Second Affirmative Constructive:Cy Smith, Dartmouth
a) Subpoint [of Plan Observation]: Standard. First, eliminate bias. Of course the alternative is the negative will offer restrictive contextual definitions; hence we will be no better off. It will be a battle of extreme contextual definition. We will be no better off at all. He says, Increase expertise. This means, of course, that he must provide a definition which provides the words "foreign military commitment" in one sentence, in that order which he does not do.
(b) Subpoint: Violates. Subpoint one, commitment equals to aid to the crisis. First, this definition requires that we go to war which, of course, is a biased definition against us. It requires that we kill people in order to be topical. Subpoint two: This is only a reasonable definition, not an ultimately reasonable one. Three: The commitment of weapons exists in the affirmative plan. We give these people parts of weapons. The parameter, of course, allows an increase in weapons as well as forces as well as men.
He says, two, examples. Subpoint one: Again it requires war. Unfair standard as above. Second: This proves there is no one definition, because Javits says, there are several possible examples of commitment, indicating there is no one ultimately reasonable standard, and hence his contextual definitions die on the vine.
He says, subpoint three, only a domestic change. Of course, we provide parts of weapons to foreign countries, an intuitively foreign commitment. Moreover, the de-classification is intrinsically a commitment to these foreign states, and it is enabling legislation. By Mike's standard all acts that are initiated in the United States would not be foreign military commitments.
Subpoint four. He says, it's effect standard, but by this definition all foreign military commitments could be effects, because they are initiated in the U.S.
Five, we shift only. Wrong. We increase our commitment to peace and security. That is the pre-existing commitment which we increase.
He says, six, no justification for the board. First, this is stone age debate. Does not indicate why justification makes any difference at all. Second, it's the international problem; hence the international help. And third, unilateral U.S. action would be topical. The parameter justifies that.
(c) Subpoint, effects is invalid. Let's skip down to his e. subpoint-I think that is it-c. -how he got e. under c. I don't know, but he says, can't separate effects from the process. If this is true, if they're inseparable, then effects standard is OK, because you cannot separate it from a direct action. He says, f., of course, that there is no negative ground, saying he cannot counterplan. Big deal. Never indicating why a counterplan is such an intrinsically negative right.
He says, (d), that they need leeway in terms of legislation. This evidence is the wrong analogy. The right analogy is standing before a court. The negative can read a lots of evidence from courts describing the standard they employ in interpreting statutes, etc., etc. But a closer analogy is the standard employed in deciding the threshold or jurisdictional question of standing-which is a close cousin to topicality, and here the courts are very liberal indeed. Gray vs. American Radiator in 1961: The standard for jurisdiction "depends upon two questions: first, whether he has certain minimum contacts with the State ... and second, whether there has been a reasonable method of notification."71 What does reasonable mean? OED [Oxford English Dictionary] in '73: "Reasonable: . agreeable to reason; not irrational, absurd, or ridiculous."72 That's a pretty low standard.
Subpoint two: Negative argument that the topic as a whole must limit in effect means that only a single word within the topic must serve in a true limiting function. For example, if only the word "'military" limited, the topic would still serve to divide the affirmative and negative ground. Three: If each word in the topic must have meaning, it need not mean that each word should limit. Individual words in the topic may gain meaning from their very redundance, in the sense that they provide emphasis. Number four: Research time outside the round unless you have research assistants is finite; hence, increased prior notice for the negative via more stringent topicality standards would not increase education, it would only shift the focus of that research to different and more numerous areas
Now, on his (2) pian meet need, subs, etc. :First: Evidence does not refer to small surface ships which were in the plan. Evidence is from Brennan of Hudson in '72: "'This possibility" of nuclear ship basing ''is often rejected in casual discussions as being excessively vulnerable." (And you think that is a negative card.) How· ever, it says, ·· ... a suitably operated surfaceship system could be of considerable effectiveness."73 We could build these small ships, and his evidence refers only to the big shipyards. We could base them on-well, I don't know. I'm not into boating, so I don't know exactly what these things are.
Second, we could assist the LDCs with production. His evidence refers to U.S. shipyard capacity. We could assist the LDCs in doing so. Three, of course it is only one means. There are many others, and we have hardening, displacement, etc.
