Y el fuego de la protesta iniciado en Túnez se propagó por todo el mundo árabe. Así, luego le tocó el turno al Egipto de Mubarak. En este caso los levantamientos comenzaron con convocatorias lanzadas por un exempleado de Google, Wael Ghonim, el 25 de enero de 2011, #Jan25 en Twitter, Día de la Policía, aunque una militante del prodemocrático 6 de abril, Asmaa Mahfouz, dice que fue un tuit suyo el que sirvió de espoleta (por cierto; el 13 de agosto de 2011, los militares (bueno, un fiscal militar) todavía en el poder, imputan a Mahfouz por incitación a la violencia contra los militares, como comenta B. Rubin). El dia anterior, 24 de enero, la revista Time publicaba Is Egypt About to Have a Facebook Revolution? (Abigail Hauslohner). Pero lo cierto es que tanto Ghonim como su compañero Abdel Rahman Mansour tienen vínculos con La Hermandad, como expone (eso y mucho más) con profundidad Raymond Stock en "The Donkey, the Camel, and the Facebook Scam: How the Muslim Brotherhood Conquered Egypt and Conned the World," (July, 2012)
In this circus of misinformation and delusion, it is not surprising that one of the most basic common beliefs of how the revolution began should be founded on a falsely mythic separation of secular and Islamic forces. For among the leaders of the January 25th revolt were the two co-founders of the famous Facebook page that helped to launch it, Kullana Khaled Sa`id (We Are All Khaled Sa`id), named after the early social media martyr from Alexandria. On March 13, 2011, the Egyptian channel ON-TV, in a program called “Egypt in a Week” (Masr fi usb'), hosted by Hassan Fouda and Amani al-Khayaat, featured as the evening’s main guest Essam El-Erian, one of the top members of both the Freedom and Justice Party (of which Mohammed Mursi is president), and of the Muslim Brotherhood that formed it.
During his conversation with al-Khayaat, El-Erian chose to reveal something that few knew about the initiators of the Egyptian revolution. He said that both of the men who ran “We are all Khaled Sa`id” on FB, Dubai-based Google executive Wael Ghonim, and an Alexandrian activist, Abdel-Rahman Mansour, had links to the MB.
El-Erian boasted that Mansour’s “political loyalty” then belonged to his organization. (He specifically used the term “al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin”—the Muslim Brotherhood—and not the Freedom and Justice Party, though at any rate there is no daylight between the two.) Even more startlingly, he said of Ghonim, who had seized the world’s imagination with his charismatic and emotional TV appearances, his hip but shy demeanor, and his brave defiance of the regime: “He joined us for a while, as a muhibb,” but had since left the group.
According to Eric Trager, who has done state-of-the-art field studies of the organization before and during the uprising, in a piece on the MB’s organization and recruitment methods in Foreign Affairs:
When an aspirant is first admitted into the Muslim Brotherhood, he becomes a muhib, “lover” or
“follower.” During this period, which typically lasts six months but can last as long as four years, the muhib enters a local usra, or “family,” a regular meeting group where his piety and ideology are closely monitored. “At the muhib level, they try to educate you and improve your morals,” Islam Lotfy, 33, another leading Muslim Brotherhood youth activist, told me. “If there is no improvement, they won’t take you.”
While there had been rumors of his connection to the group, this was the first and so far only known public confirmation of it—which attracted little public comment until now. Perhaps in response to a July 2, 2012 piece in Pajamas Media by Barry Rubin (in which he quotes this writer on the contents of El-Erian’s interview, above), on July 10 Ghonim issued an official statement confirming that he had become an MB muhibb when he was aged 17, and remained one “for a year and a half.” However, he did not reveal who was in his usra (family) or why he left, and denied that he now belongs to the Ikhwan. (As Trager states, one must spend at least five to eight years of closely supervised indoctrination, training and personal testing, to have become a full-fledged member of the organization.)
In any case, El-Erian’s disclosures utterly destroy the fiction that there was or is a clear separation between the “secular-liberal” youth cadre and the Islamists. Essentially, El-Erian is bragging none too subtly that the MB played a key role in launching the uprising. (... y sigue con mucho más)
Un mes después, y tras dieciocho días consecutivos de manifestaciones multitudinarias en la Plaza Tahrir (Libertad) de el Cairo, y en otras ciudades, habían logrado que Mubarak abandonara el poder el 11 de febrero de 2011... y en gran medida los militares 'recuperaron' parte de la influencia que en los últimos tiempos habían perdido a manos del círculo de tecnócratas reformadores próximo al hijo de Mubarak, Gamal.
Como en el caso de Túnez, el cambio se produce porque el ejército lo apoya. No obstante, siguen las manifestaciones y el 9 de abril vuelven a producirse dos asesinatos en ellas.
Algunos dicen que el final del régimen estuvo inducido por el intento de Mubarak de pasar el poder a su hijo Gamal, aunque otros dicen que no poca influencia tuvo el intento de éste de traer un nuevo grupo de gente y nuevas ideas en la gestión administrativa y económica de Egipto, perjudicando no poco al viejo estamento y a los intereses y privilegios económicos de los militares.
La foto está tomada en la Plaza Tahrir, centro de las protestas, y refleja bien la situación resultante: equilibrio arriesgado y alocado en la 'farola floja', donde la ilusión y la insensatez pueden a la razón. Veremos cómo acaba, que no se sabe cómo terminó el tipo de la bandera... aunque si hubiera sufrido daño serio probablemente lo sabríamos... pero el cielo claro apenas esconde la asfixia que el calor provoca y que claramente se refleja en el horizonte bajo.
Es tan claro, breve y esencial este artículo del profesor Barry Rubin del 1 de mayo de 2011, que resume la situación y sus implicaciones para Israel, el Medio Oriente y Occidente, que vale la pena leerlo completo: Egypt: Pillar of Fire and Political Plagues Are Bad Signs.
También es lectura obligada la entrevista larga y fantástica en la que Lee Smith aborda los principales aspectos de la situación, en esencia y con perspicacia: After the fall of the Pharoah (Michael J. Totten entrevista a Lee Smith, June 13, 2011).
El Ministro de AAEE del nuevo gobierno (nabril 2011): Dr. Nabil Elaraby.
Ya bien entrado el cambio, a finales de mayo los militares dicen que pasarán el poder a la autoridad civil que surja tras las elecciones:
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) attempted on Sunday to reassure Egyptians that it would not remain in power after elections and that it would hand over power to the elected civilian authority.
In a statement posted on its Facebook page, the SCAF said it "will not seize power in Egypt, out of respect for legitimacy and in commitment to the principles and values of the prestigious military establishment."
The statement continued by saying that the military "deals with Egyptian national forces without bias or exclusion in order to reach a national consensus through continuous and direct communication."
The statement added that “rumors and accusations” directed at the SCAF aim to “drive a wedge between the army and the people.”
The SCAF stressed that it had “sided with and supported the revolution since day one”, and that it had not sought power in Egypt.
The council continued by saying that it was working hard to “end the transitional period and hand over the country to a civilian authority elected by the people.”
The statement noted “the importance of a national consensus among all political forces on any demands, so that they can be presented to the people”.
It emphasized its refusal of any particular views being imposed on the people without their consent.
The statement pointed to the need for “the unification of efforts” and for “leaving any differences behind," concluding that “the people have the final word”, which would be determined through the ballot box.
El 19 de marzo de 2011, los egipcios votan en referéndum la reforma de seis artículos de su Constitución. El 77% vota a favor de la reforma, como pedían La Hermandad y los salafistas (pues la reforma no toca el artículo 2º que establece la sharía como base de toda la legislación egipcia) y los militares; los 'jóvenes' e incluso El Baradei y Amr Moussa se oponían, pues querían que se redactara una constitución completamente nueva. Queda claro que los activistas jóvenes, educados y laicos que inicialmente propulsaron la revolución aideológica ya no son la fuerza política que marca el paso, al menos no ahora, si lo fueron alguna vez, y cada vez más se enfrentan a los intereses del establishment militar. Relato bastante completo del proceso. Los auténticos promotores del alzamiento. Y siete mitos populares sobre la revolución, según un optmiista joven egipcio muy activo en la misma.
El 25 dic 2012 se aprueba la nueva Constitución egipcia
El 25 de diciembre de 2012 la Comisión Electoral anunció la aprobación, vota algo menos del 40% del censo y 2 de cada 3 votantes apoyaron la aprobación, de la nueva Constitución de Egipto, en la que se impone la sharia como principal fuente de legislación.
En general y Ley electoral
Parece que las elecciones a la asamblea constituyente se celebrarán por fin el 28 de noviembre de 2011, para elegir a 100 diputados que tendrán el mandato de redactar una nueva constitución antes de abril de 2013, a partir de cuyo momento se convocarían las elecciones a la Presidencia del país. Pero los militares (el Supremo Consejo Militar en el poder ahora) quieren asegurarse veto sobre el texto constitucional para lo que se han dirigido a los partidos pidiendo (o imponiendo) que se obliguen a aceptar ciertos artículos en la redacción de la nueva constitución. OJO, tras los nuevos incidentes de mediados de noviembre de 2011 con unas docenas de muertes en la Plaza Tahrir causados al parecer por los militares, parece que la junta militar se echa atrás en sus exigencias de controlar los cambios constitucionales y avanza un nuevo plan, que no está claro que salga adelante, en el que, manteniendo las elecciones del 28 de noviembre, la constitución se aprobaría y las elecciones presidenciales se celebrarían no más tarde de junio de 2012. Ahora deciden formar un Consejo Consultivo Civil que colaborará durante el proceso constituyente. Y curiosidades sobre las papeletas electorales.
El gobierno provisional (los militares) aprueba un nuevo Proyecto de Ley de Régimen electoral para el Parlamento que, en línea con lo que ocurre en Alemania, determina que la mitad de los escaños se asignen por listas de partidos y la otra mitad individualmente: Egypt cabinet approves draft parliamentary vote laws (Jul 7, 2011). Una nota al respecto (Barry Rubin, July 8, 2011)
Resultados electorales a la Asamblea del Pueblo (cámara baja) (nov 2011-ene 2012)
El mejor cuadro resumen con los resultados de las 3 rondas electorales que yo he visto es el de Al Yazira.
Egipto: militares e islamistas, de la mano (Daniel Pipes y Cynthia Farahat, 12 dic 2011)
Según el comité electoral, la Hermandad Musulmana recibió el 37% de los votos en la primera vuelta de las elecciones egipcias; los salafistas, que llevan un programa islamista todavía más extremo, obtuvieron el 24%; así que juntos sumaron un estupefaciente 61% del voto.
En la segunda vuelta, los resultados electorales (24 dic 2011) a la Asamblea del Pueblo han sido aun más favorables para los islamistas radicales, como analiza Rubin (Dec 27, 2011):
Casi el 80% de los musulmanes egipcios en nueve provincias votaron a partidos islamistas radicales en la segunda vuelta de las elecciones en Egipto. Apenas un 5% votaron por un partido islámico moderado y alrededor de un 15% por partidos liberales.
Eso lo dice todo. En el total de votos - esto es, incluyendo a los votantes cristianos - el 70% apoyaron a islamistas radicales, 47% (4 millones [largos]) a la Hermandad de Musulmanes (86 de 180 escaños, por ahora; puede que obtengan más) y 32% a los salafistas [partido Nour] (3,2 millones [largos]; el Washington Post subestimó seriamente sus votos).
El Wafd, partido liberal (pero no abiertamente anti-islamista), obtuvo 1 millón [largo]; el liberal Bloque Egipcio casi 800.000 y el Wasat, partido moderadamente islámico, 370.000 [escasos].
Aunque Daniel Pipes sospecha de masivo fraude electoral, el 21 de enero de 2012 se anuncian los resultados finales: los islamistas arrasan:
La Hermandad (47%, 235 escaños de 498 - Al Yazira le da solo 223 escaños; 10,1 MM votos), a través de su Partido Libertad y Justicia (PLJ), islamista, integrado en la Alianza Democrática,
Al-Wasat ("Partido del Centro") (2%, 10 escaños), islamista,
Al-Nur (25%, 125 escaños - Al Yazira le da solo 111; 7,5 MM votos), salafistas,
Construcción y Desarrollo (3%, 13 escaños), salafistas,
Autenticidad (1%, 3 escaños), salafistas,
el Wafd (9%, 38 escaños; 2,4 MM votos), el más antiguo partido secular de Egipto,
Bloque Egipcio (7%, 34 escaños; 2,4 MM votos), coalición encabezada por un partido fundado por el cristiano Naguib Sawiris,
Partido Reforma y Desarrollo (2%, 8 escaños), partido conservador del sobrino del expresidente Anuar al Sadat
Partido de la Revolución Continúa (1%, 7 escaños), nuevo partido liberal.
