Historicity, Tradition, Praxis and Tao: A Comparison of the World-views of Zhang Xuecheng and Modern Philosophical Hermeneutics
Wu, Chan-liang
National Taiwan University
Zhang Xuecheng’s celebrated assertion that “all the Six Classics are historical records” is a perspective on the Chinese classics that is generally recognized as having resulted in revolutionary changes in the hermeneutics applied to the classics. The huge impact of "decanonization" brought by the historical approach he took toward studying classics has been discussed over and over again, probably to the extent that it is often over-emphasized by many modern scholars.[1] However, beyond this there is still a great deal to be analyzed in Zhang’s work and the great influence it has had on modern Chinese intellectual history. It is the author’s opinion that, in fact, Zhang's thought, especially his world-view, shared many basic themes and assumptions with modern "philosophical hermeneutics. " These themes and assumptions formed not only the theoretical basis of Zhang's interpretation of Chinese Classics, but also a formidable threat to the "rise of intellectualism" in Qing intellectual history.[2]
The significance of the similarities between the world-views of Zhang and modern philosophical hermeneutics lies in the fact that modern philosophical hermeneutics represents the most important philosophical trend in the twentieth century that gives a thorough examination of the entire western intellectual tradition. A comparison between Zhang's thought and philosophical hermeneutics could enhance our understanding of the value of the legacy of Zhang's thought, which is still very much alive in contemporary China. Secondly, Zhang claimed that his scholarship was both a continuation and a major development of Neo-Confucianism, especially the Lu-Wang and Zhedong schools. Together with Zhang’s scholarship, their thinking opposed in many ways the “intellectualism” of the Qing textual study of thought. A comparison of Zhang's thought with philosophical hermeneutics can reveal the meaning of this intellectual trend from a new perspective.
Due to the complexity of this topic, a thorough treatment of it requires much more space than what can be offered here. Therefore, in this paper, I only attempt to present the basic points and some crucial evidences of my argument. The first section will be an analysis of the essentials of Zhang's world-view, the organic relations between his basic themes, and their influence on his interpretation of Chinese classics. To avoid forced analogy with the Western hermeneutic tradition, the discussion of the first section will be carried out solely in terms of Zhang's own thought. After this initial analysis, I will indicate the basic similarities between Zhang's thought and modern philosophical hermeneutics in detail.[3] The comparison between Zhang's thought and modern philosophical hermeneutics, which carries a strong anti-intellectualism implication, will improve our understanding of the question of why Zhang's thought was a major threat to the "rise of intellectualism" in modern Chinese intellectual history. In the meantime, it will also be of interest to notice how classical philological hermeneutics could be strongly influenced and even subverted by a hermeneutic theory that is basically a kind of philosophy of history.
I. Tao, Historicity, Tradition, and Praxis in Zhang's World-view and Scholarship
It is well known to the academia that Zhang's emphasis on the concepts of Tao, historicity, evolution, and praxis are special and important in the mid-intellectual history of the Qing dynasty. [4] Nevertheless, different scholars held different interpretations toward these concepts, and many of them either did not see the organic relations between these concepts or focused on only one or two of them --- especially on the concept of evolution or historicity. It seems to me that the philosophical depth and relations between those key concepts of Zhang's thought are yet to be investigated.
Modern scholars emphasized the concepts of historicity and evolution in their interpretations of Zhang's thought.[5] The emphasis on these two concepts help to explain why Zhang was rediscovered and highly evaluated by modern Chinese thinkers who were overwhelmed by the theory of evolution during the early decades of this century. These two concepts are indeed crucial to Zhang's thought and to his contribution to Chinese intellectual history. However, by doing so, scholars tended to neglect the centrality of the concept of Tao in Zhang's thought. It is mainly because the concept of Tao appeared to be too abstract to modern Chinese thinkers who advocated studying facts or concrete things in well-defined, scientific terms. Nevertheless, textual evidences tell us that it is undeniable that the concept of Tao played a, if not the, fundamental role in Zhang's thought.
Since the time of Confucius and Laozi, the pursuit of Tao, an all-embracing but not definable concept, has always been the ultimate concern of most of the first-rate Chinese thinkers. However, although these thinkers shared many basic beliefs, each generation, school and individual had their own interpretation of the meaning of Tao. Song and Ming Neo-Confucians tended to employ the concept of li (a term which, strictly speaking, cannot be translated; scholars usually render it as "rationality"), which is more independent of time and space, or the concrete situations than the concept of Tao, to interpret the concept of Tao. However, the philosophical trend since the late Ming period was to criticize the many problems caused by the rigid and abstract concept of li and return to the ancient teaching of Tao that relates better to the real world. After the collapse of Ming dynasty, a radical development of criticisms toward the hollowness of the Neo-Confucian study of li led to the rise of the textual study school in the Qing dynasty. To most of the advocates of textual study, both Tao and li were too general and abstract to be the proper subject for study or discussion. Leaders of this school proclaimed that Tao and li simply revealed themselves in the text of ancient classics -- records of the words and deeds of ancient sages. Scholars of later generations should follow the teachings and examples of those ancient sages faithfully without trying to form their personal interpretations, because history shows that personal interpretations usually lead to very subjective and diverse views of what is right and wrong, and this may lead to self-indulgence and chaos. Therefore, philological hermeneutics in its most rigid form became the standard of scholarship in the Qing dynasty.
