Fronteras
Mapa de Israel en 3D
Para entender lo que está en juego con eso de las 'Fronteras' de Israel me ha resultado muy conveniente VER el mapa topográfico en 3D de Israel de Mark Langfan (vídeo presentando el mapa), y los territorios vecinos, en 3 dimensiones para realmente entender qué es eso de Cisjordania (o Ribera o Margen Occidental) o los montes de Judea y Samaria así como el Valle del Jordán, y de paso el Valle del Jezreel, separando la Alta y Baja Galileas y conectando el Valle del Jordán con la Bahía de Haifa. Muy bueno. En su web hay explicaciones y otros mapas interesantes.
Fronteras y Seguridad
Israel's Contested Space in Historical Perspective (Jeremy Black, September 2012)
Demarcating the Israeli-Palestinian Border (David Newman, Jun 3, 2014)
A cambio de la retirada israelí de Gaza, el 14 de abril de 2004 el Presidente Bush entrega una carta al primer Ministro de Israel Ariel Sharon en la que, excluyendo las conocidas como 'salami tactics' de Irán y Siria hacia Israel, le asegura:
"In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949," as former National Security Council official Elliot Abrams reported in the June 26, 2009 Wall Street Journal."
Elliott Abrams, responsable de Oriente Medio en el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional de EEUU en la época, nos recuerda en un artículo que publica en el WSJ de 26 de junio de 2009:
"Throughout, the Bush administration gave Mr. Sharon full support for his actions against terror and on final status issues. On April 14, 2004, Mr. Bush handed Mr. Sharon a letter saying that there would be no "right of return" for Palestinian refugees. Instead, the president said, "a solution to the Palestinian refugee issue as part of any final status agreement will need to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state, and the settling of Palestinian refugees there, rather than in Israel."
On the major settlement blocs, Mr. Bush said, "In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli populations centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949." Several previous administrations had declared all Israeli settlements beyond the "1967 borders" to be illegal. Here Mr. Bush dropped such language, referring to the 1967 borders -- correctly -- as merely the lines where the fighting stopped in 1949, and saying that in any realistic peace agreement Israel would be able to negotiate keeping those major settlements.
On settlements we also agreed on principles that would permit some continuing growth. Mr. Sharon stated these clearly in a major policy speech in December 2003: "Israel will meet all its obligations with regard to construction in the settlements. There will be no construction beyond the existing construction line, no expropriation of land for construction, no special economic incentives and no construction of new settlements."
Otros asemejan la situación al Acuerdo de Munich por el que Francia, Reino Unido y Alemania despojan a Checoslovaquia de Los Sudetes, dejándola indefensa militarmente al quitarle las montañas que le servía de protección.
The long view in Israel against the 1967 line (Dore Gold, June 5, 2011) - For decades, Israel's greatest strategic minds have concluded that the Jewish state can safeguard its future only by retaining defensible borders beyond the 1967 line.
Remembering Six Days in 1967 (MIchael Oren, June 6, 2011) - The anniversary of Israel's Six-Day War is a reminder why it cannot return to armistice borders.
Israel's Right to Secure Boundaries: Four Decades Since UN Security Council Resolution 242 (Jun 4, 2007) - en este enlace diversos embajadores analizan detalles de la CS Res 242, su significado y su aplicación:
Correcting the Record on Resolution 242 (Amb. Dore Gold)
Contextualizing Resolution 242 (Amb. Meir Rosenne)
Security Council Resolution 242: An Analysis of its Main Provisions (Prof. Ruth Lapidoth)
The Territorial Clauses of Security Council Resolution 242 (Amb. Yehuda Blum)
The Plight of the Refugees and Resolution 242 (Prof. Ruth Lapidoth)
The Principles of Peacemaking (Amb. Richard Holbrooke)
Appendix A – UN Security Council Resolution 242
Appendix B- Statements Clarifying the Meaning of UN Security Council Resolution 242
Defensible Borders for a Lasting Peace (Dore Gold, Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, Meir Rosenne, 2008) - When Prime Minister Ariel Sharon first proposed his Gaza Disengagement Plan he did not seek a quid pro quo from the Palestinian side. Instead, he obtained one from the United States in the form of a letter from President George W. Bush, dated April 14, 2004, in which the U.S. assured Israel that with respect to the disputed West Bank, Israel was entitled to defensible borders. How the idea of defensible borders works into the post-Iraq War Middle East is fully examined as well as the territorial, legal, and policy implications of this critical U.S. guarantee.
