Fuente:
The Sinai campaign did not bring about an end to Arab hostility, or a change in Israel's political map. Its appeals for a final peace settlement went unheeded. The armistice agreement with Egypt, declared by Israel at the beginning of the campaign to be null and void, was still considered by the United Nations as the only valid legal and political instrument. Still, in practice, Israel had, at least temporarily, secured a major part of its aims. Its neighbours had learned to respect Israel's capability to defend itself and forcefully repel aggression. They realised that they had a long way to go before they could venture a new military confrontation. This was true specifically with regard to Egypt. While astutely conducting widespread propaganda that depicted Israel's military successes in 1956 as the result of its "collusion" with France and Britain, Egypt avoided anything that could provoke a renewed conflagration in the imminent future. The stationing of the UNEF in the Straits of Tiran and the Gaza Strip, and on the Sinai border with Israel, provided a welcome shield of border calm. Lebanon and Jordan, and, for a short period, even Syria, followed the attitude adopted by Egypt. As a consequence, Israel enjoyed a period of border tranquillity that it had not known before the Sinai campaign.
Israel could now concentrate on constructive objectives: to accomplish the integration of almost 850,000 immigrants arrived since the establishment of the State and of over 400,000 more arrivals during the following decade, to develop the national economy in agriculture, industry, construction, trade and shipping, to expand and improve the educational system, the institutions of science and the social and health services. The decade following the Sinai campaign was one of quick economic growth and rising standards of living.
The Gulf of Eilat was now open to navigation, and Israel could develop trade relations with the countries of Asia and East Africa. Eilat, a village of 520 inhabitants in 1956, was a town of 11,000 in 1966, its harbour annually handling over a million tons of cargo. An oil pipeline had been laid from Eilat to Haifa, the nightmare of an oil embargo was fading. International relations and political ties developed speedily. Political and economic relations with the countries of Asia, Africa, North and South America and Western Europe, and with most countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean Basin, expanded swiftly. Israel's friendship with the United States and with France was of marked intimacy. Friendly relations were formed with almost all newly established African States, and a network of co-operation and mutual assistance with developing countries in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Near East was built up. The number of Israel's diplomatic missions rose from 55 in 1958 to 110 in 1967. The stormy events in the Middle East in 1958 - the bloody revolution in Iraq and the subsequent crises in Lebanon and Jordan - did not disturb Israel's quietude.
But against these bright facets of development was set the distressing fact that reconciliation with Israel's Arab neighbours was no nearer.
There was no remission of the Arab boycott against Israel. Egypt continued to exercise its illegal blockade of Israel in the Suez Canal, in spite of the "assumptions and expectations" expressed by the United States in March 1957.
No progress had been made towards a solution of the Arab refugee question. All endeavours of Israel and its friends to start direct negotiations on this urgent human problem were stultified by the obdurate refusal of the Arab States to negotiate with Israel.
Jerusalem was a divided city, Jews were denied access to their Holy Places, Article VIII of the Israel-Jordan armistice agreement remained a dead letter.
The Arab hate campaign against Israel was unabated and unabashed.
Egypt, greatest and strongest of Israel's neighbours, pursued its policy of relentless hostility. While keeping the border quiescent for the time being, Nasser left no doubt that he had not relinquished his avowed aim of destroying Israel. The huge amassing of modern Soviet-made weapons was a source of permanent concern to Israel, as was Egypt's recruitment of Nazi missile experts, and as were certain of Egypt's political moves, like the establishment of the United Arab Republic in 1958 and of the Federation of Arab States in 1963.
