1979 - Tratado de Paz Israel-Egipto (26 mar)

Resumen

Fuente: Ministerio AAEE de Israel y Avalon Project - En el 35º aniversario del Tratado, los Archivos del Estado de Israel hacen una publicación especial de Documentos relacionados con el Tratado y las negociaciones que condujeron al mismo. - En el 25º aniversario se publica este documento con relatos sobre la cumbre.

 ANNEX III

Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties

Article 1. Diplomatic and Consular Relations

 The Parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange ambassadors upon completion of the interim withdrawal.

Article 2. Economic and Trade Relations

• 1. The Parties agree to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations and to terminate economic boycotts of each other upon completion of the interim withdrawal.

  2.  As soon as possible, and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties will enter negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement on trade and commerce for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations.

Article 3. Cultural Relations

• 1.  The Parties agree to establish normal cultural relations following completion of the interim withdrawal.

  2.  They agree on the desirability of cultural exchanges in all fields, and shall, as soon as possible and not later than six months after completion of the interim withdrawal, enter into negotiations with a view to concluding a cultural agreement for this purpose.

 Article 4. Freedom of Movement

• 1. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party will permit the free movement of the nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither Party will impose discriminatory restrictions on the free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the other.

  2. Mutual unimpeded access to places of religious and historical significance will be provided on a non- discriminatory basis.

 Article 5. Cooperation for Development and Good Neighborly Relations

• 1. The Parties recognize a mutuality of interest in good neighbourly relations and agree to consider means to promote such relations.

  2. The Parties will cooperate in promoting peace, stability and development in their region. Each agrees to consider proposals the other may wish to make to this end.

  3.  The Parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other.

Article 6. Transportation and Telecommunications

• 1. The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944 ("The Chicago Convention") and the International Air Services Transit Agreement, 1944.

  2. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal any declaration of national emergency by a party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other party on a discriminatory basis.

  3. Egypt agrees that the use of airfields left by Israel near El-Arish, Rafah, Ras El-Nagb and Sharm El- Sheikh shall be for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations.

  4. As soon as possible and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties shall enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a civil aviation agreement.

  5. The Parties will reopen and maintain roads and railways between their countries and will consider further road and rail links. The Parties further agree that a highway will be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage of persons, vehicles and goods between Egypt and Jordan, without prejudice to their sovereignty over that part of the highway which falls within their respective territory.

  6. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, normal postal, telephone, telex, data facsimile, wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio and satellite shall be established between the two Parties in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations.

  7. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party shall grant normal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other. Such access will be granted on the same conditions generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of other nations. Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace will be implemented upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of the aforementioned treaty.

Article 7. Enjoyment of Human Rights

The Parties affirm their commitment to respect and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and they will promote these rights and freedoms in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Article 8. Territorial Seas

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace each Party recognizes the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent passage through its territorial sea in accordance with the rules of international law.

AGREED MINUTES

 Article I

 Egypt's resumption of the exercise of full sovereignty over the Sinai provided for in paragraph 2 of Article I shall occur with regard to each area upon Israel's withdrawal from the area.

Article IV

 It is agreed between the parties that the review provided for in Article IV (4) will be undertaken when requested by either party, commencing within three months of such a request, but that any amendment can be made only by mutual agreement of both parties.

Article V

 The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V shall not be construed as limiting the first sentence of that paragraph. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V, which reads as follows: "The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba."

Article VI (2)

The provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI (2) of the Treaty, which reads as follows: "The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action of any other Party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty."

Article VI (5)

It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI (5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows: "Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligation under this Treaty will be binding and implemented."

Annex I

 Article VI, Paragraph 8, of Annex I provides as follows:

 "The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations forces and observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council."

The Parties have agreed as follows:

 "With respect to the provisions of paragraph 8, Article VI, of Annex 1, if no agreement is reached between the Parties, they will accept or support a U.S. proposal concerning the composition of the United Nations force and observers."

Annex III

The Treaty of Peace and Annex III thereto provide for establishing normal economic relations between the Parties. In accordance herewith, it is agreed that such relations will include normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids made by Israel, on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for such oil.

 For the Government of Israel (Menajem Beguin)

 For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt (Anuar el Sadat)

Witnessed by:

Jimmy Carter

President of the United States of America

Acuerdo complementario Israel-EEUU

En un acuerdo separado - Israel-US Memorandum of Agreement - suscrito el mismo día que el Acuerdo de Paz Israel-Egipto, los EEUU fijaron sus compromisos con Israel para el caso de que el tratado fuera violado, el papel de NNUU y el futurso suministro de ayuda militar y económica a Israel.

Declaraciones

Primer Ministro de Israel Menajem Beguin

En la cena del 26 de marzo de 1979

Vídeo del discurso de Beguin en la cena celebrada al concluir las negociaciones.

En la Knésset el 7 de mayo de 1979

Fuente: Ministerio de AAEE de Israel

In the traditional policy address to the Knesset, given by the Prime Minister upon the return of the Israeli Parliament from its spring recess, Mr. Begin reviewed the dramatic events of the recent weeks and issued a call to the President of Lebanon and to other Arab leaders to follow the example of President Sadat and meet with him for peace negotiations. 

Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin at the opening of the Knesset's summer session, 7 May 1979

Excerpts:

Dr. Majid, the Egyptian delegate to the UN, handed the Secretary General a document in which he spoke of the "restoration of Arab Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty." Yesterday we instructed our UN delegate, Dr. Yehuda Blum, to hand the Secretary General, for circulation among member states, an Israeli document which states: "Jerusalem is and shall forever remain one city indivisible, the eternal capital of our nation, as it -was since King David transferred his kingdom's capital from Hebron to Jerusalem over 3000 thousand years ago. "Under Israel's sovereign jurisdiction, absolute free access to the holy places has been and shall forever be guaranteed to Jew, Christian and Moslem. This was not so during the 19 years of Jordanian occupation, throughout that era Jews could not pray at the Western Wall as was their wont for generations. "Now and forever, there shall be no man - whatever his religion - who will be prevented from worshipping at his holy site."

Mr. Chairman, the normalization process in Israel-Egypt relations is progressing. When I was in Cairo, I met with President Sadat and we concluded that as El Arish will be handed back to Egyptian sovereignty, the two of us shall proclaim open borders between the two states and the determination of direct air corridor - over Sinai - between Cairo and Ben Gurion airport. This we shall do on 27 May, when we meet in El Arish.

I wish to inform the Knesset that not only will the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel, together with the Foreign, Defence and Interior Ministers meet, but wounded soldiers of Egypt and Israel will also meet. The fighters will shake each others hand and will say to each other - No more War.

A ship flying the Israeli flag, called "Ashdod", recently sailed through the Suez Canal. Why? The first paragraph which went into effect upon the ratification states: "The state of war between the parties will be terminated and peace will be established -between them upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty."

I wish to explain to the Knesset that this paragraph was proposed by us and met for some time during the negotiations with an opposition by the other party. The Egyptian delegation at the time did not want to accept the phrase dealing with the end of the state of war. We insisted on this formula, as we read a large number of peace treaties and in all of them as a principle in international law, when a peace treaty is signed, the first paragraph says that the state of war has terminated. This had and has practical significance...

There was a visit of the Defence Minister to Egypt. He was, received by President Sadat, the Prime Minister and the Egyptian Defence Minister. The talks he held were successful and advanced the peace making process in word and deed. I state with much satisfaction that the Defence Minister was warmly received not only by the Egyptian government but also by thousands of the Egyptian people, in Cairo as well as in Alexandria.

The Joint Military Commission, sitting in El Arish, began its work and it is conducting direct negotiations without a third party intervention and without a third party representative chairing the meetings. The chairmen rotate, and this joint, commission is busy at work on the implementation of the peace treaty in both the military and the civilian spheres.

Soon the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces will visit Egypt with senior officers of our army. This, too, will be a step towards the normalization of Egypt-Israel relations.

In the near future the Deputy Prime Minister will visit Egypt at the personal invitation of President Sadat; the Foreign Minister at the invitation of Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Agriculture and Energy as well. We shall, naturally, warmly receive the colleagues of these ministers who shall represent Egypt. Talks will be held between representatives of the two countries in areas relating to their specific activities, and thus we shall advance the peace process.

Mr. Chairman, with the signing of the peace treaty between ourselves and Egypt, a fundamental change in our country's international standing has occurred. We signed a peace treaty - not a cease fire, not an interim agreement, but a peace treaty with the largest and most powerful of our neighbours. The population of all our neighbours is barely half of that of Egypt. This is a turning point in the history of the Middle East. True, for the attainment of this lofty goal, making peace and signing a peace treaty between ourselves and Egypt, we made precious sacrifices. The negotiations lasted fourteen months and were tiring, there were ups and downs, hopes and frustrations, difficulties as well. But we signed a peace treaty, we concluded a chapter in the annals of Israel, we opened a new chapter in our national existence.

Mr. Chairman, I come now to explain the principles of Israel's policy towards Lebanon. Firstly, I am honoured to invite Lebanon's President, Mr. Sarkis, to come to Jerusalem to meet with me. For my part, I am prepared to leave in a civilian plane for Beirut. The subject of our conversation, whether held in Jerusalem or in Beirut or in a neutral place will be one: the signing of a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. I announce on behalf of the government of Israel that our state has no territorial claims in Lebanon. We uphold the territorial integrity and state sovereignty of Lebanon .... We are prepared to sign a peace treaty on the basis of the Israel-Lebanese borders. This goal can be achieved in but few days. This is my call to the President of Lebanon and its government....