It is well known that Zhang rebelled against the narrow-mindedness of the scholars of his time, but few scholars noticed that Zhang, like his contemporaries, also inherited the anti-Lixue (study of li) tendency of the late-Ming and early Qing period. In order to criticize the problems of the textual study, Zhang emphasized the centrality of the pursuit of Tao in Confucianism. However, in order to avoid the unfitness and emptiness of the concept of li, he also warned against talking abstractly about general principles or universal laws, and tried to link Tao to concrete situations. (YS,1,31,37-38;51,55-58) Emphasis on Tao and rejection of rigid, empty li consist two of the most prominent characteristics of Zhang's thought. By doing so, he transcended his era, and continued the spirit of both late-Ming and ancient thinkers.
Promoting the pursuit of Tao and rejecting abstract discussion of li are repeated themes in Zhang's writings. But what did Tao mean to him exactly? Why did he reject abstract discussion of general rules or principles (li) while he was so much interested in a seemingly more abstract Tao? We need to start with the first question. To Zhang, and probably to all the first class Chinese thinkers, Tao meant both the way of nature and the totality of meaning and truth. In his famous article "On the nature of Tao," Zhang said:
Tao originates in tian (heaven, cosmos, or universe). Does tian ordain Tao explicitly? I would say there is no way for me to know what happened before heaven and earth [came to existence]. When heaven and earth gave birth to man, there was Tao, but not yet in an explicit way. Three people lived in a room, then Tao became evident, but not yet distinct. When there were tens and then hundreds of people that could not be accommodated by a single room, divisions had to be made and Tao became distinct. The names of benevolence, righteousness, loyalty and filial piety, together with the institutions of jurisdiction, politics, rituals and music were all results of inevitable situations. (YS, 37)
What Zhang emphasized here is the "way" of human society, but he also made it clear that the "way" of the people and society came from nature. He said explicitly that Tao, as both the "way" of nature and society, evolved along with the time. It was a view strongly advocated first by ancient Taoists and then by some pre-Han Confucians who tried to integrate Taoism into Confucianism. By restoring this ancient world-view, Zhang maintained that Tao could not be limited to a set of norms or discoveries made by a certain sage in a specific period of time. Rather, Tao was gradually discovered and created by a series of sages to fulfill the needs of the evolving and concrete historical situations. Only with the increase of the sophistication of society, could Tao gradually reveal its content in a more explicit way.
Since Tao is not something designed or ordained by a superior source but the natural way of history, Zhang also maintained that "Tao could not be mastered by the knowledge of the sages." (YS, 37) Therefore, how can we pursue Tao just by reading the words of the sages or by repeating their behaviors? Zhang maintained that Tao is and should be "the result of the natural trend of things." (YS, 37) It became so just because it had to be so, not because it was made to be so. This argument was a most powerful and direct attack on the theoretical basis of the textual study school. The meaning of the philological hermeneutics carried out by the textual study school could be summarized, as was advocated by one of its most prominent leaders Dai Zhen only when the philology (of the texts of classics) is clear, can the principles of right and wrong be clear. However, if Tao manifests itself in the natural process which, ultimately speaking, is beyond words and theories, then one should learn not just from the classics or any written things but from the natural process of society, which is history, directly.
To further provide evidence for his theory, Zhang pointed out that ancient Chinese sages never attempted to convey Tao through writing. "All the Six Classics are history," Zhang said, "the ancients did not write books, the ancients never left actual events to talk about li. All the Six Classics were important governmental documents of former sage kings." (YS, 1) What the sage kings did was merely to actualize what the natural process necessitated, and the Six Classics were only records of this history only. (YS, 1, 38) Tao is invisibly in and behind everything. Even the sages could not have complete understanding of it. (YS, 37-38) Therefore, to do what the historical process necessitated them to do was exactly their highest wisdom. The Duke of Zhou, for example, no matter how wise he was, could not have become the Duke of Zhou without the specific historical moment and the prolonged accumulation of civilization before him. (YS, 39) Only by consummating thousands years of civilization before him could he establish practically all the basic principles for the welfare of human society. This career by itself was beyond the contrivance of any human wisdom or intelligence. It was the result of history, and it could only have been realized in concrete historical situation (YS, 37-38). History and praxis transcend human understanding. Tao realized itself only in the totality of history, in the collective action of countless people, one generation after another.