El primer presidente del Parlamento será el secretario general del PLJ, Mohamed Saad el Katatni, según un acuerdo anunciado esta semana con el resto de fuerzas.
Otra lista más completa de los resultados, aunque el total que ofrece no suma bien del todo.
Resultados electorales al Consejo de la Shura (cámara alta) (ene- 2012)
Tras el final de los comicios para la Asamblea del Pueblo, la votación para elegir a los miembros del Consejo de la Shura (Cámara Alta) comenzará el 29 de enero de 2012. Ya el nombre es indicativo, shura, concepto claramente islamista.
Egypt's Shura Council elections kick off (Ahram Online, Jan 29, 2012) - La shura tendrá 270 escaños, 180 elegidos directamente por los votantes y 90 designados por el jefe del estado, y un mandato de 6 años. La elección tiene dos fases: la primera del 29-30 de enero, con su segunda vuelta el 7 de febrero; y la segunda fase del 14-15 de febrero, con su segunda vuelta el 22 de febrero. Se espera que unos 25 millones de egipcios voten en estas elecciones.
El Tribunal Supremo anula las elecciones y disuelve el Parlamento (14 jun 2012)
El 14 de junio de 2012, el Tribunal Constitucional Supremo egipcio anula las elecciones parlamentarias celebradas y disuelve el Parlamento. Por ahora, se mantiene la Elección Presidencial prevista para estos días, aunque el mismo tribunal también ha resuelto, en otro fallo dictado el mismo día, que el candidato del “establishment”, Ahmad Shafiq, puede concurrir a estas elecciones presidenciales, de las que ya se ha celebrado la primera vuelta, así que fácil que también se anulen y se vuelva a empezar. Egypt's Shocking Legal Judgments (David Schenker y Eric Trager, June 14, 2012)
Parece un golpe de estado con cobertura legal, en el que la junta militar se hace con el control absoluto de la autoridad. Así lo comentan en BREAKING: Court Dissolves Egyptian Parliament; Army Takes Over; Civil War? (Barry Rubin, 14 jun 2012) y en otro artículo del mismo autor.
Cairo’s Judicial Coup (Nathan J. Brown, June 14, 2012)
Candidatos, Partidos y Coaliciones
En Muslim Brotherhood Makes Fools of Naive West; Two Smart Egyptians Fear Future (Barry Rubin, Nov 1, 2011) el autor nos pone al día sobre las distintas coaliciones formadas por los partidos que concurrirán a las elecciones así como sobre sus respectivas tendencias políticas.
Egypt: If A Country of 80 Million People Falls And The Media Is Deaf, Does Anyone Hear? (Barry Rubin, May 10, 2011).
Aunque antes (Apr 10) Rubin había apostado por Amr Moussa como Presidente, partiendo de que La Hermandad, como había anunciado, no se presentaría aunque dominaría el debate y la acción política, luego (May 15) prevé la alta probabilidad de que gane el candidato 'independiente' de La Hermandad, Abu Fatah.
Hasta ahora pensaba que el próximo Presidente de Egipto podría ser Amr Moussa, con una fuerte presencia islamista en el Parlamento pero no una mayoría, ni de cerca. Pero ahora el propio Moussa predice que La Hermandad logrará, junto a su aliados, la mayoría. E incluso, más recientemente, resulta posible que un líder de La Hermandad sea elegido presidente.
Polls Prove Strength, Not Weakness, of Islamists in Egypt (Barry Rubin, August 4, 2011):
Here are my adjusted figures for parties based on voters who back a party likely to win seats (more than 5 percent support in the polls). I am not saying this analysis is perfect (for example, a party with 5 percent might get 2.5 percent of the seats due to half being elected on a national level) but it does give a good general idea of the situation.
1, Islamists: 34% Muslim Brotherhood (Freedom and Justice Party). Note that Salafist (even more radical) Islamist groups don’t do well. Islamist voters are uniting behind the Brotherhood despite all the talk of splits.
2. Pro-Old Regime: 14% National Democratic Party, Mubarak’s old party.
3. Liberal, pro-democratic
14% Free Egyptians Party, a liberal, anti-Islamist party founded by big businessman Naguib Sawiris.
10% Justice Party. This is the party most associated with the Facebook kids and well-known opposition leaders.
22% Al-Wafd Party, historic liberal party.
Total for liberals: 46% That is impressive but far less than it seems. Keep in mind, though, that it is better to have 34% for one candidate than 46% for three. In a district with that outcome the Brotherhood would win.
Moreover, liberals are badly divided. The Wafd has at times toyed with a Brotherhood alliance, while the Justice Party has some far left leanings. The Free Egyptians seem to be a really serious anti-Islamist party but it is largely dependent on the largesse of one man. If liberals got one-third of the seats they could block the Brotherhood from power but not from having tremendous influence. By the same token, the Brotherhood would block a liberal majority. These three parties don’t like each other though if they cooperate and make election agreements that are implemented this might really change things.
4. So far i’ve left out the divided radical left, four parties combining hardline anti-American, neo-Marxist and radical nationalist views: Egyptian Labor, ElGhad Party, Tagamoe, and ElKarama. All together, they take 19 percent. But since they are rivals they would probably get about 10% of the seats.
Muhamad El Baradei
@ElBaradei en twitter
Al-Azhar University
Egypt’s Religious Establishment Takes On The Muslim Brotherhood (Barry Rubin, July 3, 2011)
In a major new development an Islamic force has arisen to challenge the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and support a more moderate regime in that country. This is a surprising opponent but the only one that could be of significance: al-Azhar University. Why is Egypt’s Islamic establishment taking on Egypt’s Islamists? Simple: survival and self-interest.
(...)
For the last few months, following Mubarak’s downfall, the al-Azhar leadership appeared ready to cut its own deal with the Brotherhood.
But the Brotherhood pushed too hard, demanding a totally new leadership for Egypt’s religious institutions. Facing a choice between resistance and total surrender (getting fired and perhaps facing a firing squad), al-Azhar’s heads decided to oppose the fundamental transformation of Egyptian society by the Brotherhood.
Thus, al-Azhar’s Grand Imam Ahmad al-Tayyib, whose resignation the Brotherhood had demanded, has issued a declaration on Egypt’s future favoring a “modern” and “democratic nation-state” based on a constitution including rights for women, checks and balances among governmental institutions, freedom of speech, and other such things.
Tayyib is allied with Egypt’s other leading official cleric, Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa. Both men were closely associated with the Mubarak regime, so a sweeping change in religious institutions would get them fired and possibly even facing legal charges under a Brotherhood-dominated government.
Al-Azhar's declaration: A new leap into politics? (Noha El-Hennawy, June 30, 2011)
La Hermandad de Musulmanes - Partido de la Libertad y la Justicia - Abul Futuh o Mohamed Salim al-Awa
Aquí más sobre La Hermandad en Egipto.
Egypt says Muslim Brotherhood Legal (June 7, 2011)
Brotherhood leader: We shall apply Islamic sharia (Khalaf Ali Hassan, May 26, 2011) - Sobhi Saleh:
“Terms like civil or secular state are misleading,” he said. “Islamic sharia is the best system for Muslims and non-Muslims."
Claro que para esconderse un poco, no mucho, en lugar de imponer la sharia a menudo hablan de imponer un "punto de referencia cultural islámico (marji'iyah)". Así lo dice también la cabeza del partido de La Hermandad, el Partido de la Libertad y la Justicia (PLJ), Mohamed Mursi:
“We only use Islam as the basis of our party … which means that our general framework is Islamic sharia … We don’t issue religious rules in individual cases,”
“We want to engage in a dialogue not a monologue,” he said.“The Brotherhood does not seek to control the parliament … We want a strong parliament … with different political forces.”
[But he said Islamic law could have a place in a civil state in Egypt, where about 10 percent of the 80 million population are Christians.] "Islamic sharia guarantees the rights of all people, Muslims and non-Muslims."
"The Egyptian constitution is not the constitution of the Brotherhood but ... of the Egyptian people," "[the constitution] says Egypt's legislation is based on the principles of sharia, and not its details."
Pero Reuters, como si aun no hubieran aprendido eso del doble lenguaje, coloca esas declaraciones bajo este titular: Muslim Brotherhood says it won’t force Islamic law on Egypt (Reuters, May 30). En culquier caso, el viernes 3 de junio los islamistas se manifiestan pidiendo la imposición de la sharía y un turismo que respete el islam.
La Hermandad y su vástago político, el PLJ, han atraído la mayor parte de la atención y el temor de los liberales egipcios, pero el ala islamista del espectro político cuenta cada vez con más movimientos marginales que anuncian que concurrirán a las elecciones parlamentarias de septiembre: Egypt’s Islamic fringe takes the plunge into politics (David E. Miller, May 27, 2011). Públicamente, muchos islamistas esconden los símbolos de su fanatismo, pero los críticos piensan que eso es una mera puesta en escena. Así, Nagib Gabra'il:
"The situation is extremely dangerous."
En los días previos a las elecciones de finales de noviembre de 2011, y tras los últimos altercados graves entre la Junta Militar y los manifestantes en la Plaza Tahrir, se publica en España este pasable artículo: Los islamistas se burlan de Tahrir para adueñarse de la primavera árabe (Ismael Monzón, 27 nov 2011).
Aunque inicialmente La Hermandad dijo, para no asustar a los idiotas útiles occidentales, que no presentaría candidato a la Presidencia, pues apoyaría a Muhamad El Baradei, con el que luego rompería con ocasión del referéndum para la reforma constitucional, y que solo disputaría un 30% de los escaños parlamentarios en liza, luego poco a poco ha ido reconociendo que:
irá a por el 50%: Muslim Brotherhood to Contest Parliamentary Seats (April 30),
y eso solo directamente, pues mediante coaliciones con otros salafistas podría ir a por otro 5-10%: la propia Hermandad de Musulmanes anunció que el diez de abril mediaría entre salafistas y sufíes (dos ramas del islam suní) para acabar con sus diferencias y evitar el conflicto armado entre ellos, que podría dañar los intereses de los islamistas suníes, esto es, a la propia Hermandad; y luego parece que llega a una coalición electoral con ellos en busca de un estado islámico (May 14), entre ellos con la Jama’a al-Islamiyya, como explica Sobji Saleh, abogado de La Hermandad:
“Los recientes ataques a los grupos islámicos es lo que nos ha unido”
y también irá a por la Presidencia... aunque dicen que su candidato, Abdel Moneim Abul Futuh, prominente miembro de La Hermandad, se presentará como independiente: Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood member says he will seek presidency (Marwa Awad y Abdelrahman Youssef, May 12). Barry Rubin escribe sobre el asunto: By The End of This Year Egypt Might Be Run By a Radical Islamist Regime (May 15).
Pero el propio Futh parece dispuesto a retirarse a favor de al-Awa, de cuyas opiniones nos dan cuenta aquí (June 27, 2011): "We need a normal relationship with Israel,” “As an enemy with a hudna between us.” - Sobre la posibilidad de que al-Awa sea el tapado de la La Hermandad ver aquí (June 29, 2011)
Al final Futuh va por libre y por La Hermandad se presenta Mohamed Mursi.
Como resumen Caroline Glick (June 3, 2011):
And make no mistake. They [the Muslim Brotherhood] intend to take over. As they did in the lead up to March's constitutional referendum, the Brotherhood is using its mosques as campaign offices. The message is clear: If you are a good Muslim you will vote for the Muslim Brotherhood.
When Mubarak was overthrown in January, the Brotherhood announced it would only contest 30% of the parliamentary seats. Last month the percentage rose to 50. In all likelihood, in September the Brotherhood will contest and win the majority of the seats in the Egyptian parliament.
When Mubarak was overthrown, the Brotherhood announced it would not run a candidate for president. And when Brotherhood Shura governing council member and Physicians Union leader Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh announced last month that he is running for president, the Brotherhood quickly denied that he is the movement's candidate. But there is no reason to believe them.