Thirdly, murderous attacks on Israel and on Jews from Lebanese territory. We shall not tolerate, under any circumstances, a situation in which murderers, baser than at any time since the Nazis, shall operate, shedding innocent blood of men, women and children. And in Beirut they continue to boast of these murders and promise to continue and to intensify them. There are those who make these repeated announcements, and they must realize their consequences. We shall not wait for another incident. After Nahariya, the murderers' organizations announced that they will continue their barbarous acts. This is the constant threat of terrorist actions. We shall hit these murderers at all times, in all places, with all our might, by sea, by air, by land, until they are no longer able to carry out their murderous schemes against Israelis only because they were born Israelis, against Jews because they were born Jewish. We shall give them no rest. We know where their headquarters, artillery and arsenals are. We shall strike to destroy and scatter them, the enemies of mankind, commanded by the Palestinian "Iddi Amin" - Yasser Arafat. I wish to inform the Knesset that yesterday we struck at the murderers, and only half an hour ago we again struck at them and all our aircraft, thank god, returned safely. We shall give these murderers no rest until they end murderous acts in our country and the murder of Jews...

Fourthly, Mr. Chairman, Israel desires cooperation with all of the units of UNIFIL, the force fulfills an important role in Lebanon...

Fifthly, the Syrian occupation forces must leave Lebanese territory and return to their country, Syria. This army of occupation is no longer under the guise of a Pan Arab peace keeping force. The Saudis have already left Lebanon, as did the Kuwaitis. There remain only the Syrians with their Soviet tanks and artillery, with which they wreack havoc from time to time upon the civilian population, men, women and children who live in Lebanon and are of the Christian faith. I fully agree with President Sadat who stated that the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, is according to him, a fiasco, or failure, and is the source of all trouble in Lebanon. Damascus must put an end to this failure and the sooner the better.

Sixthly, Mr. Chairman, we, the small Jewish state, rescued the ancient Christian community in northern Lebanon and the Christians and Shiite Moslems in the south from the danger of genocide. Let it be written in the annals of nations: great and mighty Christian nations did nothing to prevent the crime of genocide on their correligionists. And as usual, the UN stood idly by. We aided and shall continue to help the Christians and Shiites to maintain their lives in security and peace. The government headed by MK Yitzhak Rabin, started this blessed activity. The present government continued and intensified it, and if need be, will intensify it in the future. Let it be known that because of our aid we can influence our Christian friends in Lebanon. We cannot give them orders. One day Major Haddad said: "We are not a part of America. and neither of Israel. Our lives are on balance. We shall decide." I accepted this statement with respect and understanding, and I suggest to all of us to take it in this vein. We shall continue to influence, when need be, to prevent unnecessary conflicts. But all the factors in and out of the UN must know, as I wrote in my letter of reply to the appeal of the UN Secretary General, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and to the Prime Ministers of Norway and Eire, that the Lebanese Christians are fighting for their lives and we cannot give them directives.

But in Damascus and in Beirut there are plots being hatched against the life of Major Haddad, a Lebanese patriot, as he was termed by our Defence Minister - a brave fighter for the existence of his community. They seek his life. I myself heard these threats. Therefore I shall reiterate to all factors what I said to the U.S. ambassador to Israel, Mr. Lewis, in a formulation known to every educated American from the days that preceded the Freedom Act of Abraham Lincoln: "As far as Major Haddad is concerned, we shall, under no circumstances, sell him down the river..."

Anuar El Sadat

En la cena del 26 de marzo de 1979

Vídeo del discurso de Sadat en la cena celebrada al concluir las negociaciones.

Presidente de EEUU Jimmy Carter

Conferencia de prensa del 25 de marzo de 1979

The President's News Conference (March 25, 1979):

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY

Q. Mr. President, Bill Sims, Wycom Corporation, Laramie, Wyoming. First of all, forgive me, sir, before my question, if you could leave a little piece of paper with your name on it at the podium, a big fan of yours would love to have it. [Laughter]

My question, sir: With sometimes conflicting reports coming from the Middle East almost daily, how can the American public be sure that the agreement you will sign this week is not just window dressing? Sir, does this agreement really have meaningful significance to the world?

THE PRESIDENT. I think perhaps a hundred years from now, 50 years from now, what occurs tomorrow may be the most significant occurrence during my own term of office as President. We are a nation at peace. It's a notable achievement for a country as large as ours to be at peace.

In the Mideast, war there not only afflicts the lives of everyone involved, but it's a constant constraint on the quality of life when the people in Egypt, people in Israel—who deeply desire to live in harmony with their neighbors—have never been able to do it since Israel was founded.

When I go back 8 or 9 months to assess what did exist then and see where we stand now, it's almost unbelievable. Sadat said when I was in Egypt recently that what we achieved at Camp David was a miracle, that he never expected either Egypt or Israel to reach an agreement when he went there.

I think that we now have a posture where our excellent friends, the Israelis, and our excellent friends, the Egyptians, can be friends with one another. We're going to have a short period of time—I believe it will be short—with threats and posturing and possibly some acts of terrorism mounted against [by] those who oppose peace in the Middle East.

But my belief is that if we can open those borders and have thousands of students going back and forth between Cairo and Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv and Alexandria, and tourists going to visit the Pyramids and coming to see the Dead Sea Scrolls, and open trade and commerce, that the people themselves will so deeply appreciate the difference in their quality of life and their attitude toward life, that no matter who the leaders might be in the future, this peace will be permanent.

We're going to not stop here. We've got to address the very difficult question of the Palestinian problem.