Now, another underview on topicality. Plan is a foreign military commitment. First, the pian increases foreign military commitment. The plan provides weapons systems components, technology, and training. Of course, providing weapons safeguards involves not only technology and services related to weapons, but are in fact integral parts of the weapons themselves, including interlocking switches and detonating mechanisms.
Second, number two: Military assistance is a foreign military commitment. It is military; it is foreign; it is a commitment. Robin Uacobsohn] wrote this brief, not I. Study by the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research in '65: ". . . [A ]lliances are" .. . . . institutionalized promises of military assistance .... "74 The plan is not an ailiance in the sense of a N.A.T.O. ailiance; it is an ailiance in the sense of a military trade alliance.
Finally, three: The plan creates a nuclear power alliance. We commit ourselves to cooperating with others in order to decrease the risk of nuclear war. Of course, the plan is also parametricai in that it increases parts of weapons, increases nuclear forces in a very real sense.
(I) Now, prolif is inevitable. Granted. OK, Steve. Prolif is inevitable. (II) Second contention, (A) subpoint, will be unsafe. He says, (I), what is the statistical significance? First, each will have a series of accidents. That's the evidence from Lawrence in lAC. Dropped. Also, Dunn says, probability of war is great. It will end-1 think it is Beres who says that there is a serious risk.
Second, these wars will be bad. Subpoint a: Direct harms of war. Dunn in '77: In " ... a small-power nuclear war . . . upwards of ten million lives might be Iost."75 Subpoint b: Regional escalation. Dunn in '76: "In addition to superpower involvement, many of these new strategic situations are likely to entail involvement in the core confrontation by allied or interested peripheral Nth countries or by medium nuclear powers. For example, the core confrontation between a nuclear-armed India and ... Pakistan is also likely to draw in China and Iran as well as the superpowers."76
He says, (2) these studies are bad. First, evidence refers to the deterrence situation between two states, not necesarily referring to the risk of accidents. Second, the expert predictions that we quoted are OK. There was no specific indictment of our evidence and no evidence referring to the risk of accidental war [un· intelligible] or vulnerability.
He says, (11), that they understate the optimism. First, this evidence does not refer to prolif. It is not specific to our harm. He is referring to the risk of nuclear war between the superpowers most likely. Second, how much do we overestimate. His evidence says that-all they do is discount it a little, indicating it has no impact.
He says, (4), there is no risk. First, this evidence is talking about the U.S. and the Soviet Union rather clearly, and, second, this proves the adequacy of the safeguards; hence, I don't want to hear any plan meet needs from Mr. Marzen indicating the safeguards fail.
He says, (5), other accidents are more likely. First, the evidence refers to the U.S. and the Soviet Union, refers to complex systems, and referring to subs which I have indicated above, we will not do. And second, what is the increment of decrease to our significance? He does not tell you. In '77 Larus [Dumas] card diverse opportunity for accidents, Dunn says, there's a serious risk. And the risk would increase. Beres says, the possibility of war is great.
He says, (6), it would cause no first use. First, his own evidence says little is known about the effects. Second, there could well be bad effects. Beres in 1980: " ... [The] political effects of a nuclear war between two countries would be enormous. Since the nuclear firebreak would have been crossed, every state in the system would fear that the long-standing inhibitions against nuclear war-fighting were no longer operative. Within the resultant atmosphere of suspicion and apprehension, every state would begin to fear that it might become the victim of a preemptive strike. And such fears would generate new incentives to preempt."77 Of course, it would also increase the number of proliferants as Beres says in 1980: "For those states that had not yet joined the nuclear club, the occasion of a two-country nuclear war would almost certainly mitigate on behalf of membership."78 Finally, you might get a couple of wars to cause his no first-use policy. The world would end, but we would have no first-use, and he would be happy. Dunn in '77: "Especially following a destructive small-power nuclear war in which the Soviets and Americans had become partly entangled, both the superpowers and other nations might agree that 'business-as-usual' no longer was acceptable .... " But "it has to be recognized ... it might take several of such wars to provide the requisite shock elfect."79
Now, (B) subpoint, vulnerability. Extend the Beres evidence to, of course, indicate that they will not have it. Goldstein evidence: Indicates only contemplates use. He says only contemplates. That's at the beginning of the crisis. Once we have military problems, they will actually use. All he says on the next card is, it does not prove they will do. Our evidence says, enormous compulsion, constant incentives to preempt, and all he can say is, not very good evidence. Epstein evidence. Our evidence says intolerable pressure. He says, it only says, might. Come now. Next he says that it does not prove that they would do. Dangers are infinite. Evidence is dropped. Probability will soon be certainty. He says, how do they decide. He's an expert in the field just like his expert, and he decided this is true. He says, optimism is understated. Evidence doesn't apply to this. He says, it's only a guess. No, it is not a guess. He is an expert in the field. He has surveyed this evidence, and he concludes affirmative. The mere fact that he concludes affirmative is not an indictment against him.