According to a report Thursday in Egypt's Al- Masry al-Youm's English edition, the Brotherhood is playing to win. They are invoking the strategies of the movement's founder, Hassan al-Banna, for establishing an Islamic state. His strategy had three stages: indoctrination, empowerment and implementation. Al-Masry al-Youm cites Khairat al- Shater, the Brotherhood's "organizational architect," as having recently asserted that the Brotherhood is currently in the second stage and moving steadily towards the third stage.
En todo caso, dice que está bien preparada sea cual sea el sistema electoral que se use: Brotherhood: We have plans to deal with dual election system (June 4, 2011)
La Hermandad exhibe a Rafik Habib, cristiano que se ha unido a su PLJ, como su vicepresidente y encargado de AAEE, el cuál inculpa a la iglesia copta de diversas maldades y lanza esta y otras advertencias a los cristianos - Asharq Al-Awsat Talks to Freedom and Justice party VP Dr. Rafik Habib (Marwa Sabry, May 25, 2011):
"... the Christian community's absence from the political parties that carry an Islamic cultural point of reference (marji'iyah) will deepen the antagonism that actually exists between that community and the Islamic current.
Pero empiezan a manifestarse discrepancias (Barry Rubin las reconoce pero relativiza) entre el liderazgo de La Hermandad, más próximo al poder y los militares, y sus juventudes, que, en algunas cosas, parecen aproximarse a los denominados 'seculares': Rifts in the Muslim Brotherhood Amid Growing Anarchy in Egypt (Zvi Mazel, May 30, 2011):
The leaders of the demonstrators and the secular opposition parties believe that the Military Council is not very keen on executing radical reforms, and purposely acts slowly. Consequently, on May 27, a second Friday of Anger was held across Egypt in order to pressure the Council, and especially its leader, General Mohamed Tantawi. The Muslim Brotherhood announced that it would not take part in the demonstrations, thus reinforcing the growing gap with the secular opposition. But to their great surprise, the young guard of their movement decided to participate, against the will of the supreme leader. This is the first sign of a rift within the Muslim Brotherhood, which is known for its intransigent hierarchy and for unquestioned obedience to its leaders since its establishment 83 years ago.
El temor a que La Hermandad y los salafistas se apoderen de la revolución empieza a calar incluso entre los egipcios (May 30).
También hay gente decepcionada con La Hermandad: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Discontents (Michael J. Totten, August 11, 2011)
Coalición de La Hermandad con el Wafd (partido liberal)
El Partido Wafd es el gran partido liberal que fue central en la historia de Egipto, desde mediados de los años 20 hasta la revolución del año 1952, y gran esperanza para que Egipto se convirtiera en un estado moderno, democrático y razonablemente secular. Pero a medidos de los 50 fue echado a la cuneta, como otros grupos semejantes, por los nacionalistas radicales (los naseristas) y los islamistas radicales (la Hermandad) y nunca se ha recuperado, a pesar de toda la expectación generada en la plaza Tahrir. De hecho, el tradicionalmente moderado y liberal Wafd se ha asociado ahora con la Hermandad para las elecciones que vienen (septiembre de 2011), como ha anunciado la propia Hermandad: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood forms coalition with liberal party (Leila Fadel, June 13, 2011)... aunque ahora (Oct 8, 2011) anuncian que no irán juntos... porque los de La Hermandad no les daba suficientes puestos en las listas.
Y los coaligados del Wafd se ponen rápidamente manos a la obra: Wafd Party chief criticizes Salafis' lack of political experience (AlMasryAlYoum, June 13, 2011):
Al-Sayed al-Badawy, jefe del Wafd, ha criticado a los grupos salafistas diciendo que desconocen gran parte de la terminología política. Durante una reunión con el embajador español en El Cairo en la sede del partido añadió que no son como La Hermandad de Musulmanes, que sí tiene experiencia y busca un estado civil.
Egypt: Things Keep Getting Worse (Barry Rubin, June 15, 2011) lo considera una absorción:
Con la decisión del Partido Wafd de coaligarse con la Hermandad desaparece una de las últimas esperanzas. (...) La Hermandad cuenta con una tradición de infiltrarse en partidos políticos seculares y hacerse con ellos. Así que el Wafd no será la alternativa anti-islamista. ¿Quién lo es? Siempre pensé que la Hermandad iría bien porque tiene una ideología clara, buena organización y buen apoyo entre las bases. Ahora he de añadir otro factor que puede asegurar su victoria: carece de oposición seria.
Obama Extends Hand; America’s Enemies Extend Fist (Barry Rubin, July 9, 2011) - Ahmed Ezz El-Arab, vicepresidente del Partido Wafd y cabeza de su equipo de política exterior, le dice al entrevistador (¡siendo grabado!):
En gran medida el Holocausto nunca ocurrió;
El Diario de Anne Frank es falso;
Los ataques del 11 de septiembre fueron cosa del gobierno de EEUU e Israel, no de Osama bin Laden;
La elección de Obama no es reflejo de la democracia useña sino un complot de la clase dominante;
“Los soldados useños con doble nacionalidad israelí y de religión judía” robaron antigüedades del período del exilio babilónico y las enterraron en Jerusalén para que luego pudieran ser desenterradas y así los judíos pudieran reivindicar su vinculación con la ciudad.
Partido liberal Hizb al-Ghad (El Partido del Mañana) - Ayman Nour
Ayman Nour se separa del partido liberal al_Wafd en 2003 por discrepancias con su presidente, Naʿman Jumʿ, y forma el Hizb al-Ghad, que es reconocido por el gobierno el 27 de octubre de 2004. En las elecciones presidenciales de 2005 obtuvo el 7% de los votos y quedó segundo tras Mubarak. Poco después fue condenado a cinco años de cárcel, siendo liberado en febrero de 2009 por problemas de salud.
The Role of Israel in Ayman Nour’s Liberal Vision for Egypt (Ofir Winter, June 15, 2011)
In recent years, Ayman Nour has emerged as a prominent leader of the Egyptian liberal opposition. Although Israel is not at the focus of his discourse, it is, nevertheless, not entirely ignored. This article examines Nour’s attitude toward Israel by analyzing his views on three inter-connected issues: (a) his views on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and normalizing relations with Israel; (b) the distinction between his approaches to the United States and to Israel; (c) his vision for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the future of Israeli-Egyptian relations. In his public activity, Nour embodies a unique case study for Israel’s role in the overall political agenda of a liberal oppositionist in contemporary Egypt. This article argues that understanding Nour’s motives allow us to interpret his positions toward Israel as part of a broader line against the Egyptian regime, and not necessarily as reflecting a systematic ideological doctrine.
A mediados de octubre, un tribunal egipcio declara que Nour no podrá ser candidato en las elecciones presidenciales al tener antecedentes penales.
Egipcios Libres (al-Masriyin al-Ahrar)
Es el otro partido al parecer temido por La Hermandad, es según MIchael J. Totten (Aug 11, 2011):
The Free Egypt Party is a secular, anti-sectarian, and free market capitalist party founded by a Coptic Christian businessman, though the party is by no means a “Christian” party the way many Lebanese political parties are Christian. The founder just happens to be a Christian. I saw a number of women wearing Islamic headscarves in one of their offices when I went in there for an interview. Their platform is as anti-socialist as it is anti-Islamist.
Parece que se ha unido al Bloque Egipcio.
El Bloque Egipcio ("liberal")
Egypt’s “Moderates” Unite? A Step Forward But Not as Good as it Seems (Barry Rubin, August 16, 2011)
Catorce grupos "liberales" han formado El Bloque Egipcio para participar en las eleeciones generales que a lo mejor se celebran en noviembre de 2011. Si final y realmentemente acaban participado como bloque pueden constituir una verdadera palanca para bloquear el ascenso al poder de La Hermandad. Pero ese es un gran "si". (...)
Según B. Rubin, parece que juntos podrían optar a un 25% de los escaños. El principal grupo de los catorce es el partido Egipcios Libres (al-Masriyin al-Ahrar). Pero entre los catorce hay grupos de izquierda y antidemocráticos e incluso un partido comunista. Y el centrista partido Wafd (por sí, un 20% de los escaños) parece dudar si unirse a este Bloque o mantener su alianza con La Hermandad: sí, así de absurdas son las cosas.
Otros personajes liberales - Hala Mustafa y Tarek Hegi
Egypt’s Botched Revolution (Michael J. Totten, Sep 11, 2011) - El autor publica su entrevista con Hala Mustafa activista liberal y fundadora de la revista Democracy, y con otro liberal Tarek Hegi. Aquélla dice:
“The moment of liberal change hasn’t come yet.”
“The regime today is the same one that was founded in 1952. This is still the Nasserist regime. I was hoping this revolution would bring something different, that we could return to the liberal tradition that existed before Nasser destroyed it. Egypt had a historic opportunity to revive its liberal past, but the moment has passed. The military didn’t encourage that path, the Muslim Brotherhood jumped over everybody to manipulate the process, and the liberal secular forces retreated.”
(...)
“There’s a difference between controlling the country and ruling directly.”
“They don’t want to rule the country directly. They will hand over power after the election, and this will make a good impression on the world. This itself is one of their goals. But it doesn’t mean military control over the country will be finished. The army has been in control for all of the previous fifty years, long before the current ruling council was put into place. Eighty percent of the governors are from a military background. Most of those with key positions in the state have a military background. They will likely diminish the power of the president and give more power to the parliament. The president won’t be another Mubarak. He will be smaller. And the parliament will be bigger. The Muslim Brotherhood will control the parliament, and they know how to work together.”
Las respuestas de Tarek Hegi ofrecen algo de luz sobre la caída de Mubarak:
“Mubarak’s Egypt was a very strong police state.”
“It shouldn’t have fallen easily, but it did, partly because of the popular movement, but also because of the army. You can’t look at one and exclude the other. There was a coup d’etat. That’s why less than a thousand people were killed."
(...)
“Here’s the dramatic story.”
“On the 10th of February, Mubarak signed a decree sacking [Defense Minister Mohammad Hussein] Tantawi and appointing the head of the republican guard. The decree was sent to TV stations to be read on the air. The head of the TV station took it in his hand and went to Tantawi. So Tantawi was warned 24 hours before Mubarak stepped down. A half hour later the first announcement was made, and it was vague: The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces will continue meeting until the problem is sorted out, and the army will always side with the people. That was the first announcement, which, for somebody like me, was a sign of the coup d’etat."
“The following day, Omar Suleiman was asked to read a statement that Mubarak was supposed to have written, but instead he read something that was crafted by the army. Mubarak heard it for the first time on TV just like the rest of us did, and he was removed to Sharm El-Sheikh. The head of the republican guard has been in jail since that minute. The main function of the republican guard is to prevent a coup d’etat.”
Muhammad Moro (islamista)
In an article titled "Israel's End Is Near," Dr. Muhammad Moro, an Islamist candidate for the Egyptian presidency, claimed that the path to world freedom was the destruction of Israel, as it was the spearhead of global imperialism. He said it was the national and religious duty of Palestinians, Arabs, Muslims, and freedom seekers the world over to march peacefully in their millions to Israel's borders in order to liberate Palestine.
Al Nur (Luz) (salafista)
Los salafistas egipcios, a quienes llaman wahabitas aunque ellos niegan que el salafismo egipcio coincida con el salafismo saudí, han fundado un partido político, Al Nur (Luz), en un giro dramático a su doctrina que no reconoce a los partidos políticos y no cree en el concepto de democracia moderna, ni interfiere en la gestión de los asuntos de actualidad ni autoriza la desobediencia a los gobernantes. A Salafi tremor in Egypt—founding a party, recognizing a civil state and granting Copts the right to refer to their religion (Farrag Ismail, June 2, 2011):
Announcing the creation of Al Nour Party couldn’t have been done without the approval of the Salafi leaders and clerics, including Dr. Yasser Burhamy, Dr. Mohammed Ismail Al Moqaddem—the founder of the Salafi school in Alexandria, which is the main base of the Egyptian Salafis—and Eng. Abdul Muniem Al Shahhat as well as the influential clerics as Mohammed Hassan, Abu Ishaaq Al Huwayni and Mohammed Hussein Yaqoub.
