vol. III p.2738-2755
His biography by Plutarch (hereafter only cited as Plut.) is extant; on his sources cf. Aug. Müller De auctoribus rerum a Marcello in Sicilia gestarum (Halle 1882) 29-38. <10> Hesselbarth Historisch-kritische Untersuchungen zur dritten Dekade des Livius (Halle 1889) 533-541. Marcellus is called M. f. on the dedicatory inscription (see below) and in Plut. 1, 1, and in Fasti Cap. and Acta tr. on the year 532 he is called M. f. M. n. We still don’t know if it’s him, his son, or his grandson, who’s the consul M. Claudius M. f. on a tessera hospitalis CIL I 532 = X 6231. His father is otherwise unknown, and his grandfather was nr. 219. <20> Plut. 1, 1 incorrectly claims that he was the first to have the cognomen Marcellus (see p.2732). He fought in the first Punic War as a young man, saved the life of his ἀδελφός (half-brother or adoptive brother) Otacilius, probably T. Otacilius Crassus praetor 537 = 217 and 540 = 214, and won military awards (Plut. 2, 2f.). Not long after, he became augur (Plut. 2, 3; cf. Bardt Die Priester der vier grossen Collegien 20; mentioned as an augur by Cic. div. II 77. Liv. XXVII 36, 5). <30> As aedile curulis, he prosecuted the aedile plebis C. Scantinius Capitolinus, who had made indecent propositions to his underage son nr. 222 (see there), and managed to get him sentenced to pay a fine, which he used to make a votive offering (Val. Max. VI 1, 7. Plut. 2, 3. 5-8; cf. Mommsen St.-R. I 706, 6. II 472, 2. 493, 4). The exact time he was aedile is just as unknown as when he was first praetor (cf. Liv. XXII 35, 6. 7). <40> He became consul for the first time in 532 = 222 with Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus (Fasti Cap. Chronogr. Idat. Chron. Pasch. Cassiod. Plut. 6, 1). In the previous year, the Insubri had suffered a grave defeat and were demanding peace, but both of the new consuls had placed themselves at the head of the warring party in Rome and refused their request for peace (Polyb. II 34, 1. Plut. 6, 2. Zonar. VIII 20). <50> After this, the Insubri prepared themselves for a final deciding battle, and gathered their strength by taking large troops of Gaesati into their service under the warlord Virdumarus; both consuls set off to upper Italy from Rome. Polybios’ account (II 34, 2-35, 1) of the campaign is influenced by his predisposition for the house of Scipios against Marcellus, since he does give a good description of their victory at Clastidium, <60> but he neglects to mention his second battle with Virdumarus and his triumph, and attributes the actual deciding factor of the war to Scipio’s capture of Mediolanum alone. This account is only different to that in Zonar. VIII 20 through the fact that the latter attributes the latter undertaking to both consuls. This is the version which Plut. 7, 5f. and Eutrop. III 6 (cf. Oros. IV 13, 15) agree with, though here the victory and the second battle of Marcellus are in the foreground, <page break 2738/2739> and in the other versions this alone remains from the whole story of the campaign. First, the combined consular army besieged the Insubrian city Acerrae (Polyb. Plut. 6, 2). The enemy saw that they were not in a position to break through the siege, and tried to get rid of it by crossing the Po with their band of mercenaries and fell upon the area of Anamares (on the name see Hülsen vol. I p.2055), <10> where they stormed the stronghold Clastidium (now Casteggio). While Rome’s main forces remained under Scipio outside Acerrae, Marcellus followed the enemy over the river with most of the cavalry and some lightly armed men, and immediately found himself opposite their battle lines and in danger of being surrounded and overwhelmed by their larger forces (cf. Plut. 6, 8f. Frontin. strat. IV 5, 4). <20> With great presence of mind, he followed his orders, outwitted the Celts and outflanked them, dealt with Virdumarus one to one, and drove his troops who had fell into chaos into the river, where many met their deaths. At roughly the same time, Scipio managed to capture Acerrae, and he began to move to Mediolanum, the capital city and final refuge of the Insubri. The accounts of Polyb. II 34, 11ff. and Plut. 7, 5f. are biased in opposite ways and can perhaps be considered together, <30> up to the fact that Scipio had begun the battle here, but that Marcellus’ timely entrance had decided the battle in favour of the Romans. Either way, after Comum had also been captured (only mentioned by Zonaras) and the Insubrii had surrendered unconditionally, Marcellus triumphed alone following the acta triumph. de Galleis Insubribus et Germ[an](eis), <40> whose name first appears here, though it’s based on another record from the same time, although instead it seems to have been first inserted later for that of the Gaesati (cf. Hirschfeld Festschrift für Kiepert [Berl. 1989] 271-273). The triumph is only also mentioned by Plut. Rom. 16, 13f.; Marc. 8, 1f. Eutrop. III 6. Sil. It. XII 279f., though numerous sources report that Marcellus offered the spolia opima to Iuppiter Feretrius as the third and final man after Romulus and A. Cornelius Cossus, <50> that is, the arms of the enemy leader whom he had killed as a general with his own hand (Cic. Tusc. IV 49. Liv. ep. XX. Flor. I 20, 5. Eutrop. III 6. Oros. IV 13, 15. Ampel. 21. Val. Max. III 2, 5. Frontin. strat. IV 5, 4. Fest. p. 189. Auct. de vir. ill. 45, 1f. Verg. Aen. VI 855-859. Serv. ad loc. St. Propert. V 10, 39-44. Manil. astr. I 787f. Sil. It. I 133. III 587. XII 279f. Plut. Rom. 16, 13f.; Marc. 6, 9-7, 3. 8, 1ff.; comp. Pelop. et Marc. 1, 3). <60> The Acta triump. contain a specific entry for this event, and the coins of a descendent of the hero, P. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus, show a picture of it (Mommsen Münzwesen 648 nr. 303); the poet Naevius glorified it, probably after the death of Marcellus, in a drama with the title Clastidium (two unimportant fragments in Varro de l. l. VII 107. IX 78; seemingly a mention in Diomed. p.490, 14 Keil). <page break 2739/2740> In this military campaign, Marcellus had first dedicated a temple to Virtus and Honos (Liv. XXVII 25, 7. XXIX 11, 13. Val. Max. I 1, 8; see below).