Did his belief in history make Zhang an evolutionist, like some modern scholars have proclaimed? As a pre-modern Chinese thinker, Zhang did not believe in the idea of continuous progress. To him, the work of the Duke of Zhou represented both the highest point of civilization and the lasting resource of archetypes for later creations. While modern Western cultural historians and thinkers found that almost all of their major cultural inventions originated in Greek and Christian traditions, Zhang took it as his life-long career to trace significant cultural activities in later Chinese history to the classical period. He maintained that if a scholar really understood how history evolves from the beginning, he could unveil "the entire span of the ancient wisdom and the purity of the creation of heaven and earth."[6] Only then could he begin to know the most important thing, Tao, which is beyond words, and created things that are truly meaningful and indispensable.[7] The assumption that history has a highest point and that later cultural activities had a common source of inspiration and creativity did not mean later generations should repeat or imitate what the ancient did. On the contrary, what they should learn from the sages is not their words or actions, but the way those sages dealt with their own historical situations. No one, not even the ancient sage, could foresee the needs of and norms for the future. One should and must find out and actualize what one's own historical situation necessitates one to do. Textual study, by examining ancient rules or things that are long gone, only leads people to evade historical situation. Zhang called for a return to praxis in history.
Praxis, or to act in concrete historical situation, is the highest principle of Zhang's scholarship. Influenced by Neo-Confucianism, Zhang maintained that one should cultivate oneself to the point that one can confront the challenges of life with a peaceful mind and a humane heart. One should learn from daily life, study one's contemporary society and the models set by ancients so as to achieve the most in one's own destiny. Different personality, ability and personal and historical situation require different action. As long as one does what is necessary to be done, it is always meaningful. Starting from this criterion, any distinguished cultural achievement, as long as it satisfies the real need of the historical situation, is highly appreciated by Zhang. He was strongly against the textual study school's diminution of everything except the faithful study of the Classics. To Zhang, Tao is everywhere in history. The development of history is a necessary and meaningful process. One can find one's proper place in life and history by attending to one's concrete historical situation.
Zhang also applied the principle of praxis as a criterion to analyze the intellectual history after the Southern Song dynasty. Zhang traced his own scholarship to the Zhedong school, a school known for distinguished scholars like Lu Xiangshan, Wang Yangming, Liu Jisan and Huang Lizhou. He also differentiated himself from the Zhexi school, a school represented by Zhu Zi, Zhu's many erudite followers, Gu Tinglin and Zhang's contemporary Dai Zhen. Zhang maintained that the Zhexi school emphasized erudition, and the Zhedong school emphasized specialty. He believed that Zhedong school excelled in "interpreting the questions of heaven, man, human nature and the mandate of heaven through the study of history." (YS, 56) However, many scholars were confused by the criterion he set for Zhedong school, and some proclaimed that it was only a way for Zhang to establish his own position in intellectual history.[8] Lu Xiangshan, Wang Yangming, and Liu Jisan, for example, were certainly not historians. So why did Zhang put their scholarship in line with the study of history? The answer simply lies in the fact that what Zhang emphasized the most was the principle of praxis. Since the time of Confucius and Sima Qian, Zhang maintained, the goal of the study of history was to conduct the world. Confucius's Chunqiu (Book of History), the origin of Chinese historiography, became his most important work because it focused on contemporary problems and fulfilled the needs of his time. The spirit of Zhedong and Lu-Wang school was the same. Each Zhedong scholar led a very different style of life, but they all devoted themselves to solve the problems in their concrete historical situations. No matter what they did, whether it was political engagement, setting spiritual models for later generations, or writing history, their spirit --the principle of praxis-- was the same. To achieve one's moral self and fulfill one's "vocation" in one's concrete personal and historical situation was the true spirit of Zhedong school. This is also why Zhedong school, following the tradition of Confucius and Sima Qian, excelled in illustrating human nature and the boundary between heaven and man, the mandate of heaven, and the meaning of man's work in history. To Zhang, only through the in-depth study of real life in history can we understand the Tao of both nature and man. (YS, 56-57).
