Fuente: Ministerio AAEE de Israel y Avalon Project - En el 35º aniversario del Tratado, los Archivos del Estado de Israel hacen una publicación especial de Documentos relacionados con el Tratado y las negociaciones que condujeron al mismo. - En el 25º aniversario se publica este documento con relatos sobre la cumbre.
Durante la Conferencia de Camp David, que Beguin dijo que debiera llamarse la Conferencia de Jimmy Carter (vídeo), en los jardines de la Casa Blanca en Washington DC y con el Presidente de EEUU Jimmy Carter de testigo, Israel, representado por Menajem Beguin, y Egipto, representado por Anuar el Sadat, firman un tratado de Paz el 26 de marzo de 1979, dieciséis meses después de la visita de Sadat a Israel (vídeos de los discursos de Carter, Beguin y Sadat durante la cena de estado tras la firma).
Martin Kramer traza un interesantísimo paralelismo entre Beguin y Sadat, de quienes Carter dijo: "Eran totalmente incompatibles".
Contiene nueve artículos, un anexo militar, otro sobre las relaciones entre las partes, unas actas para la interpretación del articulado, entre ello la de su artículo 6 sobre el calendario de retirada, intercambio de embajadores, disposiciones sobre seguridad y el acuerdo relativo a conversaciones sobre autonomía; esto último incluido en una carta del Presidente Sadat y el Primer Ministro Begin al Presidente Carter.
A los principios de Camp-David de 1978 se agregaban aspectos que habían quedado sin resolver en anteriores sesiones, como el compromiso egipcio de encumbrar el pacto de paz con Israel, supeditando al mismo los acuerdos que había firmado con otros organismos o países. De esta forma, los acuerdos árabes para boicotear a Israel debían ser anulados por Egipto.
El mismo día, en un Acuerdo Israel-EEUU independiente pero complementario, EEUU describe sus compromisos con Israel en caso de violación del tratado, el papel de NNUU y la futura asistencia militar y económica a Israel.
Estados Unidos se comprometía a premiar económicamente a israelíes y egipcios, y aseguraba a Israel la cobertura de sus necesidades petrolíferas del país.
La Knésset (el parlamento israelí) aprobó el Acuerdo de Paz con Egipto por una mayoría de 95 votos a favor, 18 en contra y 2 abstenciones. Los acuerdos de paz aislaron a Egipto, por unos años, del resto del mundo árabe.
La OLP rechazó los acuerdos de Camp-David y en especial, los acuerdos que se referían al programa de autonomía para los palestinos. El líder de la OLP, Yasser Arafat dijo:
"Que firmen lo que les plazca. La falsa paz no durará".
Beguin estaba convencido que Egipto mantendría una posición pacifica, al menos, durante los 3 años que duraría la retirada israelí del Sinaí. Con respecto a la ejecución de la autonomía palestina, se hacía cada vez más evidente que a Beguin le resultaba imposible impulsar una anexión de facto de Judea, Samaria y la Franja de Gaza y, a la vez, impulsar su programa de autonomía en momentos en que los palestinos seguían declarando que su portavoz era la terrorista OLP.
El 6 de octubre de 1981 fue asesinado el Presidente de Egipto, Anwar Sadat, a manos de los islamistas de su país. Su sucesor, Husni Mubarak anunció que su gobierno continuaría respetando los acuerdos firmados por Sadat.
En Into the Fray: Begin – in retrospect (Martin Sherman, Dec 8, 2011) se hace una evaluación retrospectiva del papel de Beguin en estos acontecimientos y sus consecuencias.
The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel;
PREAMBLE
Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;
Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," dated September 17, 1978;
Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;
Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security;
Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict in all its aspects;
Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;
Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;
Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel";
Article I
The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I ), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.
Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3).
Article II
The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel in the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.
Article III
The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:
They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;
They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.
Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory , against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.
The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).
Article IV
In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.
The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.
A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.
The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.
Article V
Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations, Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non- discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.
The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.
Article VI
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.
The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.
They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.
The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.
Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter in the event of a conflict between the obligation of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.
Article VII
Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.
Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.
Article VIII
The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.
Article IX
This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.
This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.
All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.
The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
Annex I
Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Agreements
Article I. Concept of Withdrawal
Israel will complete withdrawal of all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
To ensure the mutual security of the Parties, the implementation of phased withdrawal will be accompanied by the military measures and establishment of zones set out in this Annex and in Map 1, hereinafter referred to as "the Zones."
The withdrawal from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases:
The interim withdrawal behind the line from east of El-Arish to Ras Mohammed as delineated on Map 2 within nine months from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
The final withdrawal from the Sinai behind the international boundary not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.
A Joint Commission will be formed immediately after the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty in order to supervise and coordinate movements and schedules during the withdrawal, and to adjust plans and timetables as necessary within the limits established by paragraph 3, above. Details relating to the Joint Commission are set out in Article IV of the attached Appendix. The Joint Commission will be dissolved upon completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.
Article II. Determination of Final Lines and Zones
In order to provide maximum security for both Parties after the final withdrawal, the lines and the Zones delineated on Map 1 are to be established and organized as follows:
Zone A
Zone A is bounded on the east by line A (red line) and on the west by the Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, as shown on Map 1.
An Egyptian armed force of one mechanized infantry division and its military installations, and field fortifications, will be in this Zone.
The main elements of that Division will consist of:
Three mechanized infantry brigades.
One armed brigade.
Seven field artillery battalions including up to 126 artillery pieces.
Seven anti-aircraft artillery battalions including individual surface-to-air missiles and up to 126 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm and above.
Up to 230 tanks.
Up to 480 armored personnel vehicles of all types.
Up to a total of twenty-two thousand personnel.
Zone B
Zone B is bounded by line B (green line) on the east and by line A (red line) on the west, as shown on Map 1.
Egyptian border units of four battalions equipped with light weapons and wheeled vehicles will provide security and supplement the civil police in maintaining order in Zone B. The main elements in the four Border Battalions will consist of up to a total of four thousand personnel.
Land based, short range, low power, coastal warning points of the border patrol units may be established on the coast of this Zone.
There will be in Zone B field fortifications and military installations for the four border battalions.
Zone C
Zone C is bounded by line B (green line) on the west and the International Boundary and the Gulf of Aqaba on the east, as shown on Map 1.
Only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police will be stationed in Zone C.
The Egyptian civil police armed with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this Zone.
The United Nations Force will be deployed within Zone C and perform its functions as defined in Article VI of this annex.
The United Nations Force will be stationed mainly in camps located within the following stationing areas shown on Map 1, and will establish its precise locations after consultations with Egypt:
In that part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 Km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the International Boundary.
In the Sharm el Sheikh area.
Zone D
Zone D is bounded by line D (blue line) on the east and the international boundary on the west, as shown on Map 1.
In this Zone there will be an Israeli limited force of four infantry battalions, their military installations, and field fortifications, and United Nations observers.
The Israeli forces in Zone D will not include tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft missiles except individual surface-to-air missiles.
The main elements of the four Israeli infantry battalions will consist of up to 180 armored personnel vehicles of all types and up to a total of four thousand personnel.
Access across the international boundary shall only be permitted through entry check points designated by each Party and under its control. Such access shall be in accordance with laws and regulations of each country.
Only those field fortifications, military installations, forces, and weapons specifically permitted by this Annex shall be in the Zones.
Article III. Aerial Military Regime
Flights of combat aircraft and reconnaissance flights of Egypt and Israel shall take place only over Zones A and D, respectively.
Only unarmed, non-combat aircraft of Egypt and Israel will be stationed in Zones A and D, respectively.
Only Egyptian unarmed transport aircraft will take off and land in Zone B and up to eight such aircraft may be maintained in Zone B. The Egyptian border unit.,., may be equipped with unarmed helicopters to perform their functions in Zone B.