He first appears in the second punic war after the battle at Cannae. While he was in the field, he was elected praetor for the second time. As praetor, he was supposed to leave to Sicily in 538 = 216, <10> and was still busy in Ostia with arms when the embassy from this defeat entered Rome. Now, as the experienced general, he was given the task of taking over command of the remnants of the army defeated at Cannae; he sent some of his troops to protect the capital city, others to Teanum Sidicinum, and went himself to his new posts (Liv. XXII 35, 6. 57, 1. 7f. Plut. 9, 1. Appian. Hann. 27). <20> Since Hannibal had turned towards Campania, he lead what was left of the legions from Cannae to Casilinum under Volturnus, and had the rest of his troops moved to himself here. Here, he received messengers from Nola. Hannibal had also made connections in this city after Capua deserted, and was hoping to get it on side, though the nobility stuck firm to its link with Rome and called Marcellus to help. <30> He was able to surround the region besieged by the enemy and reached Nola (Liv. XXIII 14, 10-13 with Weissenborn’s note). Here, it seemed good to first fight against the tendency towards desertion which had grown dangerous among the people. Our sources, whose reports about these events are distorted almost to the point of being unusable, recount in detail how Marcellus used his generosity and gentleness to hold a noble young man, L. Bantius, securely on the side of the Romans (Liv. XXIII 15, 7-16, 1. Frontin. strat. III 16, 1. Plut. 10, 2ff.); <40> Dio, who generally praises his skilled handling of his wavering allies (frg. 56, 33f.), gives as evidence another anecdote of Marcellus’ leniency towards a lucanian knight (frg. 56, 35). However, both anecdotes are told very similarly of Marcellus’ rival, Fabius Cunctator (cf. Val. Max. VII 3, 7. Frontin. strat. IV 7, 36. Auct. de vir. ill. 43, 5. Plut. Fab. 20, 1f.), and that makes them doubtful. <50> Even if there is some genuine truth preserved in these stories, the whole place would still need another effective method for securing the wavering trust of these potential allies, and Marcellus didn’t shy away from making use of one when he had seventy Nolani executed as traitors and had their property seized (Liv. XXIII 17, 1f.). Of course, something different remained in the memory of the Romans; so Cic. Brut. 12 says: post Cannensem calamitatem primum Marcelli ad Nolam proelio populus se Romanus erexit, <60> similarly Verg. Aen. VI 857f. of Marcellus: hic rem Romanam magno turbante tumultu sistet; in the epic of Silus Italicus (XII 166ff. 295ff.), the battle at Nola represents the turning point of Hannibal’s fate, and Claudian bell. Goth. 138-141 puts the three great generals of Rome in the second punic war together, Fabius, Marcellus, and Scipio, and praises them: campo post ausus aperto Marcellus vinci (scil. Hannibalem) docuit (cf. Val. Max. IV 1, 7: M. Marcellus … primus et Hannibalem vinci et Syracusas capi posse docuit). <page break 2740/2741> These are patriotic exaggerations, which need to be brought back to a more modest level. Liv. XXIII 16, 2ff. (cf. Frontin. strat. II 4, 8. Sil. It. loc. cit.) and Plut. 11, 2ff. tell us that Marcellus made a successful sortie, <10> and hence forced Hannibal to give up his hopes for Nola; Liv. XXIII 16, 15f. concludes his account: vix equidem ausim adfirmare, quod quidam auctores sunt, duo milia et octingentos hostium caesos, non plus quingentis Romanorum amissis (in Plut. 11, 5 even: λἐγονται γὰρ ὑπὲρ πεντακισχιλίους ἀποθανεῖν, ἀποκτεῖναι δὲ Ῥωμαίων οὐ πλείονας ἢ πεντακοσίους); sed sive tanta sive minor victoria fuit, ingens eo die res ac nescio an maxima illo bello gesta est; non vinci enim ab Hannibale tunc vincentibus difficilius fuit quam postea vincere. <20> Zonar. IX 2 only says that Hannibal wanted to take Nola with a surprise attack, but Marcellus had got in unnoticed, and Hannibal was driven back. Accordingly, it should only be taken as certain that Marcellus prevented Nola from falling by occupying it at the right time; it remains to be seen whether the enemy even tried to make any attack at all, or whether the Romans risked a failure, <30> and nothing can be said about an actual victory, especially one in an open field, against Hannibal himself. However, the impact on morale could be compared to such a victory; this was correctly noted by Livy, and because of this those that came after him, who usually only speak about one battle at Nola, give the first decisive success of the Romans in this battle as Hannibal’s first defeat, <40> and give Marcellus the highest renown (cf. eg. Val. Max. I 6, 9. Flor. I 22, 29. Oros. IV 16, 12. Ampel. 18, 10. 46, 6. Auct. de vir. ill. 42, 6. 45, 4). These claims, as well as the accounts about the other alleged victories of Marcellus over Hannibal, must be compared to evidence from unbiased authors, according to whom Hannibal, for as long as he was in Italy, was never defeated (Polyb. XV 11, 7. 12. 16, 5. Diod. XXIX 19. 20. Nep. Hann. 1, 2. 5, 4. 6, 1. Iustin. XXXI 5, 9.). <50> Plut. comp. Pelop. et Marc. 1, 5 already sought a balance between the two opposing views: Ἀννίβαν δὲ Μάρκελλος, ὡς μὲν οἱ περὶ Πολύβιον (frg. inc. 23 Hultsch) λέγουσιν, οὐδὲ ἅπαξ ἐνίκησεν, ἀλλ’ ἀήττητος ὁ ἀνὴρ δοκεῖ διαγενέσθαι μέχρι Σκιπίωνος, ἡμεῖς δὲ Λιβίῳ, Καίσαρι καὶ Νέπωτι (false! cf. the cited sources) καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῷ βασιλεῖ Ἰόβᾳ πιστεύομεν, ἥττας τινὰς καὶ τροπὰς ὑπὸ Μαρκέλλου τῶν σὺν Ἀννίβᾳ γενέσθαι· μεγάλην δ’ αὗται ῥοπὴν οὐδεμίαν ἐποίησαν, ἀλλ’ ἔοικε ψευδόπτωμά τι γενέσθαι περὶ τὸν Λίβυν ἐν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς ἐκείναις. <60> His judgement is right - that none of the advantages won by Marcellus over Hannibal were of decisive importance and influence on the whole course of the war (cf. also Frontin. strat. II 3, 9); but Plut. loc. cit. 1, 6f., also entirely appropriately and similar to Livy, justifies Marcellus’ glory with reference to the moral impact of his campaigns in Italy. <page break 2741/2742> Marcellus went the rest of the year 538 = 216 without leaving his stronghold at Nola; he didn’t try to frighten the besieged and valiantly defended Casilinum (Liv. XXIII 19, 4). He was then entrusted with reporting the state of the war to Rome and giving advice on their new plans (ibid. 24, 1f. 25, 50). <10> People put such high importance on giving him singular command that they didn’t even shy away from making an edit to their constitution, since his imperium for 539 = 215 was renewed as pro-consular through a specific popular decree, even though he was only praetor. Even before the end of the previous year, one of the designated consuls met their death, and people wanted to elect Marcellus in his place. The election took place, since this consulship is always counted along with the other four which Marcellus had (cf. Liv. XXVII 22, 1); <20> but since both consuls would have then been plebs, which had never happened before, religion was used as a pretext to stop the election. Marcellus kept the proconsular imperium he had already been granted, as well as the command of the troops gathered at Nola, though the legions from Cannae had been separated to be taken to Sicily (Liv. XXIII 25, 7. 30, 13. 31, 7f. 12-14. 32, 2. Oros. IV 16, 12. Plut. 12, 1-3; cf. Mommsen St.-R. I 642, 3. II 80. 