Stephen Mafzen o The University of Pitrsbursh
IIIB6 (China) Undeniew says, prove China accepts.s2Cy's response is fine. It proves no time to test; we'll give them the assistance.
Subpoint Number 1) Grants of vulnerability assistance to China.E3
Subpoint Number 2) Soviets have an irrational perception of China.Ea In other words, if you aid them it ticks off the Soviets. Richard Pipes in July 1980, "I don't normally worry about such Soviet anxieties, but in the case of China the Russians are indeed extremely sensitive - almost irrationally so. An all-out campaign by the United States to arm China could trigger a violent response from them." InternationalCommunication Agency 1980, "Nothing unites the Soviets, particularly Russians, more than a fear of China. Their attitude verges on the irrational. It mixes real concern for border integrity and awareness of the vast numbers of Chinese with a large does of Russian racial intolerance." Representative Schroeder in July 1980, "Secondly, the Soviets are already very angry and worried. We have given the Chinese most favored-nation trade status and access to our technology. Wehave not given comparable concessions to Russia. All this has made the Russians almost hysterical. We don't need to throw gasoline on the fire...." I would argue also from the International Communication Agency in 1980, "Russian reactions to closer American-Chinese relations are more unpredictable and intense than those of other Soviet nationalities. Russians are unlikely to view this relationshipsimply as another aspect of the Soviet-American political competition."
Subpoint Number 3) The leadership transition will come soon.8t In other words, the Soviets are going to have a leadership transition. Jeffrey Hough in 1980, "Indeed, if the experience of the Stalin and Krushchev regimes were to be repeated and the new general secretary preferred (and was able) to surround himself with men a decade younger, one would expect that within four or five years the politburo members would come predominantly from the postwar generation."
I would argue, in terms of4) Go internal if international conditions permit.86 In other words, if we don't tick off the Russians now, they will go internal and not be of interest. Simes in 1981, "A combination of economic slowdown, energy shortages, and consumer pressures, coupled with the fear of a growing technological gap with the West, may persuade a future leadership to constrain military appetites. Faced with the dilemma ofinvestment in economic modernization or in further military acquisitions, the Kremlin may, depending on the international condition, opt for the former." Jeffrey Hough in 1980, "Most important - one of the factors that will influence the direction of Soviet society is the changing nature of the outside environment, and we are part of that environment. Instead of engaging in abstract forecasting that ignores our own part in the process, we would be better advised to try to understand the impact of that environment and, above all, the ways inwhich we can affect it." Of course the best way we can affect it is not tick off the Soviets by adopting this silly plan.
5) Increased risk of war.87 Evidence from Hough in 1980, "Our military posture will be an important factor in instilling a sense of caution in the Soviet Union, but we should never forget that the other factor in deterrence is a leadership on the other side that is essentially balanced and rational and that is in a position to act in a balanced and raticnal manner. If the leaders on either side or both sides engage in games of chicken or engage in brinksmanship, if they repeatedly makedirect challenges to the manhood of the opponent, the probability increases that the situation will get out of control." Don't vote affirmative.
Observation I: Presumption is negative.E8
Subpoint A: New proliferaton are armed with glamorous and unfamiliar gadgetry by the affirmative plan.
Subpoint B: Reverses a long-standing U.S. policy regarding aid to violators of the NPT [Nuclear Proliferation Treaty]. Of course, we gave fuel to India, but of course, there was massive U.S. indignation. We have certainly not aided them and abetted them by giving them new technology to add with their budding nuclear arsenal.
C: Plan shares military secrets with the U.S.S.R. which is an independent level of presumption. In other words, at the very least, even if the secrets aren't shared with the U.S.S.R., the Soviets can get it from a Marxist Third World country. That is bad, as Dunn indicates _ their own source - in April '79, "Providing information about accident proofing could quickly entail the transfer of valuable nuclear weapon_design information. Then, in the event of a changed alliance posture _not implausible in politically unstable countries - such militarily more effective nuclear forces might come to pose a serious and direct threat to the United States and its friends.', It's more than a disad [disadvantage] , but I'll argue presumption here.