The Egyptian civil police may be equipped with unarmed police helicopters to perform normal police functions in Zone C.
Only civilian airfieldsmaybe built in the Zones.
Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those military aerial activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and the airspace above their territorial waters.
Article IV. Naval Regime
Egypt and Israel may base and operate naval vessels along the coasts of Zones A and D, respectively.
Egyptian coast guard boats, lightly armed, may be stationed and operate in the territorial waters of Zone B to assist the border units in performing their functions in this Zone.
Egyptian civil police equipped with light boats, lightly armed, shall perform normal police functions within the territorial waters of Zone C.
Nothing in this Annex shall be considered as derogating from the right of innocent passage of the naval vessels of either party.
Only civilian maritime ports and installations may be built in the Zones.
Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those naval activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and in their territorial waters.
Article V. Early Warning Systems
Egypt and Israel may establish and operate early warning systems only in Zones A and D respectively.
Article VI. United Nations Operations
The Parties will request the United Nations to provide forces and observers to supervise the implementation of this Annex and employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.
With respect to these United Nations forces and observers, as appropriate, the Parties agree to request the following arrangements:
Operation of check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and line B, and within Zone C.
Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of this Annex will be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Party.
Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace.
The arrangements described in this article for each zone will be implemented in ones A, B, and C by the United Nations Force and in Zone D by the United Nations Observers.
United Nations verification teams shall be accompanied by liaison officers of the respective Party.
The United Nations Force and observers will report their findings to both Parties.
The United Nations Force and Observers operating in the Zones will enjoy freedom of movement and other facilities necessary for the performance of their tasks.
The United Nations Force and Observers are not empowered to authorize the crossing of the international boundary.
The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations Force and Observers will be drawn. They "ill be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.
The Parties agree that the United Nations should make those command arrangements that will best assure the effective implementation of its responsibilities.
Article VII. Liaison System
Upon dissolution of the Joint Commission, a liaison system between the Parties will be established. This liaison system is intended to provide an effective method to assess progress in the implementation of obligations under the present Annex and to resolve any problem that may arise in the course of implementation, and refer other unresolved matters to the higher military authorities of the two countries respectively for consideration. It is also intended to prevent situations resulting from errors or misinterpretation on the part of either Party.
An Egyptian liaison office will be established in the city of El-Arish and an Israeli liaison office will be established in the city of Beer-Sheba. Each office will be headed by an officer of the respective country, and assisted by a number of officers.
A direct telephone link between the two offices will be set up and also direct telephone lines with the United Nations command will be maintained by both offices.
Article VIII. Respect for War Memorials
Each Party undertakes to preserve in good condition the War Memorials erected in the memory of soldiers of the other Party, namely those erected by Egypt in Israel, and shall permit access to such monuments.
Article IX. Interim Arrangements
The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians behind the interim withdrawal line, and the conduct of the forces of the Parties and the United Nations prior to the final withdrawal, will be governed by the attached Appendix and Map 2.
Appendix to Annex I. Organization of Movements in the Sinai
Article I. Principles of Withdrawal
The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases as described in Article I of Annex I. The description and timing of the withdrawal are included in this Appendix. The Joint Commission will develop and present to the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations forces in the Middle East the details of these phases not later than one month before the initiation of each phase of withdrawal.
Both parties agree on the following principles for the sequences of military movements.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX, paragraph 2, of this Treaty, until Israeli armed forces complete withdrawal from the current J and M Lines established by the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of September 1975, hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Agreement, up to the interim withdrawal line, all military arrangements existing under that Agreement will remain in effect, except those military arrangements otherwise provided for in this Appendix.
As Israeli armed forces withdraw, United Nations forces will immediately enter the evacuated areas to establish interim and temporary buffer zones as shown on Maps 2 and 3, respectively, for the purpose of maintaining a separation of forces. United Nations forces' deployment will precede the movement of any other personnel into these areas.
Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zone A, units of Egyptian armed forces shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.
Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zones A or B, Egyptian border units shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix, and will function in accordance with the provisions of Article II of Annex I.
Egyptian civil police will enter evacuated areas immediately after the United Nations forces to perform normal police functions.
Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the Gulf of Suez in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.
Except those movements mentioned above, deployments of Egyptian armed forces and the activities covered in Annex I will be offered in the evacuated areas when Israeli armed forces have completed their withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.
Article II. Subphases of the Withdrawal to the Interim Withdrawal Line
The withdrawal to the interim withdrawal line will be accomplished in subphases as described in this Article and as shown on Map 3. Each subphase will be completed within the indicated number of months from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty:
First subphase: within two months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Arish, including the town of El Arish and its airfield, shown as Area I on Map 3.
Second subphase: within three months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area between line M of the 1975 Agreement and line A, shown as Area II on Map 3.
Third subphase: within five months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area east and south of Area II, shown as Area III on Map 3.
Fourth subphase: within seven months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Tor- Ras El Kenisa, shown as Area IV on Map 3.
Fifth subphase: Within nine months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the remaining areas west of the interim withdrawal line, including the areas of Santa Katrina and the areas east of the Giddi and Mitla passes, shown as Area V on Map 3, thereby completing Israeli withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.
Egyptian forces will deploy in the areas evacuated by Israeli armed forces as follows:
Up to one-third of the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai in accordance with the 1975 Agreement will deploy in the portions of Zone A lying within Area I, until the completion of interim withdrawal. Thereafter, Egyptian armed forces as described Article II of Annex I will be deployed in Zone A up to the limits of the interim zone.
The Egyptian naval activity in accordance with Article IV of Annex I will commence along the coasts of areas I, III and IV, upon completion of the second, third, and fourth subphases, respectively.
Of the Egyptian border units described in Article II of Annex I, upon completion of the first subphase one battalion will be deployed in Area I. A second battalion will deployed in Area II upon completion of the second subphase. A third battalion will deployed in Area Ill upon completion of the third subphase. The second and third battalions mentioned above may also be deployed in any of the subsequently evacuated areas of the southern Sinai.
United Nations forces in Buffer Zone I of the 1976 Agreement will redeploy enable the deployment of Egyptian forces described above upon the completion of the subphase, but will otherwise continue to function in accordance with the provisions of that Agreement in the remainder of that zone until the completion of interim withdrawal, as indicated in Article I of this Appendix.
Israeli convoys may use the roads south and east of the main road junction east of El Arish to evacuate Israeli forces up to the completion of interim withdrawal. These convoys will proceed in daylight upon four hours notice to the Egyptian liaison group and United Nations forces, will be escorted by United Nations forces, and will be in accordance with schedules coordinated by the Joint Commission. An Egyptian liaison officer will accompany convoys to assure uninterrupted movement. The Joint Commission may approve other arrangements for convoys.
Article III. United Nations Forces
The Parties shall request that United Nations forces be deployed as necessary to perform the functions described in the Appendix up to the time of completion of final Israeli withdrawal. For that purpose, the Parties agree to the redeployment of the United Nations Emergency Force.
United Nations forces will supervise the implementation of this Appendix and will employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.
When United Nations forces deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article and II of this Appendix, they will perform the functions of verification in limited force zones in accordance with Article VI of Annex I, and will establish check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts in the temporary buffer zones described in Article II above. Other functions of the United Nations forces which concern the interim buffer zone are described in Article V of this Appendix.
Article IV. Joint Commission and Liaison
The Joint Commission referred to in Article IV of this Treaty will function from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty up to the date of completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.
The Joint Commission will be composed of representatives of each Party headed by senior officers. This Commission shall invite a representative of the United Nations when discussing subjects concerning the United Nations, or when either Party requests United Nations presence. Decisions of the Joint Commission will be reached by agreement of Egypt and Israel.