649). <30> In the year 539 = 215, Marcellus supposedly won a second victory at Nola. In the rather broad and drawn-out story in Liv. XXIII 41, 13-46, 7 (cf. Eutrop. III 12, 1: M. Claudius Marcellus consul), the speeches of the influential characters take up the most space, and the depiction of the actual things that happened is confusing and questionable. In complete agreement with Liv. XXIII 46, 4. 6, <40> Plut. 12, 5f. gives the hyperbolically high number of Punic losses, as well as the deferral of Numidian and Spanish cavalry to the Romans; however, he speaks even more briefly about the battle, and adds a note about a new tactic used by Marcellus (12, 4). Just as Liv. XXIII 41, 13-43, 4, Zonar. IX 3 presents the plunder campaigns lead by Marcellus to Samnium as the reason for Hannibal targeting Nola, and he reports of Hannibal’s heavy defeat and the desertion of his own men. <50> With tradition how it is here, it is probable that Marcellus’ success for this year in Nola was limited to a few raids and some kind of lucky battle against smaller sections of the Punic army. Of even less value is the tradition about Marcellus’ third victory at Nola in the next year. At the time, 540 = 214, he had been elected consul for the third time, <60> together with Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator (Fasti fer. Lat. CIL I2 p. 57. Chronogr. Idat. Chron. Pasch. Nep. Cato 1, 2. Liv. XXIV 9, 3. 7ff. 10, 1f. 14, 8. Cassiod. Fest. p. 352. Plut. Marc. 13, 1; apophth. Fab. 3. Zonar. IX 4). The rest of the sources don’t acknowledge the battles at Nola under his consulship at all; this already makes Livy’s report (XXIV 13, 8-11. 17, 1-8) dubious, but even the details he gives don’t stand up to criticism. <page break 2742/2743> Marcellus stood at the head of the consular army at Suessula in 540 = 214, after he had dismissed his army at the end of the previous year, except for the occupation of Nola (Liv. XXIII 48, 2). The existence of this occupation has been completely forgotten in the story about his consulship, and the situation seems to have been just like it was in 538 = 216: the plebs in Nola are inclined to desert from Rome, <10> the senate asks Marcellus for help, and he quickly turns up and occupies the city. Then the battles with the Carthaginians, just as in 539 = 215, last three days total, and Rome’s victorious advances are only given a target because of an unanticipated event: in the first instance it was rain, in this instance it was the absence of the cavalry lead by C. Claudius Nero (nr. 246), who already appears in this position in 538 = 216 in Sil. It. XII 173 - which even Livy couldn’t explain. <20> In the end, the ratio of Roman and Carthaginian losses in the years 538 = 216 and 540 = 214 is almost equal. A few other details, like the placement of M. Pomponius - who was a commander in Gaul - on the battlefield in Campania (Liv. XXIV 17, 2 with Weissenborn’s note) don’t make his account any more believable, and accordingly we are allowed to cross it out completely as an invention made by a dishonest annalist. <30> On the three alleged victories of Marcellus at Nola, cf. further Egelhaaf Histor. Ztschr. (N. F. XVII) LIII 464-469. Streit Zur Gesch. des zweiten pun. Krieges in Italien nach d. Schlacht von Cannae (Berl. Studien VI 2) Berl. 1887, 18f. 21-26. A victory which was far more real and far more important, won by the Romans in the year 540 = 214 in Campania, was the capture of Casilinum. To besiege this stronghold, Marcellus joined forces with his colleague Fabius, <40> and when Fabius began to want to give up because of their heavy losses, Marcellus was in favour of pushing on. The siege was mostly made up of Campanians. Fabius finally assured them that they would make a free retreat, but Marcellus was unfaithful enough to attack those withdrawing, to surround the gate they were escaping through, and to push into the city from that point on. It would be conceivable that this break of trust fell on both consuls’ shoulders, <50> but because tradition is favourable to Fabius the blame was pushed on to Marcellus alone, but Marcellus has acted similarly in other situations, and the report in Liv. XXIV 19, 3-11 gives no reason for suspicion. Marcellus was then sick for a short time, and remained in Nola (Liv. XXIV 20, 7).
After he had recovered, he was sent to a different battlefield, in Sicily, where he supposedly won more honour for himself. <60> The most extensive and complete depiction of his military campaigns in Sicily is given by Livy; its value comes from the fact that it was essentially lifted from Polybios, but either way, Livy distorted his story with occasional supplements from other sources, and especially with chronological and topographical inaccuracies. Out of Polybios’ original work, for this section of the second Punic war we mainly have fragments of his account of the siege of Syracuse, <page break 2743/2744> which were still often selected by Byzantine authors (cf. the critical apparatus to Hultsch’s edition). The rest of the accounts mostly trace originally back to Polybios, and are of less value; Silius Italicus’ account fills his 14th book, and because of the poetic liberties taken by the poet, it can be put to one side along with the others. <10> Also, cf. the works cited in the introduction by Aug. Müller and Hesselbarth (476ff.); I am unable to access Tuzzi Ricerche cronologiche sulla seconda guerra punica in Sicilia in Beloch Studi di storia antica I, Rome 1890. While he was still consul, Marcellus went over to Sicily (Polyb. VIII 3, 7. Liv. XXIV 21, 1. Plut. 13, 1. Sil. It. XIV 110ff.), but he can only have arrived there around the end of the year. <20> In Syracuse, Rome’s allies were in charge, they had got rid of their most significant enemy Hippokrates by sending him to Leontinoi with 4000 mercenaries and Roman defectors, and they began discussions with the new Roman generals (Liv. XXIV 27, 6). However, in the meantime, the siege of Leontinoi began the war on its own, since lead to the devastation of the Roman province and the slaughter of one of the Roman guards sent to protect it. <30> Marcellus immediately declared that peace had been broken (ibid. 29, 5) and moved against Leontinoi. The administration in Syracuse did want to express their satisfaction to him, and sent an army to punish the man who had destroyed the peace, but he himself arrived at Leontinoi even faster, took the city by storm, and had two thousand Roman deserters who fell into his hands be whipped and executed (Liv. XXIV 30, 1-4. 6f. 31, 7. Plut. 14, 1f. Sil. It. XIV 125ff.). <40> This cruel severity was in line with Roman laws of war (cf. Marquardt St.