Tras el fracaso, al menos temporal, de las conversaciones de paz a las que en 2013 isralíes y palestinos habían sido empujados por EEUU, Abú Abas, Presidente de la Autoridad Palestina y del Fatah, envía el 23 de abril de 2014 una delegación del Fatah a Gaza para firmar un nuevo acuerdo de unidad con el Jamás de Haniya.
El 23 de abril de 2014 Fatah y Jamás firman públicamente un acuerdo, conocido como Acuerdo de Shati (texto), que, muy probablemente como en las múltiples ocasiones anteriores, la última en 2011-2012, no llevará a ningún lado y será una mera estratagema para seguir avanzando en sus respectivas posiciones de lucha contra Israel. Alunos comentarios: WINEP, JCPA, Al-Zaytouna y, otro, de Ghazi Hamad, viceministro de exteriores de Jamás, ya transcurridos 8 meses largos del fallido acuerdo.
Desde luego, el acuerdo no supone que Jamás haya renunciado a la destrucción de Israel, como altos responsables de Jamás reconocen y airean sin esconderse en numerosas declaraciones de estos mismos días, lo que ha llevado a una tímida declaración de rechazo del acuerdo por parte de la administración del Presidente Obama; y ha conllevado la previsible respuesta de rechazo de Israel.
Veremos... pero, salvo que logre consolidarse, me abstendré de perder mucho tiempo con este nuevo gambito.
En Ramala, el 2 de junio Abás toma juramento al 'gobierno de tecnócratas' resultante del acuerdo de unidad de Fatáh y Jamás. Llaman gobierno de tecnócratas porque dicen que no han incorporado al mismo miembros de Jamás, y así poderlo usar como a esta hoja de parra con la que evitar que la alianza pudiera dificultar las relaciones exteriores, especialmente con EEUU e Israel; dice Abás:
"Hoy, tras anunciar el gobierno de unidad nacional, declaramos el fin de la división que ha causado daño catastrófico a nuestra causa"
El gobierno está formado por 17 ministros, a quienes califican como profesionales independientes sin lazos políticos con Fatah ni Jamás, a tres de los cuales, provenientes de Gaza, Israel ha negado el acceso a la Ribera Occidental.
Uno de los objetivos declarados del nuevo gobierno es preparar las elecciones que prevén celebrar en 2015.
Palestinian Reconciliation and the Rising Power of Hamas and Islamic Jihad: An Iranian Windfall (Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi, May 14, 2014); su resumen:
"Fatah and Hamas are continuing to talk in an attempt to translate the reconciliation agreement, signed between the sides on April 23, 2014, into a series of operative steps. These primarily involve integrating Hamas and Islamic Jihad into the PLO institutions, setting up a unity government, and preparing for new parliamentary and presidential elections.
The PA has rejected the demand that Hamas must accept the Quartet principles (renouncing terror, recognizing Israel, and recognizing the agreements signed between Israel and the PLO and the PA) before being allowed into the government or the PLO institutions. Abbas vehemently claims that Hamas is not a terror organization. Abbas' consent to integrating Islamic Jihad into the PLO implies he does not regard it as a terror group either.
Abbas needs Hamas' cooperation to make it appear that the government of the PA exists in Gaza as well. With the PA striving for international recognition, this is of supreme importance. Hamas is clearly pleased with the international stamp of approval it expects to attain with Abbas' help.
The entry ticket Abbas is providing Hamas and Islamic Jihad into the PLO enables them to compete for control of the PLO institutions and, through elections, to take the helm of the Palestinian national movement. In the 2006 parliamentary elections in the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas won an overwhelming majority. Thus Hamas sees a historic opportunity to upgrade its current status and is competing to become the exclusive representative of the Palestinian people both in Palestine and the diaspora.
By repeatedly defying the United States, and being prepared to integrate Islamic Jihad as well into the PLO, and possibly also other Islamic terror organizations, Abbas is signaling that he is no longer in the American camp. Instead he is adopting positions of the rejectionist camp and seeking closer ties with Iran, ally of Hamas and patron of Islamic Jihad."
The Palestinian Reconciliation Agreement: Tactical Relief or Strategic Opportunity? (Kobi Michael y Udi Dekel,May 14, 2014)
The reconciliation agreement reached recently by Fatah and Hamas is a result of the internal weakness of both organizations, with each suffering a steady erosion of legitimacy and public support. The government of technocrats to be formed is a mechanism meant to make a show of both sides living under the same roof without either one having to give up its fundamental ideology. Should a Palestinian unity government of technocrats be established, one option open to Israel is a transition from a discourse of opposition to the reconciliation, to an attempt to restart the political process but with an essential difference in the format of the process. This would entail moving away from a discussion of the permanent status agreement core issues, where the gaps cannot be bridged any time soon, to a gradual construction of a two-state reality by helping the Palestinians build a responsible, stable, and functioning political entity.