The Israelis are committed to this proposition, the Egyptians are committed to this proposition, and so are we. But I think as we let the other Arab entities-the PLO, Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis—see the tremendous benefits of the peace between Israel and Egypt, it's going to be much easier to bring them in the process and therefore achieve what I dream about—which may not come during my own term of office, but I'll continue to work for—and that is a comprehensive peace throughout the Middle East.

So, I think it is very significant, it is permanent, it's a first step. But as Sadat says, it's a foundation for what we all dream for—that comprehensive peace in the Middle East. I think it's a very good step.

Conferencia de prensa del 10 de abril de 1979

The President's News Conference (April 10, 1979):

MIDDLE EAST

Q. Within the last few hours, Mr. President, a terrorist bomb was exploded in Tel Aviv, and Israel has bombed Lebanon. Isn't there likely to be even more violence in the Middle East than there was before the treaty, and what can you do about it? And would you be willing to stop arms sales, all arms sales to the Mideast?

THE PRESIDENT. First, I would not be willing to stop all arms sales to the Middle East, because I think the countries there must have an adequate means of defending themselves—Israel, Egypt, and others.

Secondly, I believe that the terrorist bombing is a longstanding problem. It's not something that just has arisen because the treaty has been signed. I think the terrorism threats are counterproductive. My own hope is that the best way to alleviate this constant dependence on death and hatred and destruction and terrorism is to prove the viability and the advantages of the peace process.

I would like to see, as early as possible, but by the end of next month, all the borders open between Israel and Egypt, a free passage of students and tradesmen, diplomats, tourists, and for the demonstrated advantages to Israel and Egypt to be very apparent to the citizens of Jordan and Syria and Lebanon and to the Palestinians, wherever they live, hoping to convince them that that's the best approach to achieve their own purposes and goals-that is, peace and a realization of the right to control their own future.

But I don't think there's any doubt that terrorism will continue in the coming months. I hope it will wane as it's proven that the peace treaty is permanent and that it is going to work.

An immediate step that will tend to convince everyone that it is permanent and cannot be disrupted by terrorist acts will be the quick ratification of the treaty by the Egyptian Parliament and the exchange of the documents themselves. And then the return of El Arish and the first part of the Sinai to Egypt—I think that will be a step in the right direction.

Conferencia de prensa del 30 de abril de 1979 sobre la política israelí sobre los asentamientos

The President's News Conference (April 30, 1979):

ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY

Q. Mr. President, the Israeli Cabinet has recently approved two new settlements on the West Bank. In light of the enormous cost to the United States of implementing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, isn't it reasonable to expect the Israelis to cease from settlement policy which violates international law? And secondly, why should the American people pay for policies of the Israelis that undermine the peace process and run counter to American foreign policy?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, the position of the United States historically has been consistent, and my own position on settlements in the West Bank, Gaza area and on the Golan Heights, and in the Sinai have my position has been consistent. The Israeli Government knows perfectly well, after hours of discussion on this issue, what my position is.

We do consider the creation of Israeli settlements in these areas as being inconsistent with international law, and, as I've said many times, they are an obstacle to peace. Knowing that, the Israeli Government still on occasion authorizes new settlements. They interpret the law differently from myself.

I hope that the Israeli Government will severely restrain any inclination, either approved by the Knesset or done without legal sanction, in establishing new settlements. But there is a limit to what we can do to impose our will on a sovereign nation.

Conferencia de prensa del 29 de mayo de 1979

The President's News Conference (May 29, 1979):

THE MIDDLE EAST

Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, sir, is it feasible in your view to expect the Palestinians and other Arab nations to join the peace process as long as the United States does not put forward some of its own ideas in greater detail about what autonomy is going to look like on the West Bank and Gaza?

In other words, as long as the Israelis are continuing to say there will be no Palestinian homeland, there will be no entity linked or unlinked to Jordan, there will be no Palestinian state, is it not incumbent on the United States, again in this peace process, to come forward with some ideas of its own in order to encourage the Palestinians to join in?

THE PRESIDENT. We've never been reticent about putting forward our ideas both to the Israelis and the Egyptians and to others about what ought to be done in the West Bank, Gaza area. We've never espoused an independent Palestinian state. I think that would be a destabilizing factor there.

I believe the next step ought to be the exchange of views during the negotiations between Israel and Egypt. We will observe the different proposals that are inevitably going to be made; some of them have been described publicly. Then later on, after the negotiations proceed as far as they can do with any degree of momentum, we will reserve the right—requested, I might say, by both Israel and Egypt— to put forward United States proposals to break a deadlock or to provide a compromise solution.

We have been involved in that kind of process both at Camp David and when I went to the Middle East. I think that's one of the reasons that we've been as successful as we have so far.

But for us to preempt the negotiations by putting forward, to begin with, an American proposal, I think, would be counterproductive, and it would remove some of the reasonable responsibility that ought to be directly on the shoulders of Prime Minister Begin and his government and President Sadat and his government.

I might say that this past weekend, I talked personally to President Sadat and to Prime Minister Begin and, this morning, to Secretary Vance. And they were all very pleased and very excited not only at the progress made in El Arish and Beersheba but also at the attitude on both sides toward a constructive resolution of these very difficult issues.