But the main factor in upsetting the shaky equilibrium in the area was Syria, which conducted a policy of unremitting provocation of Israel and of prodding the other Arab States into active belligerence. Exploiting its hill-top topographical advantage over Israel, Syria embarked on a proliferation of border incidents - encroachment on Israeli territory, disturbance of the cultivation of their lands by Israeli farmers, shelling of Israeli settlements, interference with Israeli fishing on Lake Kinnereth, acts of sabotage and murder. The Syrians could act in this way with impunity so far as the United Nations was concerned, since the automatic application of its right of veto by the Soviet Union prevented any possible censure of the aggressive activity of Damascus by the Security Council. Israel was left with no alternative but to exercise its right of self-defence by armed resistance, earning the reprimands of the Security Council, as was the case after an Israeli counter-attack in 1962.
The situation grew even worse after the Ba'ath Party assumed power in Syria, in 1963. Syria's call for instant war by the Arab States on Israel as a reaction to Israel's carrying out of its water development project had been rejected by the other Arab States under the leadership of Nasser, but, to maintain their anti-Israel posture, they endorsed the plan to divert the Jordan headwaters, as well as the setting up of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, which aimed to liquidate Israel. If the other Arab States at that time had, as it seems, no intention to exceed the bounds of verbal warfare, Syria was determined to escalate the tension in the area and to step up pressure on the other Arab States to fall in line. Syrian efforts to prevent Israel from using the Dan River sources (in Israeli territory) led to serious border clashes in November 1964, as did Syrian works to divert the Banias flow in 1965-66. Syria was instrumental in creating the terrorist Al-Fatah organisation in 1965. After the radical left wing of the Syrian Ba'ath Party assumed power in February 1966, the terrorist organisations became more active. Their incursions into Israel were carried out in part from Syria across Jordanian or Lebanese territory, with the intention of involving Jordan and Lebanon in incidents with Israel. On 7 April 1966, in a land and air battle that developed after heavy shelling of Israeli villages by Syrian artillery, six Syrian Mig planes were downed by the Israeli Air Force. In October 1 1966, Syrian Premier Yusuf Zu'ayin threatened: "We shall set the entire area afire and any Israeli movement will result in a final resting place for Israel."
The situation was perilous, but Israel was still hopeful that, in the other Arab States, caution and a sober assessment of the risks involved in war would prevail. Things became critical, however, when the Soviet Union not only encouraged Syria in its aggressive designs, but also beguiled Egypt into action by spreading false information about an impending Israeli invasion of Syria. The stage was set for the great encounter.
Fuente: Ministerio de RREE de Israel
Israel Committed to Peace, Address to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Meir, 7 October 1957.
Basic Policy of the Government of Israel, 17 December 1959.
Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Ben Gurion on the situation along the Israel Syria border, 10 April 1962.
Israel note to the Security Council concerning the Tripartite Arab Federation, 29 April 1963.
Notes from the Prime Minister of Israel to Presidents and Prime Ministers following the establishment of the Arab Federation, 5 May 1963.
Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Ben Gurion, 6 May 1963.
Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol, 24 June 1963.
Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol, 26 August 1963.
Draft Resolution S/5407 submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States to the Security Council, 29 August 1963.
Israel's Position on the Middle East Arms Race Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol, 20 May 1964.
National Covenant of the Palestine Liberation Organization, 28 May 1964.
Government of Israel Statement following the second Arab Summit Conference, 13 September 1964.
Israeli note to the Security Council following the second Arab Summit conference, S/5980, 18 September and S/6020, 19 October 1964.
Draft Resolution S/6113 submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States to the Security Council, 17 December 1964.
The Israeli Peace Plan, statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol, 17 May 1965.
Statement to the General Assembly by Foreign Minister Meir, 17 October 1965.
Statement by Foreign Minister Spokesman on border situation, 2 November 1965.
Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol, 12 January 1966.
Statement to the Knesset by Foreign Minister Eban, 23 March 1966.
Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol, 18 May 1966.
Statement to the Knesset by Prime Minister Eshkol, 17 October 1966.
Draft Resolution S/7568 submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States, 27 October 1966 and Draft Resolution S/7575/Rev. 1, submitted to the Security Council by the Argentine, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria and Uganda, 3 November 1966.
Independence Day message by Prime Minister Eshkol, 13 May 1967.