Una vez más, el embajador Dore gold nos recuerda - Rabin's last Knesset speech (Nov 2, 2012) - la posición del asesinado Primer Ministro de Israel pocos días antes de su asesinato, expuesta el 5 de octubre de 1995 ante la Knésset:
"Las fronteras del Estado de Israel, durante la solución permanente, estarán más allá de las que existían antes de la guerra de los Seis Días. No volveremos a las líneas del 4 de junio de 1967."
Israel's Requirement for Defensible Borders (Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, 2005) -
Memorándum Secreto de la Junta de Jefes de Estado Mayor (USJCoS) del Ejército de EEUU (JSCM-373-67), del 29 de junio de 1967), firmado por el entonces Presidente del USJCoS, General Earle G. Wheeler. El memorándum sostiene que, en opinión del USJCoS y desde un punto de vista militar, Israel necesita para su seguridad y defensa retener las tierras altas de Samaria occidental, y no solo mantener presencia militar en el valle del Jordán, que es la estrategia militar pública de las IDF: "Desde un punto de vista estrictamente militar... la visión de la Juenta de Jefes de Estado Mator... [ve necesario] el control [israelí] la tierra elevada prominente que corre de norte a sur" a lo largo de Judea y Samaria. El Apéndice del Memorándum concreta que Israel necesita, como mínimo, una línea de defensa a lo largo de "Bardala-Tubas-Nablus-Bira-Jerusalem", que "daría una porción de los píes de las colinas [de Judea y Samaria] a Israel y evitaría la acción de artillería contra los oblados israelíes de las tierras bajas".
Israel Requires Defensible Borders - 1967 Lines No Border (Dore Gold on Fox News, May 29, 2011) (video): Any future agreement between Israel and the Palestinians requires that Israel maintain defensible borders, said Amb. Dore Gold in an appearance on Fox News, May 27, 2011. The "1967 lines" merely demarcate where a ceasefire took place and were never intended to be an international boundary, he said.
Defensible Borders on the Golan Heights (Maj.-Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland, 2009) - Israeli-Syrian negotiations in 1999-2000 discussed security arrangements to compensate Israel for the loss of the Golan Heights. The idea was to guarantee that in case of war, IDF forces could quickly return to the place where they are currently stationed. This analysis demonstrates that Israel does not possess a plausible solution to its security needs without the Golan Heights. Not only was the "solution" proposed in the year 2000 implausible at the time, but changing circumstances have rendered Israel's forfeiture of the Golan today an even more reckless act.
Getting to the Territorial End-Game of an Israeli-Palestinian Peace Settlement (Edward P. Djerejian, 2010) - El diplomático americano encabeza un grupo que pretende abordar lo que el título expone.
The legal borders of Israel under international law: San Remo's Mandate: Israel's 'Magna Carta' (Video) - Video de la conferencia celebrada en 2010 en San Remo para conmemorar el 90 aniversario de la Conferencia de San Remo en la que los poderes mundiales transfirieron derechos legales exclusivos sobre la Tierra de Israel al pueblo judío.
The 1967 Line (Yaakov Lozowick, May 26, 2011).
The 1967 Lines and Israel's Defensibility - Some Hard Facts (Steven Stotsky, June 7, 2011)
Territorialy Speaking (Dore Gold, Sep 2, 2011)
In any future peace arrangements, Israel must retain vital parts of the West Bank that it needs for its security and not just assume that it can just re-capture them if a security need arises.
Israel's 1967 Borders: What's The Big Fuss? (Yonatan Silverman, May 29, 2011)
Las fronteras de Israel (video, subtitulado en español)
Israel: necesidades de seguridad críticas
Dan Diker on Israel’s Return to Security-Based Diplomacy
Israel Doesn’t Need the West Bank To Be Secure (Martin van Creveld, December 24, 2010) - Arun dice (May 30, 2011) que es un artículo excelente; a mí me parece que es una bobada que, en pocas líneas tiene abundantes frases hechas falsarias, todas alineadas con la propaganda izquierdista y palestina.