So, at this point, I feel very hopeful that both sides are negotiating in good faith. We'll be there to help them when they need our help.

Conferencia de prensa del 9 de octubre de 1979

The President's News Conference (October 9, 1979):

THE MIDDLE EAST

Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, sir, is it feasible in your view to expect the Palestinians and other Arab nations to join the peace process as long as the United States does not put forward some of its own ideas in greater detail about what autonomy is going to look like on the West Bank and Gaza?

In other words, as long as the Israelis are continuing to say there will be no Palestinian homeland, there will be no entity linked or unlinked to Jordan, there will be no Palestinian state, is it not incumbent on the United States, again in this peace process, to come forward with some ideas of its own in order to encourage the Palestinians to join in?

THE PRESIDENT. We've never been reticent about putting forward our ideas both to the Israelis and the Egyptians and to others about what ought to be done in the West Bank, Gaza area. We've never espoused an independent Palestinian state. I think that would be a destabilizing factor there.

I believe the next step ought to be the exchange of views during the negotiations between Israel and Egypt. We will observe the different proposals that are inevitably going to be made; some of them have been described publicly. Then later on, after the negotiations proceed as far as they can do with any degree of momentum, we will reserve the right—requested, I might say, by both Israel and Egypt— to put forward United States proposals to break a deadlock or to provide a compromise solution.

We have been involved in that kind of process both at Camp David and when I went to the Middle East. I think that's one of the reasons that we've been as successful as we have so far.

But for us to preempt the negotiations by putting forward, to begin with, an American proposal, I think, would be counterproductive, and it would remove some of the reasonable responsibility that ought to be directly on the shoulders of Prime Minister Begin and his government and President Sadat and his government.

I might say that this past weekend, I talked personally to President Sadat and to Prime Minister Begin and, this morning, to Secretary Vance. And they were all very pleased and very excited not only at the progress made in El Arish and Beersheba but also at the attitude on both sides toward a constructive resolution of these very difficult issues.

So, at this point, I feel very hopeful that both sides are negotiating in good faith. We'll be there to help them when they need our help.

The President's News Conference (October 9, 1979):

PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

Q. Mr. President, a question on the Middle East. Do you agree with those such as former Ambassador Andrew Young and George Ball and others who say that it is now time to do away with the restrictions put on our foreign policy by Henry Kissinger and open up a dialog with the Palestinians and the PLO?

THE PRESIDENT. No, I do not. We will not negotiate with the PLO. We will not recognize the PLO until after the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist and endorses United Nations Resolution 242 as a basis for Middle East peace.

FRANK CORMIER [Associated Press]. Thank you, Mr. President.

Otros

The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress (Jimmy Carter, January 23, 1979)

The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress (Jimmy Carter, January 23, 1980)

The State of the Union Annual Message to the Congress (Jimmy Carter, January 16, 1981)

United States. President (1977-1981 : Carter), Jimmy Carter, United States. Office of the Federal Register - Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1977 - Biography & Autobiography

1981-1982 - Culminación del proceso

Otros Documentos relevantes

Documento preparatorio dirigido al Presidente de EEUU elaborado para el equipo negociador americano antes de la cumbre.

Fuente: Ministerio de AAEE de Israel

Los siguientes documentos deals predominantly with the evolution of Israel-Egypt relations after the signing of the peace treaty in March 1979. Attention is paid to the progress of the autonomy negotiations, the visits of President Navon and Prime Minister Begin to Egypt and those of President Sadat to Israel, and in the annexes, a number of key Israel-Egypt agreements are fully reproduced. Israel's struggle in the United Nations General Assembly, Security Council and various UN organs, is also highlighted as most of the Arab states continued to undermine Israel's position in the UN and to attack the Camp David Accords and the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. They were, at times, aided by European initiatives. There is also material dealing with the situation in Judea and Samaria and in Jerusalem.

Cronografía de la época 1979-1980

LIST OF DOCUMENTS

1. Foreign Ministry reaction to Egyptian statements on the Camp David Accords

2. , 10 April and 4 May 1979.

   1. Letter from Prime Minister Begin to UN Secretary General Waldheim on the situation in Lebanon, 18 April 1979.

   2. Foreign Ministry statement on the acquittal of Nazi war criminals, 20 April 1979.

   3. Remarks by Foreign Minister Dayan on the future of settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza region, 24 April 1979.

   4. Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Egypt, 25 April 1979.

   5. Statement by the President of the Security Council on UNIFIL, 26 April 1979.

   6. Broadcast to the nation by President Navon on Independence Day, 1 May 1979.

   7. Telecast to the nation by Prime Minister Begin on Independence Day, 1 May 1979.

   8. Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin at the opening of the Knesset's summer session, 7 May 1979.

   9. Statement by the Government of Israel on the execution of Habib Elkanian in Iran, 9 May 1979.

   10. Interview with Prime Minister Begin on IDF Radio, 19 May 1979.

   11. Remarks by Foreign Minister Dayan at El Arish, 23 May 1979.

   12. IDF Order of the Day on the return of El Arish to Egypt, 25 May 1979.

   13. Statements by Interior Minister Burg, Defence Minister Ali and Secretary of State Vance at the opening of the autonomy talks, Beersheba, 25 May 1979.