Adel Abdul Ghaffar, the acting deputy for the founders of al-Nour Party, highlighted the new party’s goals in a way that should be studied carefully. He never said the party would be committed to the Islamic sharia (law), but he said “the higher reference will be for the Islamic sharia.” This is exactly an imitation of the second article of the current constitution, which states that Islamic sharia is the main source of legislation. Also the phrase that says that Islam is the state’s official religion has a clear indication that the higher reference will be for Islamic sharia.
The Salafi Al Nour Party even excels over the current constitution in dealing with the civil state, by securing “a religious freedom for the Copts” and giving them “the right to refer to their religion” as well as establishing a modern state and rejecting the model of religious state (the Islamic Caliphate as defined by mass media.)
ENTREVISTA CON EL LÍDER DEL PRINCIPAL PARTIDO SALAFISTA EGIPCIO (Ismael Monzón, 7 dic 2011) - “Los cristianos deben aceptar que la sharía dicta la ley en Egipto”
Partido de la Justicia
Dirigido por Mostafa El-Naggar es, al parecer, uno de los dos a los que más teme La Hermandad. Según MIchael J. Totten (Aug 11, 2011):
" [ se centra]“ en la 'justicia social', aunque es centrista e incluye activistas tanto de la izquierda como de la derecha, incluyendo a la hermana de Mohamed El-Baradei’, Mona, una economista.
Al Karama (naserista de izquierdas)
Report: Egypt's al-Karama party wants to cancel Camp David Accords (Haaretz, June 16, 2011) - Al-Karama party says peace with Israel not in Egypt's interest, according to report by Egyptian newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm:
Al-Karama party representative Amin Iskander said the party wishes to cancel the agreement [the 1978 Camp David Agreements] "immediately because it’s not in Egypt’s interest. (...) “we befriend those who want to befriend us, and make enemies of those who want to make enemies of us".
The Al-Karama party plans to field its leader Hamdin Sabbahy in presidential elections.
According to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace the Al-Karama party is a left-leaning Nasserist party with socialist tendencies that calls for political pluralism. The party has petitioned the Political Parties Committee for legal status multiple times without success, though Sabbahy ran as an independent candidate in the 2000 parliamentary elections and won a seat. A campaign is currently underway supporting his presidential candidacy for the 2011 election.
Como acota Ysrael Matza,:
On the face of it, Al-Karama should be just the political party you'd want to win in Egypt... And yet... they want to 'cancel' the Camp David accords
Preludio
20 posibles candidatos a la Presidencia de Egipto (MEMRI, April 8, 2011), cuyas elecciones están previstas para finales de 2011, en septiembre probablemente. Este artículo se escribe un año antes de que estas elecciones efectivamente se celebraran.
El Candidato de La Hermandad: Mohamed Morsi
Tras diversas incidencias - incluyendo la descalificación de diversos candidatos para concurrir a las elecciones presidenciales, entre ellos Tantawi, cabeza de los militares en el poder, y el primer candidato de La Hermandad -, ya sabemos quién será el candidato real de La Hermandad y, muy probablemente el nuevo Presidente de Egipto: Mohamed Morsi. Aquí nos lo presentan: Meet the Islamist Political Fixer Who Could Be Egypt’s Next President (Eric Trager, April 27, 2012) - Aquí lo analizan un poco más después de que fuera el más votado en la primera vuelta de la elección presidencial: Brother Number One (Shadi Hamid, June 7, 2012)
En este video del mítin de lanzamiento de su campaña (está subtitulado, pero aquí está la transcripción al inglés por si acaso) se dice todo, llama al califato con sede en Jerusalén así como al martirio suicida estilo Jamás y la toma de armas contra Israel:
Lo decimos alto y claro: Sí, Jerusalén es nuestro objetivo. Rezaremos en Jerusalén, o moriremos como mártires en el camino.
Los 'moderados' siempre tan moderados.
Amr Moussa
Nacionalista radical, con manifestaciones claramente anti EEUU y anti Israel, pero pragmático, aunque demagogo. Presidente de la Liga Árabe.
Egypt Front-Runner Seeks Israel Reset (Matt Bradley, May 6, 2011) - Amr Moussa, destacado candidato en las encuestas, quiere reafirmar el Dominio Cairota.
Amr Moussa’s vision for Egypt (Lally Weymouth, May 10)
Egypt's next President? (Israel Matzav, May 11, 2011)
Futuh (ex Hermandad)
Resultados de la Primera Vuelta (23-24 mayo 2012)
La primera vuelta se ha celebrado durante el miércoles y el jueves, 23 y 24 de mayo de 2012. Según Al-Ahram, los resultados finales, sumados los 27 gobiernos regionales, de los que mejor han salido han sido:
Mursi, 5.553.097 (25,3 %) - Hermandad de Musulmanes
Shafiq, 5.210.978 (24,9%) - exgeneral y exprimer ministro con Mubarak
Sabahi, 4.739.983 (21,5%) - izquierda radical
ʿAbd el-Moneim Abou’l Futuh, 3.936.264 (19%) - ex Hermandad de Musulmanes disidente y supuesto islamista 'moderado'
ʿAmr Mussa, 2.407.837 (menos del 10%) - exministro de exteriores y presidente de la Liga Árabe
NEWS FLASH: Muslim Brotherhood Claims Victory in Egypt Presidential Election (Barry Rubin, May 25, 2012)
Mapping the Egyptian Presidential Election (Eric Shewe, May 26, 2012)
Egypt’s (First-Round) Presidential Election is a Defeat (Perhaps Only Temporary) For the Islamists (Barry Rubin, May 27, 2012)
Resultados de la 2ª vuelta (16-17 junio 2012) - Gana Morsi, el Hermano Musulmán
La segunda vuelta se celebra los días 16 y 17 de junio de 2012.
The Next Egyptian President: Likely Scenarios (Eric Trager, June 15, 2012)
In Egypt, a sense of dread (David Ignatius, June 14, 2012)
Morsi's Victory in Egypt: Early Implications for America and the Broader Middle East (Robert Satloff, June 25, 2012)
Worst-case scenario in Egypt (Martin Kramer, June 26, 2012)
Los sindicatos.
El fiscal general de Egipto llama a declarar a Mubarak, que inmediatamente es hospitalizado (a finales de abril parece que se preparan para llevarlo al hospital de una prisión), y luego, el 13 de abril de 2011, detienen a sus hijos Gamal y Alaa. El 15 de abril el Presidente de la Corte de Apelaciones egipcia declara que Mubarak podría ser colgado si se le encuentra culpable de haber dado la orden de disparar contra los manifestantes. Casi desde el principio, los manifestantes han cuestionado el acuerdo de venta de gas a Israel y ahora parece que van a interrogar a Mubarak sobre el asunto: Mubarak Faces More Questioning on Gas Deal With Israel (Neil MacFarquhar, April 22, 2011)
Y el círculo se va cerrando y afectando cada vez a un mayor número de miembros del anterior régimen, como a un exprimer ministro y otros dos exminsitros; y ahora otro; y el de interior.
El 16 de septiembre, sábado, atendiendo la solicitud de los manifestantes, un tribunal disuelve el Partido Democrático Nacional de Mubarak (más), fundado por Anuar el Sadat en 1978, y decomisa sus fondos; dice el tribunal:
"Es ilógico que no permanezca ningún instrumento del régimen, ahora que éste ha caído,"
"[sus fondos deben volver al Estado], pues este dinero es en realidad dinero del pueblo."
Aunque a menudo se ha presentado a la oposición como movimientos inducidos por asuntos domésticos exclusivamente, lo cierto es que las manifestaciones estaban llenas de expresiones anti EEUU, de antisemitismo y anti Israel.
Los manifestantes lo pueden decir más alto, aunque sería difícil (video, May 13), pero no más claro:
"Estoy aquí hoy por dos razones," dice un manifestante: "Para apoyar la unión civil entre musulmanes y cristianos [la manifestación ocurre después de la quema de iglesias y ataques a los coptos] y para apoyar a los palestinos. "
¡Los cristianos y musulmanes de Egipto unidos serán quienes liberen Palestina de la injusticia sionista!" [la manifestación se celebra pocos días antes de una anunciada marcha hacia Gaza]
A lo que la masa responde coreando: "¡Iremos a Jerusalén aunque seamos un millón de mártires!"
Y los portavoces: "¡Muerte a Israel!" ...
Como apostilla Martin Kramer (May 14): "Ilusiones engañosas de un país que ni siquiera puede alimentarse." Y esta foto en la Plaza Tahrir (May 13) es aún más clara. Comentario de Barry Rubin (May 13)
Ya antes se mostraba lo mismo, claramente, en estas fotos y este artículo que nos ofrece el periodista y bloguero egipcio 3Arabawy, que allí estuvo entre los 'jóvenes' y bien anti-israelí que es, tanto que es de los que quiere cerrar la embajada de Israel en Egipto (en la foto a la izquierda, egipcios manifestándose ante la embajada israelí en El Cairo) y las de todo el mundo, esto es, acabar con la existencia de Israel.
Tahrir Documents, grupo egipcio que viene traduciendo al inglés los principales documentos producidos durante estos levantamientos, publica la proclama de los levantados del 15 de mayo en la que - parafraseando el "Dios mediante, nos encontraremos en Tel Aviv y Haifa" del Presidente de Irak, Abdul Rahman Arif, al comienzo de la Guerra de los Seis Días (donde proclamaba que el objetivo árabe no era otro que borrar Israel del mapa) - llaman a sus compatriotas egipcios a encontrarse en Jerusalén (y participar en la Tercera Intifada):
"La llamada de Al Aqsa: nos encontraremos en Jerusalén"
[Left logo:] The Union of Arab Doctors, Committee of Relief and Emergency
[Center Logo:] The Call of al-Aqsa
[Right logo:] Palestinian Refugees Revolution [in English and Arabic]
[Handwritten notes:]
80 million people are waiting for the day of the final crossing to liberate Palestine
80 million wait patiently at your borders
They light your candles
And rejoice at your return
Oh Sunni Arab land
Waiting there before my eyes, oh precious one
We’ll overcome the thugs.
[end handwriting]
Do not look back upon the ages that forced us into humiliation. Instead,
look ahead to a sun waiting to appear.
Do not fearfully listen to an indomitable myth,
for behind you there is an army that has broken every bridge.
Do not keep telling them of dissent and betrayal.
After what happened in Egypt, it’s impossible to believe
what they were saying… isn’t that right?
Open your eyes to a light that all of existence sees.
Discover the truths hidden by the cowardice of the Jews.
Rip off the disguise that the stalemate put in place and oversaw.
I urge you, do not kill the determination of resistance with your silence.
[faded rear text:]
The Third Palestinian Intifada 15-5-2011
Palestine shall be freed… We are the ones that will free her.
From the river to the sea… and from the sea to the river.
[Handwritten notes:]
80 million will sacrifice themselves for you, oh Palestine. We will bring the rapists to justice and they will wish to depart.
[end handwriting]
(...)
Un encuesta de finales de abril de 2011 muestra que la mayoría de los egipcios quiere anular el Tratado de Paz con Israel, y una gran mayoría son partidarios de la sharia, lo que algunos consideran muestras de odio. Llegando a final de año, en Are Egypt's Islamic Parties Planning to Nullify the Peace Treaty with Israel? (Jonathan D. Halevi; Dec 26, 2011) analizan las posiciones de los partidos sobre el tema.
En la manifestación cairota de estudiantes del 27 de abril, convocada en respuesta de la petición de Shimon Peres a los jóvenes para que normalicen relaciones con Israel, y para acabar con el suministro de gas a Israel:
cantan: "nos deshicimos del agente israelí, ahora ha llegado el momento de deshacernos de Israel", y
también: "Muerte a israel, Muerte al Sionismo",
al tiempo que animan a la "resistencia palestina" a no dejar la lucha armada y
gritan"Kossom Israel, Kossom Israel", en clara referencia al lanzamiento de cohetes qasam sobre civiles en Israel desde Gaza.
Nada de esto predetermina lo que vayan a hacer futuros gobiernos egipcios, pero sí indica claramente que estas proclamas influirán en la demagogia política y mediática que viene, sea democrática o menos democrática u otra cosa: nadie se atreverá a proponer nada (cambios económicos, sociales, técnicos, políticos, etc.) sin previamente acogerse al odio a Israel, de manera que nadie pueda acusarlo de agente sionista, pues en caso contrario sería inmediatamente descalificado y ya nadie atendería sus mensajes.