“Intellicopter” Tour Provides Bird’s Eye View of Israel’s Defense Needs
¿Golfo Persa o Golfo Arábigo? La bomba dirá
1947 (29 nov) - Fronteras de la Partición en la AG Resolución 181
En el magnífico No End to Palestinian Claims: How Israel and the Palestinians View Borders (January 8, 2014), Pinhas Inbari expone cómo los palestinos ni siquieran se conforman ahora, ni en el marco de sus actuaciones ante NNUU en 2011 y 2012 ni el de las negociaciones que empujados por EEUU mantienen con Israel en 2013-2014, con las 'Fronteras de antes de 1967', esto es, las fronteras del Armisticio de 1949, sino que buscan las fronteras definidas en la propuesta que acompañaba la AG Res 181 de 29 nov de 1987, que los árabes nunca aceptaron. Resume Inbari:
Un documento interno estratégico (según se publica en la propia web de Fatáh) elaborado en la oficina del negociador jefe palestino Saeb Erekat en 2013 sostiene que el objetivo de las actuales negociaciones de 2013-2014 con Israel no es llegar a un acuerdo sino crear una coartada para que EEUU pueda imponer una solución a Israel fundada en la 'legitimidad internacional'. Los palestinos acordaron negociar solo después de que Kerry, Secretario de Estado de EEUU, se comprometiera a apoyar la posición palestina sobre las líneas de 1967.
Sin embargo, ha habido repetidos signos de que los líderes palestinos reclaman territorio israelí 'dentro de' las líneas de 1967. En 1999, la OLP planeaba sustituir los Acuerdos de Oslo por demandas territoriales palestinas basadas en el Mapa de Partición que se unió a la Resolución 181 de la Asamblea General de NNUU, esto es, que ampliaban sus demandas territoriales. Junto a otras manifestaciones semejantes, el Observador de la OLP ante NNUU, Nasser al-Kidwa, escrine en una carta oficial dirigida al Secretario General de NNUU Kofi Anan diciendo:
"Israel aun debe explicar a la comunidad internacional las medidas que tomó ilegalmente para extender sus leyes y reglamentos al territorio ocupado en la guerra de 1948, más allá del territorio asignado al estado judío en la Resolución 181 (II)."
Tras la retirada unilateral israelí de Gaza en 2005, los palestinos demandaron la anexión del poblado fronterizo israelí de Netiv Ha’asara. Al negociar el tema del agua, los palestinos reclaman no solo el agua de la Ribera Occidental y Gaza sino también la del acuífero israelí y el Mar de Galilea. Y también reclaman soberanía sobre el enclave de al-Hama en los Altos del Golán porque formaba parte del Mandato Británico sobre Palestina.
En septiembre de 2011, Mahmoud Abbas dijo a la Asamblea General de NNUU que solicitaba la admisión como miembro de NNUU con "base en las fronteras de 1967". Pero en el documento formal de solicitud que presentó ante NNUU no hay la menor referencia a las líneas de 1967 sino exclusivamente a la Resolución 181 de la Asamblea General de 1947. Y ello en consonancia con lo que ya declrararon semejantamente cuando los palestinos declararon su independencia en 1988.
Así, se acumulan evidencias considerables sobre el hecho de que los líderes palestinos mantienen reclamaciones de territorio israelí 'dentro' de las líneas de 1967.
1948 (16 nov) - CS Resolución 62: líneas de demarcación permanentes en el armisticio a alcanzar
1948 - CS Res 62 (16 nov) (English SC Res S/1080) - insta a las partes la celebración de una armisticio aplicable a todos los sectores de Palestina y a negociar "el trazado de las líneas de demarcación permanentes que las fuerzas armadas de las partes respectivas no deberán franquear; las medidas de retiro y reducción de estas fuerzas armadas que garanticen el mantenimiento del armisticio durante el período de transición que habrá de llevar a un paz permanente en Palestina."
