Чтобы победить Аль Каиду в Ираке генерал Мак Кристал был вынужден от иерархии перейти к опоре на групповой разум. Об этом он рассказывает во многих своих видео и в книгах.
Генерал МакКристал говорит, что командуя войсками коалиции в Афганистане он выполнял функцию "садовника", который выращивает взаимодействие и команды. Точнее, дает командам и взаимодействию вырасти.
Подобный подход (все участники обмениваются информацией со всеми) ранее позволил ему победить АльКаиду в Ираке (АльКаида и сама так действовала). Правда, этот принцип привел к тому, что Мэннинг слил много информации в ВикиЛикс.
Генерал говорит, что АльКаида - это была 2.0 организация.
ИСИС (или как она?) - это 3.0 организация.
Но придут и 4.0 организации.
Одна из книг генерала - "Команда команд", название намекает на систему, когда взаимодействуют команды, вместо одной иерархической структуры.
На 43:50 генерал даже говорит про shared consiousness - коллективный разум (группы)! Мне нравится эта тема и этот термин. Мне казалось, никто этим серьезно не занимается, но вижу, что это не так.
Многое перекликается с тем, что слышал от Клейна на семинарах и в жизни:
1. Если есть цель (проект) и непонятно, что делать, нужно начать регулярно встречаться и общаться, обсуждать. Из этого начнет что-то рождаться.
2. Мир стал настолько сложным, что нужно адаптироваться (переобуваться) на лету.
(19 апр 2018) на 20 мин Мак Кристал как раз говорит про рост эффективности от гармоничного взаимодействия. Другими словами это можно назвать везением.
Может, попробовать с ним связаться, раз ему тоже это интересно?
на 26 мин: the team is not the sum of it parts. Команда - это не сумма элементов.
Намекает на синергию, на рост эффективности (везение) от хорошего взаимодействия.
на 29 мин:
What makes a team great?
Trust + Purpose + Context = Shared Consciousness
на 48 мин:
Технологические и другие усовершенствования не позволяли победить Аль Каиду.
(19 апр 2018) на 5 мин генерал признается, что его самым значимым учителем стал террорист Аль-Заркави
на 19 мин определение команды:
The team is whatever community is required to get the task done
(23 апр 2018)
Фрагменты про создание "сети, которая сможет победить сеть террористов" из книги "My Share of the Task" by McChristal.
To confront Zarqawi’s spreading network, TF 714 had to replicate its dispersion, flexibility, and speed. Over time, “It takes a network to defeat a network” became a mantra across the command and an eight-word summary of our core operational concept. But the network didn’t yet exist. Building it would prove to be one the largest challenges I faced in my career. It required turning a hierarchical force with stubborn habits of insularity into one whose success relied on reflexive sharing of information and a pace of operations that could feel more frenetic than deliberate.
...
The Situational Awareness Room reflected how my command style and command team were evolving. As I stressed transparency and inclusion, I shared everything with the team sitting around the horseshoe and beyond. E-mails that came in were sent back out with more people added to the “cc” line. We listened to phone calls on speakerphone. (Rare exceptions to this policy of transparency were sensitive personnel issues and cases when sharing would betray someone’s trust.) As a result, I increasingly found T.T. and other senior officers could frequently anticipate my position on an issue and make the decision themselves.
Открытость своим союзникам:
comfortable with and to do so with anyone who wanted to be part of our network. We allowed other agencies to follow our operations (previously unheard of), and we widely distributed, without preconditions, intelligence we captured or analysis we’d conducted. The actual information shared was important, but more valuable was the trust built up through voluntarily sharing it with others.
(23 апр 2018)
Генерал мак Кристал использовал ежедневные видео конференции для повышения эффективности его команды в Ираке.
Про ежедневные видео конференции в книге My Share of the Task:
Eventually, every member of TF 714 and partners in D.C. could view the meetings on their personal computers, listening through their headphones. Especially as TF 714’s battlefield success gained notice, by 2007 the O&I was a worldwide forum of thousands of people associated with our mission.
The size of the forum invited an array of perspectives that built a collectively richer understanding of the topic at hand. So too did the depth of information we discussed and the regularity of our conversations. Few topics were off limits: Granular tactics were discussed alongside strategy, intelligence alongside operations, resourcing alongside values. The best moments came when a briefing sparked a conversation among multiple people at different agencies that disclosed information that was known but had not been shared across the community.
I quickly saw, however, that beyond its value for the information shared, the O&I was the single most powerful tool I had at my disposal in leading a dispersed force. A video teleconference couldn’t replace a hand on a shoulder. But the O&I provided me nine hours a week during which I could seek to influence, inspire, and learn from those I led. I asked probing questions, but also ones I knew the answers to, in order to give them a moment to demonstrate their mastery in front of an audience of thousands of their peers. I would restate something I feared was unclear or provide my personal assessment of something I wanted to ensure was accurate, only to have the experts correct me. These exchanges were helpful in calibrating my thinking, but they also hopefully demonstrated to everyone that we were less a team led by me than we were a team leading one another. The regular briefings also reinforced the briefers: As Admiral Nelson knew, decentralizing did not mean disengaging, and those farthest out could not have any doubt that their work fit into a wider mission.
Unless someone in my room was talking, one camera was on me the whole time. By nature an introvert, I found the requirement to be on camera for so long exhausting, but it forced me to be a better leader. My interactions with one person were amplified to the thousands...
...
Critically, the O&I fostered decentralized initiative and free thinking while maintaining control of the organization and keeping the energy at the lowest levels directed toward a common strategy. This was meant to liberate subordinates and remove unnecessary hesitation. When I told a major, for example, that he did not have to ask permission to do something, I simultaneously broadcast that directive to all of the other majors. They now didn’t have to waste time dialing up headquarters. Everyone left the O&I confident they knew the latest update of our organization’s intent, strategy, rules, and approvals. Our discipline of schedules, processes, and standards did not reduce adaptability or creativity. It was the foundation that allowed for it.
In subtle and overt ways, the O&I helped us to animate Beltway conference rooms and cubicles with the “This is a war” ethos that filled our austere, dusty outstations downrange. By spanning time zones, we were gluing together groups of people with different levels of devotion. We relied on people in the States for whom this was a nine-to-five job, who picked up their kids from soccer practice after work. Even when their commitment was outsize for D.C., it often didn’t match the grueling pace maintained in three- and four-month spurts by people downrange. The O&I helped stoke further commitment. In most stateside locations, the military wore the dark green uniform or the blue blouse to the office. So after months and eventually years of appearing in the tan uniforms worn by those deployed, we built up moral suasion. The impact was more immediate when people outside the war zone watched the operators brief. They saw their days-old beards and the guns, helmets, and body armor hanging on the wall. They knew those men would in a few hours be out in dark, tight spaces. The stand-up reminded analysts that their work was not just paper traffic; it affected lives. Those who were frustrated by sending intelligence reports into the ether had the simultaneously sobering and exciting experience of hearing that their work did, or could, lead to a senior leader being captured or to a car-bomb factory being shut down.
These moments were motivation enough for much of our force, so in concluding remarks, I would summarize some of what I had heard and try to connect it to our bigger goals. We didn’t have time to drive this with emotions, to huff and puff. We needed constant, demanding, driven vigilance and professionalism. I tried to build that up a few sentences at a time through forceful but even tones. Do your job. People’s lives are on the line. Thanks, as always, for all you are doing.