II. Zhang's Thought and Modern Philosophical Hermeneutics
From both a historical and philosophical point of view, modern philosophical hermeneutics could be characterized as a rebellion against Platonism, the origin and heart of almost the entire Western intellectual tradition. However, while a thing is always greatly influenced by what it rebels against, modern philosophical hermeneutics, excluding certain parts of Heidegger's thought in his later years, was at the same time a continuation of the Platonic tradition. As a continuation of Platonic tradition, philosophical hermeneutics differs from Zhang's thought in countless ways. However, as a rebellion against the Platonic tradition, philosophical hermeneutics shares many fundamental, especially cosmo-ontic, themes and assumptions with the entirely non-Western thought of Zhang.[9]
1. Tao, Ereignis, and Protests toward the Dominance of Li or Rationality
Since the time of Socrates and Plato, Western philosophers aspired to "ground culture and everything that transpires within it by appeal to ahistorical, or at least universal and necessary, definitions, criteria, or theories."[10] Modern philosophy and science inherited this tradition and incurred, as was clearly pointed out by Nietzsche, the twin crises of modern Western civilization: scientism and nihilism -- both are symptoms of an over-indulged rationalism. Continuing Nietzsche's critique, Heidegger, the founder of philosophical hermeneutics, spent his entire life trying to find a way to overcome these crises. Heidegger maintains that in order to solve the many problems caused by the "technological" essence of science and philosophy, we need to surpass the metaphysical tradition that is deeply rooted in the entire Western tradition. Gadamer, a student of Heidegger and the spokesman for philosophical hermeneutics, using Heidegger's ontology as his starting point, systematically criticized Platonic and Enlightenment epistemology so as to develop his hermeneutic thinking.[11] Despite the many differences between them, both Heidegger and Gadamer believed "in the finitude and historicity of human life and culture, and in the rootness of truth, knowledge, and morality in traditions and social practices." (HP, xiii) To both of them, "to treat practices, traditions, and historicity as the horizons of existence is not to fall into gross subjectivism or relativism. It is to abandon the Platonic quest for a philosophical foundation for culture." (HP, xiii) This post-platonic attitude coincides with Zhang's emphasis on historicity, tradition and praxis to an astonishing level.
Zhang did not rebel against Platonism, but he did protest strongly against something that is similar in its domination of defining what is significant and what is right and good. As mentioned earlier in this paper, Zhang inherited the anti-Lixue (study of Li, with emphasis on the centrality of li in both nature and society) tendency of the late-Ming and Qing period. He tried to rebel against the domination of the concept of li and returned to the ancient "concept' of Tao which, it seemed to him, corresponds to the real world in a better way. At the same time, he fought against the textual study school's belief that there are lasting norms imbedded in the text of classics to guide us forever. To Zhang, what is important is not words, theories, or even classics but this very real and complex world. What is good and right is not something embodied in the form of eternal norms or concepts. Rather, it is something naturally required by historical process, something that can only be realized in praxis.
Both Zhang and modern hermeneutics rebel against the dominance of norms or concepts that claimed to be everlasting and universal – whether they are Li or rationality. Both sides try to point out the complexity of history and human nature that could not be fully grasped by our limited faculty of thinking, even less by theories or words. They represent a shift from a stable, well-regulated world-view to a world-view of becoming. To Zhang, this means a return to ancient Chinese world-view -- a dynamic cosmo-ontic view centered on the concept of Tao.[12] To Heidegger, this means a return to the versatility of the pre-Platonic world of Greeks. Both of them speak of a state that is the source and origin of later cultural creativity, a state that is ultimately beyond words and written records. Although their scholarships were totally different from each other, they shared a similar world-view and the many basic beliefs derived from it. This could be the basic reason why there are so many important similarities between them.
The rebellion against li or rationality manifests itself first of all in the introduction of the factor of time into their thinking. The introduction of the factor of time and a criticism of traditional concept of li or rationality crystallized in their interpretations of Tao and Ereignis (belonging-together, event of appropriation). To Zhang, and to the Chinese intellectual tradition, the major difference between the concept of Tao and li lies in the former's emphasis on time.[13] Heidegger, by contrast, put great emphasis on a new term -- Ereignis -- in his later works in order to express the belong-togetherness of Being and time. The many similarities between the world-views of Zhang and Heidegger's can also be ascribed to the basic similarity between Zhang's concept of Tao and Heidegger's concept of Ereignis.
Heidegger embodied his struggle with the European metaphysical tradition firstly in Being and Time, in which the central question was, not surprisingly, the relation between Being and time. In the famous introduction of this book he indicated clearly that "time must be brought to light-and genuinely conceived as the horizon for all understanding of Being for any way interpreting it. "[14] Starting with the emphasis on the temporality and historicity of Dasein, Heidegger's study of Being qua Being eventually turned out to be an attempt to grasp history comprehensively. Being, like Tao, reveals itself in the entire history.[15] The holistic nature of Being necessarily emphasizes the "radical relatedness of everything" in the manner that "thing comes to being only as an aspect of a total project, which, as it allows it to appear, consumes and dissolves it in a network of references." (HM 450) The entire process of founding, breaking-through, and dissolving of beings is the "playing" of Being itself in time. The old way of seeing individual being as beings qua beings represented the metaphysical legacy of Platonism, while Heidegger reminded us never to forget the question of Being, and to think in terms of Being qua Being. To overcome the metaphysical tradition and the onto-theological language of the West, Heidegger brought to us a new world-view with the factor of time at its center.