The Joint Commission will supervise the implementation of the arrangements described in Annex I and this Appendix. To this end, and by agreement of both Parties, it will:
coordinate military movements described in this Appendix and supervise their implementation;
address and seek to resolve any problem arising out of the implementation of Annex I and this Appendix, and discuss any violations reported by the United Nations Force and Observers and refer to the Governments of Egypt and Israel any unresolved problems;
assist the United Nations Force and Observers in the execution of their mandates, and deal with the timetables of the periodic verification when referred to it by the Parties as provided for in Annex I and this Appendix;
organize the demarcation of the international boundary and all lines and zones described in Annex I and this Appendix;
supervise the handing over of the main installations in the Sinai from Israel to Egypt;
agree on necessary arrangements for finding and returning missing bodies of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers;
organize the setting up and operation of entry check points along the El Arish-Ras Mohammed line in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of Annex III;
conduct its operations through the use of joint liaison teams consisting of one Israeli representative and one Egyptian representative, provided from a standing Liaison Group, which will conduct activities as directed by the Joint Commission;
provide liaison and coordination to the United Nations command implementing provisions of the Treaty, and, through the joint liaison teams, maintain local coordination and cooperation with the United Nations Force stationed in specific areas or United Nations Observers monitoring specific areas for any assistance as needed;
discuss any other matters which the Parties by agreement may place before it.
Meetings of the Joint Commission shall be held at least once a month. In the event that either Party of the Command of the United Nations Force requests a specific meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours.
The Joint Committee will meet in the buffer zone until the completion of the interim withdrawal and in El Arish and Beer-Sheba alternately afterwards. The first meeting will be held not later than two weeks after the entry into force of this Treaty.
Article V. Definition of the Interim Buffer Zone and Its Activities
An interim buffer zone, by which the United Nations Force will effect a separation of Egyptian and Israeli elements, will be established west of and adjacent to the interim withdrawal line as shown on Map 2 after implementation of Israeli withdrawal and deployment behind the interim withdrawal line. Egyptian civil police equipped with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this zone.
The United Nations Force will operate check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts within the interim buffer zone in order to ensure compliance with the terms of this Article.
In accordance with arrangements agreed upon by both Parties and to be coordinated by the Joint Commission, Israeli personnel will operate military technical installations at four specific locations shown on Map 2 and designated as T1 (map central coordinate 57163940), T2 (map central coordinate 59351541), T3 (map central coordinate 5933-1527), and T4 (map central coordinate 61130979) under the following principles:
The technical installations shall be manned by technical and administrative personnel equipped with small arms required for their protection (revolvers, rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, hand grenades, and ammunition), as follows:
T1 - up to 150 personnel
T2 and T3 - up to 350 personnel
T4 - up to 200 personnel
Israeli personnel will not carry weapons outside the sites, except officers who may carry personal weapons.
Only a third party agreed to by Egypt and Israel will enter and conduct inspections within the perimeters of technical installations in the buffer zone. The third party will conduct inspections in a random manner at least once a month. The inspections will verify the nature of the operation of the installations and the weapons and personnel therein. The third party will immediately report to the Parties any divergence from an installation's visual and electronic surveillance or communications role.
Supply of the installations, visits for technical and administrative purposes, and replacement of personnel and equipment situated in the sites, may occur uninterruptedly from the United Nations check points to the perimeter of the technical installations, after checking and being escorted by only the United Nations forces.
Israel will be permitted to introduce into its technical installations items required for the proper functioning of the installations and personnel.
As determined by the Joint Commission, Israel will be permitted to:
Maintain in its installations fire-fighting and general maintenance equipment as well as wheeled administrative vehicles and mobile engineering equipment necessary for the maintenance of the sites. All vehicles shall be unarmed.
Within the sites and in the buffer zone, maintain roads, water lines, and communications cables which serve the site. At each of the three installation locations (T1, T2 and T3, and T4), this maintenance may be performed with up to two unarmed wheeled vehicles and by up to twelve unarmed personnel with only necessary equipment, including heavy engineering equipment if needed. This maintenance may be performed three times a week, except for special problems, and only after giving the United Nations four hours notice. The teams will be escorted by the United Nations.
Movement to and from the technical installations will take place only during daylight hours. Access to, and exit from, the technical installations shall be as follows:
T1: Through a United Nations check point, and via the road between Abu Aweigila and the intersection of the Abu Aweigila road and the Gebel Libni road (at Km. 161), as shown on Map 2.
T2 and T3: through a United Nations checkpoint and via the road constructed across the buffer zone to Gebel Katrina, as shown on Map 2.
T2, T3, and T4: via helicopters flying within a corridor at the times, and according to a flight profile, agreed to by the Joint Commission. The helicopters will be checked by the United Nations Force at landing sites outside the perimeter of the installations.
Israel will inform the United Nations Force at least one hour in advance of each intended movement to and from the installations.
Israel shall be entitled to evacuate sick and wounded and summon medical experts and medical teams at any time after giving immediate notice to the United Nations Force.
The details of the above principles and all other matters in this Article requiring coordination by the Parties will be handled by the Joint Commission.
These technical installations will be withdrawn when Israeli forces withdraw from the interim withdrawal line, or at a time agreed by the parties.
Article VI. Disposition of Installations and Military Barriers
Disposition of installations and military barriers will be determined by the Parties in accordance with the following guidelines:
Up to three weeks before Israeli withdrawal from any area, the Joint Commission will arrange for Israeli and Egyptian liaison and technical teams to conduct a joint inspection of all appropriate installations to agree upon condition of structures and articles which will be transferred to Egyptian control and to arrange for such transfer. Israel will declare, at that time, its plans for disposition of installations and articles within the installations.
Israel undertakes to transfer to Egypt all agreed infrastructures, utilities, and installations intact, inter alia, airfields, roads, pumping stations, and ports. Israel will present to Egypt the information necessary for the maintenance and operation of the facilities. Egyptian technical teams will be permitted to observe and familiarize themselves with the operation of these facilities for a period of up to two weeks prior to transfer.
When Israel relinquishes Israeli military water points near El Arish and El Tor, Egyptian technical teams will assume control of those installations and ancillary equipment in accordance with an orderly transfer process arranged beforehand by the Joint Commission. Egypt undertakes to continue to make available at all water supply points the normal quantity of currently available water up to the time Israel withdraws behind the international boundary, unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Commission.
Israel will make its best effort to remove or destroy all military barriers, including obstacles and minefields, in the areas and adjacent waters from which it withdraws, according to the following concept:
Military barriers will be cleared first from areas near populations, roads and major installations and utilities.
For those obstacles and minefields which cannot be removed or destroyed prior to Israeli withdrawal, Israel will provide detailed maps to Egypt and the United Nations through the Joint Commission not later than 15 days before entry of United Nations forces into the affected areas.
Egyptian engineers will enter those areas after United Nations forces enter to conduct barrier clearance operations in accordance with Egyptian plans to be submitted prior to implementation.
Article VII. Surveillance Activities
Aerial surveillance activities during the withdrawal will be carried out as follows:
Both Parties request the United States to continue airborne surveillance flights in accordance with previous agreements until the completion of final Israeli withdrawal.
Flight profiles will cover the Limited Forces Zones to monitor the limitations on forces and armaments, and to determine that Israeli armed forces have withdrawn from the areas described in Article II of Annex I, Article II of this Appendix, and Maps 2 and 3, and that these forces thereafter remain behind their lines. Special inspection flights may be flown at the request of either Party or of the United Nations.
Only the main elements in the military organizations of each Party, as described in Annex I and in this Appendix, will be reported.
Both Parties request the United States operated Sinai Field Mission to continue its operations in accordance with previous agreements until completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes. Thereafter, the Mission be terminated.
Article VIII. Exercise of Egyptian Sovereignty
Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over evacuated parts of the Sinai upon Israeli withdrawal as provided for in Article I of this Treaty.
