeployment of Israeli military forces to specified military locations will be gradually implemented in accordance with the DOP in three phases, each to take place after an interval of six months, after the inauguration of the Council, to be completed within 18 months from the date of the inauguration of the Council."

The extent of the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council following the completion of the FRD process is described in Article XI.2:

"The two sides agree that West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations, will come under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Council in a phased manner, to be completed within 18 months from the inauguration of the Council, as specified below."

Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the City of Hebron (23 Jan 1997)

Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel

The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995, provided that as part of the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip there would be a redeployment of forces in Hebron. The Agreement set out guidelines for this redeployment, including the establishment of a Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH).

In order to arrive at more detailed provisions regarding the redeployment in Hebron the two sides commenced negotiations on a Protocol, amplifying the guidelines contained in the Interim Agreement.

During the period between the conclusion of the Interim Agreement and the Hebron Protocol, the two sides invited Norway to sent a group of 50-60 Norwegians to act as an "advance TIPH" preparing for the new TIPH to be established following the redeployment. Under an Agreement dated May 9, 1996, the Norwegian personnel arrived and commenced their operation in the city, preparing for the establishment for the new TIPH, contributing to a feeling of security for the Palestinian inhabitants of the city, helping promote stability, and providing reports.

On January 15, 1997 the Hebron negotiations were completed and a Protocol concerning the Redeployment in Hebron was signed, setting out agreed arrangements for the implementation of the redeployment provisions of the Interim Agreement. Following the signing of this Protocol the two sides signed, on January 21, 1997, an Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in the city of Hebron setting out the arrangements for the new TIPH.

This Agreement provides that the TIPH will comprise up to 180 persons from Norway, Italy, Denmark Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey, with Norway being responsible for the coordination of the TIPH's activity.

The task of the TIPH is to monitor and report on efforts to maintain normal life in Hebron, to provide a feeling of security among the Palestinians of Hebron and to help promote stability. In addition, the TIPH personnel are to assist in the promotion and execution of projects, to encourage economic development and growth in the city and to provide reports. The TIPH has no military or police functions.

The TIPH members are identifiable by their distinctive khaki unifomis and the special emblem on their uniforms and vehicles. Practical aspects of their operation and activity are set out in a Memorandum of Understanding concluded by the participating countries with the agreement of the two sides.