However, as Nietzsche pointed out much earlier: "of all the idols vanishing in the twilight 'being' must have been the first to go," Heidegger read in Nietzsche's The Will to Power that “Being was a necessary fiction, an invention of weary men who cannot endure a world of ceaseless change and eternal Becoming."[16] Although Heidegger's interpretation of Being was an effort to unite Being and time, he gradually felt the need to turn away somewhat from the term Being, which still bears some misleading resemblance to the European metaphysical tradition. That is why he chose to use the term Ereignis in his later works. Professor Owens indicated that: "The discovery of the belonging together of Being and time suggested to Heidegger that understanding of Being could come an go.......The belonging of Being and time and the fluid relation between them Heidegger crystallized in the word "Ereignis," event of appropriation."[17] Ereignis is a concept that bears a great deal of resemblance of the concept of Tao. Before we start a discussion of the relation between the two, we should give a belief review of past research into the similarities between Heidegger and Taoism.
In the past twenty years more than twenty-five articles and books have been published, in Western languages alone, on the study of the relationship between Heidegger and Taoism. Those studies showed abundant evidence of both Heidegger's familiarity with and continued interest in Taoism. Quite a few authors also successfully argued for and documented the many fundamental similarities between the thought of Heidegger, not only in his later years but also in his early days, and ancient Chinese Taoists.[18] Some of them, offered very cogent observations on the many similarities between the concept of Ereignis and Tao. A very good comparison of them was made by Professor Owens, summarized as follows: Ereignis is a process, not a being; while Tao is also a way, not a being. Ereignis and Tao are both devoid of content. Ereignis singularized itself in particular things while Tao is one with all things and concretized itself in the myriad. Ereignis is an ever-shifting context of relations while the Tao of things is constantly changing. Ereignis, just like Tao, can not be mastered.[19] I would like to add that these similarities all start with the basic fact that both Ereignis and Tao, using Heidegger's term, is not a being, but a process in which Being reveals itself in time.
Zhang's interpretation of Tao came from Yizhuan, an ancient Chinese classic that tried to integrate Confucianism and Taoism. Since the cosmo-ontic framework of Yizhuan derived from Taoism, so did Zhang's world-view. To Zhang, Tao manifests itself only gradually in the evolution of history, and it is everywhere in the tradition. (YS, 37-41) As a historical process, Tao is never-ending and cannot be mastered or predicted. While manifesting itself only in the historical process, Tao is also devoid of content and singularizes itself in particular event. (YS, 37-41) The amazing similarities between the world-views of Zhang and Heidegger's are not accidental. They all started from the emphasis on time and history.
However, there are also some major differences between Heidegger and Zhang regarding the issues of time, history and tradition. As a Confucian, Zhang emphasized the value-creating aspect of Tao, while Heidegger, like the Taoist, emphasized more the poetic aspect of Ereignis. Both of them realized that true originality is very rare in human history. However, Heidegger, probably with the concept of progress in mind, paid special attention to the precious moments of creation in history, and emphasized: "History is rare. There is history only whenever the essence of truth is incipiently decided "(HP, 18). In contrast, Zhang believed that almost all the inventions in later days originated from the classical period.
2. Human Understanding, Praxis, and Factuality
The main body of modern hermeneutics is to interpret what is human understanding, or, in Gadamer's words, to form "a theory of the real experience that thinking is."[20] The starting point of this career for Heidegger, as well as for his student Gadamer, is to conceive understanding" as the very way of Dasein's Being."[21] To be "the very way of Dasein's Being," understanding represents not just reasoning or interpretation but human experience in general, a theme best expressed by Heidegger's assertion: "human experience is hermeneutical through and through." (HP, 6) As being-in-this-world, our very way of existence necessarily involves praxis. Living experience is always an interaction between a person and the “living context”—one’s concrete personal and historical situation. To understand what is going on around us and to respond to it consist the very core of our experience from the beginning of our life.[22] The distinguished pragmatist philosopher Richard J. Bernstein points out that "one of the most important and central claims in hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics is that all understanding involves not only interpretation, but also application." (HP, 272) Bernstein also makes it clear that "one of his profoundest insights has been the linkage (or fusion) of hermeneutics and praxis, and his claim that all understanding involves appropriation to our own concrete historical situation." (HP, 290)
At first sight, this kind of hermeneutic inquiry seems to have little to do with Zhang's scholarship. It is true that Zhang never attempted to give a philosophical analysis of the "conditions that make understanding possible" as modern hermeneutics did.[23] However, Zhang did point out again and again the limitation of human understanding set by man's very historical situation and the necessity of integrating thinking with application. Zhang's theory starts from his belief that Tao, while embodying itself in everything, is "unable to perceive." (TY, 36) He maintained that this evolving world, as a whole, predicates Tao, and Tao is inseparable from concrete historical existence, from the evolving process of this world. Since Tao is unable to perceive, even the sages could not but studying the all kinds of phenomena emerged in the evolution of history so as to realize what is necessarily to be done in their particular historical situation. (TY, 36) No one can go beyond one's historical situation to have a full grasp of Tao. The best we can do is not to know Tao but to "comply with Tao" -- that is, to know what is necessarily to be done in one's immediate and concrete historical situation. (TY, 36-37) We simply could not expect to have a full grasp of Tao.