ANNEX II
Map of Israel-Egypt International Boundary
ANNEX III
Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties
Article 1. Diplomatic and Consular Relations
The Parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange ambassadors upon completion of the interim withdrawal.
Article 2. Economic and Trade Relations
The Parties agree to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations and to terminate economic boycotts of each other upon completion of the interim withdrawal.
As soon as possible, and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties will enter negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement on trade and commerce for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations.
Article 3. Cultural Relations
The Parties agree to establish normal cultural relations following completion of the interim withdrawal.
They agree on the desirability of cultural exchanges in all fields, and shall, as soon as possible and not later than six months after completion of the interim withdrawal, enter into negotiations with a view to concluding a cultural agreement for this purpose.
Article 4. Freedom of Movement
Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party will permit the free movement of the nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither Party will impose discriminatory restrictions on the free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the other.
Mutual unimpeded access to places of religious and historical significance will be provided on a non- discriminatory basis.
Article 5. Cooperation for Development and Good Neighborly Relations
The Parties recognize a mutuality of interest in good neighbourly relations and agree to consider means to promote such relations.
The Parties will cooperate in promoting peace, stability and development in their region. Each agrees to consider proposals the other may wish to make to this end.
The Parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other.
Article 6. Transportation and Telecommunications
The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944 ("The Chicago Convention") and the International Air Services Transit Agreement, 1944.
Upon completion of the interim withdrawal any declaration of national emergency by a party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other party on a discriminatory basis.
Egypt agrees that the use of airfields left by Israel near El-Arish, Rafah, Ras El-Nagb and Sharm El- Sheikh shall be for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations.
As soon as possible and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties shall enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a civil aviation agreement.
The Parties will reopen and maintain roads and railways between their countries and will consider further road and rail links. The Parties further agree that a highway will be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage of persons, vehicles and goods between Egypt and Jordan, without prejudice to their sovereignty over that part of the highway which falls within their respective territory.
Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, normal postal, telephone, telex, data facsimile, wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio and satellite shall be established between the two Parties in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations.
Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party shall grant normal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other. Such access will be granted on the same conditions generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of other nations. Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace will be implemented upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of the aforementioned treaty.
Article 7. Enjoyment of Human Rights
The Parties affirm their commitment to respect and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and they will promote these rights and freedoms in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
Article 8. Territorial Seas
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace each Party recognizes the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent passage through its territorial sea in accordance with the rules of international law.
AGREED MINUTES
Article I
Egypt's resumption of the exercise of full sovereignty over the Sinai provided for in paragraph 2 of Article I shall occur with regard to each area upon Israel's withdrawal from the area.
Article IV
It is agreed between the parties that the review provided for in Article IV (4) will be undertaken when requested by either party, commencing within three months of such a request, but that any amendment can be made only by mutual agreement of both parties.
Article V
The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V shall not be construed as limiting the first sentence of that paragraph. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V, which reads as follows: "The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba."
Article VI (2)
The provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI (2) of the Treaty, which reads as follows: "The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action of any other Party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty."
Article VI (5)
It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI (5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows: "Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligation under this Treaty will be binding and implemented."
Annex I
Article VI, Paragraph 8, of Annex I provides as follows:
"The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations forces and observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council."
The Parties have agreed as follows:
"With respect to the provisions of paragraph 8, Article VI, of Annex 1, if no agreement is reached between the Parties, they will accept or support a U.S. proposal concerning the composition of the United Nations force and observers."
Annex III
The Treaty of Peace and Annex III thereto provide for establishing normal economic relations between the Parties. In accordance herewith, it is agreed that such relations will include normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids for Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids made by Israel, on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for such oil.
For the Government of Israel (Menajem Beguin)
For the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt (Anuar el Sadat)
Witnessed by:
Jimmy Carter
President of the United States of America
En un acuerdo separado - Israel-US Memorandum of Agreement - suscrito el mismo día que el Acuerdo de Paz Israel-Egipto, los EEUU fijaron sus compromisos con Israel para el caso de que el tratado fuera violado, el papel de NNUU y el futurso suministro de ayuda militar y económica a Israel.
En la cena del 26 de marzo de 1979
Vídeo del discurso de Beguin en la cena celebrada al concluir las negociaciones.
En la Knésset el 7 de mayo de 1979
Fuente: Ministerio de AAEE de Israel
In the traditional policy address to the Knesset, given by the Prime Minister upon the return of the Israeli Parliament from its spring recess, Mr. Begin reviewed the dramatic events of the recent weeks and issued a call to the President of Lebanon and to other Arab leaders to follow the example of President Sadat and meet with him for peace negotiations.
Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin at the opening of the Knesset's summer session, 7 May 1979
Excerpts:
Dr. Majid, the Egyptian delegate to the UN, handed the Secretary General a document in which he spoke of the "restoration of Arab Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty." Yesterday we instructed our UN delegate, Dr. Yehuda Blum, to hand the Secretary General, for circulation among member states, an Israeli document which states: "Jerusalem is and shall forever remain one city indivisible, the eternal capital of our nation, as it -was since King David transferred his kingdom's capital from Hebron to Jerusalem over 3000 thousand years ago. "Under Israel's sovereign jurisdiction, absolute free access to the holy places has been and shall forever be guaranteed to Jew, Christian and Moslem. This was not so during the 19 years of Jordanian occupation, throughout that era Jews could not pray at the Western Wall as was their wont for generations. "Now and forever, there shall be no man - whatever his religion - who will be prevented from worshipping at his holy site."
Mr. Chairman, the normalization process in Israel-Egypt relations is progressing. When I was in Cairo, I met with President Sadat and we concluded that as El Arish will be handed back to Egyptian sovereignty, the two of us shall proclaim open borders between the two states and the determination of direct air corridor - over Sinai - between Cairo and Ben Gurion airport. This we shall do on 27 May, when we meet in El Arish.
I wish to inform the Knesset that not only will the President of Egypt and the Prime Minister of Israel, together with the Foreign, Defence and Interior Ministers meet, but wounded soldiers of Egypt and Israel will also meet. The fighters will shake each others hand and will say to each other - No more War.
A ship flying the Israeli flag, called "Ashdod", recently sailed through the Suez Canal. Why? The first paragraph which went into effect upon the ratification states: "The state of war between the parties will be terminated and peace will be established -between them upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this treaty."
I wish to explain to the Knesset that this paragraph was proposed by us and met for some time during the negotiations with an opposition by the other party. The Egyptian delegation at the time did not want to accept the phrase dealing with the end of the state of war. We insisted on this formula, as we read a large number of peace treaties and in all of them as a principle in international law, when a peace treaty is signed, the first paragraph says that the state of war has terminated. This had and has practical significance...
There was a visit of the Defence Minister to Egypt. He was, received by President Sadat, the Prime Minister and the Egyptian Defence Minister. The talks he held were successful and advanced the peace making process in word and deed. I state with much satisfaction that the Defence Minister was warmly received not only by the Egyptian government but also by thousands of the Egyptian people, in Cairo as well as in Alexandria.
The Joint Military Commission, sitting in El Arish, began its work and it is conducting direct negotiations without a third party intervention and without a third party representative chairing the meetings. The chairmen rotate, and this joint, commission is busy at work on the implementation of the peace treaty in both the military and the civilian spheres.
Soon the Chief of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces will visit Egypt with senior officers of our army. This, too, will be a step towards the normalization of Egypt-Israel relations.
In the near future the Deputy Prime Minister will visit Egypt at the personal invitation of President Sadat; the Foreign Minister at the invitation of Egypt's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and the Ministers of Agriculture and Energy as well. We shall, naturally, warmly receive the colleagues of these ministers who shall represent Egypt. Talks will be held between representatives of the two countries in areas relating to their specific activities, and thus we shall advance the peace process.
