vol. V p.1334-1343
He was Cn. f. (SC. in Cic. ad fam. VIII 8, 5. 6), son of nr. 21 (Suet. Nero 2) and was therefore probably the younger brother of nr. 22. Dio gets neither his party-status nor his actual age right when he says XLI 11, 2: <20> τῶν τε γὰρ Συλλείων ἐγεγόνει καὶ πολλὴν (scil. χώραν) ἐκ τῆς δυναστείας ἐκείνης ἐκέκτητο. As far as we know, Domitius first entered the public sphere as a rather young man in 681 = 73 BCE, when he took over representing the Roman tax-farmer in his court-case against the Oropians (SC. de Oropiis IGS I 413, 24; cf. Mommsen Herm. XX 283). However, in 684 = 70 he was called up as a witness in the trial of Verres about an event that had happened the previous year, <30> where Cicero (Verr. I 139) calls him adulescens clarissimus ac princeps iuventutis (on this, cf. Mommsen St.-R. II 827, 5). Much later on, Cicero refers to him with the following words (Mil. 22): dederas enim, quam contemneres populares insanias, iam ab adulescentia documenta maxima, for which there are two notes, Ascon. Mil. p. 39f.: <40> Constantiam L. Domiti quam in praetura praestitit significat. Nam eo tempore, cum C. Manilius tribunus plebis subnixus libertinorum et servorum manu perditissimam legem ferret, ut libertinis in omnibus tribubus suffragium esset, idque per tumultum ageret et clivum Capitolinum obsideret, discusserat perruperatque coetum Domitius ita, ut multi Manilianorum interficerentur. Quo facto et plebem infimam offenderat et senatus magnam gratiam inierat. <50> Schol. Bob. p.284 Or: L. Domitium ….. commonefacit constantiae suae, cuius exempla edidisse nuper in adulescentia videbatur. Nam cum C. Manilius post annum tribunatus sui, quem turbulentissime gesserat, causam de maiestate dicturus esset, accusante Cn. Minucio, id egit per multitudinem conspiratam, ut obsideret eundem Cn. Minucium accusatorem suum, cui obsesso auxilium tulit adgretata bonorum multitudine L. hic Domitius.
The name of C. Manilius has often been corrupted into Cn. Manlius and similar in the mss. of Asconius; <60> for this reason, and because we are told it was in praetura, people have usually assumed that Domitius didn’t intervene against the law from the tribune C. Manilius from 688 = 66, but against some other law from another tribune Cn. Manlius in the year 696 = 58, when he was praetor. However, for one, Cicero’s words iam ab adulescentia fit into the first timeline much better, when Domitius had still not taken on any office; <page break 1334/1335> for another, in the year 696 = 58, the law about the voting rights of freedmen was planned, though not introduced, by the tribune P. Clodius himself and not by some otherwise unknown colleague of his (evidence in Mommsen St.-R. III 440, 2); for another, the problem of the phrase in praetura is solved easily enough without altering the text, by assuming a small omission and understanding the praetorship not as being that of Domitius, but as being that of the orator Cicero himself, which did fall in 688 = 66; <10> for another, the role which Domitius played in that year and the following one at Manilius’ trial can be explained by the fact that in the latter case (689 = 65), Cicero was heavily counting on the support of the young man in his campaign for consulship, and for this reason he even refused to take on a case for which Domitius would have perhaps represented the opposite side (ad Att. I 1, 3f.). <20>
Domitius was the curule aedile in the year 693 = 61, and seems to have put on very magnificent games; cf. Plin. n. h. VIII 131 (and hence Solin. 26, 10): Annalibus notatum est M. Pisone M. Messalla cos. a. d. XIV kal. Oct. Domitium Ahenobarbum aedilem curulem ursos Numidicos (cf. Friedländer Sittengesch. Roms6 II 540, vol. II p.2759) centum et totidem venatores Aethiopas in circo dedisse. Dio XXXVII 46, 4: ὁ δῆμος ἀπαυστὶ μέχρι τότε τὰς ὁπλομαχίας θεώμενος ἐξανέστη τε μεταξὺ τοῦ ἔργου καὶ ἄριστον εἵλετο (cf. Friedländer in Marquardt St.-V. III 495). <30> At that time, when Pompey was trying to secure the election of his legate and tool L. Afranius to consul for the following year using bribery, together with his brother-in-law M. Cato, Domitius managed to get two harsh decisions of the senate made against this kind of activity, the harshest of which was also directed against the consul M. Pupius Piso as well as Pompey (Cic. ad Att. I 16, 12). <40> However, Afranius’ election was, of course, not prevented because of this; nevertheless, Domitius kept working even more keenly as a supporter of the senate-party and as an opponent to the triumvirate which was forming at the time, which meant that in 695 = 59 someone tried to get him out of the way, when L. Vettius, who had been incited by P. Vatinius, denounced him as one of the main participants in the alleged conspiracy against Pompey (Cic. ad Att. II 24, 3; Vatin. 25).