-V. II 573), but in this case it had severe consequences. Hippokrates and his brother Epikydes had escaped and met the men from Syracuse who were drawing in to Leontinoi; by vividly and hyperbolically painting a picture of the cruelties done by the Romans in the city they conquered, they got them on side, turned back to their home city far more powerful, <50> and here rallied the people so that a revolution happened after a short while and Syracuse easily fell to the Carthaginians from Rome. Immediately, Marcellus set about breaking this important city (Liv. XXIV 33, 1. Plut. 14, 2. Sil. It. XIV 178ff.) and began to besiege it, one of the most famous sieges of all antiquity. Livy then describes the events up to the bloodbath from Henna in 540 = 214, while in the following year he reports nothing at all of what happened in Sicily; <60> this fact alone, and many others, already show sufficiently enough that his chronology is wrong. However, it can hardly be said that he had condensed the events of two years, but instead, he forced them into one year, since at best, the events just described here still fell under Marcellus’ consulship, but the siege was not begun before spring 541 = 213. <page break 2744/2745> When Marcellus was given the province Sicilia finibus eis, quibus regnum Hieronis fuisset for this year (Liv. XXIV 44, 4), the battle was perhaps in mind, though much more preparations were needed before it could be begun. On the chronology, in contrast to the most commonly accepted view of Weissenborn (on Liv. XXIV 39, 13; toned down in newer prints [5 1895]), <10> cf. the correct notes by Hesselbarth loc. cit. 478f. (similarly Tuzzi according to reports; different, though hardly better, Matzat Römische Zeitrechnung [Berl. 1889] 137ff.). Marcellus personally lead the attack from the sea, and the propraetor Ap. Claudius Pulcher (nr. 293) lead the attack on land (Polyb. VIII 5, 1. Plut. 14, 3); the Romans had all tools of the ancient art of besieging at their fingertips, and tried once more to take the city by storm, but all attacks were warded off, <20> many ships and machines were annihilated, because the genius mathematician and engineer Archimedes knew to constantly set new and effective cannons and defensive tools against them to defend his fatherland. The ancient sources give detailed accounts of this, and only the later ones contain many exaggerations (Polyb. VIII 5, 2-9, 10. Plut. 15, 1-17, 3. Liv. XXIV 33, 9-34, 16. Sil. It. XIV 292ff. Tzetz. Chil. II 103-149 with the list of sources at the end: ὁ Δίων καὶ Διόδωρος γράφει τὴν ἱστορίαν, <30> hence considered as a potential fragment for both, Diod. XXVI 18. Dio frg. 56, 38, cf. 39. Zonar. IX 4; cf. for critique Heiberg Quaestiones Archimedeae [Kopenhagen 1879] 38-41; on the topographical difficulties Lupus Die Stadt Syrakus [German edition of the work by Cavallari-Holm, Strassb. 1887] 214-217). Making fun of his own powerlessness against Archimedes (Polyb. VIII 8, 6. Plut. 17, 1), <40> Marcellus was finally forced to give up making attacks and decided to blockade the city, which could only happen very incompletely because of how far they had pushed out. For eight months, the Romans camped outside of Syracuse after these unsuccessful attacks (Polyb. VIII 9, 6); this time encompassed the second half of the year 541 = 213 and the first months of the next year, up until they decided to try storming the city again, but Marcellus did not spend those months doing nothing. <50> Only two thirds of the army remained under Appius outside the city; with the final third, the general moved against the cities on the island allied with Carthage. This was because Syracuse’s successful resistance combined with the landing of a strong Punic army had sparked turmoil there. Now, Helos and Herbesos had been forced to surrender, Megara had been stormed and destroyed, even Agrigento had been occupied by the enemy before Marcellus had reached it (Polyb. VIII 9, 11f. Liv. XXIV 35, 1f. Plut. 18, 2. 20[?], 2. Zonar. IX 11). <60> During this, on his way back at Akrillai (now Biscari) he surprised ten thousand people from Syracuse lead by Hippokrates, who had come through the Roman lines unnoticed and had intended to join up with the Carthaginians; he scattered them completely, only their leader saved himself with the cavalry, and joined the Carthaginian army (Liv. XXIV 35, 9-36, 1. Plut. 18, 2). <page break 2745/2746> Both Rome and Carthage strengthened their position on Sicily; for a short time, a Punic land army and fleet appeared outside Syracuse, and Marcellus was also able to add to his forces with more warships and a legion which had landed in Panormos, and had successfully countered the enemy demonstrations (Liv. XXIV 36, 2-9). He undertook even more campaigns in the middle of the island (cf. Liv. XXIV 37, 9. 38, 9. XXV 6, 20. Plut. 18, 2. Zonar. IX 4), <10> though the report of battles with the Carthaginians (Zonar. IX 4 end) is incorrect, since above all his ain was to prevent the betrayal of the indigenous people, whom Murgantia had handed over to the enemy. In one of the most important and secure places, Henna, which lay in the middle of the island, the Roman commander L. Pinarius was alleged to have wrought a horrific slaughter of the inhabitants on mere suspicion. <20> Although Marcellus previously knew nothing of this act, which had filled the islanders with disgust and driven them into the ranks of the enemy, he approved of it after the fact, and he allowed his soldiers to treat the unfortunate city like one which had been captured (Liv. XXIV 39, 7; cf. Plut. 20, 2); even one of his own votive offerings bears the inscription: M. Claudius M. f. consol Hinnad cepit (CIL I 530 = VI 1281). <30> During the winter of 541 = 213 to 542 = 212, he set up a solid winter camp in Leon near Syracuse (Liv. XXIV 39, 8-13; on this cf. Lupus loc. cit. 124), and received an embassy from the legions from Cannae stationed in west Sicily, who asked him if they could fight under his leadership and redeem themselves for their previous shame. He brought up and supported their request in the senate, and was granted permission to fulfill it, <40> though under terms which were still rather disgraceful for the soldiers (Liv. XXV 5, 10-7, 4. Val. Max. II 7, 15. Frontin. strat. IV 1, 44; in Plut. 13, 3-8 incorrectly placed earlier). Marcellus’ imperium was extended into 542 = 212 under the previous limits (Liv. XXV 3, 6), and now, finally, their prospects of taking over Syracuse seemed to be good. Allies with the Roman side were created in the city, though they were discovered, and their betrayal was thwarted. <50> However, there was now a weak point in the northern wall near the beach, and a window during which the walls would be badly guarded - the great three-day festival of Artemis. Like all other similar ones, it happened in Spring (cf. vol. II p.1343f.; Artemis Ortygia and the district Ortygia in Syracuse were named after the quail, the bird of spring); Liv. XXV 23, 2 is very correct when he has them start taking action again at the beginning of spring. <60> While the festival was happening in the city, and high spirits and recklessness dominated the city, by night a Roman contingent scaled that part of the walls, went along it up to Hexapylon, took over this main gate on the northern wall, and let their comrades in. Epikydes, who was coming running up, found the large district Epipolai full of Romans and was forced to give it up; the next morning, Marcellus saw himself as leader of Epipolai, <page break 2746/2747> as well as Neapolis and Tyche which were districts bordering it (Polyb. VIII 37, 1-13. Liv. XXV 23, 1-24, 10. Plut. 18, 3-6. Polyaen. VIII 11. Zonar. IX 5. Tzetz. Chil. II 131-134). The support of Syracuse refugees did more to help achieve this takeover than our reporters admit (cf. Liv. XXVI 21, 10. 