Esto no será bueno en ningún caso y perjudicará los intereses de casi todos, muy especialmente de los egipcios, pero lo peor es que puede llegar a ser dramático si al gobierno llega gente sin mucho sentido y con poca experiencia.
A la izquierda, fotos de manifestantes quemando una bandera de Israel y de un cartel pidiendo "Muerte a Israel" durante una manifestación ante la Embajada de Israel en el día de conmemoración de la Naqba judía el 15 de mayo. Y aquí un video de esa manifestación. Todo publicado originalmente en sitios proárabes y claramente anti-israelíes.
Claro que algunos en Israel ya empiezan a pensar en recuperar el Sinaí: If Egypt Continues Like This, It Should Lose The Sinai For The Third, And Last, Time ( ,May 29, 2011)
Es inocente pensar que los egipcios, o los árabes en general según indican las encuestas, vayan a aceptar jamás la existencia de un estado judío entre ellos: Will Egypt be too busy to hate? .(James Kirchick, Aug 26, 2011) -
La voz 'moderada' de La Hermandad en Egipto, Essam el-Erian, dice:
"Los judíos tienen el derecho de vivir en los países árabes.. Durante décadas y siglos han vivido con seguridad. Pero la existencia de un estado judío va contra todas las reglas de los estados en todo el mundo... Espero que las revoluciones en el mundo árabe puedan cambiar el mapa. Todos los mapas pueden cambiarse."
9 sep 2011 - Asalto y evacuación de la Embajada en Israel
Official Statement by PM Netanyahu Following the Events in Cairo (Sep 10, 2011)
Este artículo se publicó horas antes del ataque a la embajada: Egypt's Military Council Toying with Israel (Mudar Zahran, Sep 9, 2011)
Video del asalto (Al Yazira)
Egypt protesters attack Israeli Embassy (Michael Birnbaum, Ingy Hassieb y WaPo, Sep 9, 2011)
Israel requests U.S. aid after protesters attack embassy in Cairo (Michael Birnbaum e Ingy Hassieb, WaPo, Sep 9)
Embassy Attack Leader Was Involved in WTC 1993 Bombing (VJ, Sep 9)
Egypt’s Rulers Are Letting the Mob Rule (Jonathan S. Tobin, Sep 9)
Egipto declara el estado de alerta tras el asalto a la embajada israelí (LD, 10 sep 2011) - El embajador de Israel evacuado. Egipto declaró el estado de alerta para hacer frente a los disturbios cerca a la Embajada de Israel en El Cairo, invadida este viernes por manifestantes.
Israel evacuates ambassador in Cairo following attack (REUTERS, sep 10) - Senior staff flies out of Egypt after activists use hammers to destroy protective wall around Israel's embassy; diplomat is left behind to maintain affairs while Israel weighs response
Embassy riots: Israeli envoy leaves Egypt (Attila Somfalvi, Sep 10) - Mob attack on Israeli embassy in Egyptian capital leads to dramatic decision: Air Force plane returns ambassador, 80 diplomats and their family members to Israel. Six Israelis stranded in building rescued by Egyptian commando force
Egypt declares state of alert in wake of attack on Israeli Embassy (Mohamed Fadel Fahmy, CNN, Sep 10)
Israeli ambassador reaches Tel Aviv after embassy attack, but consul remains in Cairo (Al Arabiya, Sep 10)
Egypt Fears Erupt on Street, in Policy (Matt Bradley, Sep 10) - Antigovernment Protesters Demand Change, Attack Israeli Embassy, as Government Slows Visas Amid Concerns on Terror
Israeli PM condemns embassy attack in Egypt (AP, Sep 10)
Angry crowd turns on journalists reporting embassy attack in Egypt (Ivan Watson, CNN, Sep 11, 2011)
Egyptian soccer fans? (Israel Matzav, Sep 11, 2011)
Egypt: Where Moderates and Judges Endorse Terrorism (Barry Rubin, May 31) -
"Former Deputy Head of Egypt's Court of Appeals Judge Mahmoud al-Khodheiri, gave an interview on al-Jazira (thanks to MEMRI for video and translation) and said: "We should stop exporting natural gas to Israel.” But is it all about the money? No: “I consider the export of gas to Israel an act of treason, and we should stop it. I salute the people who bombed the gas pipe, because this is my blood that is being transferred to my enemy." A man who’s been a high-ranking judge salutes terrorists who blew up a pipeline. Yet judges are supposed to uphold the rule of law. If a judge can cheer those who blow things up that opens the door to supporting other acts of lawless violence. Wherever al-Khodheiri draws the line others will find justification for mayhem. Attack Christians? Kill Jews? Assassinate secularists or government officials? Once lawlessness is rationalized as absolute right there are no limits. (...) President Barack Obama and European leaders don’t get it. We are about to be projected back to the bad old days of radical Arab nationalist regimes competing with each other in militancy, anti-Americanism, and hatred of Israel. Except this time they’re Islamists and that’s worse. When top judges yell for fire and vengeance your society is in real trouble. And so are its neighbors. No democratic state can be built on such a foundation. Ignore all those soothing and ignorant journalists and “experts” on television and in the newspapers. Here comes the judge. And he’s a hanging judge."
Vuelve el terrorismo interior del Takfir-wal Higra
Terrorism Returns to Egypt, Will Sanity about Islamism Arrive in the West? (Barry Rubin, August 11, 2011)
As I’ve predicted since February, a major consequence of the Egyptian revolution and the rise of radical Islamism there will be a return to the terrorism of the 1990s which destroyed the tourism industry; targeted Christians; murdered moderates and secularists; and killed government officials and bystanders.
Now a group has attacked two police stations in el-Arish. And of course CNN misses the point. Those responsible, it reports, are, “Takfir-wal Higra, a group sympathetic to al Qaeda’s goal of establishing an Islamic Caliphate.” Actually, the group originated in Egypt long before Usama bin-Ladin began his political activity. And in Egypt, terrorist Islamists come out of the Muslim Brotherhood, demanding faster and more extreme tactics. We will be seeing a lot of such people in the coming months and years.
Once again, this recalls to me the 1981 book of Muhammad Abd al-Salaam Faraj, The Forgotten Commandment. I read it soon after it appeared. At the time, the book seemed like the ravings of a marginal figure, one for whom even the Takfir-wal Higra group of the time was too moderate. Faraj posited that jihad had been brushed aside for centuries by those who wrongly interpreted Islam and must be restored, immediately, to be top priority.
In retrospect, Faraj did ideologically for Sunni Muslims what Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini did for Shias: the creation of a new and powerful revolutionary Islamist movement. In the 30 years since this book was written, the once-obscure ideas of Faraj have swept the minds of millions of people and caused many thousands of deaths. They are now in sight of hegemony in the Sunni Muslim world.
Terroristas en un Sinaí descontrolado
Netanyahu warns Egypt losing control of growing terror groups in Sinai (Jonathan Lis y Jack Khoury, May 30) - PM says Hamas and international terror groups are strengthening presence in Egypt and that the country's military government is having trouble 'realizing its sovereignty' in Sinai:
"Egypt is having a hard time realizing its sovereignty in Sinai,"
"International terror organizations are stirring in Sinai and their presence is increasing due to Sinai's connection to Gaza."
"Hamas is strengthening in Egypt." "It transferred more of its activities to Egypt and less to Syria due to the turmoil there."
"The Muslim Brotherhood is also not an insignificant player in Egypt."
Report: Over 400 al-Qaida terrorists now in Sinai (JPost, May 30)
Egypt denies Israel’s allegation of Al Qaeda presence in Sinai (FP, June 2, 2011)
Beduinos armados cortan la carretera a Sharm El Sheij (May 27, 2011) y Guerra de clanes en el Sinaí
Armed Bedouins cut road to Egypt's Sharm el-Sheikh (AlMasryAlyoum, May 28, 2011)
La agencia de noticias palestina informa (Ma'an, June 5, 2011) que según fuentes de la seguridad egipcia el Sinaí se encuentra al borde de una guerra de clanes, entre los Tayaha y los Fawakhriyya.
Islamist-secular rift threatens Egypt's emerging democracy (Noha El-Hennawy, June 2, 2011)
Postura de la Autoridad Palestina y Jamás
Desde luego, la Autoridad Palestina no era partidaria de la caída de Mubarak. En The Wrath of Abbas (Dan Ephron, April 24, 2011, Newsweek) Abbas critica a EEUU por su "descortés" trato a Mubarak y declara:
“Desde el primer día, cuando empezó con Mubarak, hablé por teléfono con la Señora Clinton. Le dije: ¿Se da cuenta de las consecuencias? ¿Caos o La Hermandad de Musulmanes, o ambos?” ... “Ahora tienen ambos.”
Egipto abre el paso de Rafah con Gaza (27 mayo 2011)
Israel cambia su despliegue de fuerzas, redirigiéndose al Neguev (Elad Benari, April 18, 2011) y las IDF aprueban su calendario.
The hunger to come in Egypt (Spengler, May 10, 2011):
Egypt is running out of food, and, more gradually, running out of money with which to buy it. The most populous country in the Arab world shows all the symptoms of national bankruptcy - the kind that produced hyperinflation in several Latin American countries during the 1970s and 1980s - with a deadly difference: Egypt imports half its wheat, and the collapse of its external credit means starvation.
The Revolution Blows Up (Niall Ferguson, June 5, 2011) - El mercado de valores de Egipto está por los suelos y los ricos se han llevado su dinero a Zurich:
Except for the oil exporting countries, the economic consequences of the Arab revolutionary wave have been almost entirely negative. In a report published last month, the Institute of International Finance predicted that growth in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia will fall from 4.4% in 2010 to -0.5% this year. Egypt’s economy will contract by 2.5%, Yemen’s by 4%.
Egypt’s Central Agency for Statistics estimates that the economic losses incurred when the crowds thronged Tahrir Square were about $1.7 billion. Add to that the subsequent losses in revenue from tourism, the cost of ongoing disruption due to strikes, and the enforced return of more than a million migrant workers fleeing war-torn Libya.
The big story, however, is capital flight. Rich Arabs do not trust this revolution and have been rushing to get their cash into safe havens. According to Reuters, the country’s foreign-exchange reserves fell by as much as a third in the first three months of the year. Al-Hayat estimates that $30 billion has left Egypt since the onset of the Arab Spring.
Economics, Muslim Brotherhood Style (Stanley Kurtz, June 10, 2011):
The most interesting tidbit from today’s news on Egypt’s economy is that the Muslim Brotherhood has put forward an economic plan. According to the Times, the Brotherhood would have “the government require all Muslims to contribute 7.5 percent of their income to a privately run charitable institution under government oversight–essentially a flat income surtax.”
Egypt's economic growth rate drops to -4.2% (Amira Saleh y Sara Nour Eldeen, June 12, 2011):
(...) the economic growth rate during the third quarter of the current fiscal year would drop to -4.2 percent, compared to 5.4 percent during the same period last year.
“This is the first time we have had a negative rate in ten years,” she said, attributing it to a drop in tourism by 33 percent, manufacturing by 12 percent, construction by 9 percent, transport and storage by 9.7 percent, and wholesale and retail trade by 7.9 percent.
“It is not yet catastrophic,” she said. “But we must quickly address the reasons for that drop.”
Egypt Constitution and Laws (Gobierno de Egipto)
Tahrir Documents - They say: "TD is an ongoing effort to archive, translate, and make available printed matter from the 2011 Egyptian Revolution and its aftermath. We are not affiliated with the papers’ authors nor with any political organization, Egyptian or otherwise."
Post con un comentario mío de cuando cae Mubarak.
Otros artículos sobre los acontecimeintos en Egipto, sobre todo centrados en la Hermandad de Musulmanes y las repercusiones para Israel:
The Reality of the Muslim Brotherhood (Tarek Heggy, 12 Feb 2011) - Análisis magnífico y esencial de uno de los que mejor predijeron los acontecimientos ocurridos en Egipto.
The Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian Crisis (Dore Gold, JCFPA)
Muslim Brotherhood: Prepare Egyptians for War With Israel (Yaakov Lappin, Jpost)
Israel, Alone Again? Why Israelis worry about the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Yossi Klein Halev, NYT)
Crepúsculo en Tahrir (Serafín Fanjul, LD) - Recuerda que Al-Baradei'i significa albardero.
Egypt's Islamist Riddle: Muslim Brotherhood Says It Seeks Limited Role, but Its Radical Roots Spur Questions (Keith Johnson, WSJ)
Why the Egyptian Revolution is not Islamist (Haroon Moghul, Loonwatch)
The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategies in Egypt and Jordan (Reva Bhalla, Stratfor)
Egypt: The Turning Point, The Regime's Plan on What to Do Next (Barry Rubin)
A Note of Warning and Encouragement for Egyptians. From an Iranian writer who lived through the 1979 Revolution. (Abbas Milani, The New republic) - Señala los ecos de la revolución iraní en la crisis actual de Egipto - Entrevista de M.J. Totten con Milani
Egypt Doesn't Have a Democratic Culture (Amr Bargisi)
It is Plastic Hour in the Arab World (David Pryce-Jones)
How the White House Approached Egyptian Turmoil (Marc Ambinder, The Atlantic) - M.Kramer comenta respecto de este artículo: "¿De verdad recibió la Casa Blanca un informe diciéndole que 'Egipto no es un país musulmán' y que 'Hosni Mubarak es un copto cristiano perteneciente a cierta secta?' Difícil de creer. ¿O no?"
Game over: The chance for democracy in Egypt is lost (Robert Springborg, FP) - M.Kramer comenta respecto de este artículo: "Robert Springborg es un verdadero experto sobre Egipto (no alguien surgido en un instante ni un romántico). No simpatiza con el régimen, pero reconoce su maestría. Sostiene que Mubarak y los militares ya han ganado. Interesante."
Al Qaradawi preaching in a Qatari mosque to Meydan Tahrir protesters (foto, izquierda al fondo) (Yfrog, por cortesía de SultanAlQassemi via Martin Kramer on FB)
Over a million protesters break curfew in Cairo (on Feb, 4, Friday)
Neil Lazarus on the ongoing crisis in Egypt, and Israeli reaction to it (video)
The west must be wary of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (Benny Morris) - Sostiene que La Hermandad tiene el claro objetivo de hacerse con el poder en Egipto, mediante elecciones, pero: "los occidentales no deben llamarse a engaño, [La Hermandad] no tiene ningún aprecio por la democracia ni considera que ésta tenga valor alguno. Sus líderes la ven solo como un medio para alcanzar un fin, y éste incluye poner fin a la democracia."... y, sorprendentemente, lo hace en el anti-israelí The Guardian.
Why Egypt Will Not Soon Become Democratic (Daniel Pipes) - Viene a decir que la democracia no es cosa de dos días ni de unas elecciones solo.
The Arab World's New Political Establishment (Khaled Abu Toameh) - Sostiene que "hay signos de que los islamistas radicales [¿hay otros?] están intentando secuestrar los levantamientos prodemocráticos que barren el mundo árabe."
Amr Moussa considering running for presidency in Egypt - El secretario general de la Liga Árabe dice que está pensando en concurrir a las elecciones para reemplazar a Hosni Mubarak.
Arab Columnist on Facebook's Role in the Social and Political Struggle in the Arab Countries [la periodista Sawsan Al-Abtah]
En su sermón del viernes [4 de febrero] (video) dirigido al múndo árabe, Ali Jamenei llama al ejército egipcio a unirse a las masas para derrocar a Mubarak - Y llama a instaurar el régimen islámico en Egipto, siguiendo el eco de la voz de la nación iraní que, sostiene, resuena resuena por todo el mundo musulmán. Y claro, también se despacha contra los enemigos habituales: "[Estos acontecimientos, de Túnez, Egipto, etc.] pueden limpiar de las caras de [las gentes] árabes y musulmanas el polvo de décadas de opresión y humillación inflingidas a estas nobles gentes por Occidente y América." - Principales puntos de sus dos sermones en inglés (en su propia web)
Out of Egypt (Samuel Tadros)
Sandmonkey's last post (reproduced by M.J.Totten) - El Egyptian Sandmonkey ha sido apaleado, detenido durante dos horas y liberado. Yo sigo su blog y me gusta el tipo. Reproduzco aquí uno de los párrafos de su post: "Now, just in case this isn’t clear: This protest is not one made or sustained by the Muslim Brotherhood, it’s one that had people from all social classes and religious background in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood only showed up on Tuesday, and even then they were not the majority of people there by a long shot. We tolerated them there since we won’t say no to fellow Egyptians who wanted to stand with us, but neither the Muslims Brotherhood not any of the Opposition leaders have the ability to turn out one tenth of the numbers of Protesters that were in Tahrir on Tuesday. This is a revolution without leaders. Three Million individuals choosing hope instead of fear and braving death on hourly basis to keep their dream of freedom alive. Imagine that."
Brotherhood statements foster confussion (IPT) - con abundante información y enlaces
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Explains How It Will Get Rid of Peace Treaty with Israel (Barry Rubin)
Muslim Brotherhood Supreme Guide: 'Los EEUU empiezan a experimentar el principio de su fin; la mejora y cambio en el mundo musulmán solo se puede alcanzar mediante la yihad y el sacrificio."
Muhammad Ghanem, representante en Londres de La Hermandad, parece que ha olvidado la consigna de moderación: "[Mubarak] está en Sharm Al-Sheik, protegido por los sionistas, por el Estado de Israel. Hay un helicóptero listo para llevarlo a Israel... el sigiente paso debe ser la desobediencia civil, incluyendo impedir el paso por el Canal de Suez, parar el suministro de petróleo y gas natural a Israel y preparse para la guerra con Israel."
Rashad al-Bayoumi, segundo de La Hermandad, en una entrevista con las televisión japonesa NHTV: "Cuando el Presidente Mubarak se vaya y se forme un gobierno provisional, será necesario derogar el tratado de paz con Israel."
Beware Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood (Leslie H. Gelb)
Obama's Egypt Flip-Flop (Leslie H. Gelb)
Egypt's Democratic Mirage. How Cairo’s Authoritarian Regime Is Adapting to Preserve Itself (Joshua Stacher, FA, 7 feb 2011)
Regional Ramifications of Unrest in Egypt (Prof. Efraim Inbar, 6 feb 2011)
Mubarak's Interests Are Not America's.The dictator can't be trusted. The West must lean on the Egyptian military for a transitional government that will pave the way to free and fair elections (SAAD EDDIN IBRAHIM, WSJ, 8 feb 2011) Pero M.Kramer le puntualiza: "Pero [Mubarak] mantuvo la paz entre Israel-Egipto a través de momentos difíciles. Pregúntale a Shimon Peres."
The Peace Process: Quo Vadis? (Shlomo Avineri, 11th Annual Herzliya Conference, 9 feb 2011) (video, 10') Del autor, M.Kramer dice: "Shlomo Avineri, uno de los verdaderos sabios de Israel, aborda muchos puntos sobre Egipto y el proceso de paz. Resumen: ni habrá pronto democracia en Egipto ni avances importantes en el proceso de paz Israeli-Palestino"
Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: In Their Own Words (Jonathan D. Halevi, JCFPA, 6 feb 2011)
The Muslim Brotherhood - in its own words. Traducción al inglés de “Jihad is the way” de Mustafa Mashhur, Líder de La hermandad de Musulmanes en Egipto, 1996-2002 (Itamar Marcus and Nan Jacques Zilberdik, en PMW)
UNDERSTANDING EGYPT: ISLAMIC SOCIALISM AND THE LEFT (Scott Baker, The Blaze, 6 feb 2011)
The Muslim Brotherhood’s Genocidal Spiritual Leader (Michael J. Totten, 9 feb 2011)
Jewel of the Nile. Yussuf al-Qaradawi, the world’s most popular and authoritative Sunni cleric, is a Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Egyptian based in Qatar. A return to his home country would be dangerous for Israel and the West. (Lee Smith, The Tablet, 9 feb 2011)
The Muslim Brotherhood's Strategy in Egypt (Eric Trager, feb10)
'Iran opposition leader under house arrest' (Jpost, feb10) - Estos lo tienen claro. Sonre este hecho: White House Calls Out Iranian 'Hypocrisy' (STEPHEN F. HAYES, WS)
Tariq's Tricks: How the West's Favorite Islamist Spins His Web (Barry Rubin, 10 feb 2011, AT)
Egypt…we see, but do we understand? (Tariq Alhomayed, 10 feb 2011)
Muslim Brotherhood: Jihad is the Way (February 09, 2011)
Obama’s Carter-esque foreign policy deployed to Egypt (Barbara Kay, 8 feb)
No room at table for Muslim Brotherhood (Jeff Jacoby, 9 feb)
Israel and the Egyptian protests (Ben Smith, 9 feb 2011)
Egypt's Orderly Transition Becomes a War of Attrition (Michael Singh, 9 feb)
Could al Qaeda Hijack Egypt's Revolution? (Kenneth M. Pollack. 9 feb)
Recent Developments in Egypt and Lebanon: Implications for U.S. Policy and Allies in the Broader Middle East (Robert Satloff, 9 feb)
Hosni's very balanced system (Michael Young, feb)
Ideas for U.S. Middle East Policy in the Wake of the Egypt Crisis (Robert Satloff, 9 feb)
Inside the White House Egypt meeting (Laura Rozen, 6 frb)
A Friendship of Values, Not Convenience (Daniel Gordis, 8 feb)
Egypt and the Way of Revolutions (Joshua Muravchik, 7 feb)
Les défis de la révolution (Le Monde, 5 feb)
Muslim Brotherhood: The Unreliable Ally (Jonathan Schanzer, 10 feb)
Learning the Wrong Lessons From Egypt (Jon Alterman, 9 feb)
Egypt: A Select Reading List (Harvard University)
The New Apologists for the Muslim Brotherhood Intensify Their Whitewash (Ron Radosh, 8 feb)
Justified jitters. Israel has been chided internationally for taking a dark view of events in Tahrir Square. But a look at possible political scenarios in Egypt does not bode well for the Jewish state. (Avi Issacharoff, 11 feb)
New York Times Fails to Insist Upon Factual Accuracy in Op-Ed by Muslim Brotherhood Leader (11 feb)
New York Times Covers Up for Its Favorite Muslim Brother (Charles Jacobs, Feb 10)
FBI Chief: Muslim Brotherhood Supports Terrorism (IPT, 10 feb)
Former Speaker of Muslim Brotherhood Calls upon Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia to Follow Iran (MEMRI TV (video)
New Poll Reveals Egyptian Views on Protests (Dr. David Pollock,TWIFNEP, feb 2011)
Egypt: Scoop/New Government Has No Illusions About the Muslim Brotherhood (Barry Rubin, 12 feb 2011)
Regarding the Brotherhood (Issandr El Amrani, 13 feb)
The Tragedy of Mubarak (Christopher Dickey, 13 feb) - Estupendo y documentado artículo y, como dice M. Kramer, rara joya en la marea del periodismo inspirado en Egipto tipo 'mira yo estoy a favor'".
Egypt Crisis: Fears rising for prospects of protest-battered economy (Praveen Swami, 13 feb) - "Antes de esta crisis, Egipto tenía una de las economías de Oriente Medio que mejor se comportaron. Su PIB creció un robusto 7% de media entre 2006-2008. A pesar de la crisis global, creció un 4.7% en 2009 y el 5.3% en 2010 ―una de las mayores tasas de crecimiento del mundo… Los expertos dicen que ahora es probable que el PIB flote alrededor del 2%." ¿Quién va a pagar la revolución?... que se calcula que ha costado al país 18.750 MM€.
Muslim Brotherhood Leaders Don't Always [Correction: Almost Never] Tell the Truth (Barry Rubin, 7 feb)
From San Francisco to Sarajevo (Michael. J. Totten entrevista al musulmán Stephen Schwartz, feb 14)
Links 14 February 2011 (Issandr El Amrani, 15 feb)
The Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces Under Field Marshal Tantawi: A Recipe for Revolution or More of the Same? (Col. (ret.) Dr. Jacques Neriah, JCPA, 16 feb)
Un Egipto sin Mubarak (Serafín Fanjul, LD, 16 feb)
What the Muslim Brothers Want (Essam El-Errian, NYT, 9 feb) - El-Errian es miembro del Consejo de Guía de La Hermandad
Understanding the Muslim Brotherhood (Bret Stephens, WSJ, 15 feb) - Este artículo responde en gran medida al de El-Errian en el NYT de 9 feb y a otros similares.