His election to praetor for 696 = 58 filled Cicero, who at the time was hard-pressed, with good hope (ad Q. fr. I 2, 16); <50> however, after he came into office, Domitius didn’t busy himself with the attacks against the orator and instead sought to overturn Caesar’s laws from his four-year consulship together with his colleague C. Memmius Gemellus. Caesar declared that he was prepared to let the senate decide about their legal validity, but the senate didn’t dare make any investigation; <60> the proconsul and both of the praetors fought for three days long with speeches that were later published; then at the end of March, after Cicero’s exile had been enacted in the meantime, the proconsul travelled away into his province, and took with him any chance of an investigation (Suet. Caes. 23; Nero 2. Schol. Bob. Sest. p.297; Vatin. p.317). Domitius intended to bring Cicero’s return from exile to debate (Cic. ad Att. III 15, 6), but this didn’t come to fruition. <page break 1335/1336> As soon as he was able to put himself forward for the consulship in 698 = 56, he began to develop his agenda: as consul, he would do what he had unsuccessfully tried to do as praetor - that is, he would take Caesar’s provinces and armies from him; consequently, when the triumvirs gathered in Luca in April that year, it was decided that both of Caesar’s associates, Pompey and Crassus, should stand as candidates against Domitius themselves (Suet. Caes. 24). <10> This decision was kept temporarily secret; the surest path to fulfilling it was to instate an interregnum, and indeed, the tribunes C. Cato and M. Nonius Sufenas prevented all election meetings with their objections.
In autumn, the optimates demanded a specific statement from Pompey and Crassus about their intentions; Plut. Pomp. 51, 4f. names Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus as the consul’s spokesman (vol. IV p.1390) and misplaces the scene in a popular assembly, <20> but in Crass. 15, 2 he names Domitius alongside the consul and has the matter brought up in the senate, which is perhaps more credible. The year 699 = 55 began with an interregnum; this was when the two triumvirs put themselves forward as candidates, and all other candidates stepped back; only Domitius, encouraged by M. Cato, stayed strong and held up his own candidacy. <30> However, when he wanted to go to the Campus Martius before daybreak on the day of the election, his entourage was attacked by Pompey’s armed following and was forced backwards; his torch-bearer was killed, Cato was wounded, and he himself fled into his house and was besieged there by his opponents until Pompey and Crassus had been successfully elected (Cic. ad Att. IV 8 b, 2. Plut. Crass. 15, 4-7; Pomp. 52, 1f.; Cat. min. 41, 2f. Appian. bell. civ. II 17 [incorrectly about Pompey, cf. Drumann G. R. III 280, 41]. Dio XXXIX 31, 1). <40>
In contrast, his renewed campaign for the consulship for the following year was more successful; in the comitia held around the end of the year, he was elected as a candidate for the senate-party for 700 = 54 alongside the triumvir Ap. Claudius Pulcher (evidence in vol. III p.2850 nr. 297). The idea that he consul imperatorem (Caesarem) ab exercitibus Gallicis retrahere temptavit is an inaccurate story from Suetonius (Nero 2); <50> his goal had, of course, always been this (Suet. Caes. 24, see above), but during his consulship itself he couldn’t do much towards it. At every opportunity, though usually without success, he tried to make his hostility towards the powerful man as cuttingly clear as possible, as during the handling of the Egyptian matter which was close to Pompey’s heart, and during the trial against his favourite A. Gabinius (Dio XXXIX 60, 3ff. Cic. ad Q. fr. II 11, 2; on this cf. nr. 11), <60> and also in September after the death of Julia, Caesar’s daughter and Pompey’s wife, when he objected to them taking over the Campus Martius (Dio XXXIX 64).