30, 5f. 31, 4f. Frontin. strat. III 3, 2; on this, Lupus loc. cit. 228. 235). <10> Instead, these say how Marcellus, as he was looking out over the magnificent and extensive city from the heights he had captured, broke into tears (Liv. XXV 24, 10-14. Plut. 19, 1f. Augustin. civ. dei I 6. III 14), similar to the Scipio the younger on the towers of Carthage. This is referenced by the poet, who placed the surely fictional anecdote at the end of the siege of Syracuse (Sil. It. XIV 665-678), and he does it in the right way, since the capture of Epipolai still in no way meant the whole matter had been resolved. <20> Most of our sources consider it more or less like this (cf. the short mentions in Vell. II 37, 2. Flor. I 22, 33f. Eutrop. III 14, 3. Oros. IV 17, 1 Auct. de vir. ill. 45, 5); even Plut. 18, 6 quickly passes over it, and Zonar. IX 5 only says that the complete takeover of Syracuse still cost much more time and effort. Since the poetic depiction in Sil. It. XIV 618ff. is very free, Livy is the only source left over. <30> Marcellus handed over most of the captured districts to his soldiers to plunder (see below), and occupied them. However, his new camp was threatened on both sides; to the east, it bordered the district Achradina, which was protected by specific strong walls and was allied with the island Ortygia; to the west, Euryalos soared with its vast fortifications, and offered itself to an army as a stronghold almost in and of itself. <40> The occupying forces of Achradina, which contained many Roman defectors, abruptly rejected any suggestions of peace; even the commander of Euryalos put off having negotiations with Marcellus for a while hoping for relief, but eventually he decided to surrender (Liv. XXV 24, 15-25, 4. 25, 10). Now the Romans were protected in the back, and could focus entirely on Achradina (ibid. 26, 1f.). However, the help which the people of Syracuse had been waiting for from outside had now turned up. <50> The Carthaginian admiral Bomilkar had broken out of their harbour, reported the state of affairs to Carthage, and returned with renewed strength (ibid. 25, 11-13); the enemy cities of Sicily armed themselves and put Hippokrates in charge of a reinforcement army (Appian. Sic. 4, which probably ought to be moved to here); the Carthaginian army under Himilko joined up with this one. After that, there was a combined attack on land and on water against the Romans, <60> supported by an attack from those in Syracuse, but it was fought off (Liv. XXV 26, 3-6). Marcellus soon gained an ally in malaria, which was very severe there at the height of summer (according to Liv. XXV 26, 7: tempore autumni), lead to other illnesses, and epidemics were common. In the high-altitude districts of the city, the Romans were less affected by it than the enemy’s reinforcements in the swampy lowlands at Anapos; <page break 2747/2748> both leaders and most of their manpower fell as victims to the disease (Liv. XXV 26, 7-15. Sil. It. XIV 580ff.). A Sicilian army gathered itself together again, and a large provisional war fleet was sent out from Carthage to help Syracuse. Although the Roman ships sailed off against them, there was no confrontation; <10> for unclear reasons, the Carthaginians turned around and left the city to its fate; even Epikydes, who had joined up with them, hesitated in rescuing them and went to Agrigento, and Sicily - as far as it had been ruled by Hiero - submitted to Roman rule (Liv. XXV 27, 1-28, 3). Even peace negotiations with those enclosed seemed to be drawing to an end; without doubt, the lack of food which was becoming almost tangible helped them along (cf. the suggestions in ibid. 26, 2. 31, 15). <20> However, the people of Syracuse were no longer the ones in control in their own city, but the foreign mercenaries and Roman deserters had opposed them and taken the power for themselves (ibid. 28, 4-30, 1). Finally, it was one of the leaders of the mercenaries, Moericus of Spain, who let himself be won over by the Romans. While Marcellus was making a mock attack against Achradina and was moving almost all the city’s defenses there, <30> Moericus took up a number of Roman soldiers in Ortygia; when they landed, they took over the most important parts of the island and let other allies in (ibid. 30, 2-12; on various things that aren’t clear about the story, cf. Lupus loc. cit. 230-234). After the fall of Ortygia, Achradina could not hold up any more; Marcellus himself gave the Roman defectors the opportunity to escape, to avoid some kind of last-ditch battle, and the people of Syracuse surrendered (Liv. XXV 31, 1-7). <40> Marcellus stained the glory he had earned through the mistreatment of the city. After Epipolai had been captured, he had handed over to his soldiers the districts which were taken over at the time, under the condition that the life and freedom of the inhabitants remained untouched (Liv. XXV 25, 5-9. Augustin. civ. dei I 6. Diod. XXVI 20. Plut. 19, 4. Polyaen. VIII 11. Zonar. IX 5). He did the same thing after Achradina surrendered, though he was inclined to ask for more protection of Rome’s allies and others. How well his orders were followed can already be concluded from the death of the old Archimedes, which the general had wanted to keep alive above all (Cic. Verr. IV 131; fin. V 50. Liv. XXV 31, 9f. Val. Max. VIII 7 ext. 7. Plin. n. h. VII 125. Sil. It. XIV 676-678. Plut. 19, 7-10. Zonar. IX 5. Tzetz. Chil. II 131ff.). Even the Roman reports (Livy, Zonaras) don’t deny that similar things often happened over those days, <60> and there is almost universal agreement over the barbaric way in which Syracuse was completely and utterly plundered. Only Cicero makes an exception, who instead of describing the pillages undertaken by the Sicilian governor Verres in Syracuse, describes the generosity and mercy of the city’s capturer, in the most splendid way (Verr. II 4. IV 115f. 120-123. 