Egypt protest hero Wael Ghonim barred from stage (Agence France-Presse, 18 feb) - Yusuf Qaradawi, conocido como el jeque del suicidio (por justificar como islámico y promover este sistema de lucha), de vuelta en Egipto ha sermoneado hoy a la gente en la Plaza Tahrir... de cuyo estrado ha sido expulsado el héroe de las revueltas Wael Ghonim, el ejecutivo de Google, al parecer por los guardaespaldas de Qaradawi (PD esta noticia debe ser falsa porque el propio Ghonim en su twitter escribe el mismo 18 feb: "I loved Sheikh Qaradawi Khutbah today. Was truly inspired when he said: Today I'm going to address both Muslims and Christians. Respect!" y "Victorious Friday in Tahrir Square yesterday. Amazing scene. No one can stand up against the Egyptian dream"). Martin Kramer relata un encontronazo en Doha en 2002 con Qaradawi, y desde FB nos dirige a un corto video de Qaradawi "el moderado". Barry Rubin publica el mismo 18 feb dos artículos sobre el tema Egypt: Qaradawi, World's Leading Islamist Tries to Take Charge of the Revolution y Egypt Gets Its Khomeini: Qaradawi Returns in Triumph. Y aquí un ejemplo de cómo la prensa lava la imagen radical de al-Qaradawi presentándolo como teólogo moderado: Egypt revolution unfinished, Qaradawi tells Tahrir masses. Leading Islamic theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi returned from Qatar to rally hundreds of thousands at Tahrir Square today in his first public speech since 1981.En El Mundo -Egipto celebra en la plaza Tahrir su primera semana sin Mubarak (19 feb)- ni mencionan el alias por el que es conocido Qaradawi ni su vinculación con La Hermandad ni, por supuesto, la expulsión de Ghonim del estrado en el evento que describen. Por supuesto, ninguno menciona la llamada que hizo Qaradawi a la "liberación de Jerusalem." Video del sermón/manifestación del 18 feb a que se refieren todos estos artículos.
Qaradawi Calls For Attacks (Juan Cole, 09/03/2004) - Y Juan Cole es una habitual anti-israelí, o sea, nada sospechoso de antimusulmán
The “non-sectarian” Yusuf al-Qaradawi (video, MEMRI TV, 17 dic 2010) - En este mismo reconoce la legitimidad del terrorismo suicida contra Israel.
Egypt: a political revolution (Peter Kellner, Feb 21, 2011)
Gullible amnesia (Arnaud de Borchgrave, Commentary, Feb. 22)
Plaza Tahrir, El Cairo, 2MM de personas: "¡A Jerusalem! ¡Mártires a millones!" (feb 22) (video) - Traducción completa de la soflama de Al-Qaradawi
A Frightful Democracy: The Egyptian revolution's leaders have an illiberal agenda (Stanley Kurtz; March 2)
Egypt's revolution has been 10 years in the making (Hossam el-Hamalawy, Mar 2) - Hosni Mubarak's wall of fear began to crumble once people were able to see that others shared their desire for liberation
The Brotherhood Revolution! (Tariq Alhomayed, 3 mar) - Arguye que hay noticias de que los miembros jóvenes de La Hermandad pretenden llevar a cabo una revolución dentro de la misma organización, y que esto es algo muy destacable.
Whose vision will build the new Egypt? (Amir Taheri, March 5)
Muslim Brotherhood's New Campaign: Seize Control of Egypt's Islamic Institutions (Barry Rubin, March 5, 2011)
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Leader Calls for Israel to Be “Wiped Off the Map” (mar 7)
In a Divided Egypt, the Military and Islamists Play for Political Advantage (Eric Trager, 18 Mar)
Egypt to Vote Tomorrow on Constitutional Amendments (Lee Smith, 18 mar)
Egypt Vote Results Shows Islamists' Rising Sway (Matt Bradley, WSJ, 21 mar) - Ya después del referéndum para modificar seis artículos de la constitución: al parecer el 77% ha votado a favor de la reforma, como pedían La Hermandad y los salafistas (pues la reforma no toca el artículo que establece la sharía como base de toda la legislación egipcia) y los militares; los 'jóvenes' e incluso El Baradei y Amr Moussa se oponían, pues querían que se redactara una constitución completamente nueva.
Egypt’s First Vote (Yasmine El Rashidi, 24 Mar) - Relato bastante completo
Islamist Group Is Rising Force in a New Egypt (Michael Slackman, March 24, 2011) . - Hasta el NYT se cae del burro: "También está claro que los activistas jóvenes, educados y laicos que inicialmente propulsaron la revolución aideológica ya no son la fuerza política que marca el paso, al menos no ahora."
Muslim Brotherhood Makes Gains in Egypt (Ryan Mauro, 25 mar)
Egypt's Islamists: A Cautionary Tale (Hillel Fradkin & Lewis Libby — 26 Mar) - On March 20, Egypt held a referendum vote, and it is the common consensus that the results indicate the degree of support and power for the Muslim Brotherhood. In this special preview of an article from Commentary’s April issue, written several weeks before, Hillel Fradkin and Lewis Libby consider the political program of the this venerable Islamist movement.
Who Really Made Egypt's Revolution?: The Story The Media Missed (Barry Rubin, 29 mar) - Aside from well-meaning, hi-tech independents, the April 6 Movement was helped —or, if you wish, infiltrated- by four groups. Tagammu is Egypt’s leftist party with strong Marxist overtones. Three other organizations have their origins in apparently liberal groups. These are the al-Ghad party, led by former opposition presidential candidate, Ayman Nour; the Kifaya movement, and the National Association for Change led by Muhammad ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Nobel Peace Prize winner, and presidential candidate. Despite its liberal origins, by the time it allied with the April 6 Movement, Kifaya was largely taken over by the Brotherhood... While itself liberal reformist, ElBaradei’s National Association for Change was a small group largely dependent on the Brotherhood for organizational support and vote-getting activity. Despite all their ideological differences--left-wing, nationalist, liberal, or Islamist--all four of the groups associated with the April 6 Youth Movement had as one of their top-priority issues the goal of ending the Egypt-Israel peace treaty... But there is also an additional factor. Knowing that any direct association with the Brotherhood would discredit it in the eyes of many, the April 6 Youth Movement had an understanding with the Brotherhood... In April 2009, the April 6 Youth Movement directly participated in creating the Egyptian Coalition for Change. This umbrella group also called for abrogating the treaty with Israel, thus putting the April 6 Youth Movement on the record as favoring this step. The April 6 Youth Movement’s partners in this coalition were mainly al-Wasat, the Brotherhood’s least radical faction which split away convinced that the parent group would never become moderate; Brotherhood members; and al-Karama, a left-wing socialist, anti-Western radical nationalist party. In August 2009, the April 6 Youth Movement expressed support for the Brotherhood. It is important to understand that while the April 6 Movement was not a front for the Brotherhood, many of its activists were Islamists and leftist, while most of its members held strongly anti-Western and anti-Israel views. Moreover, the movement viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as a major partner and ally... Similar factors shape the views of the Egyptian military leaders, the men who made the revolution possible. It is well-known in Egypt that many of the highest officers are conservative, pious Muslims who do not perceive the Brotherhood as an enemy. A symbolic sign of these attitudes has been the increasingly “Islamic dress” of the generals’ wives.
ElBaradei: We'll fight back if Israel attacks Gaza (Ynet, April 4, 2011) - In interview with Arab newspaper, former IAEA chief says if elected as Egypt's next president he will open Rafah crossing in case of an Israeli attack. - Barry Rubin comenta sobre esta noticia: Flash: American-Backed Egyptian "Moderate" (Next President?) Threatens War On Israel! (Barry Rubin, April 5)
Egyptian Daily: Muslim Brotherhood Member Considering Presidential Bid (April 6) - The Egyptian daily Al-Masri Al-Yawm states that a video was posted on YouTube April 5th in which Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood member Abd Al-Mun'im Abu Al-Futuh sets out his intention to run as an independent in the upcoming Egyptian presidential election. According to the newspaper, Al-Futuh said that he wanted to represent all the people, not only the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Futuh recently quit the party established by the Muslim Brotherhood and said that he intended to found a new party called Al-Nahda
7 Popular Myths about the Revolution (Sandmonkey, April 7, 2011) - Sandmonkey desarrolla estas 7 ideas, que considera incorrectas: 1) The Army is co-opting the revolution/trying to establish another military dictatorship; 2) The NDP/Mubarak is still controlling the country; 3) The Islamists are hijacking the revolution; 4) New Parties are the only way to save the next elections; 5) Amr Moussa / Baradei is the new President; 6) International forces will destroy the revolution; y 7) There is doom and gloom everywhere!
Keeping the “Greens” Out of Power in Egypt (Max Boot, April 7)
Egypt Without Mubarak (Joshua Stacher; April 7, 2011)
Egypt: At the Crossroads (Saad Eddin Ibrahim, April 7, 2011)
Among the Muslim Brothers. The contradictory faces of political Islam in post-Mubarak Egypt.(Matthew Kaminski, April 9)
Egypt’s military forcibly breaks up Tahrir Square protest; 2 reported killed (Fredrick Kunkle, April 9)
MB to Sponsor Reconciliation between Egypt's Salafis and Sufis (Ikhwanweb, April 10) - Muslim Brotherhood (MB) Shura Council member Mohamed Gamal Heshmat has revealed the group's intention to broker a reconciliation between the Salafists and the Sufis in order to avoid problems in Egypt that may destroy everything and everybody in the event of an armed conflict between the rival parties
Egypt Goes Full Circle: Back to Imprisoning Bloggers (Barry Rubin, April 11)
Egyptian Military Council Moves to Ban Criticism Of It: Egyptian Blogger Arrested for 'Insulting the Army' (MEMRI, April 11)
Egyptian protesters increasingly disillusioned with army (Jeffrey Fleishman, April 11, 2011)
Anwar Ibrahim’s Double Game: The Muslim Brotherhood’s Chosen Man Stumps Among the Christians (Christopher Badeaux, April 12)
Egyptian Presidential Candidate Muhammad Ali Bilal Supports Amendments to the Camp David Accord (Al-Mihwar TV, Egypt, April 12, 2011)
The Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Current, and Prospects for Post-Mubarak Egypt: An Early Assessment (Robert Satloff, April 13, 2011) - "I believe deep concern about the Muslim Brotherhood's potential emergence as a major player and even power-broker is warranted. As I noted in previous congressional testimony, the Brotherhood is not, as some suggest, simply an Egyptian version of the March of Dimes -- that is, a social welfare organization whose goals are fundamentally humanitarian. On the contrary, the Brotherhood is a profoundly political organization that seeks to reorder Egyptian (and broader Muslim) society in an Islamist fashion. Tactically, I believe the organization will exploit whatever opportunities it is offered; it has renounced its most ambitious goals and the violent means to achieve them only as a result of regime compulsion, not by free choice. Should the Brotherhood achieve political power, it will almost certainly use that power to transform Egypt into a very different place. The best case analogy would be Turkey under Erdogan, where the secular state is gradually being Islamized. A more realistic situation would see deeper and more systemic Islamization of society, including the potential for a frightening growth of sectarianism between Muslims and Copts and even deepening intra-Muslim conflict between Salafis and Sufis..."
Radical Islamist groups gaining stranglehold in Egypt - (Damien McElroy, April 17, 2011) - The rapid spread of Muslim political parties ahead of September's parliamentary elections has strengthened fears that Egyptian democracy will be dominated by radical Islamic movements.