Together with his colleague in office, he made the shameful agreement for mutual support with the candidates for the consulship for 701= 53, C. Memmius and Cn. Domitius Calvinus (nr. 43, see also vol. III p.2851); <page break 1336/1337> when Memmius revealed all their dealings in October, Domitius broke down like he had been destroyed on account of the shame (Cic. ad Att. IV 17, 2). With the death of Julia, Caesar and Pompey began to become alienated, and Pompey started getting closer to the senate-party, where Domitius had been one of the main members. Perhaps the designated tribune of the plebs, C. Lucilius Hirrus, acted as a middle man between them both. In the middle of the year, Cic. ad Att. IV 16, 5 writes the following about him: Hirrus cum Domitio in gratia est, <10> and later Hirrus prepared a law to name Pompey dictator (Cic. ad Q. fr. III 8, 4. 6 from November, among others). Either way, Pompey and Domitius had been fully reconciled by the beginning of 702 = 52, since when the presiding quaestor had to be elected from the consuls by the people, following the special law Pompey had introduced for the case against Milo (see vol. I p.2275), Domitius was elected, <20> which would hardly have been possible without Pompey’s permission or indeed even his endorsement (Cic. Mil. 22. Ascon. Mil. 33f.).
Since Domitius was one of the most influential characters in the senate, M. Caelius regularly kept Cicero up to date on what he was doing in his absence: in 703 = 51, Domitius happily spread malicious rumours about Caesar’s plight and defeats in Gaul (ad fam. VIII 1, 4). For the senate-decisions from 30th September 703 = 51, he was at the head of the legal witnesses (ibid. 8, 5. 6). <30> he did vote in favour of Cicero’s supplications in spring 704 =50, but - just like Q. Metellus Scipio - it was only to provoke the tribune C. Scribonius Curio to intercession, and therefore to thwart the supplications (ibid. 11, 2); Drumann (G. R. III 21) spots this motive in his aristocratic pride highlighted by Cic. ad Att. IV 8 b, 2, and in his contempt for the upstart that came from it; this was probably also added to by jealousy, perhaps against Caesar, <40> because Domitius himself was yet to boast any military laurels. Caelius reports of his own conflicts with Domitius in September 704 = 50, which probably arose from the constantly heightening tensions and differences between the parties; Domitius supported his old colleague in the consulship, the censor Ap. Claudius, against Caelius (ad fam. VIII 12, 1f.), and Caelius - as far as he was able - tried to get Domitius to fail in his campaign for becoming augur against Caesar’s candidate M. Antony (ibid. 14, 1. cf. 12, 4; vol. I p.2597). <50>
The year 705 = 49 dealt the final blow between Pompey and the senate-party with Caesar; at the very beginning of January, Caesar’s governorship of Gaul was taken away from him, and Domitius was named as his successor (Caes. bell. civ. I 6. 5. Cic. ad fam. XVI 12, 3. Suet. Caes. 34; Nero 2. Lucan. VII 607. Appian. bell. civ. II 32. 38. 82). Suddenly, a main role in the first more important episode of the civil war had fallen to him. <60> The sources for this are primarily Caesar’s report and Pompey’s letters which are extant among Cicero’s; Oberst Stoffel (Hist. de Jules Cesar. Guerre civile I 12-23. 224-244 cf. panel 2) has given a description of it, based on in-depth research. The reports differ about Domitius’ forces: App. II 32 says that he left Rome μετὰ τετρακισχιλίων ἐκ καταλόγου, <page break 1337/1338> and II 38, he says that Caesar surrounded him in Corfinium οὐ πάντας ἀμφ’ αὑτὸν ἔχοντας τοὺς τετρακισχιλίους. According to Lucan. II 480, the forces from Corfinium were made up of oppositus quondam polluto tiro Miloni. According to this, Pompey would have transferred the manpower he raised in 702 = 52 - one legion strong - over to Domitius, for his governorship (cf. v. Domaszewski Neue Heidelberger Jahrbücher IV 163, 4). <10> According to Caesar I 15, 5-7, after the evacuation of Picenum, L. Vibullius Rufus combined the troops in that rough location which had remained faithful to Pompey, in his …. Lucilium Hirrum cum sex cohortibus …. excipit; quibus coactis XIII efficit. cum his ad Domitium …. Corfinium pervenit …. Domitius per se circiter XX cohortes Alba, ex Marsis (cf. Domitius in Marsis Cic. ad Att. VIII 13 a, 3 from 23rd January) et Paelignis, finitimis ab regionibus coegerat; <20> according to 17, 2 Domitius had cohortes amplius XXX; according to 18, 1 there