131; cf. Quintil. inst. or. V 11, 7); <page break 2748/2749> here, the lawyer is intentionally distorting the facts, though on the other hand, the charges over what Marcellus did, which the embassies from Syracuse are the ones to announce in Liv. XXVI 29, 4. 30, 1-10 (cf. Plut. 23, 4, see below), could have been the result of exaggeration for rhetorical effect, and also, when he was comparing the behaviour of Fabius in Tarentum and Marcellus in Syracuse - which would go badly for him - the tradition of the family of the Fabii may have also influenced things (Liv. XXVII 16, 8. Plut. 21, 1ff.). <10> Luxury and greedy acquisition of Greek works of art in Rome date to the time of Marcellus’ plunder of art; he was reprimanded for this by men like Cato and Polybios (Polyb. IX 10, 1ff. Liv. XXV 40, 2. XXXIV 4, 4). Even if he really did only bring one of Archimedes’ planetariums into his house as plunder (Cic. rep. I 21f.), <20> the plunder he used to decorate his newly dedicated temple on the Porta Capena and other sanctuaries in Rome and outside Italy was far more numerous and valuable (cf. Cic. Verr. IV 121; rep. I 21. Liv. XXV 31, 8-11. 40, 1-3. XXVI 21, 7f. 30, 9. 31, 9. Plut. 21, 1ff. 30, 5f.); there is also a dedicatory inscription extant, which was set up after he returned home, probably 544 = 210 (CIL I 531 = VI 474: Martei M. Claudius M. f. consol dedit). <30> All in all, the plunder was no less than what was later stolen in Carthage (Liv. XXV 31, 11. Plut. 19, 6), and people seem to have brought over so much melted bronze to Rome that ore from Syracuse was even used for building projects (Plin. n. h. XXXIV 13; cf. Münzer Quellenkritik des Plin. 286 note). According to Liv. XXV 31, 5. XXXI 31, 8, Syracuse fell in the third year of the siege, and it also leads to the conclusion that the end of the whole undertaking cannot be placed before 543 = 211, <40> which can be concluded from the chronology of the events up until here (cf. Matzat loc. cit. 143, 5). When Marcellus’ pro-consular imperium had been renewed for this year to end the war (Liv. XXVI 1, 6), the city’s surrender was probably close, but had not yet happened. It is completely certain that the further successes in Sicily belong in the year 543 = 211, which Livy still places in the previous year (cf. Matzat loc. cit. 145, 8. Hesselbarth 500f.). <50> The capture of the capital city resulted in all of the east of Sicily being taken over; Marcellus made peace terms to each of the cities according to how they had acted policitally (Liv. XXV 40, 4), and once again they tried to secure themselves good terms fulfilled properly, as far as it was possible (App. Sic. 5). Though Plut. 20, 3-11 uses Poseidonos as an example of Marcellus’ mercy against those he had conquered, <60> he was still not justified to make such general conclusions from it, like: πρῶτος δοκεῖ τότε Μάρκελλος ὑποδεῖξαι τοῖς Ἕλλησι δικαιοτέρους Ῥωμαίους (20, 1f.). Marcellus had to leave it to his successors to establish the newly won area as a Roman province, since the battles had not yet stopped. Hannibal sent a cavalryman from his school, the Numidian Muttines, to Sicily, and the position of the Carthaginians and their allies improved through his bold expeditions. <page break 2749/2750> Even Hanno and Epikydes dared to leave their secure position at Agrigento, and pushed on to the southern river Himera (now Fiume Salso). Here, Marcellus met the enemy, and even lost in a few scuffles with Muttines. However, both other Punic generals, jealous of the Numidians, <10> waged a battle in his absence and were completely defeated with great losses (Liv. XXV 40, 5-41, 7). As a victor, Marcellus headed to Syracuse and then to Rome at the end of summer (Liv. XXVI 21, 1. 14. Zonar. IX 5. Appian. Iber. 17 with the false story of him being sent to Spain). Even while he was hanging around in Sicily, supplications were decided upon to honour him, and he was justified to start asking for a triumph, <20> where he lamented that he had to leave his army at Sicily, and that the legions from Cannae who had fought under him deserved no rewards for their courage (Liv. XXVI 21, 2f. Plut. 13, 8; cf. also Ammian. Marc. XXVIII 4, 23 on his self-confidence). His request was met with opposition. Here, as well as on his conduct with the Sicilians coming up, we hear once more of Marcellus’ enviers and foes, <30> even public dislike of him (cf. eg. Liv. XXVI 21, 3f. 26, 6. 11. 29, 5. 35, 4. Plut. 22, 1. 23, 1. 4. Auct. de vir. ill. 45, 6); M. Cornelius Cethegus is named as one of his opponents, his successor in Sicily, whose social circles seem to have coincided with Scipio’s, and perhaps Marcellus’ adversaries were only found in these circles and nowhere else. At the time, both of the Scipios had fallen in Spain, <40> and because of this, the glory of the man who had conquered Syracuse shone even brighter. Accordingly, although he didn’t end up getting the triumph, he was still granted an ovatio for the first time since the beginning of the Second Punic War; unsatisfied, he first climbed the Alban hills in triumph, before parading the rich plunder he had taken from Syracuse before the Romans during his ovatio (Liv. XXVI 21, 5-13. Val. Max. II 8, 5. Auct. de vir. ill. 45, 6. Plut. 21, 1. 22, 1; comp. Pelop. et Marc. 3, 4, who incorrectly speaks of three triumphs of Marcellus; cf. also Mommsen St.-R. I 129, 2. 3). <50> He was soon granted a further honour, since he won the consulship for the following year with M. Valerius Laevinus (Chronogr. Idat. Chron. Pasch. Liv. XXVI 22, 12f. XXIX 16, 1. XXXI 13, 2. Flor. I 22, 25. Oros. IV 17, 14. Cassiod. Fest. p. 364. Plut. 23, 1. Zonar. IX 5 end).
Tradition about the following final years of Marcellus’ life is very cloudy, <60> and has been distorted with lies; here, we are essentially dependent on Livy, whom Plutarch mostly follows, and Livy lifts his material here from entirely unreliable annals, like those of Valerius Antias. Marcellus is glorified to the extreme, and remarkably it is often him himself who is doing the glorifying (cf. eg. his words in Liv. XXV 41, 1: se, qui Hannibalem subnixum victoria Cannensi ab Nola reppulisset, with the similar, though much stronger Liv. XXVII 2, 2: se, qui post Cannensem pugnam ferocem victorem Hannibalem contudisset). <page break 2750/2751> In the year 544 = 210, Marcellus entered his fourth consulship before his colleague arrived, and lead an investigation into arson alone (Liv. XXVI 26, 5. 