Mr. Chairman, with the signing of the peace treaty between ourselves and Egypt, a fundamental change in our country's international standing has occurred. We signed a peace treaty - not a cease fire, not an interim agreement, but a peace treaty with the largest and most powerful of our neighbours. The population of all our neighbours is barely half of that of Egypt. This is a turning point in the history of the Middle East. True, for the attainment of this lofty goal, making peace and signing a peace treaty between ourselves and Egypt, we made precious sacrifices. The negotiations lasted fourteen months and were tiring, there were ups and downs, hopes and frustrations, difficulties as well. But we signed a peace treaty, we concluded a chapter in the annals of Israel, we opened a new chapter in our national existence.
Mr. Chairman, I come now to explain the principles of Israel's policy towards Lebanon. Firstly, I am honoured to invite Lebanon's President, Mr. Sarkis, to come to Jerusalem to meet with me. For my part, I am prepared to leave in a civilian plane for Beirut. The subject of our conversation, whether held in Jerusalem or in Beirut or in a neutral place will be one: the signing of a peace treaty between Lebanon and Israel. I announce on behalf of the government of Israel that our state has no territorial claims in Lebanon. We uphold the territorial integrity and state sovereignty of Lebanon .... We are prepared to sign a peace treaty on the basis of the Israel-Lebanese borders. This goal can be achieved in but few days. This is my call to the President of Lebanon and its government....
Thirdly, murderous attacks on Israel and on Jews from Lebanese territory. We shall not tolerate, under any circumstances, a situation in which murderers, baser than at any time since the Nazis, shall operate, shedding innocent blood of men, women and children. And in Beirut they continue to boast of these murders and promise to continue and to intensify them. There are those who make these repeated announcements, and they must realize their consequences. We shall not wait for another incident. After Nahariya, the murderers' organizations announced that they will continue their barbarous acts. This is the constant threat of terrorist actions. We shall hit these murderers at all times, in all places, with all our might, by sea, by air, by land, until they are no longer able to carry out their murderous schemes against Israelis only because they were born Israelis, against Jews because they were born Jewish. We shall give them no rest. We know where their headquarters, artillery and arsenals are. We shall strike to destroy and scatter them, the enemies of mankind, commanded by the Palestinian "Iddi Amin" - Yasser Arafat. I wish to inform the Knesset that yesterday we struck at the murderers, and only half an hour ago we again struck at them and all our aircraft, thank god, returned safely. We shall give these murderers no rest until they end murderous acts in our country and the murder of Jews...
Fourthly, Mr. Chairman, Israel desires cooperation with all of the units of UNIFIL, the force fulfills an important role in Lebanon...
Fifthly, the Syrian occupation forces must leave Lebanese territory and return to their country, Syria. This army of occupation is no longer under the guise of a Pan Arab peace keeping force. The Saudis have already left Lebanon, as did the Kuwaitis. There remain only the Syrians with their Soviet tanks and artillery, with which they wreack havoc from time to time upon the civilian population, men, women and children who live in Lebanon and are of the Christian faith. I fully agree with President Sadat who stated that the Syrian occupation of Lebanon, is according to him, a fiasco, or failure, and is the source of all trouble in Lebanon. Damascus must put an end to this failure and the sooner the better.
Sixthly, Mr. Chairman, we, the small Jewish state, rescued the ancient Christian community in northern Lebanon and the Christians and Shiite Moslems in the south from the danger of genocide. Let it be written in the annals of nations: great and mighty Christian nations did nothing to prevent the crime of genocide on their correligionists. And as usual, the UN stood idly by. We aided and shall continue to help the Christians and Shiites to maintain their lives in security and peace. The government headed by MK Yitzhak Rabin, started this blessed activity. The present government continued and intensified it, and if need be, will intensify it in the future. Let it be known that because of our aid we can influence our Christian friends in Lebanon. We cannot give them orders. One day Major Haddad said: "We are not a part of America. and neither of Israel. Our lives are on balance. We shall decide." I accepted this statement with respect and understanding, and I suggest to all of us to take it in this vein. We shall continue to influence, when need be, to prevent unnecessary conflicts. But all the factors in and out of the UN must know, as I wrote in my letter of reply to the appeal of the UN Secretary General, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and to the Prime Ministers of Norway and Eire, that the Lebanese Christians are fighting for their lives and we cannot give them directives.
But in Damascus and in Beirut there are plots being hatched against the life of Major Haddad, a Lebanese patriot, as he was termed by our Defence Minister - a brave fighter for the existence of his community. They seek his life. I myself heard these threats. Therefore I shall reiterate to all factors what I said to the U.S. ambassador to Israel, Mr. Lewis, in a formulation known to every educated American from the days that preceded the Freedom Act of Abraham Lincoln: "As far as Major Haddad is concerned, we shall, under no circumstances, sell him down the river..."
En la cena del 26 de marzo de 1979
Vídeo del discurso de Sadat en la cena celebrada al concluir las negociaciones.
Conferencia de prensa del 25 de marzo de 1979
The President's News Conference (March 25, 1979):
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY
Q. Mr. President, Bill Sims, Wycom Corporation, Laramie, Wyoming. First of all, forgive me, sir, before my question, if you could leave a little piece of paper with your name on it at the podium, a big fan of yours would love to have it. [Laughter]
My question, sir: With sometimes conflicting reports coming from the Middle East almost daily, how can the American public be sure that the agreement you will sign this week is not just window dressing? Sir, does this agreement really have meaningful significance to the world?
THE PRESIDENT. I think perhaps a hundred years from now, 50 years from now, what occurs tomorrow may be the most significant occurrence during my own term of office as President. We are a nation at peace. It's a notable achievement for a country as large as ours to be at peace.
In the Mideast, war there not only afflicts the lives of everyone involved, but it's a constant constraint on the quality of life when the people in Egypt, people in Israel—who deeply desire to live in harmony with their neighbors—have never been able to do it since Israel was founded.
When I go back 8 or 9 months to assess what did exist then and see where we stand now, it's almost unbelievable. Sadat said when I was in Egypt recently that what we achieved at Camp David was a miracle, that he never expected either Egypt or Israel to reach an agreement when he went there.
I think that we now have a posture where our excellent friends, the Israelis, and our excellent friends, the Egyptians, can be friends with one another. We're going to have a short period of time—I believe it will be short—with threats and posturing and possibly some acts of terrorism mounted against [by] those who oppose peace in the Middle East.
But my belief is that if we can open those borders and have thousands of students going back and forth between Cairo and Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv and Alexandria, and tourists going to visit the Pyramids and coming to see the Dead Sea Scrolls, and open trade and commerce, that the people themselves will so deeply appreciate the difference in their quality of life and their attitude toward life, that no matter who the leaders might be in the future, this peace will be permanent.
We're going to not stop here. We've got to address the very difficult question of the Palestinian problem.
The Israelis are committed to this proposition, the Egyptians are committed to this proposition, and so are we. But I think as we let the other Arab entities-the PLO, Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese, Iraqis—see the tremendous benefits of the peace between Israel and Egypt, it's going to be much easier to bring them in the process and therefore achieve what I dream about—which may not come during my own term of office, but I'll continue to work for—and that is a comprehensive peace throughout the Middle East.
So, I think it is very significant, it is permanent, it's a first step. But as Sadat says, it's a foundation for what we all dream for—that comprehensive peace in the Middle East. I think it's a very good step.
Conferencia de prensa del 10 de abril de 1979
The President's News Conference (April 10, 1979):
MIDDLE EAST
Q. Within the last few hours, Mr. President, a terrorist bomb was exploded in Tel Aviv, and Israel has bombed Lebanon. Isn't there likely to be even more violence in the Middle East than there was before the treaty, and what can you do about it? And would you be willing to stop arms sales, all arms sales to the Mideast?
THE PRESIDENT. First, I would not be willing to stop all arms sales to the Middle East, because I think the countries there must have an adequate means of defending themselves—Israel, Egypt, and others.