were seven in Sulmo (only five according to Cic. ad Att. VIII 4, 3) and according to 24, 3 there were six in Alba Fucens (similarly Cic. ad Att. IX 6, 1). On 10th February, Pompey (in Cic. ad Att. VIII 11 A) found out that Domitius was coming to him cum suis cohortibus XII (mss. surely falsely: XI) et cum cohortibus XIV, quas Vibullius adduxit …. Hirrum cum V cohortibus subsequi; <30> and a week later he wrote (ibid. 12 A, 1 cf. 3): ad L. Domitium litteras misi, primum uti ipse cum omni copia ad nos veniret; si de se subitaret, ut cohortes XVIIII, quae ex Piceno ad me iter habebant, ad nos mitteret ….. quod meas XVIIII et suas XII cohortes tribus in oppidis distributuas haberet - nam partim Albae, partim Sulmone collocavit. This means that Caesar and Pompey differed completely from each other in terms of how they say the cohorts were distributed between Pompey’s three leaders; <40> they somewhat agree in the total amout of forces (around thirty cohorts = three legions, cf. further Cic. ad Att. VIII 7, 1. Plut. Caes. 34, 3. Oros. VI 15, 4); but for Pompey, this total includes the forces at Sulmo and Alba, but for Caesar, it doesn’t seem to. This presents a two-fold problem, which people have tried to solve in various ways; but, for example, Stoffel I 12. 226f. must assume Pompey was lacking in knowledge, <50> O. E. Schmidt (Briefwechsel des Cicero 132f.) assumes Caesar wasn’t being precise and made mistakes, while v. Domaszewskia loc. cit. 165 takes Caesar and only Caesar into account, and I find that none of the solutions I am aware of are fully satisfying, but I also do not know of anything better to suggest. At the very least, it should be noted that Pompey referred to official reports, while Caesar only gives a rough estimate to one of his numbers (circiter 15, 6) and increases the force of his victory by being unclear, <60> so he wasn’t writing without an agenda. Without doubt, the battle which Domitius had drawn together in the land of the Paelignii was an important one, and the location was chosen quite skilfully to Caesar’s disadvantage (about these advantages which lead the Italians to make it their capital in the social wars, cf. Stoffel I 18f. 240ff. among others). <page break 1338/1339>
After Vibullius had arrived at this place and had brought the report of Caesar’s unstoppable advances, following the request Pompey had made to him, Domitius first decided to move back towards the south and to meet with the general in Apulia; he reported to him that he was intending to break off from Corfinium on 9th February (Pompey to Cicero 10th February ad Att. VIII 11 A; cf. to Domitius ibid. 12 B, 1). <10> However, he suddenly changed his mind about this decision, and stayed in Corfinium, probably encouraged by the many senators and noblemen who had fled there; Pompey didn’t find this out from him directly, but instead found it out from Vibullus, and then wrote to him ibid. 12 B on 11th or 12th February, with the pressing demand that he set off to Apulia as soon as possible, <20> before Caesar could cut off the route between them. The 16th February was when Pompey first received a message from Domitius himself about his plans: he was intending to deal with Caesar. And, since he had soon become aware that Caesar was turning against Corfinium, he sent a second message after his first one: he wanted to confront Caesar, and he wanted Pompey to bring him help as quickly as possible; we have the response to the first letter - no - with an addendum (§ 4) referring to the second letter in ibid. 12 C. <30>
On the next day, the 17th February, Pompey received the message that Caesar was at Corfinium. On 14th or 15th, coming from Asculum (according to Stoffel; but cf. O. E. Schmidt loc. cit. 385ff.), Caesar had reached the north entrance to the valley at Corfinium, the Valle Peligna; Domitius sent out five cohorts to destroy the bridge across the river, but before they had completed their mission, <40> Caesar’s vanguard appeared and forced them back into the city; the path for Caesar’s army was clear, and they made camp east of the city, to cut off the routes between Domitius and both Sulmo and Pompey (Caes. I 16, 2-4. Dio XLI 10, 2; cf. Lucan. II 478-504, according to which Domitius also had the floodgates on the Aternus opened in order to make it harder for the enemy to cross over). Next, Domitius sent his request for aid to Pompey, the main contents of which are found in Caes. I 17, 1f., <50> and which, as already noted, fell into Pompey’s hands on 17th February; Pompey immediately replied in the letter ad Att. VIII 12 D (cf. Caes. I 19, 4), saying that he couldn’t afford to send assistance to Corfinium, and that he could only repeat his pressing demand that Domitius - whenever it was possible - should meet with him in Apulia; at the same time, Pompey explained the situation to the two consuls in two letters ibid. 6, 2 (cf. 11 D, 3) and ibid. 12 A, <60> and he tried to justify his actions to them (cf. ibid. 6, 2). The messages Cicero had received about Domitius and sent on to Atticus up to that point (VII 23, 1. 