   14. Statements by Presidents Navon and Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin during President Sadat's visit to Beersheba, 27 May 1979.

   15. Excerpts from statement in the Knesset by Foreign Minister Dayan on Israel's relations with Egypt and the U.S., 29 May 1979.

   16. Security Council Resolution 449 2979) extending UNDOF's mandate, 30 May 1979.

   17. Highlights of statement by Prime Minister Begin to Herut Convention, 3 June 1979.

   18. U.S. State Department statement on Israeli settlements, 4 June 1979.

   19. Excerpts from press conference with Foreign Minister Dayan prior to his departure for Egypt, 4 June 1979.

   20. Interview with Foreign Minister Dayan on Israel Television, 8 June 1979.

   21. Letter from Prime Minister Begin to Senator Charles H. Percy on Israeli settlements, 10 June 1979.

   22. Statement issued by Prime Minister Begin on Israeli settlements, 11 June 1979.

   23. Statement by Interior Minister Burg on the autonomy, Alexandria, 11 June 1979.

   24. Statement to the press at the conclusion of the autonomy talks in Alexandria, 12 June 1979.

   25. Excerpts from statements in the Security Council by Ambassador Blum on the situation in Lebanon, 12 and 14 June 1979.

   26. Security Council Resolution 450 (1979) extending UNIFIL's mandate, 14 June 1979.

   27. Knesset Resolution on the limitation of Nazi crimes, 18 June 1979.

   28. Statement by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community, 18 June 1979 and Israel's reaction, 20 June 1979.

   29. Opening statements at the third session of the autonomy talks, 25 June 1979.

   30. Joint statement by the Israel, Egypt and U.S. delegations to the autonomy talks, statements by the Chief Delegates and excerpts from a press conference with them, 26 June 1979.

   31. Address by Prime Minister Begin to the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism, 2 July 1979.

   32. Statements in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin and Labour Party Chairman Peres on the visit of Yasser Arafat to Austria, 5 July 1979.

   33. Press conference with Prime Minister Begin upon his return from Alexandria, 12 July 1979.

   34. Security Council Resolution 452 (1979) on Israeli settlements in the territories, 20 Jury 1979.

   35. Letter from Secretary General Waldheim to the President of the Security Council on the termination of UNEFs mandate, 24 July 1979 and reaction by Ambassador Blum, 29 July 1979.

   36. Joint statement following the visit of Egyptian Defence Minister Ali, 31 July 1979.

   37. Opening statements by heads of delegations to the autonomy talks, Haifa, 6 August 1979.

   38. Letter from Secretary of State Vance to Representative Zablocki on Israel's use of U.S. weapons in Lebanon, 8 August 1979.

   39. Draft resolution S/13514 and statement in the Security Council by Ambassador Blum on Palestinian rights, 23 August 1979.

   40. President Sadat's visit to Haifa: welcoming address by President Navon, reply by President Sadat, address by President Navon and reply by President Sadat, joint press conference Sadat-Begin, addresses by Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, press conference with President Sadat, departure statements by Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, 4-6 September 1979.

   41. Joint interview with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin on French Television, 7 September 1979.

   42. Excerpts from an interview with Chief of Staff Eitan on IDF Radio, 8 September 1979.

   43. Address by Foreign Minister Dayan at the dinner offered by Foreign Minister Genscher, Bonn, 10 September 1979.

   44. Statements in the White House by President Carter, Vice President Mubarak and Foreign Minister Dayan on the first anniversary of the Camp David Accords, 17 September 1979.

   45. Address in the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Dayan, 27 September 1979.

   46. Excerpts from an interview with Foreign Minister Dayan on Israel Television, 28 September 1979.

   47. Summary of a briefing by Foreign Minister Dayan, 8 October 1979.

   48. Address to the Council of Europe by Foreign Minister Dayan, 10 October 1979.

   49. Cabinet communique on settlements, 14 October 1979.

   50. Interview with Foreign Minister Dayan on Israel Television, 19 October 1979.

   51. Letter of resignation of Foreign Minister Dayan and interviewwith him, 21 October 1979.

   52. Letter from Prime Minister Begin to President Sadat on the occasion of the second anniversary of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, 18 November 1979.

   53. General Assembly Resolution 34/65, Question of Palestine, 29 November 1979.

   54. Security Council Resolution 456 (1979), extending UNDOF's mandate and note by the President of the Council, 30 November 1979.

   55. General Assembly Resolution 34/70, the Situation in the Middle East, 6 December 1979.

   56. General Assembly Resolution 34/89, Israeli Nuclear Armament, 11 December 1979 and statement by Ambassador Blum, 4 December 1979.