Observation II: No significant decrease in accident risk.se
Subpoint A: Some safeguards exist now. Of course, inherency simply says they cannot afford sophisticated safeguards, not that they have no safeguards whatsoever.
Subpoint B: The one-second evidence they [affirmative] will read in IAR - I hope - probably assumes that every nuke in the world has a PAL. To that extent, it does not apply to this affirmative plan, because it assumes total solvency, and gives me the Beres link on case side.
Subpoint c: overall no significant decrease in the risk. As worrrstetter - their own source - notes in 1965,'.Even if, with large-scale proliferation, each new nuclear power adopted a positive control system with a high standard of responsibility, there would be an increase in the probability of mistakes, simply because there would be more control centers. It is apparent that this problem is not widely understood. When it is, there should be reduced any temptation to cut the costs of a national force by 'volume' sales to other powers." Of course, volume sales in technology is what it's talking about, and that is the affirmative plan.
[Observation III] Plan meet [need] one: Human error.eo
Subpoint A: The affirmative installs a technological fix to reduce the risk of a nuclear accident.er That is what the plan does. Tries to implement PALs.
Subpoint B: Technolory can't eliminate human etror.e2
Subpoint l) Human intervention cannot be eliminated. In otherwords, even with the PALs you're going to have humans involved. As Shapely indicates in August l980, "Perhaps the idea that we can have a perfect nuclear warning and command capability - or a perfect war machine - is hubris. Engineers know full well that no technological system can be perfect. There must always be room for human intervention.
2) Prolif increases human interaction and error. Evidence comes from Dumas in November 1980, "The more weapons we deploy, and the greater their geographical dispersion, the more people will be interacting with them. And the greater will be the likelihood of a disaster resulting from human error." He continues, he notes, ..Human failure could also play a major role in precipitating an accidental nuclear exchange .... False warnings of a major accident, false alerts, or even improperly authorized (but properly coded) messages ordering thelaunching of nuclear weapons could accidentally generate a holocaust, or even provide the preconditions."
Subpoint C: Human error is the most significant problem.e3 Lloyd Dumas in November of 1980, "Not until we have sharply reduced the vast arsenals of weapons of mass destruction will we have even a serious chance of keeping human reliability problems from eventually triggering a catastrophe." Charles Cornwell in 1968 [slZ] , ..Seemingly inexplicable, inconsistent and unpredictable human .goofs' account for 50 to 70 percent of all failures of major weapons and space vehicles. This puts human error ... ahead of mechanical, electrical and structural failures ..." which, of course, is the only thing the affirmative deals with.
Observation IV: I would argue disadvantage Number l) Increase vulnerability ea of Third World nuclear arsenals to a preemptive strike.
Subpoint A: The affirmative implements safeguards. This is what is done in the plan. PAIs.
Subpoint B: Safeguards increase vulnerabilityes to a preemptive strike. 1) Authorization standards. Even if you implements pALs you still have to decide. In other words, you add all these extra permissive action links. That means you have to consult with political leaders.... Can I stop? lMarzen stops and talks with the debate offtcialslTake this off as prep time. fHe backtracks to Subpoint A and resumes speakingl
Preemptive strike. Subpoint A: The affirmative implements safeguards. That's PAls. B: Safeguards increase vulnerability to a preemptive strike. See? It wasn't that slow
Number 2) Authorization standards. Even if you vote affirmative with PALs you've got the damn permissive action links, and you're still going to have to consult political leaders before you implement them. If you implement PAIs, you have authorization standards, and that 'increases the problem. As Miller notes in 1979, referring to pAls, "one interesting aspect of the release procedure is the time involved in acquiring release authority. The many steps involved serve to guardagainst inadvertant release, but at the same time they can serve to jeopardize the responsiveness of the military commander in the field who has an urgent need for the use of nuclear weapons. For example, as long as 24 hours may be required for release authority to be granted to a NATO field unit."