Since human understanding is limited by his historical situation, Zhang maintained that pure and theoretical understanding of the li (reason) of things is unreliable, (TY, 1, 29) and that "the learning of the ancients is inseparable from practical issues." (TY, 46) To study the classics does not mean that we should simply imitate those norms and models established by the ancients, but that we should learn from them the knowledge and wisdom of using one's intrinsic capacities to handle one's immediate historical situation. (TY, 45-46) "To learn means to act," Zhang said, not just reading. (TY, 46) Confucius "differentiates thinking from learning" because "just thinking is not learning, we must practice on real issues so as to learn." (TY, 47)
The starting points and methods of Zhang, Heidegger, and Gadamer's scholarship are very different. However, we do find that similar world-views eventually lead to similar emphasis on praxis in concrete historical situation and on the limitation of human understanding. The similarities between the concepts of Tao, Being and Ereignis, concepts most central to both Zhang and modern philosophical hermeneutics, explain their common attitudes toward human understanding. While Tao or Ereignis stands for the most fundamental and universal theme of each system, the emphasis on praxis, time, tradition and historicity are all logically connected in their world-views. Anti-intellectualism is a necessary result of this kind of world-view.
Taking human understanding as the very way of Dasein's Being also makes modern philosophical hermeneutics a "Hermeneutics of factuality." Both Heidegger and Gadamer emphasized the finitude of temporality, "the concealed ground for the historicity of Dasein." (HP, 9) Therefore, to both of them, the concept "hermeneutic" designates "the basic being-in-motion of Dasein, which constitutes its finitude and historicity and hence includes the whole of its world experience."[24] Scholars have pointed out that the radical finitude and temporality of factuality suggested by the "hermeneutics of factuality" will lead to the belief that "all I can do is to affirm that that's the way things are and that's how I am and have to be, and let them be accordingly, in their full uniqueness." (HP, 20) This could be called "the immediacy of experience"--all that can finally be said that 'there it is'." (HP, 20)
The above view of philosophical hermeneutics reminds us of Zhang's very Taoist belief that Tao is the result of an "inevitable situation" and that we should do only what the historical situation necessitates us to do. (budeyi, cannot stop from doing; a crucial term in Zhuangzi.) Tao cannot be mastered or predicted; we can only adhere to the immediate experience and try to be one with the natural flow of it. This Taoist attitude of "to be one with the way" was fully absorbed into Zhang's philosophy of history. (TY, 35-37)
The radical finitude and temporality of things also leads to what Professor Wayne called the "radical concrete particularity," a theme shared by both Heidegger and Chinese Taoists. Professor Wayne points out that: "from the Heideggerian and the Taoist points of view, things appear to be very much like unique events. Each and every one is unique but transient hypostasis of -or pause in- a constant but 'ahistorical' process."[25] Both Heidegger and Taoists believe that we should experience the radical concrete particularity of things. In order to "experience the radical concrete particularity of things, we have to, first, unlearn the universalizing tendencies of conceptual representation and languages."[26] Heidegger's theme of releasement (Gelassenheit) and Taoist theme of non-action (wuwei) are exposition of this basic belief.[27]
From a Chinese and Taoist point of view, the "radical concrete particularity" can be seen as an important attribute of qi (air-like concrete existence). A major development of the Chinese intellectual history from Song to Ming is the mounting emphasis on qi. Song Neo-Confucians extolled li, but Ming Neo-Confucians began to emphasize that "li is in qi," while some thinkers in late-Ming period maintained that "without qi there is no such thing as li." This is also a mounting protest toward the domination of the abstract norm of li, and a return to praxis. A radical development of this tenet, like the "radical concrete particularity" extolled by Zen or Taoism, would be a complete break with li, and creates a world-view which "dissolve" things into the constantly changing process. Zhang, as a Confucian, did not go to the extreme. He adopted a moderate way to express his avocation for returning to praxis by asserting that "Tao is inseparable from qi* (here qi* stands for another Chinese character which means concrete object)" or "li is inseparable from event."(TY, 40, 1, 29) Concrete object or event, which still bears a certain degree of constancy and stability in the flow of history, is the basis of his experience. It is still a manifestation of the belief that both Tao and li could only be found in concrete object or practical situation, but it is not as radical as Heidegger's and Taoist thought.