Secondly, I believe that the terrorist bombing is a longstanding problem. It's not something that just has arisen because the treaty has been signed. I think the terrorism threats are counterproductive. My own hope is that the best way to alleviate this constant dependence on death and hatred and destruction and terrorism is to prove the viability and the advantages of the peace process.
I would like to see, as early as possible, but by the end of next month, all the borders open between Israel and Egypt, a free passage of students and tradesmen, diplomats, tourists, and for the demonstrated advantages to Israel and Egypt to be very apparent to the citizens of Jordan and Syria and Lebanon and to the Palestinians, wherever they live, hoping to convince them that that's the best approach to achieve their own purposes and goals-that is, peace and a realization of the right to control their own future.
But I don't think there's any doubt that terrorism will continue in the coming months. I hope it will wane as it's proven that the peace treaty is permanent and that it is going to work.
An immediate step that will tend to convince everyone that it is permanent and cannot be disrupted by terrorist acts will be the quick ratification of the treaty by the Egyptian Parliament and the exchange of the documents themselves. And then the return of El Arish and the first part of the Sinai to Egypt—I think that will be a step in the right direction.
Conferencia de prensa del 30 de abril de 1979 sobre la política israelí sobre los asentamientos
The President's News Conference (April 30, 1979):
ISRAELI SETTLEMENT POLICY
Q. Mr. President, the Israeli Cabinet has recently approved two new settlements on the West Bank. In light of the enormous cost to the United States of implementing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, isn't it reasonable to expect the Israelis to cease from settlement policy which violates international law? And secondly, why should the American people pay for policies of the Israelis that undermine the peace process and run counter to American foreign policy?
THE PRESIDENT. Well, the position of the United States historically has been consistent, and my own position on settlements in the West Bank, Gaza area and on the Golan Heights, and in the Sinai have my position has been consistent. The Israeli Government knows perfectly well, after hours of discussion on this issue, what my position is.
We do consider the creation of Israeli settlements in these areas as being inconsistent with international law, and, as I've said many times, they are an obstacle to peace. Knowing that, the Israeli Government still on occasion authorizes new settlements. They interpret the law differently from myself.
I hope that the Israeli Government will severely restrain any inclination, either approved by the Knesset or done without legal sanction, in establishing new settlements. But there is a limit to what we can do to impose our will on a sovereign nation.
Conferencia de prensa del 29 de mayo de 1979
The President's News Conference (May 29, 1979):
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, sir, is it feasible in your view to expect the Palestinians and other Arab nations to join the peace process as long as the United States does not put forward some of its own ideas in greater detail about what autonomy is going to look like on the West Bank and Gaza?
In other words, as long as the Israelis are continuing to say there will be no Palestinian homeland, there will be no entity linked or unlinked to Jordan, there will be no Palestinian state, is it not incumbent on the United States, again in this peace process, to come forward with some ideas of its own in order to encourage the Palestinians to join in?
THE PRESIDENT. We've never been reticent about putting forward our ideas both to the Israelis and the Egyptians and to others about what ought to be done in the West Bank, Gaza area. We've never espoused an independent Palestinian state. I think that would be a destabilizing factor there.
I believe the next step ought to be the exchange of views during the negotiations between Israel and Egypt. We will observe the different proposals that are inevitably going to be made; some of them have been described publicly. Then later on, after the negotiations proceed as far as they can do with any degree of momentum, we will reserve the right—requested, I might say, by both Israel and Egypt— to put forward United States proposals to break a deadlock or to provide a compromise solution.
We have been involved in that kind of process both at Camp David and when I went to the Middle East. I think that's one of the reasons that we've been as successful as we have so far.
But for us to preempt the negotiations by putting forward, to begin with, an American proposal, I think, would be counterproductive, and it would remove some of the reasonable responsibility that ought to be directly on the shoulders of Prime Minister Begin and his government and President Sadat and his government.
I might say that this past weekend, I talked personally to President Sadat and to Prime Minister Begin and, this morning, to Secretary Vance. And they were all very pleased and very excited not only at the progress made in El Arish and Beersheba but also at the attitude on both sides toward a constructive resolution of these very difficult issues.
So, at this point, I feel very hopeful that both sides are negotiating in good faith. We'll be there to help them when they need our help.
Conferencia de prensa del 9 de octubre de 1979
The President's News Conference (October 9, 1979):
THE MIDDLE EAST
Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, sir, is it feasible in your view to expect the Palestinians and other Arab nations to join the peace process as long as the United States does not put forward some of its own ideas in greater detail about what autonomy is going to look like on the West Bank and Gaza?
In other words, as long as the Israelis are continuing to say there will be no Palestinian homeland, there will be no entity linked or unlinked to Jordan, there will be no Palestinian state, is it not incumbent on the United States, again in this peace process, to come forward with some ideas of its own in order to encourage the Palestinians to join in?
THE PRESIDENT. We've never been reticent about putting forward our ideas both to the Israelis and the Egyptians and to others about what ought to be done in the West Bank, Gaza area. We've never espoused an independent Palestinian state. I think that would be a destabilizing factor there.
I believe the next step ought to be the exchange of views during the negotiations between Israel and Egypt. We will observe the different proposals that are inevitably going to be made; some of them have been described publicly. Then later on, after the negotiations proceed as far as they can do with any degree of momentum, we will reserve the right—requested, I might say, by both Israel and Egypt— to put forward United States proposals to break a deadlock or to provide a compromise solution.
We have been involved in that kind of process both at Camp David and when I went to the Middle East. I think that's one of the reasons that we've been as successful as we have so far.
But for us to preempt the negotiations by putting forward, to begin with, an American proposal, I think, would be counterproductive, and it would remove some of the reasonable responsibility that ought to be directly on the shoulders of Prime Minister Begin and his government and President Sadat and his government.
I might say that this past weekend, I talked personally to President Sadat and to Prime Minister Begin and, this morning, to Secretary Vance. And they were all very pleased and very excited not only at the progress made in El Arish and Beersheba but also at the attitude on both sides toward a constructive resolution of these very difficult issues.
So, at this point, I feel very hopeful that both sides are negotiating in good faith. We'll be there to help them when they need our help.
The President's News Conference (October 9, 1979):
PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
Q. Mr. President, a question on the Middle East. Do you agree with those such as former Ambassador Andrew Young and George Ball and others who say that it is now time to do away with the restrictions put on our foreign policy by Henry Kissinger and open up a dialog with the Palestinians and the PLO?
THE PRESIDENT. No, I do not. We will not negotiate with the PLO. We will not recognize the PLO until after the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist and endorses United Nations Resolution 242 as a basis for Middle East peace.
FRANK CORMIER [Associated Press]. Thank you, Mr. President.
Otros
The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress (Jimmy Carter, January 23, 1979)
The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress (Jimmy Carter, January 23, 1980)
The State of the Union Annual Message to the Congress (Jimmy Carter, January 16, 1981)
United States. President (1977-1981 : Carter), Jimmy Carter, United States. Office of the Federal Register - Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1977 - Biography & Autobiography
Documento preparatorio dirigido al Presidente de EEUU elaborado para el equipo negociador americano antes de la cumbre.
Fuente: Ministerio de AAEE de Israel
Los siguientes documentos deals predominantly with the evolution of Israel-Egypt relations after the signing of the peace treaty in March 1979. Attention is paid to the progress of the autonomy negotiations, the visits of President Navon and Prime Minister Begin to Egypt and those of President Sadat to Israel, and in the annexes, a number of key Israel-Egypt agreements are fully reproduced. Israel's struggle in the United Nations General Assembly, Security Council and various UN organs, is also highlighted as most of the Arab states continued to undermine Israel's position in the UN and to attack the Camp David Accords and the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. They were, at times, aided by European initiatives. There is also material dealing with the situation in Judea and Samaria and in Jerusalem.