And, of course, their evidence on case side simply talks about readiness of the weapons. It does not factor in to the fact you must consult with political leaders before you launch, indicating that I have an increased vulnerability because of authorization. Miller concurs in'79, "In fact, the real danger may be that so many checks, constraints, and verification procedures that are established in the United States will actually be unable to release and launch a nuclear weapon or weapons if it decided to do so, even with the civilian hierarchy intact, in full control of their facilities and all communications systems in full working order," and I don't think they're going to get that.
The reason is because of 2) Weakness in command and control. Of course, all they do is harden, but overall, to the extent that C3 is gone, it does not matter if you save the missiles. As Betts indicates in spring '79, "In strategic national interaction, command and control is potentially a major problem: poor countries, with weak nuclear forces developed on a shoestring, might face a choice between viability and stability." Dunn, their own source, in'77;"Development of a reliable and survivable command and control system may well exceed the capabilities of the many low-to-medium technology prospective proliferators." Kincade indicates that this destruction makes the question on missile vulnerability moot. Kincade in Winter '81, "Perhaps the more interesting and realistic vulnerability that is growing as a result of the increased numbers and effectiveness of reentry vehicles is that of military command, control and communications (C3) facilities .... Early distructions of these centers or metely their vital communications links could almost render moot the question of how many offensive missiles survive."
I would argue that even the U.S. can't protect them; thus if they're going to use that as an example, as Mark told me in cross-ex, they do not solve. Evidence comes from Albright in October 1980, "(A recently declassified study by Richard) Foster of Stanford Research International ... said it remains true that Washington and all (other) fixed national command centers could be crippled by only 19 warheads of 8 megatons each." Calder in 1979, "Communication with submerged submarines is difficult even in peacetime unless they comeclose to the surface the only radio signals that can penetrate to them through the water are extremely long waves. The superpowers have the necessary transmitters ..., but these are presumed to be targeted by the opponent's missiles." Kincade, Winter '81, "Providing highly dependable command and control facilities has proved difficult, however, owing to problems inherent in defending a limited number of fixed sites against a determined nuclear attack and the limitations ofmobile command posts." Albright, October '80, "Military satellites, and much of the rest of the communications system, may be knocked out by electromagnetic pulses from a large high-altitude burst,,' and "The Joint Chiefs of Staff anticipate a 'wide-spread loss of connectivity' between the president and the commanders in the opening minutes of a nuclear war. The Chiefs said this loss would be caused bythe powerful electromagnetic pulses from a high-altitude nuclear burst which could burst or upset electronic and computer circuits."
Observation V: Disad 2) Complexity trade-off.e6
Subpoint A: The affirmative implements PALs to increase safety. Subpoint B: Safety measures equal increased complexity.eT Four subpoints explain. l) PAI^s add redundancy. Of course, the permissive action links by their very definition means you have all these extra links to go through before you can launch the weapon. That's how they gain their advantage. Dumas explains in 1977, "The nature of the demands commonly placed on these systems is such that the possibilities for design simplification are likely to be fairly limited." In other words, you have to have a lot of links.
2) Redundancy increases the complexity. Dumas in'77, "Redundant safety systems . .. increase the probability of other ... malfunctions because of the contribution of complexity."
3) Geographical dispersion is an independent link. You have them spread out in a lot, and there it is, the next thing you have increased complexity [sic] . Dumas in"77,"ln addition, greater geographical dispersion will also increase the complexity ... of the communication and control systems required." He [Dumas] continues in November of 1980: "As the military systems in which these weapons are embedded have become more complex, geographically dispersed andtechnologically sophisticated, there is increased probability that they will eventually fail."
4) Technology is a fixation of the board. Of course, ... on the LDC's. Their technical advisors to accept ... get the LDCs to do it. Shapely in August '80, "Our natural desire to push the state of the art - our technological exuberance - may make us ignore that tried and true and keep us from making sure that things work." 