24. 26, 1. VIII 1, 1. 3, 7) are, in places, imprecise, and in places only offer minor extra details to the rest of the accounts; his letters to his friend do tell us how differently Pompey’s behaviour, as well as that of Domitius, was already considered by their own party-members at that time (VIII 1, 3. 3, 7. 7, 1. 8, 1f. 9, 3. 11 D, 5. 12, 3. 6), <page break 1339/1340> a point on which viewpoints still differ very strongly right now [from 1903-5’s perspective] (cf. eg. Mommsen R. G. III 387. Stoffel I 236ff. O. E. Schmidt. loc. cit. 139. 390).
In the four to five days between the request for support being sent out and Pompey’s answer being received, Domitius dedicated everything to defence, <10> he spread the artillery over the walls, organised guard-duty, and tried to secure the soldiers’ loyalty by promising them compensation in the form of land (Caes. I 17, 3f. Dio XLI 11, 1). In the same time, Caesar won Sulmo through M. Antony, combined the forces there with his own, gained supplies and fortified his side, and after three days he welcomed large reinforcements via the eighth legion, 22 newly recruited cohorts, and 300 cavalrymen; <20> he then set up a second camp to the west of the city so that he could block the two passes on that side, and he connected the two camps in the south with a chain of fortifications, while in the north the observation posts were enough (Caes. I 18, 1ff.); according to Stoffel, the whole flanking line covered 8km. According to Lucan. II 505f., siege engines were also put on standby and an assault was prepared. <30>
Pompey’s answer on 17th February put Domitius in huge distress; he kept the real contents of the letter secret, and declared that Pompey had promised to bring support quickly; while he encouraged his men to wait it out, he only had his own escape in mind, and with a few trusted men he planned his get-away. However, his conduct aroused suspicion; the soldiers banded together, and felt absolved of any duty on their side since they couldn’t trust their general; <40> the Marsi did still insist upon the defence tactic at first, and even came to blows with the rest of the army over it, but when they found out about Domitius’ plans to escape they also changed their minds at once. Domitius was captured by his soldiers and was put under guard; envoys were sent to Caesar to tell him that they were ready to open the doors to him, to follow his orders, and to hand over Domitius. Since night had already fallen, <50> Caesar didn’t dare to take over the city right away; he sent the envoys back and was cautious in taking every measure to make sure that the besieged men were not tricking him, and that they wouldn’t escape.
In the morning, under the authority of the disloyal soldiers, P. Lentulus Spinther (vol. IV p.1397) opened up negotiations in the name of the optimates who were in the city and received calming reassurances for him and the others, about whom he said adeo esse perterritos nonnullos, ut suae vitae durius consulere conentur (Caes. I 19, 1-22, 6). <60> This was especially true of Domitius; he had asked the doctor, who was under his control, to administer him poison: when he found out that the enemy he was so scared of were being gentle, he regretted this decision, and he was delighted when his doctor confessed to have only given him safe sleeping drugs, so much so that he gave him his freedom. <page break 1340/1341> The stories about this generally agree, although they put their emphasis on different details, cf. Plut. Caes. 34, 3 (from which Zonar. X 7 at the end) and the edited accounts in Sen. de benef. III 24. Plin. n. h. VII 186. Suet. Nero 2. However, Lucan. II 507ff. has the situation virtually upside down, so that he can honour Domitius’ great-grandson emperor Nero. In truth, his ancestors’ and descendants’ fear of death similarly appear at the deciding hour, <10> and could only serve as a foil for how the republicans like Cato acted .