En otoño de 1948, diplomáticos israelíes iniciaron negociaciones informales con representantes de Egipto, Siria y Jordania; el 12 de noviembre, el primer ministro Ben-Gurión dijo que había conversaciones en curso con dos estados árabes. Entre tanto, Israel intentaba convencer a las Potencias que lo mejor para llegar a un acuerdo eran las negociaciones directas. EEUU apoyó la idea y Canadá la propuso al Consejo, que el 16 de noviembre aprobó esta resolución llamando a las partes a sustituir la tregua por un armisticio permanente.
1967 Lines and Land swaps
‘Land Swaps’ and the 1967 Lines (Dore Gold, June 20, 2011) - uno de los grandes expertos en el tema, el exembajador autor del artículo hace un poco de historia y pone en contexto el tema.
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin made clear in his last Knesset address in October 1995 that Israel would never withdraw to the 1967 lines. He stressed that Israel would have to retain control of the Jordan Valley, the great eastern, geographic barrier which provided for its security for decades since the Six Day War. He didn't say a word about land swaps. For neither Resolution 242 nor any subsequent signed agreements with the Palestinians stipulated that Israel would have to pay for any West Bank land it would retain by handing over its own sovereign land in exchange.
So where did the idea of land swaps come from? During the mid-1990s there were multiple backchannel efforts to see if it was possible to reach a final agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. The Palestinians argued that when Israel signed a peace agreement with Egypt, it agreed to withdraw from 100 percent of the Sinai Peninsula. So they asked how could PLO chairman Yasser Arafat be given less than what Egyptian president Anwar Sadat received.
As a result, Israeli academics involved in these backchannel talks accepted the principle that the Palestinians would obtain 100 percent of the territory, just like the Egyptians, despite the language of Resolution 242, and they proposed giving Israeli land to the Palestinians as compensation for any West Bank land retained by Israel. This idea appeared in the 1995 Beilin-Abu Mazen paper, which was neither signed nor embraced by the Israeli or the Palestinian leaderships. Indeed, Abu Mazen (Mahmoud Abbas) subsequently denied in May 1999 that any agreement of this sort existed.
There is a huge difference between Egypt and the Palestinians. Egypt was the first Arab state to make peace, and in recognition of that fact, Prime Minister Menachem Begin gave Sadat all of Sinai. Moreover, the Israeli-Egyptian border had been a recognized international boundary since the time of the Ottoman Empire. The pre-1967 Israeli boundary with the West Bank was not a real international boundary; it was only an armistice line demarcating where Arab armies had been stopped when they invaded the nascent state of Israel in 1948.
In July 2000 at the Camp David Summit, the Clinton administration raised the land swap idea that had been proposed by Israeli academics, but neither Camp David nor the subsequent negotiating effort at Taba succeeded. Israel's foreign minister at the time, Shlomo Ben-Ami, admitted in an interview inHaaretz on September 14, 2001: “I'm not sure that the whole idea of a land swap is feasible.” In short, when the idea was actually tested in high-stakes negotiations, the land swap idea proved to be far more difficult to implement as the basis for a final agreement.
After the collapse of the Camp David talks, President Clinton tried to summarize Israeli and Palestinian positions and put forward a U.S. proposal that still featured the land swap. But to his credit, Clinton also stipulated: “These are my ideas. If they are not accepted, they are off the table, they go with me when I leave office.” The Clinton team informed the incoming Bush administration about this point. Notably, land swaps were not part of the 2003 Roadmap for Peace or in the April 14, 2004 letter from President Bush to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.
It was Prime Minister Ehud Olmert who resurrected the land swap idea in 2008 as part of newly proposed Israeli concessions that went even further than Israel's positions at Camp David and Taba. It came up in these years in other Israeli-Palestinian contacts, as well. But Mahmoud Abbas was only willing to talk about a land swap based on 1.9 percent of the territory, which related to the size of the areas of Jewish settlement, but which did not even touch on Israel's security needs. So the land swap idea still proved to be unworkable.
Writing in Haaretz on May 29, 2011, Prof. Gideon Biger, from Tel Aviv University's department of geography, warned that Israel cannot agree to a land swap greater than the equivalent of 2.5 percent of the territories since Israel does not have vast areas of empty land which can be transferred. Any land swap of greater size would involve areas of vital Israeli civilian and military infrastructure.