Subpoint C: Impact complexity decreases safety.es l) Trade-off exists. Dumas in "77, "Each additional system built represents, in effect, additional opportunities for something to go wrong." "Because there are more chances for something to go wrong, in general the more complex any system or subsystem is, the more likely it is to experience a malfunction." That is Dumas again. Talbot concurs withexcellent, awesome card in February 1981, "As nuclear technology becomes more sophisticated and complex, the chances of accidents ... increase, despite the best safety precautions and most advanced training for operating personnel. Since designs, equipment and operating for systems... can never be totally error-free, and since their verycomplexity multiplies the chances of something going wrong, experts predict unavoidable, unpreventable nuclear accidents ...."
2) Risk overall increases on balance. Dumas in'77, "Unspectacular, routine failures... can trigger accidental wars. These are far more likely to occur than spectacular events, like the unauthorized launch of a nuclear missile," as Mike indicates on case side.
3) Empirically proven. Evidence comes from Shapley, in August 1980, "Ironically, the alerts started happening after the completion of a NORAD [North American Air Defense] modernization program that was meant to upgrade and increase its data processing capability. It is possible that our warning and command systems are getting too complex and sophisticated." She continues, "Yet the very recent falsealerts suggest that the very complexity of the system is one cause of its problems."
4) The result is we are at the brink of nuclear war. Thee in January 1980, "Only a few days ago, we again survived a nuclear alert caused by a U.S. computer error which raised the alarm about an imminent Soviet missile attack. The alert lasted for six minutes. If it had lasted a few minutes longer, we would have been plunged into a nuclear Armageddon." Ottinger in 1980, "The entire world was faced with the realistic prospect of Armageddon." Dumas concluded in December 1980 that the bombers were called back blah, blah, blah - that's a lousy card. OK. Shulman in January 1981, "False alarms in the U.S. 'early warning system' nearly triggered nuclear war three times in recent months ...." I think that is a significant risk.
Observation VI: Disadvantage number three - and this is interesting: Attack concealment.ee
Subpoint A: The affirmative plan deploys Mideast nuclear anenals at sea - at least some elements of them, and Mark will indicate on case side how you cannot put these things in caverns. To that extent, they're going to have to use surface ships and subs.
Subpoint B: A disguised attack will occur.r00 Subpoint l) Technologically possible. Speed in'79, "There is also an important tactical danger in having all the U.S. ballistic missiles on submarines. The Soviets could then attack this sea-based force without launching a nuclear attack against U.S. territory. Depending on the nature of the attack, the United States might not even be able to identify the attacking party ." Of course, it applies to the U.S., but, I think, if anything, since they are relying on technology, the evidence would be very applicable.
Subpoint 2) Fanatics exist. Kaddafi. The favorite cross-ex exampl..tot New Repubtic, March, 1981, "Egypt's President Sadat called him a vicious criminal, 100 percent sick and possessed of a demon. Sudan's President Numerity said he had a split personality - both of them evil. The PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] itself has called him a mad man. Deranged or not, however, he became the Daddy Warbucks of international terrorism." Same source continues, "In the spring of that year, defectors from a team of atomic scientiststold the BBC that they had already been working on an atom bomb in Chasma, Pakistan, with $100 billion put up by Colonel Kaddafi. Pakistan said he would make it but Kaddafi would own it, they said, predicting its completion in 1981."
Subpoint C: Impact: Superpower war. He'll nuke some subs in order to get a disad. Frank in 1962, "But the most serious flaw in the doctrine of invulnerable bases is that they would cause an enemy to conceal the source of its attack. This will become ridiculously easy when many countries have nuclear weapons.... If a country chose to be more diabolical ... and small countries would certainly have the incentive to be so, it might arrange to fire a weapon in such a way that it would appear to come from Russia, and we and Russia would thenfall on each other."