A Threat to the Rise of Intellectualism
As a rebellion against Platonism, philosophical hermeneutics carries a strong anti-intellectualism and anti-rationalism tendency, and this is why philosophical hermeneutics can be associated with the theory of deconstruction and post-modernism. Zhang's thought, as a protest toward the dominance of li and textual study, also carries strong anti-intellectualism elements and tendencies. Its emphasis on praxis is a legacy from Lu-Wang school and a result of his distrust toward concepts, theories and written norms. Zhang’s inquiry into Tao leads to what is ultimately unsayable.(TY, 36) His emphasis on historicity leads to a pragmatic and evolutionary view of knowledge that may eventually shake the authority of knowledge. The central theme of his thought-- advocating the primacy of praxis in concrete historical situation-- is a kind of anti-intellectualism in its very nature.
Zhang's thought represents a very important intellectual trend in both early modern and modern China. As a continuation of late-Ming Confucianism, Zhang's scholarship and thought was a major development of the Lu-Wang tradition in the Qing dynasty. Zhang coined a new term for his school--Zhedong school, and interpreted it as a tradition emphasizing on the pursuit of Tao through praxis in concrete personal and historical situation. He criticized his contemporaries for retreating to books and for their belief in the changelessness of li, which represented a secularized version of Chengzhu school. In the Qing dynasty, Zhang's thought echoed with Yuan mei, Wang Zhong and the Tongcheng school and greatly influenced later “New Script” (JinWen) thinkers like Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan—also leaders the Statecraft (Jingshi) school.[28] The Textual study school gradually declined after the heyday of the Qing dynasty, and the principle of praxis, which better represents the true spirit of original Confucianism, arose. After Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan, we have Kang Youwei’s evolutionary view of history and Tan Sitong's pursuing of Tao in praxis. The introduction of the theory of evolution and Hu Shih's pragmatism and evolutionary world-view also supported Zhang's world-view. Later on, Chinese Marxism was especially appreciated for its dialectic interpretation of history and emphasis on revolution, change, and praxis. The stress on praxis, inquiry into Tao or some ultimate guiding "principle," and the belief in the historicity of things gradually became the basic themes of a new age. Intellectualism never reigned in this new age-- revolution and action did.
Glossary
Budeyi 不得已
Chengzhu 程朱
Chunqiu 春秋
Dai Zhen 戴震
Duke of Zhou 周公
Gong Zizhen 龔自珍
Gu Tinglin 顧亭林（炎武）
Hu Shih 胡適
Huang Lizhou 黃黎洲（宗羲）
Jingshi 經世
JinWen 今文
Kang Youwei 康有為
Laozi 老子
li 理
Lixue 理學
Tan Sitong 譚嗣同
Liu Jisan 劉蕺三（宗周）
Lu-Wang 陸王
Lu Xiangshan 陸象山（九淵）
qi 氣
qi* 器
Sima Qian 司馬遷
Tian 天
Tongcheng 桐城
Wang Yangming 王陽明（守仁）
Wang Zhong 汪中
Wei Yuan 魏源
wuwei 無為
Yizhuan 易傳
Yuan mei 袁枚
Zhedong 浙東
Zhexi 浙西
Zhu Zi朱子
Zhuangzi 莊子
* Collected in Classics and Interpretations: The Hermeneutic Traditions in Chinese Culture (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000)
[1]For example, see P. Demieville, "Chang Hsueh-ch'eng and His Historiography," Beasley & Pulleyblank eds., Historians of China and Japan(Oxford: Oxford UP, 1961); David S. Nivison, The Life and Thought of Chang Hsueh-cheng (Stanford: Stanford University Press,1966), 141; Yu, Lun Dai Zhen yu Zhang Xuecheng, 34-39, 47-53; Benjamin A. Elman, Classicism, Politics, and Kinship(UC, 1990), 226-228. However, we should keep in mind that although Zhang criticized the traditional ahistoric attitude toward classics, he still firmly believed in the paramount value of the classics. Zhang took ancient classics as the kernel of the governmental records of an unparalleled era in which all kinds of possible goods of human society had evolved into their natural maturity and perfection. According to Zhang, although the ancient sages never intended to leave their teachings in writings, their career, together with the records of it, are nevertheless the source of wisdom and creativity, the origin of true scholarship and culture, and shining models in every aspect to later generations. (Zhang Xuecheng, Zhangshi Yishu [Shanghai: Shangwu, 1936; Hereafter cited as YS], 1-29.)
[2]For the rise of intellectualism in the Qing dynasty, see Professor Yu Ying-shih, Lun Dai Zhen yu Zhang Xuecheng (Taipei: Huashih, 1980), 1-183. As for Zhang Xuecheng, Professor Yu emphasized the influence Zhang received from Dai Zhen and Qing intellectualism. This observation is true. However, we can also detect a very strong anti-intellectualism tendency in Zhang's thought.
[3]However, in spite of the fact that Zhang's world-view did share many basic assumptions and beliefs with philosophical hermeneutics, Zhang, with an entirely different intellectual background, was neither interested in nor critical or "philosophical" enough to create the kind of philosophical hermeneutics as was developed in the West.