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Leaders Announce Plans For Islamic Law (MB, April 17, 2011)
Brotherhood leaders announce they'll implement Sharia, set off storm (ALMASRYALYOUM, April 17, 2011) - Mahmoud Ezzat, the Muslim Brotherhood's deputy Supreme Guide, said in a forum held in the Cairo district of Imbaba on Thursday that the group wants to establish an Islamic state after it achieves widespread popularity through its Freedom and Justice Party. Meanwhile, Brotherhood leader Saad al-Husseiny, said at the forum that the group aims to apply Islamic legislation and establish Islamic rule. His remarks rattled the leaders of several political parties, who said the statements, which were at odds with the concept of a civil state, would worry liberals. - Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood back on the defensive (Dina Samak, de Ahramonline, April 17) cita a Ezzat diciendo: "The enforcement of sharia [Islamic law] punishments will need time, and will only come after Islam is planted in every heart and masters the life of people, and then Islamic punishments can be applied," además de exponer las reacciones de las facciones políticas seculares egipcias
Leadership vacuum in Suez illustrates Egypt's instability (Hannah Hallam, April 19, 2011) - En eñ esencial puerto de Suez no hay ninguna autoridad ni control.
Egypt's yawning social divides are now exposed (Issandr el Amrani, Apr 20, 2011)
Reconsidering the Brotherhood's Inevitability (IPT News, April 20, 2011)
Moussa: Camp David Accords have expired (ALMASRYALYOUM, April 20, 2011) - Moussa: "The Camp David Accords have expired and they do not govern the situation now, (...)What governs the relationship between the two countries is the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty."
In Cairo, with the Muslim Brotherhood (Gideon Rachman, April 21, 2011)
Surprise! Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Seeks Islamist Dictatorship (Barry Rubin, April 21, 2011) - "It shouldn’t be a surprise that the Muslim Brotherhood wants an Islamist state in Egypt. After all, that’s been its goal since the organization was founded almost 75 years ago, a goal from which it is never deviated for one minute. Two Brotherhood leaders, Mahmoud Ezzat, the deputy Supreme Guide, and Saad al-Husseiny, announced the group’s two-stage strategy, though I’m expressing it here in my words: Phase one: Use its new Freedom and Justice Party to build a broad base of support. Do well in a couple of elections. take 30 percent of parliament, lay the basis for an Islamist state in the new constitution; Phase two: Use anti-Western and anti-Israel demagoguery, preach Islamism in every possible way, indoctrinate young people, watch as a more secular regime fails, and then establish a radical Islamist state with the full array of special punishments, killing of converts, jihad against Israel, etc."
In Cairo withe the Muslim Brotherhood (Gideon Rachman, Apr 21, 2011- comentado en Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt: ‘Your interests are with us, not with the Jews’) (Apr 21)
Times profiles weapons-smuggling to Gaza (Apr 21, 2011)
Remaking Cairo from below (Mohamed Elshahed, April 21, 2011)
The Internal Crisis of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Hani Nasira, April 22, 2011)
New Poll Brings Bad News for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Ryan Mauro, April 22, 2011) - Secularist parties have a clear majority of support, but the Brotherhood might still have significant sway over the government.
#Jan25 #Palestine was, is, has always been in our hearts (3Arabwy, April 23
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Leaders Plan Islamic Legislation; Blame “Friends Of Israel” For Criticism (MB, April 23, 2011)
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Leaders Plan Islamic Legislation; Blame “Friends Of Israel” For Criticism (Hamdi Kasem y Ibtisam Taalab, April 23, 2011)
Understanding Post-Mubarak Egypt (Daniel Pipes, April 26, 2011) - Sostiene que los militares, que no son seculares, seguirán gobernando, cooperando rutinariamente con los islamistas y explotando el miedo a La Hermandad, aunque ésta no es tan poderosa.
Egypt in Middle of Arab Cold War (Shadi Hamid, April 26, 2011)
So what would the Muslim Brothers actually do? (Gideon Rachman, April 27, 2011) - Que no se sabe, pues tiene diversas facciones muy distintas.
No One Expects the Muslim Inquisition (Sultan Knish, April 27, 2011)
Muslim Brotherhood to Contest Parliamentary Seats (April 30)
Islamist in Egypt after the Revolution (Kamal Habib, May 3)
Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood Sticks with Bin Laden (May 3) y una breve apostilla al mismo (CAMERA, May 4)
The New Egypt: Back to Belligerence? (Elliot Jager, May 5) - Positive gestures aside, however, Israeli officials are plainly troubled by what appears to be a strategic shift in Cairo's orientation, one that in the most optimistic analysis replicates the earlier Turkish turn against the Jewish state. Egypt's ultimate trajectory is impossible to forecast, but as far as Israel is concerned, the broad outlines of the new regime's approach are already ominously discernible.
Muslim Brotherhood urges review of Israel ties (Heba Saleh, May 5 2011) - acotación de Martin Kramer: Head of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood: "We ask for: an end to normalisation [with Israel] which has given our enemy stability; an end to [Egyptian] efforts to secure from infiltrators the borders of the Zionists; the abolition of all [joint] economic interests such as the QIZ agreement and the export of Egyptian gas to Israel." Oh, and could the IMF fork over $10bn since Egypt is sinking
Progress? Now Even Egypt's Religious Establishment Hates America (Barry Rubin, May 5, 2011)
Egypt Front-Runner Seeks Israel Reset (Matt Bradley, May 6, 2011) - Amr Moussa, Top in Polls for President, Wants to Reassert Cairo's Dominance
Egypt: Situation Deteriorating Badly and Rapidly (Barry Rubin, May 9, 2011)
Egypt Clashes Turn Spotlight on Radicals (Matt Bradley, May 9, 2011)
U.S. eyes ways to support battered Egypt economy (Reuters, May 9, 201)
Reporter's Notebook: Mere steps ahead of an angry Cairo mob (Ian Lee, May 8, 2011)
Worrying Signs from Egypt (Evelyn Gordon, May 9, 2011)
The hunger to come in Egypt (Spengler, May 10, 2011)
Egypt: If A Country of 80 Million People Falls And The Media Is Deaf, Does Anyone Hear? (Barry Rubin, May 10, 2011)
Israel's New Neighbor Egypt: Radical Nationalist President; Islamist-Dominated Parliament (Barry Rubin, May 11, 2011)
Egypt’s new foreign policy (WaPo Editorial, May 10, 2011)
The Cost of Egypt’s Revolution? (Lee Smith, May 11, 2011)
Egypt's next President? (Israel Matzav, May 11, 2011)
Whitewashing the Muslim Brotherhood (Janet Doerflinger, May 20)
Egyptian Islamist: The Egyptian People Want an Islamic State (May 28) - On May 28, 2011, the Egyptian daily Al-Yawm Al-Sabi' published an article by Mamdouh Isma'il, an attorney for Egyptian Islamists and former jihad activist, titled "The People Want an Islamic Egypt." In the article, Isma'il called on Egyptians to turn out en masse for demonstrations demanding the establishment of an Islamic state in Egypt, and exhorted them not to settle for a secular state with an Islamic source of authority.
The Arab Upheaval: Egypt's Islamist Shadow (Cynthia Farahat, Summer 2011) - no se trata de que La Hermandad llegue al poder, sino de que lo siga ejerciendo.
The real Egyptian revolution (Caroline Glick, June 3, 2011) - "As for the military, its actions to date make clear that its commanders do not see themselves as guardians of secular rule in Egypt. Instead, they see themselves as engines for a transition from Mubarak's authoritarian secularism to the Brotherhood's populist Islamism. (...) The fact that the military would rather facilitate Egypt's economic collapse than take the unpopular step of renewing gas shipments to Israel ought to end any thought that economic interests trump political sentiments. This situation will only get worse when the Muslim Brotherhood takes over Egypt in September. And make no mistake. They intend to take over. As they did in the lead up to March's constitutional referendum, the Brotherhood is using its mosques as campaign offices. The message is clear: If you are a good Muslim you will vote for the Muslim Brotherhood. (...) With the Iranians now apparently moving from developing nuclear capabilities to developing nuclear warheads, and with the Palestinians escalating their political war and planning their next terror war against Israel, it stands to reason that no one in the government or the IDF wants to consider the strategic implications of Egypt's reversion from peace partner to enemy. But Israel doesn't get to decide what our neighbors do. We can only take the necessary steps to minimize their ability to harm us.It's time to get cracking."
Egypt Is The New Iran; (Barry Rubin, June 3, 2011) - "To put it simply, what has happened in Egypt is not just the undoing of the “Mubarak regime” but the undoing of the “Sadat regime,” that is, repealing the revolution Anwar al-Sadat made in the late 1970s and early 1980s. (...) Egypt’s transformation will be for today what Iran’s meant for the last thirty years. Inasmuch as U.S. influence had an effect, Jimmy Carter’s incompetence helped give us Islamist Iran, Barack Obama’s incompetence and ideology helped give us radical (perhaps Islamist) Egypt. (...) Thirty years after the Egypt-Israel peace treaty; eighteen years after Israel agreed to the Palestinian Authority ruling almost all West Bank/Gaza Palestinians; and six years after Israel withdrew from all of the Gaza Strip, the basic Egyptian moderate's view of Israel has not changed one bit. A group that openly proclaims it wants to kill all Jews (genocide, ibada) rules the Gaza Strip. It violently represses any opposition, helps to expel all of the Christians there, teaches children that they should grow up to be terrorists and kill Jews, breaks a functioning ceasefire and openly attacks Israel militarily. Israel defends itself. But to this Egyptian moderate (whose statement on Israel the audience at MIT applauded wildly) Israel is supposedly the one committing genocide. Why should Israel's giving up all of the West Bank and east Jerusalem have any more effect than Israel leaving the Sinai Penninsula, the Gaza Strip, southern Lebanon, and the populated portions of the West Bank? And how can anyone dare assert that doing so would end the conflict without even having the decency to deal with these facts? Contemplate those three paragraphs [here in bold] before advocating the idea that more Israeli concessions will bring peace."
After the fall of the Pharoah (Michael J. Totten entrevista a Lee Smith, June 13, 2011) - Entrevista larga y fantástica que aborda los principales aspectos de la situación en esencia y con perspicacia. Lectura obligada. Lee Smith: Some analysts, like Martin Kramer, argue convincingly that the Egyptians are going to have to use the country’s instability to raise money; instead of a stable, or static, Egypt like the one that Mubarak held together as an authoritarian regime, the new regime is going to need to present an Egypt on the verge of catastrophe and spinning out of the US orbit—unless Washington foots the bill. Other analysts, like Amr Bargisi, think that Egyptian strategy is not that calculated. He argues that no one in Egypt knows what they’re doing, not the army and not the political class, that they’re all just winging it. Given the sometimes chaotic nature of Egyptian society, this perspective is also convincing. I suspect it’s a combination of the two—the ruling classes are essentially rudderless but know that the only way out is by demanding a hefty sum from the Americans. In effect, this is what the peace treaty was in the first place—Washington bribing Cairo not to wreck itself on the shoals of another war with Israel. For thirty years all that cost was $2 billion a year, but now it’s going to cost a lot more: the pity is that we don’t have the money for it. I think if you want to get a sense of where Egypt is heading, it’s useful to understand the mounting disappointments of the revolutionaries. I don’t mean to say that one should take any pleasure from the frustrations of people who wanted something better for their country, but it is important to know more precisely what it is they wanted—or rather, given where the revolution started where it hoped to go. Now that many of the revolutionaries are becoming angry with a military they embraced as brothers during the heady days of the uprising, it is clear they never understood the role of the army in the first place. Egypt’s is a military regime, the same regime that has been running things since Nasser’s 1952 coup. It seems Mubarak had forgotten this fact and imagined he was leading a Mubarak dynasty, with his son Gamal to succeed him. It seems the revolutionaries were also ignorant of this, and it is likely to be every bit as disastrous for them as it was for the man they toppled from power. So, if you want to know where Egypt is going, perhaps the central, and most astonishing, fact seems to be that the revolution never understood the real character of the regime that it was rebelling against—that is a bad sign. (...) The verdict is still out, and I hope I’m proven very wrong, but until then I’ll stick with my initial assessment—the Egyptian revolution is going to spell trouble for the US, Israel, the Arabs, and most importantly, for Egypt itself.
Early Observations on Post-Mubarak Egypt (Jason Brownlee and Joshua Stacher, Jun 17, 2011)
Omaha prof gets scare in Egypt (Roger Buddenberg, June 28, 2011) - He left Egypt “more pessimistic about this revolution. … I just foresee this huge battle ahead.” Egyptians don't yearn for Mubarak to return, he said, but “the hurdles are profound. … Egyptian politics are going to be tempestuous for years to come.”
Tahrir & Beyond (blog de Gigi Ibrahim, un joven egipcio)