On 21st February, in the early hours of the morning, Corfinium was handed over to Caesar; mocked by their own soldiers who were accompanying them, the aristocratic prisoners were lead out before Caesar, with Domitius at the front; with a few words, Caesar reproached them for their ungratefulness, and dismissed everything else unhurt, <20> and even gave Domitius back his war-chest of six million sesterces; he combined the troops of the Pompeiani with his own, and thereby strengthened his forces by at least three legions, and, after he had spent seven days total at Corfinium, he set off marching again to the south (Caes. I 23, 1-5; cf. II 32, 8). Cic. ad Att. VIII 14, 1 reported Caesar’s departure from Corfinium on 2nd March, and (ibid. 3) also that he had not returned the money he had found to Domitius. <30> The latter point is probably based on false reports; since the victor’s report did not contain direct untruths, and he is also supported on this point by Appian. II 38. 41. Appian’s apparent deviations from the rest of his account have only come about because they have been skilfully shortened; the other accounts we have about Domitius’ disaster at Corfinium don’t offer any details (cf. Liv. ep. CIX. Vell. II 50, 1. Suet. Caes. 34; Nero 2. Flor. II 13, 19. Oros. VI 15, 4. Plut. Caes. 34, 3. 35, 1) apart from Dio XLI 11, 2f., who agrees with Caesar here. <40>
After Corfinium was captured, only dubious rumours arrived at Cicero about Domitius’ plans (ad Att. VIII 12, 6. 14, 3. 15, 1. IX 1, 2. 3, 1. 6, 2. 9, 3. 15, 4); it was clear that he didn’t consider himself bound by Caesar’s clemency - which, incidentally, his followers disapproved of (cf. Cael. in Cic. ad fam. VII 15, 2) - and became his enemy again, <50> but at first he didn’t want to go over to Pompey, because each of them considered the other one to blame for their side’s misfortune. He only spent a little while in Etruria near Cosa, where he had an estate, and where an inscription of one of his freedmen has also been found (CIL I 1344 = XI 2638); he gathered together seven light ships from this seaside city and the island Igilium which lay opposite, <60> he manned them with his slaves, freedmen, and coloners, and sailed west towards Massalia (Caes. I 34, 2; cf. Cic. ad Att. IX 6, 2. 9, 3). Although the Massaliotes wanted to remain neutral in the civil war, they welcomed him willingly and gave him command against Caesar (Caes. I 36, 1f. Suet. Nero 2). Caesar handed over the task of besieging to his legates D. Brutus and C. Trebonius; <page break 1341/1342> as he was besieging the Pompeiani in Spain himself, there were fights at Massalia where both sides showed great vigour (Caes. I 36, 4f. Dio XLI 19, 3). In a seabattle, Brutus completely wiped out both Domitius’ and the Massaliotes’ ships which had joined together (Caes. I 56, 1-59, 1. Dio XLI 21, 3. Lucan. III 509ff.), then in a second seabattle, he wiped out the new Massaliote fleet as well as L. Nasidienus’s (Caes. II 3, 1-7. Dio XLI 25, 1), and Trebonius managed the besieging from the land with skill and luck (Caes. II 1, 1ff. 7, 4ff. and elsewhere).
