The breakdown of the Soviet Union - how far will it go? 

September 1991

Note[1]

by the Deputy Head of the Analysis and Policy Planning Centre

of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Buhler

Paris, 2 September 1991.

SUBJECT: The breakdown of the Soviet Union: how far will it go?

The Soviet Union is no more. The supports that ensured its cohesion gave way as the putsch failed. The vacancy of the central authorities, clear in the collapse or disappearance of its most visible symbols – the Party, the KGB, the special forces of the Interior Ministry – has brought a political space that the Republics have swiftly moved into: some have proclaimed their own independence in turn, while others have immediately established the instruments to exercise effective power (armed forces, border protection, national currencies, etc.).

As for the «centre», the seat of power no longer has its own will. And even if it had, it no longer has the measures of constraint to impose it.

1. Sovereignty as a federal republic, proclaimed for two years by democratically elected Supreme Soviets, is now becoming fully-fledged sovereignty. The trauma of the putsch has deprived the «centre» of the means of coercion that had hitherto enabled it to limit this sovereignty to a purely theoretical dimension.

The reality of the exercise of power by the Republics has given the proclamations of independence that have come one after another real meaning, above and beyond the criterion of international law that it constitutes for the recognition of a State, bringing these independences into the political order. The Republics that have decided to do so have become independent States by free choice and are virtually subjects of international law.

Recognition by other States depends on their political assessment of the stability of the new State, but does not constitute a criterion for its existence per se.

The pursuit of these goals is subject to the – domestic – imperative of consolidating power and rebuilding political structures weakened by the «perestroika» and dislocated by the collapse of the Party

2. These sovereign entities are currently entering an interim period in which their relations are redefined around three major issues:

- The guarantee of free exercise of sovereignty: for certain Republics, recognition as a State – by the international community and above all by the other Republics – represents, in bringing them the status of subjects of international law, the highest form of sovereignty. Others will seek the required guarantees in political dialogue between one another.

The first of these guarantees is ownership of wealth, which was hitherto confiscated, through various mechanisms (prices, centralized resource allocation, etc.) by the central State. The sharing of wealth should be achieved without major difficulties when it comes to the material assets located in the territory of the Republics. Other assets (currency reserves, claims, assets abroad) and the liabilities of the Soviet State will be a subject of upcoming bargaining.

- The sharing of the security function that was previously delivered by the central State. Republics aspiring to independence must envisage the terms of their security: the militias – the beginnings of national armies – that have formed do not have the resources to fulfil this role, especially in sensitive areas in the south, where the strategic vacuum left by the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces could draw in foreign intervention (Iran, Turkey, etc.).

- The issue of economic prosperity, which is determined by the ability of each sovereign Republic to both reform its economic structures and to attract Western economic assistance.

3. Four actors or categories of actors are engaged in this bargaining:

a) Russia:

Russia has been at the very centre of the system from the outset, and is seeking its bearings now that it has collapsed. In this quest for identity and purpose, the sense of responsibility for the whole area of Russian civilization, not limited to the administrative limits of the Russian Federation, is clearly visible. The ostensible care for the fate of Russian populations in other Republics is one manifestation, but the sentiment goes far beyond such «national» solidarity.

Yet uncertainty continues to reign in Moscow as to the frameworks in which Russia’s influence will be exercised: an overhauled federation, in which some continue to believe; a confederal structure; or a mere network of interstate bilateral relationships?

The question remained ambiguous in the first days after the putsch, but by taking over the bodies of the vacant central power, positioning himself as a dispatcher of independences and above all by threatening secessionist Republics with frontier changes, Mr Yeltsin has broken with this ambiguity, causing tensions in Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The agreement in principle reached hastily with Ukraine brings renewed ambiguity, establishing a code of conduct between the two Republics while leaving the future open.

Indeed, it is no doubt in Russia’s interest to remain ambiguous as to the question of the final architecture of the union, and to focus efforts on the most pressing issues: taking power in Russia and getting the economy back on the rails. But for such a strategy to be possible, Ukraine will also have to accept ambiguity. That is no doubt in its interest, but Mr Kravchuk, whose democratic legitimacy remains to be confirmed, may be tempted to take a nationalist path. The fragile equilibrium that has been established would then be broken, and one can imagine the nationalist wave that could reach Russia itself.

b) Secessionist Republics:

To date, 11 Republics have proclaimed their independence.

For the Baltic Republics, the issue is settled politically insofar as Russia has agreed to this step by recognizing their independence – at the cost of guarantees on the rights of the Russian minority, in the case of Lithuania – and nobody appears to be in a position to challenge their choice.