27, 6). After Laevinus arrived, the provinces were shared out; <10> Marcellus got Sicily again by lot, though this was followed by a number of complaints about how he acted during his time in office and was supposedly brought up for debate in the senate, and just as he had put off these discussions until after Laevinus arrived to ensure they were run without bias, he voluntarily offered to exchange provinces with him, the man whom the war in Italy had fallen to. Despite this generosity, the embassies from the Sicilian cities, <20> especially those from Syracuse, raised severe charges against him, and not only were these supported by his opponents, but even the strict T. Manlius Torquatus denounced his cruelty. However, Marcellus justified himself with reference to the necessities of war; the senate agreed with his measures, and gave the people of Syracuse empty condolences for the future. Whether Marcellus had really acted as nobly during the whole affair as our sources say remains to be seen; <30> the dismissed denouncers must have tried to reconcile him, so they voluntarily became his clients and granted him and his house great honours (Liv. XXVI 26, 5-11. 27, 16. 29, 1-32, 8, cf. XXXVIII 43, 9; hence Val. Max. IV 1, 7 and with arbitrary flourishes and changes Plut. 23, 2-9; somewhat different is Zonar. IX 6, cf. Dio frg. 56, 41). Even in Cicero’s time, there was a festival, the Marcellia, celebrated in Syracuse to honour the city’s conquerer and his descendents (Cic. Verr. IV 151. Plut. 23, 9). <40> It still took a little time, during which they gathered arms, specifically they got a voluntary loan for the fleet, before the consuls could go off into their provinces (Liv. XXVI 36, 12). Marcellus went to the army at Apulia, and made alliances in the cities there which were still on Hannibal’s side (ibid. 38, 5). He was able to take Salapia (now Salpi) through betrayal, and here he almost completely annihilated 500 Numidian cavalry, <50> one of Hannibal’s elite troops (Liv. XXVI 38, 11-14. Val. Max. III 8 ext. 1. Appian. Hann. 45-47. Zonar. IX 7; cf. also Dasius). From Apulia, he turned to Samnium and took two important very well stocked camps from Hannibal (Liv. XXVII 1, 1f. Plut. 24, 2; on the position of the otherwise unknown locations, cf. Neumann Zeitalter der pun. Kriege 451). Then, he supposedly clashed with the Carthaginians themselves at Numistro in Lucania, <60> and he took revenge for their victory over Cn. Fulvius Centumalus. According to Liv. XXVII 2, 1-12 (hence Plut. 24, 2-7) the battle Marcellus began remained undecided until after night had fallen; on the next day, Hannibal refused to take up the fight again, and vacated the field the following night; Marcellus attributed the victory to himself, pursued his enemy to Venusia, <page break 2751/2752> did more damage to him in small skirmishes, and remained at his heel. In contrast, Frontin. strat. II 2, 6 says: Hannibal apud Numistronem contra Marcellum pugnaturus cavas et praeruptas vias obicit a latere: ipsaque loci natura pro munimentis usus clarissimum ducem vicit (cf. also II 3, 9). Here, despite Hesselbarth’s balanced view loc. cit. 519f., we are forced to decide on one report or the other, <10> and their meeting at Numistro must be considered one of Marcellus’ defeats. However, he remained near Hannibal, and when he had to appoint a dictator after a conflict between the senate and his colleague who was called to Rome, he did this in camp (Liv. XXVII 4, 1-4. 5, 18f. Plut. 24, 8. 25, 1f.). He also kept his command in the year 545 = 209, when the old consul Fabius took over Tarentum (Liv. XXVII 7, 8. 11. 10, 12. Plut. 25, 2). <20> In order to force Hannibal away from there, Fabius urged the undisciplined troops occupying Rhegion to attack Caulonia, but at the same time, according to Liv. XXVII 12, 2, he supposedly asked his colleague and Marcellus to occupy it. And then, in great vivid detail, Livy XXVII 12, 7-15, 1 (hence Oros. IV 18, 4 and Plut. 25, 3-26, 7) tells the story of how Marcellus carried this out: right at the beginning of spring, he marched out to Canusium against Hannibal, <30> he had an indecisive fight on the first day, on the second he suffered a severe defeat; then, with a long speech and harsh punishments, he rallied his soldiers to summon all their strength, and on the third day after a long and difficult battle, he won a great victory; leaving 8000 dead, Hannibal fled to Brutium, and only his own severe losses prevented Marcellus from pursuing him. <40> The details of the report of the battle bear clear signs of being invented by Valerius Antias (for the three-day length of the battles, cf. Marcellus’ alleged siege of Nola); it is one of his worst, since the the results of the battle were exactly the opposite of what would be expected from a victory of Marcellus (heavily emphasised by Streit loc. cit. 38-40). Hannibal moved on rapidly and undeterred to Bruttium, liberated Caulonia there, <50> and turned back unchallenged to Tarentum, which must have fallen in the meantime on account of betrayal; however, around the end of the year in Rome, charges were raised louder and louder against Marcellus, and were finally spoken publically by C. Publicius Bibulus, who said that he had allowed his army to be massacred by Hannibal twice, and that now, while he was gadding about in Italy, <60> he had been keeping it idle in the districts of the city at Venusia the whole summer (Sinuessa instead of Venusia in Plut. 26, 8, probably only a mistake, which then lead to the addition of εἰς Καμπανίαν, which then was reminiscent of Hannibal’s districts in Capua, and lead to the embellishment of Bibulus’ speech 27. 2; Venusia correctly 29, 1). According to our sources, Marcellus triumphed over these charges just as he had done previously over those of the Sicilians; <page break 2752/2753> he justified himself so brilliantly (according to Liv. XXVII 21, 4 only commemoratione rerum suarum) that not only did the people reject the request to abrogate his proconsulship - which was therefore actually proposed, unlike a few years later when it was merely demanded for Scipio (Liv. XXIX 19, 6[?]) - but Marcellus was elected consul for the next year (Liv. XXVII 20. 10-21, 4. Plut. 27, 1-5). These contradictions of Livy’s against himself, as has been pretty generally recognised, <10> imply that Marcellus’ victory in 545 = 209 was mere rubbish; the proconsul probably never fought a battle against Hannibal in which he wasn’t defeated. As designated consul, he was sent on to Etruria, to suppress uproar there (Liv. XXVII 21, 7. Plut. 28, 1), <20> then he began his fifth consulship in 546 = 208 with T. Quinctius Crispinus (Chronogr. Idat. Chron. Pasch. Liv. XXVII 22, [?]. XXX 27, 11. Cassiod.; referred to as consul for the fifth time on Marcellinus’ coins, Mommsen Münzw. 648 nr. 303; in Cic. div. II 77. Nep. Hann. 5, 3. Ascon. Pisc. p. 11. Auct. de vir. ill. 45, 7. Plut. Fab. 19, 7; Marc. 1, 1. 28, 6. 