At the end of summer, when Caesar was returning from Spain through Gaul, the city was ready to surrender; before this happened, Domitius escaped by sea since he couldn’t expect the victor to be merciful a second time, and in his ship he was fortunate to evade those pursuing him (Caes. II 22, 2-4. Suet. Nero 2. Dio XLI 25, 2; cf. Plin. n. h. VII 1186). <20> In the following year, 706 = 48, he was in Pompey’s camp in Thessaly, not that he got along too well with his party colleague; he would mockingly call the general Agamemnon, the king of kings (Plut. Pomp. 67, 4, cf. Appian. II 67); he rebuked the tempered Cicero for being timid (Cic. ad fam. VI 21, 1), who often responded with something witty (Plut. Cic. 38, 3); ahead of time, he had fierce arguments with Q. Metellus Scipio and P. Lentulus Spinther about who would get the title of Pontifex Maximus after Caesar’s death (Caes. III 83, 1. Plut. Pomp. 67, 6; Caes. 42, 1, cf. Appian. II 69); from this account and from that of Nic. Damasc. v. Caes. 4, it can only be concluded that he became Pontifex. <30> In the assembly, he declared the harshest view about what the fate of those who had remained neutral should be, and he wanted penalties all the way up to execution to be hanging over their heads (Caes. III 83, 3. Suet. Nero 2, cf. the reference in Cic. ad Att. XI 6, 2). <40> His cruelty prompted a later orator to invent the following atrocity: at hercule a M. Catone L. Domitio ceterisque eiusdem factionis quadraginta senatores, multi praeterea cum spe bona adulescentes sicuti hostiae mactati sunt, cum interea importunissima genera hominum tot miserorum civium sanguine satiari nequierant (Ps.-Sall. ad Caes. de rep. II 4, 2. cf. Jordan De suasoriis ad Caes. senem de rep. inscriptis [Berlin 1868] 17). <50>
In the deciding battle at Pharsalos on 9th August, he lead one wing of the army, according to Plut. Pomp. 69, 1; Caes. 33, 2. Appian. II 76 say it was the left, Lucan. VII 220 says it was the right. The account from the historians should take precedence over that of the poet; since the fact that the general Pompey also witnessed the battle from the left wing (Caes. III 88, 2), and that Cic. Phil. II 71 accuses M. Antony, who was leading men opposite the Pompeiani on the right, of the death of Domitius and many other optimates, <60> doesn’t prove anything in favour of Lucan’s account. When the battle was decided in Caesar’s favour, Domitius fled out of the camp to high ground; his forces had left him out of exhaustion, and so he was caught and cut down by enemy cavalry (Caes. III 99, 4. Cic. Phil. II 27, 71; Brut. 267. Tac. ann. IV 44. Suet. Nero 2. Appian. II 82; poetically described by Lucan. VII 599-616). <page break 1342/1343>
Cicero praised Domitius a lot in the trial against Milo (22) and in the Philippics held after Caesar’s death (II 27. 71. XIII 29), but in a private letter at the time of the siege at Corfinium he calls him an idiot (ad Att. VIII 1, 3), and characterises him as an orator with the following choice words: nulla ille quidem arte, sed Latine tamen et multa cum libertate dicebat (Brut. 267). <10> Cicero refrained from writing a description of this bitter enemy of his, and instead let the facts speak for themselves, which would lead to a rather unfavourable opinion of the man. Ps.-Sall. ad Caes. de rep. II 9, 2: an L. Domiti magna vis est, cuius nullum membrum flagitio aut facinore vacat, lingua vana, manus cruentae, pedes fugaces, quae honeste nominari nequeunt inhonestissima is worthless, because this source is an imitation of Ps.-Sall. in Cic. 5 and badly done, <20> which wasn’t for Domitius but for Catiline in the style of Cic. Cat. I 13 (cf. Jordan Herm. XI 312). Whether Domitius is the man showcased in a tragedy by Curiatius Maternus (Tac. dial. 3) must remain uncertain (cf. p.1331). He was married to Porcia, Cato’s sister (Cic. Phil. II 27. Plut. Cat. min. 41, 2), who outlived him by three years (Cic. ad Att. XIII 37, 3. 48, 2; cf. Mommsen Herm. XV 101, 1); his son is nr. 23. The honorary inscription in Athens to a Λεύκιος Δομέτιος Ἀηνόβαρβος probably doesn’t belong to this Domitius, <30> but to his grandson nr. 28 with the same name (CIA III 581), just as the Milesian inscription of a Λεύκιος Δομέτιος Γναίου υἱὸς Ἀηνοβάρβος ὕπατος (S.-Ber. Akad. Berl. 901, 906).
[Münzer.]
This article is referenced by: Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (23), Cn. Domitius Calvinus (43)
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