As for the other Republics, their determination varies depending on when the decision was taken but, apart perhaps from Belarus, this is not a matter of one-upmanship to be in the best position for the bargaining about the future union. Georgia has effectively taken its dependence, while Armenia has simply sought to respect a constitutional procedure that is today meaningless and Moldova aspires to reunification with Romania. As for Ukraine, the relationship of which with Moscow was shaken by the trauma of Chernobyl, there is no longer any question as to its determination, if only because it will always prefer dissociation from Russia to a partition between the very nationalist western Ukraine and the more Russified eastern Ukraine. Only the terms remain to be negotiated. There is already a legal framework with the seat at the UN.

c) The Muslim Republics:

The initiatives of the three Muslim Republics that have in turn proclaimed their independence (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia) are more reflective of the survival instincts of the local leadership, made up of conservative communists today out of step with Moscow’s democratic institutions, than of a precise political project.

The situation is similar in Tajikistan and Turkmenia, which have not proclaimed their independence.

Kazakhstan is a case apart because of its demographic make-up (Kazakhs are a minority and concentrated in the south) and because of its strategic importance (military nuclear facilities, space activities and natural resources).

d) The centre:

Discredited by the failed coup d’État, the centre is seeking to win back political space in the ongoing recomposition process by positioning itself as an arbiter and moderator of Mr Yeltsin’s quest for hegemony, which is highly displeasing to the Republics. But the confiscation of the instruments of real power (armed forces, KGB, police, economy) by Mr Yeltsin leaves the centre, embodied by Mr Gorbachev, with no credible options. And above all, the Republics see a much better protection from «greater Russia» hegemony in their own ability to resist than in a weakened, impotent centre.

4. The terms of the political and economic bargaining that awaits are determined by the instruments in the hands of the different parties:

- Protection of non-native minorities is a powerful lever – particularly in the hands of a strong Republic like Russia – that can affect the Republics seeking independence by making it subject to a right of interference or to the organization of plebiscites in disputed regions. The threat of non-recognition and demands for frontier changes is already part of the playbook of pressure and intimidation.

- Economic power relations are another argument in bargaining: the very high level of interdependence in the industrial fabric limits the use of this type of instrument, but valuing trade at market prices – which is on the horizon – will swiftly highlight the reality of transfers between Republics with surpluses and those that are «subsidized» (notably in Central Asia).

- Security will be the third key factor in the bargaining, in the hands of the Republic that appropriates the USSR military apparatus – no doubt Russia. This apparatus, spread across the territory of the other Republics, works two ways: either as a guarantee pending a final settlement, or as the threat of a withdrawal that would throw the newly independent Republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Central Asia) into war and inevitably draw in foreign intervention. Independence treaties will probably include a defence agreement, restoring Russia’s nineteenth-century role as protector and guardian of the «bellicose» nations of its southern neighbourhood.

Despite the high level of interdependence, the political dissociation of the Soviet Union is ultimately inevitable. On the strength of its democratic legitimacy, the national movement in the Republics defies the imperial logic that they suspect to be behind Mr Yeltsin’s approaches. The fact that this process is underway in Ukraine sounds the death knell for the empire inherited from the Tsars.

The maximum framework that could be envisaged is that of a confederal structure to manage the – many – common interests of States that are independent and therefore subjects of international law.

The crux of the problem is the transition to this order: a transition exposed to risks of accidents given the many subjects of dispute, particularly with Ukraine (issue of Crimea, attached to it only in 1948) and Kazakhstan; and one in which the temptation of nationalist extremism could become strong, should economic failure undermine the fragile democratic legitimacy of the new Russian leaders.

The leaders of the Republics therefore face a further test of political maturity; they must find the right pace in transforming their relations to avoid the risk of losing control, due to faits accomplis and reprisals, and to maintain, as long as is needed, ambiguity on the terms of independence, while negotiating realities and skirting around confrontations on symbols.

The ability of the West to influence this delicate process should not be overstated. But we can and must accompany it by following the evolution of the relations between the protagonists, without pre-empting them by recognizing States prematurely or, conversely, recognizing effective situations too late. While maintaining formal inter-state relations with the centre, which is now an empty shell, we should forge political relationships with the genuine political interlocutors of tomorrow – the Republics. It is to them that our proposals for economic assistance should be sent. We will thus be best placed to nudge the various parties towards moderation. In particular, we would do well to deter them from developing strategies in which they break away economically, and all assistance should be subject to movement towards a market economy (see note no. C/91-52 of 28 August 1991 of the Analysis and Policy Planning Centre).

We must however be realistic and not promote obsolete «unionist» aims: domestic political momentum obeys forces beyond our control and our refusal to recognize a given independence would not stop it from taking place in reality.

Lastly, without waiting for clarification of political relations, we need to scope out, in EC12 format, a «Marshall Plan for Training» (see note no. C/91- 43 of 28 June 1991 from the Analysis and Policy Planning Centre) to swiftly provide the future elites produced by the dismemberment of the USSR with a contemporary political, economic and legal culture. (P. Buhler).

[1] Source: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, La Courneuve Diplomatic Archives Centre, FRMAE_ FRMAE_3701TOPO/7664, Europe, 1991-1995, USSR 1991.