   57. Security Council Resolution 459 (1979) extending UNIFIL's mandate, 19 December 1979.

   58. Excerpts from a meeting between Prime Minister Begin and the editors of the Israeli press, 21 December 1979.

   59. Joint press conference Sadat-Begin, Aswan, 10 January 1980.

   60. Statement in the Knesset by prime Minister Begin on his talks with President Sadat, 16 January 1980.

   61. The Israeli model for the self-governing authority, 16 January 1980.

   62. Statement by Interior Minister Burg on the autonomy talks, 17 January 1980.

   63. Communique issued at the conclusion of the 8th round of the autonomy talks, Herzliya, 1 February 1980.

   64. Excerpts from press luncheon with Prime Minister Begin, 7 February 1980.

   65. Statement by Prime Minister Begin on the situation in Jerusalem, 4 February 1980, and letter from Ambassador Blum to Secretary General Waldheim on the situation in Jerusalem, 13 February 1980.

   66. Statement by Ambassador Mortada upon presentation of his credentials and reply by President Navon, 26 February 1980.

   67. Statement in the Security Council by Ambassador Blum on the situation in the territories, 27 February 1980.

   68. Security Council Resolution 465 (1980) on the situation in the territories, 1 March 1980.

   69. Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin on Security Council Resolution 465 (1980), 6 March 1980.

   70. Foreign Ministry's statement on the PLO's relations with Austria, 14 March 1980.

   71. White House statement on invitation of Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat and excerpts from press briefing, 19 March 1980.

   72. Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Secretary of State Vance on U.S. policy in the Middle East, 20 March 1980.

   73. Interview with Foreign Minister Shamir on Israel Radio, 20 March 1980.

   74. Interview with Prime Minister Begin by French speaking journalists, 21 March 1980.

   75. Statement by Prime Minister Begin on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, 26 March 1980.

   76. Interview with Prime Minister Begin on Israel Television, 26 March 1980.

   77. Foreign Ministry statement on Jerusalem, 2 April 1980.

   78. Statement in the Security Council by Ambassador Blum on the situation in Lebanon, 14 April 1980.

   79. Press conference with Prime Minister Begin prior to his departure for Washington, 14 April 1980.

   80. Exchange of toasts by President Carter and Prime Minister Begin, the White House, 15 April 1980.

   81. Interview with Prime Minister Begin on ABC Television, 20 April 1980.

   82. Foreign Ministry statement on the Council of Europe Resolution, 24 April 1980.

   83. Security Council Resolution 467 (1980) extending UNIFIL's mandate, 24 April 1980.

   84. Excerpts from an interview with Prime Minister Begin in Yediot Achronot, 25 April 1980.

   85. Letter from Prime Minister Begin to Norway's Prime Minister Nordli on the situation in Lebanon, 29 April 1980.

   86. Security Council draft resolution S/13911 on the Question of Palestine, 30 April 1980, and the statement of U.S. Ambassador McHenry.

   87. Statements by the heads of the Israel, Egypt and U.S. delegations at the ninth round of the autonomy talks, Herzliya, 1 May 1990.

   88. Statement in the Knesset by Defense Minister Weizman on the situation in the territories, 5 May 1980.

   89. Excerpts from the concluding press conference of the ninth round of the autonomy talks, 7 May 1980.

   90. Security Council Resolution 468 (1980) on the expulsion of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, 8 May 1980.

   91. Statement by Prime Minister Begin on the suspension of the autonomy talks, 12 May 1980.

   92. Interview with Foreign Minister Shamir on Israel Radio, 16 May 1980.

   93. Security Council Resolution 469 (1980) on the expulsion of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, 20 May 1980.

   94. Letter from Prime Minister Begin to Secretary General Waldheim, 21 May 1980.

   95. Security Council Resolution 470 (1980) extending UNDOF's mandate, 30 May 1980.

   96. Excerpts from statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin on Israel's foreign policy, 2 June 1980.

   97. Security Council Resolution 471 (1980) on attacks on the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and El-Bireh, 5 June 1980 and Cabinet resolution, 8 June 1980.

   98. Letter from Prime Minister Begin to a group of Members of the British House of Commons on self-determination, 10 June 1980.

   99. Resolution of the heads of government and ministers for foreign affairs of the European Council (Venice Declaration), 13 June 1980 and the Cabinet statement, 15 June 1980.

   100. Interview with Prime Minister Begin in Le Figaro, 14 June 1980.

   101. Security Council Resolution 483 (1980) extending UNIFIL's mandate, 17 June 1980.

   102. Excerpts from statement in the Knesset by Foreign Minister Shamir, 19 June 1980.

   103. Excerpts from an interview with Prime Minister Begin on IDF Radio, 20 June 1980.

   104. Security Council Resolution 476 (1980) on Jerusalem, 30 June 1980, Israel's reaction and U.S. statement, 1 July 1980.

   105. Address by Foreign Minister Shamir at the Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations on Israel's foreign policy, 7 July 1980.

   106. Statement by Prime Minister Begin in response to President Sadat's interview in Readers Digest, 15 July 1980.

   107. Statement in the General Assembly by Ambassador Blum, 23 July 1980.

   108. Foreign Ministry statement on the supply of uranium to Iraq, 28 July 1980.

   109. Foreign Ministry statement on the transfer of the Venezuelan embassy from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, 28 July 1980.