Cronografía de la época 1979-1980
Foreign Ministry reaction to Egyptian statements on the Camp David Accords
, 10 April and 4 May 1979.
Letter from Prime Minister Begin to UN Secretary General Waldheim on the situation in Lebanon, 18 April 1979.
Foreign Ministry statement on the acquittal of Nazi war criminals, 20 April 1979.
Remarks by Foreign Minister Dayan on the future of settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza region, 24 April 1979.
Exchange of Instruments of Ratification of the Treaty of Peace with Egypt, 25 April 1979.
Statement by the President of the Security Council on UNIFIL, 26 April 1979.
Broadcast to the nation by President Navon on Independence Day, 1 May 1979.
Telecast to the nation by Prime Minister Begin on Independence Day, 1 May 1979.
Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin at the opening of the Knesset's summer session, 7 May 1979.
Statement by the Government of Israel on the execution of Habib Elkanian in Iran, 9 May 1979.
Interview with Prime Minister Begin on IDF Radio, 19 May 1979.
Remarks by Foreign Minister Dayan at El Arish, 23 May 1979.
IDF Order of the Day on the return of El Arish to Egypt, 25 May 1979.
Statements by Interior Minister Burg, Defence Minister Ali and Secretary of State Vance at the opening of the autonomy talks, Beersheba, 25 May 1979.
Statements by Presidents Navon and Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin during President Sadat's visit to Beersheba, 27 May 1979.
Excerpts from statement in the Knesset by Foreign Minister Dayan on Israel's relations with Egypt and the U.S., 29 May 1979.
Security Council Resolution 449 2979) extending UNDOF's mandate, 30 May 1979.
Highlights of statement by Prime Minister Begin to Herut Convention, 3 June 1979.
U.S. State Department statement on Israeli settlements, 4 June 1979.
Excerpts from press conference with Foreign Minister Dayan prior to his departure for Egypt, 4 June 1979.
Interview with Foreign Minister Dayan on Israel Television, 8 June 1979.
Letter from Prime Minister Begin to Senator Charles H. Percy on Israeli settlements, 10 June 1979.
Statement issued by Prime Minister Begin on Israeli settlements, 11 June 1979.
Statement by Interior Minister Burg on the autonomy, Alexandria, 11 June 1979.
Statement to the press at the conclusion of the autonomy talks in Alexandria, 12 June 1979.
Excerpts from statements in the Security Council by Ambassador Blum on the situation in Lebanon, 12 and 14 June 1979.
Security Council Resolution 450 (1979) extending UNIFIL's mandate, 14 June 1979.
Knesset Resolution on the limitation of Nazi crimes, 18 June 1979.
Statement by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community, 18 June 1979 and Israel's reaction, 20 June 1979.
Opening statements at the third session of the autonomy talks, 25 June 1979.
Joint statement by the Israel, Egypt and U.S. delegations to the autonomy talks, statements by the Chief Delegates and excerpts from a press conference with them, 26 June 1979.
Address by Prime Minister Begin to the Jerusalem Conference on International Terrorism, 2 July 1979.
Statements in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin and Labour Party Chairman Peres on the visit of Yasser Arafat to Austria, 5 July 1979.
Press conference with Prime Minister Begin upon his return from Alexandria, 12 July 1979.
Security Council Resolution 452 (1979) on Israeli settlements in the territories, 20 Jury 1979.
Letter from Secretary General Waldheim to the President of the Security Council on the termination of UNEFs mandate, 24 July 1979 and reaction by Ambassador Blum, 29 July 1979.
Joint statement following the visit of Egyptian Defence Minister Ali, 31 July 1979.
Opening statements by heads of delegations to the autonomy talks, Haifa, 6 August 1979.
Letter from Secretary of State Vance to Representative Zablocki on Israel's use of U.S. weapons in Lebanon, 8 August 1979.
Draft resolution S/13514 and statement in the Security Council by Ambassador Blum on Palestinian rights, 23 August 1979.
President Sadat's visit to Haifa: welcoming address by President Navon, reply by President Sadat, address by President Navon and reply by President Sadat, joint press conference Sadat-Begin, addresses by Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, press conference with President Sadat, departure statements by Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, 4-6 September 1979.
Joint interview with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin on French Television, 7 September 1979.
Excerpts from an interview with Chief of Staff Eitan on IDF Radio, 8 September 1979.
Address by Foreign Minister Dayan at the dinner offered by Foreign Minister Genscher, Bonn, 10 September 1979.
Statements in the White House by President Carter, Vice President Mubarak and Foreign Minister Dayan on the first anniversary of the Camp David Accords, 17 September 1979.
Address in the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Dayan, 27 September 1979.
Excerpts from an interview with Foreign Minister Dayan on Israel Television, 28 September 1979.
Summary of a briefing by Foreign Minister Dayan, 8 October 1979.
Address to the Council of Europe by Foreign Minister Dayan, 10 October 1979.
Cabinet communique on settlements, 14 October 1979.
Interview with Foreign Minister Dayan on Israel Television, 19 October 1979.
Letter of resignation of Foreign Minister Dayan and interviewwith him, 21 October 1979.
Letter from Prime Minister Begin to President Sadat on the occasion of the second anniversary of Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, 18 November 1979.
General Assembly Resolution 34/65, Question of Palestine, 29 November 1979.
Security Council Resolution 456 (1979), extending UNDOF's mandate and note by the President of the Council, 30 November 1979.
General Assembly Resolution 34/70, the Situation in the Middle East, 6 December 1979.
General Assembly Resolution 34/89, Israeli Nuclear Armament, 11 December 1979 and statement by Ambassador Blum, 4 December 1979.
Security Council Resolution 459 (1979) extending UNIFIL's mandate, 19 December 1979.
Excerpts from a meeting between Prime Minister Begin and the editors of the Israeli press, 21 December 1979.
Joint press conference Sadat-Begin, Aswan, 10 January 1980.
Statement in the Knesset by prime Minister Begin on his talks with President Sadat, 16 January 1980.
The Israeli model for the self-governing authority, 16 January 1980.
Statement by Interior Minister Burg on the autonomy talks, 17 January 1980.
Communique issued at the conclusion of the 8th round of the autonomy talks, Herzliya, 1 February 1980.
Excerpts from press luncheon with Prime Minister Begin, 7 February 1980.
Statement by Prime Minister Begin on the situation in Jerusalem, 4 February 1980, and letter from Ambassador Blum to Secretary General Waldheim on the situation in Jerusalem, 13 February 1980.
Statement by Ambassador Mortada upon presentation of his credentials and reply by President Navon, 26 February 1980.
Statement in the Security Council by Ambassador Blum on the situation in the territories, 27 February 1980.
Security Council Resolution 465 (1980) on the situation in the territories, 1 March 1980.
Statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin on Security Council Resolution 465 (1980), 6 March 1980.
Foreign Ministry's statement on the PLO's relations with Austria, 14 March 1980.
White House statement on invitation of Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat and excerpts from press briefing, 19 March 1980.
Statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by Secretary of State Vance on U.S. policy in the Middle East, 20 March 1980.
Interview with Foreign Minister Shamir on Israel Radio, 20 March 1980.
Interview with Prime Minister Begin by French speaking journalists, 21 March 1980.
Statement by Prime Minister Begin on the occasion of the first anniversary of the signing of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, 26 March 1980.
Interview with Prime Minister Begin on Israel Television, 26 March 1980.
Foreign Ministry statement on Jerusalem, 2 April 1980.
Statement in the Security Council by Ambassador Blum on the situation in Lebanon, 14 April 1980.
Press conference with Prime Minister Begin prior to his departure for Washington, 14 April 1980.
Exchange of toasts by President Carter and Prime Minister Begin, the White House, 15 April 1980.
Interview with Prime Minister Begin on ABC Television, 20 April 1980.