Furthermore, in the summaries of the past negotiations with Prime Minister Olmert, the Palestinians noted that they would be demanding land swaps of "comparable value" – meaning, they would not accept some remote sand dunes in exchange for high quality land near the center of Israel. In short, given the limitations on the quantity and quality of territory that Israel could conceivably offer, the land swap idea was emerging as impractical.
Pushing Israel back to 1967 lines is illegal under International Law (Ted Belman, July 11, 2011) - Según Jacques Gauthier, abogado especialista de derecho humanitario internacional, en consulta a la Camara de los Comunes británico en julio de 2011:
The Balfour Declaration, issued by the British Government in 1917, in which the Jewish people were promised a national home did not qualify as international law. However, the San Remo Resolution of 1920, which incorporated the Balfour Declaration, made the pledge binding under International Law. The San Remo Declaration, together with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations and Article 80 in the Charter of the United Nations, are still applicable today. Pressuring Israel to go back to 1967 lines and dividing Jerusalem would thus be a serious breach of International Law.
2011 - Discurso de Obama con mención a las Fronteras de 1967
2011 - Netanyahu ante el Congreso de EEUU
Posición de la OLP
Memo del Equipo de Negociación Palestino a su líder sobre: ANTICIPATORY BORDERS STRATEGY: Two possible “borders first” scenarios and recommended. Palestinian response (Aug 27, 2009)
Mapas históricos
En este enlace, en este otro y en este otro hay unas secuencias de mapas explicativos del proceso conflictivo y fronterizo israelo-árabo-palestino, con breves anotaciones históricas.
Y en este unos sencillos mapas con la evolución de las fronteras de Israel desde el Mandato Británico (1922) hasta hoy.
A continuación otros mapas en el mismo sentido, pero sin explicación (y la secuencia está incompleta, por ahora).
(...) Primero y sobre todo un Jerusalén unido... como capital de Israel, bajo soberanía israelí."
↑ 1947 - Plan de Partición ↑ 1949 - Líneas de Armisticio
↓ 1967 - Tras la guerra ↓ 1975 - Acuerdo Intermedio
↓ 1982 Retirada del Sinaí
Frontera de Seguridad
El 3 de noviembre de 2013, durante una convención para conmemorar el 96º aniversario de la Declaración Balfour, el Primer Ministro Netanayhu dice, en relación con las negociaciones de paz en marcha entre Israel-Palestinos, empujados por EEUU, que "entre las muchas cosas que sin duda" incluirá un posible acuerdo "sin duda la primera será que la frontera de seguridad del Estado de Israel siga a lo largo del [río] Jordán", aunque no aclaró que quiere decir con 'frontera de seguridad'.
Documentos y Fuentes
Informe de David Makovsky, con Sheli Chabon y Jennifer Logan, Enero, 2011, para el The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (English)
The impossible is indeed achievable. Middle East negotiators can adjust Israel's borders to include the large majority of West Bank settlers and still meet Palestinian Authority territorial demands. This proposition -- stemming from principles the two parties have repeatedly expressed as well as current realities on the ground -- may guide leaders and diplomats in the coming months as they seek to advance the peace process.
In this new Washington Institute report, David Makovsky analyzes the intersection of demography and geography in the West Bank in order to demystify the territorial dimension of the conflict and facilitate peacemaking. Through detailed maps and in-depth population data, he shows how the parties can use land swaps to meet some of their most important goals, such as minimizing dislocation, ensuring security, and establishing a contiguous Palestinian state in the West Bank. Territory is not the only issue on the peace agenda -- security, refugees, Jerusalem, and recognition of Israel's legitimacy are key -- but breakthrough on this issue may open the door to progress on the others.
Interactive map (January, 2011) - As a complement of Imaging the Border, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy offers this fully interactive online map. Users can explore the report's various land swap proposals and see detailed information about every Israeli and Palestinian community in the West Bank. With satellite and terrain maps drawn from the most up-to-date Google Earth database, the interactive map permits users to examine these proposals from a local perspective, down to the level of individual streets and buildings. Data from the controversial Triangle option has been included for purposes of comparison.
Otros
Why Borders Matter (Barry Rubin, June 1, 2011)
Border Fiction: Fracture and Contestation in Post-Oslo Palestinian culture (William Andrew Paul, 2013)