   110. General Assembly Resolution ES-7/2, Question of Palestine, 29 July 1980.

   111. Statement in the Knesset by Foreign Minister Shamir, 30 July 1980.

   112. Basic Law - Jerusalem, Knesset Resolution, 30 July 1980.

   113. Letter from Prime Minister Begin to President Sadat, 4 August 1980.

   114. Letter from Prime Minister Begin to President Sadat, 18 August 1980.

   115. Statement in the Security Council by Ambassador Blum on Jerusalem, 20 August 1980.

   116. Security Council Resolution 478 (1980) on Jerusalem, 20 August 1980 and Foreign Ministry reaction, 21 August 1980, and the Cabinet reaction, 24 August 1980.

   117. Address by Foreign Minister Shamir at the Herut Central Committee, 24 August 1980.

   118. Foreign Ministry reaction to the transfer of the Dutch embassy from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, 26 August 1980.

   119. Statement on the resumption of the autonomy talks, 4 September 1980.

   120. Resolution of the Islamic foreign ministers, Fez, 20 September 1980.

   121. Address in the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Shamir, 29 September 1980.

   122. Excerpts from statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin on Jewish communities in the Diaspora, 13 October 1980.

   123. Interview with Foreign Minister Shamir in Maariv, 17 October 1980.

   124. Excerpts from an address by Professor Werblowsky in UNESCO's fourth committee, Belgrade, 20 October 1980.

   125. Address by President Navon at a dinner offered by President Sadat, Cairo, 26 October 1980.

   126. Address to members of the National Democratic Party of Egypt by President Navon, Cairo, 29 October 1980.

   127. Cable from President Sadat to President Navon, 4 November 1980.

   128. Cables from Prime Minister Begin to President Carter and to President-Elect Reagan, 5 November 1980.

   129. Press conference with Prime Minister Begin prior to his departure for the U.S., 9 November 1980.

   130. Interview with Prime Minister Begin on NBC Television, 16 November 1980.

   131. Security Council Resolution 481 (1980) extending UNDOF's mandate, 26 November 1980.

   132. General Assembly Resolution 35/45 financing UNDOF, 1 December 1980.

   133. General Assembly Resolution 351115 financing UNIFIL, 10 December 1980.

   134. General Assembly Resolution 35/147, Israeli Nuclear Armament, 12 December 1980.

   135. General Assembly Resolution 35/169, Question of Palestine, 15 December 1980 and Foreign Minister reaction, 16 December 1980.

   136. General Assembly Resolution 35/207, Situation in the Middle East, 16 December 1980.

   137. Security Council Resolution 483 (1980) extending UNIFIL's mandate, 17 December 1980. 139.

   138. Joint statement Begin-Sadat on the autonomy talks, 18 December 1980.

   139. Security Council Resolution 484 (1980) on the mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, 19 December 1980.

ANNEXES

• • Annex I - Summarized minutes recording main subjects discussed and agreed upon between Egypt and Israel concerning the framework and process of preparing and concluding various agreements between the two states in order to implement full normalization, Cairo, 3 February 1980.

  • Annex II - Summarized minutes recording the main points dealt with in the meeting of the High Committee, Tel Aviv, 6-7 February 1980.

  • Annex III - Memorandum of understanding regarding the operation of the airlines of Egypt and Israel and other related matters, Cairo, 14 February 1980.

  • Annex IV - Memorandum of understanding between Egypt and Israel on telecommunications and postal services, Tel Aviv, 17 February 1980.

  • Annex V - Memorandum of agreements between Egypt and Israel on tourism, Cairo, 10 March 1980.

  • Annex VI - Memorandum of understanding between Egypt and Israel on the promotion of agricultural cooperation, Tel Aviv, 24 March 1980.

  • Annex VII - Memorandum of understanding between Egypt and Israel on land transportation, sea transportation and ports, Tel Aviv, 30 March 1980.

  • Annex VIII - Cultural agreement between Israel and Egypt, Cairo, 8 May 1980.

  • Annex IX - Agreement on trade and commerce between Israel and Egypt, Cairo, 8 May 1980.

  • Annex X - Air transport agreement between Israel and Egypt, Cairo, May 1980.

Puesta al Día

Encuesta sobre los 'enemigos' percibidos por el pueblo egipcio (BBC, November 1, 2006) que origina Rethinking the Egypt-Israel "Peace" Treaty (Daniel Pipes, November 21, 2006) que es completado con The Egypt-Israel "Peace" Treaty: Updates Daniel Pipes (November 21, 2006) con puestas al día que llegan a 2011.

Los Levantamientos en Egipto, de comienzos de 2011, que, en el marco de lo que se ha llamado la Primavera Árabe, acaba con la caída de Mubarak, junto al Acuerdo Fatah-Jamás para formar un gobierno de unidad palestino de mayo de 2011, también tensan fuertemente la situación del Acuerdo de Paz Israelo-Palestino.

La llegada al poder en Egipto de la Hermandad de Musulmanes en 2012, junto al significativo incremento de la infiltración de terroristas, fundamentalistas y traficantes de armas y personas en el Sinaí y el aumento de los ataques terroristas en y desde la zona, tensa al máximo la presión sobre el Tratado de Paz: Sinai, the New Egypt, and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (Alan Baker, August 22, 2012).