Foreign Ministry statement on the Council of Europe Resolution, 24 April 1980.
Security Council Resolution 467 (1980) extending UNIFIL's mandate, 24 April 1980.
Excerpts from an interview with Prime Minister Begin in Yediot Achronot, 25 April 1980.
Letter from Prime Minister Begin to Norway's Prime Minister Nordli on the situation in Lebanon, 29 April 1980.
Security Council draft resolution S/13911 on the Question of Palestine, 30 April 1980, and the statement of U.S. Ambassador McHenry.
Statements by the heads of the Israel, Egypt and U.S. delegations at the ninth round of the autonomy talks, Herzliya, 1 May 1990.
Statement in the Knesset by Defense Minister Weizman on the situation in the territories, 5 May 1980.
Excerpts from the concluding press conference of the ninth round of the autonomy talks, 7 May 1980.
Security Council Resolution 468 (1980) on the expulsion of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, 8 May 1980.
Statement by Prime Minister Begin on the suspension of the autonomy talks, 12 May 1980.
Interview with Foreign Minister Shamir on Israel Radio, 16 May 1980.
Security Council Resolution 469 (1980) on the expulsion of the Mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, 20 May 1980.
Letter from Prime Minister Begin to Secretary General Waldheim, 21 May 1980.
Security Council Resolution 470 (1980) extending UNDOF's mandate, 30 May 1980.
Excerpts from statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin on Israel's foreign policy, 2 June 1980.
Security Council Resolution 471 (1980) on attacks on the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah and El-Bireh, 5 June 1980 and Cabinet resolution, 8 June 1980.
Letter from Prime Minister Begin to a group of Members of the British House of Commons on self-determination, 10 June 1980.
Resolution of the heads of government and ministers for foreign affairs of the European Council (Venice Declaration), 13 June 1980 and the Cabinet statement, 15 June 1980.
Interview with Prime Minister Begin in Le Figaro, 14 June 1980.
Security Council Resolution 483 (1980) extending UNIFIL's mandate, 17 June 1980.
Excerpts from statement in the Knesset by Foreign Minister Shamir, 19 June 1980.
Excerpts from an interview with Prime Minister Begin on IDF Radio, 20 June 1980.
Security Council Resolution 476 (1980) on Jerusalem, 30 June 1980, Israel's reaction and U.S. statement, 1 July 1980.
Address by Foreign Minister Shamir at the Leonard Davis Institute of International Relations on Israel's foreign policy, 7 July 1980.
Statement by Prime Minister Begin in response to President Sadat's interview in Readers Digest, 15 July 1980.
Statement in the General Assembly by Ambassador Blum, 23 July 1980.
Foreign Ministry statement on the supply of uranium to Iraq, 28 July 1980.
Foreign Ministry statement on the transfer of the Venezuelan embassy from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, 28 July 1980.
General Assembly Resolution ES-7/2, Question of Palestine, 29 July 1980.
Statement in the Knesset by Foreign Minister Shamir, 30 July 1980.
Basic Law - Jerusalem, Knesset Resolution, 30 July 1980.
Letter from Prime Minister Begin to President Sadat, 4 August 1980.
Letter from Prime Minister Begin to President Sadat, 18 August 1980.
Statement in the Security Council by Ambassador Blum on Jerusalem, 20 August 1980.
Security Council Resolution 478 (1980) on Jerusalem, 20 August 1980 and Foreign Ministry reaction, 21 August 1980, and the Cabinet reaction, 24 August 1980.
Address by Foreign Minister Shamir at the Herut Central Committee, 24 August 1980.
Foreign Ministry reaction to the transfer of the Dutch embassy from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, 26 August 1980.
Statement on the resumption of the autonomy talks, 4 September 1980.
Resolution of the Islamic foreign ministers, Fez, 20 September 1980.
Address in the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Shamir, 29 September 1980.
Excerpts from statement in the Knesset by Prime Minister Begin on Jewish communities in the Diaspora, 13 October 1980.
Interview with Foreign Minister Shamir in Maariv, 17 October 1980.
Excerpts from an address by Professor Werblowsky in UNESCO's fourth committee, Belgrade, 20 October 1980.
Address by President Navon at a dinner offered by President Sadat, Cairo, 26 October 1980.
Address to members of the National Democratic Party of Egypt by President Navon, Cairo, 29 October 1980.
Cable from President Sadat to President Navon, 4 November 1980.
Cables from Prime Minister Begin to President Carter and to President-Elect Reagan, 5 November 1980.
Press conference with Prime Minister Begin prior to his departure for the U.S., 9 November 1980.
Interview with Prime Minister Begin on NBC Television, 16 November 1980.
Security Council Resolution 481 (1980) extending UNDOF's mandate, 26 November 1980.
General Assembly Resolution 35/45 financing UNDOF, 1 December 1980.
General Assembly Resolution 351115 financing UNIFIL, 10 December 1980.
General Assembly Resolution 35/147, Israeli Nuclear Armament, 12 December 1980.
General Assembly Resolution 35/169, Question of Palestine, 15 December 1980 and Foreign Minister reaction, 16 December 1980.
General Assembly Resolution 35/207, Situation in the Middle East, 16 December 1980.
Security Council Resolution 483 (1980) extending UNIFIL's mandate, 17 December 1980. 139.
Joint statement Begin-Sadat on the autonomy talks, 18 December 1980.
Security Council Resolution 484 (1980) on the mayors of Hebron and Halhoul, 19 December 1980.
Annex I - Summarized minutes recording main subjects discussed and agreed upon between Egypt and Israel concerning the framework and process of preparing and concluding various agreements between the two states in order to implement full normalization, Cairo, 3 February 1980.
Annex II - Summarized minutes recording the main points dealt with in the meeting of the High Committee, Tel Aviv, 6-7 February 1980.
Annex III - Memorandum of understanding regarding the operation of the airlines of Egypt and Israel and other related matters, Cairo, 14 February 1980.
Annex IV - Memorandum of understanding between Egypt and Israel on telecommunications and postal services, Tel Aviv, 17 February 1980.
Annex V - Memorandum of agreements between Egypt and Israel on tourism, Cairo, 10 March 1980.
Annex VI - Memorandum of understanding between Egypt and Israel on the promotion of agricultural cooperation, Tel Aviv, 24 March 1980.
Annex VII - Memorandum of understanding between Egypt and Israel on land transportation, sea transportation and ports, Tel Aviv, 30 March 1980.
Annex VIII - Cultural agreement between Israel and Egypt, Cairo, 8 May 1980.
Annex IX - Agreement on trade and commerce between Israel and Egypt, Cairo, 8 May 1980.
Annex X - Air transport agreement between Israel and Egypt, Cairo, May 1980.
Encuesta sobre los 'enemigos' percibidos por el pueblo egipcio (BBC, November 1, 2006) que origina Rethinking the Egypt-Israel "Peace" Treaty (Daniel Pipes, November 21, 2006) que es completado con The Egypt-Israel "Peace" Treaty: Updates Daniel Pipes (November 21, 2006) con puestas al día que llegan a 2011.
Los Levantamientos en Egipto, de comienzos de 2011, que, en el marco de lo que se ha llamado la Primavera Árabe, acaba con la caída de Mubarak, junto al Acuerdo Fatah-Jamás para formar un gobierno de unidad palestino de mayo de 2011, también tensan fuertemente la situación del Acuerdo de Paz Israelo-Palestino.
La llegada al poder en Egipto de la Hermandad de Musulmanes en 2012, junto al significativo incremento de la infiltración de terroristas, fundamentalistas y traficantes de armas y personas en el Sinaí y el aumento de los ataques terroristas en y desde la zona, tensa al máximo la presión sobre el Tratado de Paz: Sinai, the New Egypt, and the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty (Alan Baker, August 22, 2012).