[4]Ex. Qian Mu, Zhongguo jin sanbainian xueshushi (Shanghai: Shangwu, 1937), 382-402, 534-536; P. Demieville, "Chang Hsueh-ch'eng and His Historiography," Beasley & Pulleyblank eds., Historians of China and Japan (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1961), 180; David S. Nivison, The Life and Thought of Chang Hsueh-cheng (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966); Yu, Lun Dai Zhen yu Zhang Xuecheng, 34-39, 47-53; Hu Shih, Zhang Shizhai xiansheng nianpu (Taipei: Yuanliu, 1986), 166; Benjamin A. Elman, Classicism, Politics, and Kinship (UC, 1990), 226-228.
[5]Ibid.
[6]Zhang Xuecheng, Wenshi Tongyi (Taipei: Huashi, 1980; hereafter cited as TY), 160.
[7]To Zhang Xuecheng, Wenshi Tongyi and Jiaochou Tongyi are not only works on "the history of scholarship," but also inquires into Tao. See TY, 1-44, 160, 559-562.
[8]Ex. Nivison, The Life and Thought of Chang Hsueh-cheng, 279-280, 249-250; Yu, Lun Dai Zhen Yu Zhang Xuecheng, 56-75.
[9]Given Zhang's emphasis on the importance of historicity, tradition, and praxis, he would agree with the tenet of both modern hermeneutics and pragmatism that "the social practices and traditions of a specific historical or cultural world are the horizons of existence." (Robert Hollinger, ed., Hermeneutics and Praxis (Notre Dame: UP of Notre Dame, 1985; hereafter cited as HP, xiii) The horizon of existence of Zhang was entirely different from that of modern Western thinkers. Therefore, it is meaningless to indicate the many superficial similarities or differences between them. What is truly interesting is the very basic similarities between their world-views.
[10]HP, x.
[11]HP, xii, 27.
[12]Ref. Wu, Chan-liang, "The Cosmo-ontological View of Becoming in Ancient Chinese Taoism," Bulletin of the Department of History of National Taiwan University, V. 19, (1996.6), 259-289.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Heidegger, Being and Time (tr. John Macquarrie Z Edward Robinson, New York: SCM Press, 1962), 39.
[15]However, to Heidegger, "possibility belongs to Being as much as do actuality and necessity, which encompasses both possibility and actuality," (Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought [New York, Harper & Row, 1971], 183.) This means that Being, which encompasses both possibility and actuality, is larger than real history. Although it is not something against Zhang's world-view, it seems this kind of thought never occurred to his mind.
[16]See David F. Krell, "General Introduction: The Question of Being," in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings (Krell ed. New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 7-8.
[17]Wayne D. Owens, "Radical concrete Particularity" (Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 17, 1990, 237.
[18]Ex. Charles Wei-husn Fu, "Creative Hermeneutics: Taoist Metaphysics and Heidegger," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 3, 1976; Charles Wei-husn Fu, "The Trans-onto-theo-logical Foundations of Language in Heidegger and Taoism," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 5, 1978; Wayne D. Owens, "Radical concrete Particularity"; Joan Stambough, "Heidegger, Taoism, and The Question of Metaphysics," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 11, 1984; Graham Parks, "Intimation of Taoist Themes in Early Heidegger," Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 11, 1984.
[19]Owens, "Radical Concrete Particularity," 238-242.
[20]Gadamer, Truth and Method: Fundamental Feathers of a Philosophical Hermeneutics (tr. G. Barden Z J. Cumming, New Crossword), xxiv.
[21]1. See HP, 6. This is one of the major themes in Being and Time. 2. Hans-Georg Gadamer, in reference to Heidegger's analysis of Being, indicates that understanding is "the original form of the realization of Dasein, which is being-in-the-world." (Truth and Method, 230)
[22]Pragmatism, which is highly related to the theory of evolution and biological studies, emphasizes life experience too. See John Dewey, Experience and nature (New York : Dover Publications, 1958)
[23]Gadamer's major concern is "to describe the conditions that make understanding possible." To him, "hermeneutics is a 'theory of the actual experience that thinking is.'" (HP, 5)
[24]Gadamer, Truth and Method, xviii.
[25]Owens, "Radical Concrete Particularity," 249-250.
[26]Ibid., 250.
[27]Professor Owens and professor Stambough have discussed in detail the remarkable similarities between Heidegger's notion of releasement (Gelassenheit) and the Taoist theme of non-action (wu-wei). See Owens, "Radical Concrete Particularity" 242-248, and Stambough, "Heidegger, Taoism and the Question of Metaphysics," 345-348.
[28] Qian Mu, Zhongguo jin sanbainian xueshushi, 416, 428-443, 534-535.