30, 6; comp. Pelop. et Marc. 3, 4. Appian. Hann. 50). Both consuls got Italy as a province (Liv. XXVII 22, 2), but Marcellus was kept in Rome for religious reasons. In Clastidium and then again in Syracuse, he had dedicated a temple to Honos and Virtus, <30> and wanted to fulfill his vow by setting up the temple to Honos built by Q. Fabius Maximus again, and putting an image of Virtus in it. However, the pontifices objected; because of this, he had to construct a specific temple of Virtus, which was connected to it as well as to a temple of Mars. They lay outside Porta Capena and were magnificently decorated with the art works stolen from Syracuse; <40> supposedly, Marcellus did not survive long enough for them to be dedicated, but it was his son who did that (Cic. Verr. IV 120-123; nat. deor. II 61; rep. I 21. Liv. XXVII 25, 7-9. XXIX 11, 13f. Val. Max. I 1, 8. Ascon. Pis. p. 11. Lactant. div. inst. I 20, 12. Plut. Marc. 28, 1ff.; fort. Rom. 5; cf. also Mommsen on CIL I 531). He took up charge over the army at Venusia again, and Crispinus also brought his own army to there; both camped together between Venusia and Bantia and waited for the opportunity to fight (Liv. XXVII 25, 10. 12-14. Plut. 29, 1-3). <50> During a reconaissance ride, both consuls fell in an ambush at Petelia; Crispinus escaped seriously wounded, and Marcellus died there. The reports on this important event differ in a few various ways (on this cf. Hesselbarth loc. cit. 530-533). The most reliable is that of Polyb. X 32, 1-6, according to whom it was the consuls’ own lack of caution which lead to their doom, <60> which prompted the author to have a longer discussion about this lack of caution, and also prompted a fair amount of blame (ibid. 7-12: similarly Appian. Hann. 50: ὁ Ἀννίβας …. ἐπῄνεσε μὲν ὡς στρατιώτην, ἐπέσκωψε δὲ ὠς στρατηγόν. Plut. comp. Pelop. et Marc. 3, 4: οὐ στρατηγοῦ πτῶμα, προδρόμου δέ τινος ἢ κατασκόπου πέπτωκεν). In Livy XXVII 26, 1-27, 11 many threads of the tale have clearly been corrected, eg. that an ambush was set specifically for the consuls, <page break 2753/2754> that their escort was made up of Etruscans and people from Fregellae, that this escort abandoned the generals; he first references differing reports XXVII 26, 13, where he introduces an anecdote with quidam prodidere memoriae, which Val. Max. I 6, 9. Plin. n. h. XI 189. Plut. Marc. 29, 8 also give in agreement; then he concludes his report XXVII 27, 12-14: <10> Multos circa unam rem ambitus fecerim, si quae de Marcelli morte variant auctores, omnia exsequi velim. ut omittam alios, Coelius triplicem gestae rei rationem edit: unam traditam fama, alteram scriptam laudatione fili, qui rei gestae interfuerit, tertiam, quam ipse pro inquisita ac sibi comperta adfert; ceterum ita fama variat, ut tamen plerique loci speculandi causa castris egressum, omnes insidiis circumventum tradant. Because of this confusion in tradition, <20> we probably have to content ourselves with a general knowledge of what happened. Plutarch 29, 4-16 takes his story from Livy; Appian. Hann. 50 gives a report which differs from the others, but it is less useful. Shorter depictions and mentions are Cic. Tusc. I 89. Nep. Hann. 5, 3. Eutrop. III 16, 4. Oros. IV 18, 6. 8. Auct. de vir. ill. 45, 7. Sil. Ital. XV 343ff. Plut. Fab. 19, 7; Flamin. 1, 5; comp. Pelop. et Marc. 3, 4f. Zonar. IX 9. Marcellus’ corpse fell into the hands of the enemy; Hannibal took his signet ring off, so he could use it in some kind of trickery for the war (Liv. XXVII 28, 4. Appian. Hann. 50. Zonar. IX 9), but according to our sources which agree on this point, he gave the dead man an incredibly honourable funeral (Cic. Cato 75. Liv. XXVII 28, 1. Val. Max. V 1 ext. 6. Auct. de vir. ill. 45, 7. Sil. Ital. XV 381-396. Appian. Hann. 50. Plut. Marc. 30, 1; comp. Pelop. et Marc. 3, 7; cf. Polyb. [?] in Suid. I 2, 991 Bernh. Zonar. IX 9). <40> Auct. de vir. ill. 45, 8 says: Ossa Romam remissa a praedonibus intercepta perierunt, Appian. Hann. 50: τὰ ὀστᾶ τῷ παιδὶ προσέπεμψεν ἐς τὸ Ῥωμαίων στρατόπεδον; both versions are also given by Plutarch 30, 1-4, the first in detail with reference to Cornelius Nepos and Valerius Maximus, the second with reference to Livy and Caesar Augustus, but neither Valerius Maximus nor Livy mention it at all, and no one has yet successfully solved this difficulty. <50> Nothing is known about Marcellus’ grave.
At his death, Marcellus was over 60 years old (Liv. XXVII 27, 11. Plut. 28, 6) and had fought in 39 battles (Plin. n. h. VII 92; incorrectly Ammian. Marc. XXV 3, 13: twenty). Virtus and Honos were his gods, and the story of his life is that of his military campaigns. His funeral oration, which his son held for him and which Coelius Antipater made use of (see above), would have exaggerated his service a lot; <60> perhaps Augustus was drawing upon it when he was celebrating his step-son M. Claudius Marcellus’ great ancestors in his funeral oration. However, Roman patriotism contributed more than a sense of family superiority to his honour; Livy trustingly repeated these inventions, and Plutarch, based on them, published a very artificial image of the character of Marcellus, which he compares to Pelopidas with less success. <page break 2754/2755> The ancients liked to put Marcellus and Fabius together (even Cic. rep. V 10 in Non. p.337, 33f., as well as Claudian. bell. Gildon. I 89. Liv. XXIV 9, 7-11. Plut. Fab. 19, 2f. 5-7; Marc. 9, 2f.; apophth. Fab. 3); before Scipio Africanus emerged, they were both the most capable of Rome’s generals in the Second Punic War, Marcellus probably the more valuable, and Fabius the more sympathetic of the two. <10> Marcellus was personally strong, brave, and daring; it is difficult to get a picture of his strategy, since tradition is in no way sufficient for this. A few tactical inventions are attributed to him (Plut. 12, 4. Auct. de vir. ill. 45, 3. Ampel. 18, 10; perhaps also Veget. I 15), but this is a matter of less value. However, he cannot have merely been a capable soldier, but he must have also proved himself as a good general, even though he was far away from being on the same level as Hannibal’s genius. <20> He had a particular respect for Greek religion, art, and science; on the surface he was devoted to Roman religion, but his spirit wouldn’t allow itself to be limited by that (characteristically Cic. div. II 77). He was free of both religious judgement and moral judgement, and had often fought for Rome with cruelty and treachery. <30> These are, more or less, the most common and dominant traits of his character, which can be concluded from an unbiased consideration of his history taking its distortions into account. His portrait is only extant on the coins of Marcellinus (Mommsen Münz. 648 nr. 303); statues and busts are unjustified in bearing his name (cf. Bernoulli Röm. Ikonographie I 29-31).
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