(Ill) Third contention, desirable. (A) sub· point, politically feasible. He says, does not prove would accept. But, of course, this evidence does prove in the absence of compelling disincentives to do so, they would accept. Skip down to the Dunn evidence. He says, does not prove change military perception. Are the military people blind? Now look, his argument assumes they are stupid, will not listen to reason, and are totally irrational. Now, the plan provides technical assistance and training and can tell these people that the PAL are good; hence there would be no reason for the military not to accept them.
On his plan meet need, (B) subpoint, military does not like. Subpoint (1) under this. First, this evidence assumes crude system. Evidence brought from Dunn indicates that the LDC system would be bad, and, therefore, the military would dislike, but the superpower systems are good. Second, this evidence is empirically desired, since the developed countries accepted these systems, and he can show no reason to believe that the military plays a greater role in the developed countries than it does in the LDC. For example, France after the Second World War provides an excellent counter-example, because DeGaulle faced near revolt from his soldiers, yet he was able to get them to institute the PAL. Of course, Algeria was a slight problem there.
Subpoint (2), he says they can circumvent. First, this is not true. Evidence comes from　Mullen in '78: "There are safeguards against such attempts," at bypassing the arming and firing circuits "involving such things as disassembly of the weapon or destruction of the core's potential to become supercritical."SO Second, evidence referred to the old system. It's '67 evidence. All evidence in lAC updates this, indicates that it is not true.
(3), He says, they will urge the leaders to eliminate them. First, they can urge them, never indicating the will-they can urge them-never indicating they will do or that they will overcome. Second, perceptions are based on information, and we can tell them, and they will change their minds.
He says, (4), they won't lose the struggle. Evidence only says that they can turn, never indicating it's a real risk. Second, the civilians can bribe them with vulnerability assistance. This also applies up in the AI subpoint. That is to say, all of this evidence he reads says they will fear increased vulnerability which does not assume the other half of the plan. If we were just running the old case, that would be one thing. We provide vulnerability assistance, and hence they will not fear decreased readiness.
He says, (5), all countries must agree. Evidence from Larus. This evidence is irrelevant. Larus is saying in the best case, if you wanted 100 percent solvency, you would need every country to agree. If you get fewer countries, you get less solvency, but it's still a comparative advantage.
He says, (6), China. He said that the safety system would have been poorly designed. Exactly our argument. They would have been poorly designed and wouldn't have had time to test which is why the superpowers should provide them to them.
He says, (7), secret countries. First, there are no sanctions-we remove sanctions from the plan; hence, there is no reason to believe they would not disclose to us. Second, the plan guarantees secrecy.
He says, (8), no time to test. First, right again. Therefore, the superpowers should give them complete system. His evidence refers to indigenous technology. We can provide them complete systems. Second, this aid would fit their weapons; hence, we would not need time we would not need all the time he talked about to fit it to their weapons. Beres in '80: " ... [A]ll tactical nuclear weapons that are deployed overseas include mechanical or electrical devices which prevent their firing in the absence of a specially coded signal issued by higher command."Sl That is tactical nuclear weapons which are small nuclear weapons-got me which is just like the proliferants indicating, of course, it would apply. Also, safety applies to bombers. That's the Biddle evidence in lAC indicating it would fit their weapons, and we would not need the time.
Now, his last argument is, we would never know if the safety level has been reached. Wrong. We would give them the information, give them the superpower experience. We know these systems are OK. Now, if the military is stupid, then he's got some mileage out of this argument, but if they're at least semi-conscious, I think that they would probably like the plan.
Underview: None of this applies to vulnerability assistance, only PAL, and the plan can let them accept the one and not the other.