Observation number (1): Case obviously not topical. Subpoint (a): Standards. Contextual are the best. That will be the standard. Contextual definitions are best. Subpoint One: Eliminates bias. Negative team is going to obviously offer you the most restrictive definitions possible. Affirmative team is going to try and offer you the most broad and overly nonrestrictive definition as possible. Therefore, you should go with the contextual definition and get some kind of blend of the two. I'll argue, number two, increases deferment to expertise. We should go by the experts in the field and see what they define as a foreign military commitment, other than a bunch of undergraduates trying to string a bunch of words together to find out what the overall meaning is.
I will argue subpoint (b): Dartmouth violates. One, commitment is to aid in crisis. Dr. Terry Deibel in April 1980: In 1969 the Senate as a whole defined commitment along these lines: A national commitment as resolved in Senate Resolution 85 means the use of armed forces of the United States on foreign territory, or a promise to assist a foreign country. government, or people by the use of the armed forces.
Now, I'll argue number two: Examples, Jacob Javits in September 1969: "I have in mind two illustrative poles" of what a national commitment is: "one, a commitment which puts us in military bases, for example, where the forces of the United States represent a trip-wire if there be any military action; and the other pole a commitment, for example, with respect to arms limitation or arms control, which would change the position or posture of the United States in any major way." Representative Paul Boland [sic] in '73: A commitment is ''any preexisting relationship between this country and another that would significantly tend to lead this country toward the use of force even if, at the moment of crisis, it were not otherwise American policy to use it."
Little three: Only a domestic action. Definition comes from Compact Edition of the Oxford Dictionary in 1971: "Domestic: Of or pertaining to one's own country or nation; not foreign, internal, inland, or 'home.' " Obviously domestic decision. All it requires is a domestic act. That means a domestic act to turn lose the PALs which means de-classifying information. Domestic act. At the very best it is a foreign effect, meaning that when you do this domestic action, it results in a foreign effect by giving this stuff to foreign countries.
However, I'll argue number four: At best, equals effect. At best domestic action by Dartmouth results in overseas countries getting PALs which leads to the advantage.
I will argue number five: Shift only. What they are going to talk about is a commitment that already exists. United States is already existed to commitment to peace in these areas that they're talking about like the third world, the Middle East, etc. All they're going to be doing is a qualitative increase.
I will argue, number six: No justify the treaty board. No justify why we have to have a board between the USSR and China. Why can't the U.S. alone just simply do it? No need to have a foreign military commitment to anybody else to unleash all of these PALs to the third world.
I will argue (c): Effects invalid. A: "Significantly" precedes "foreign military commitments." Thus the significant change must be on the military commitment, not the effect of the plan. B: The effect standard makes "significantly" redundant. We already know that all cases must be significant. That is a prima facie burden. C: The effect standard would make the topic meaningless. A small change in any aspect of military policy could potentially have significant effects. Any case could be run. I'll argue D: The effect standard would destroy educational debate, hundreds of cases, reduce dash, lessen quality of arguments that go with preparedness. I would argue little E: Can't separate effects from the process. James Buchanan in 1975: "It is impossible for an external observer to lay down criteria for 'goodness' independently of the process through which results or outcomes are attained. The evaluation is applied to the means of attaining outcomes, not to outcomes as such." I would argue F: Means no negative ground. Means we couldn't do anything, any minor repair, any counter plan, because anything we do would have an effect on a foreign military treaty; otherwise we wouldn't be able to affect the affirmative harm area or significance area. Destroys negative ground.
I would argue (d): Only give affirmative leeway if they don't abuse the topic and the definitions. Francis J. Ludes, Corpus ]uris Secundum: "Presumptions as to words, phrases, and provisions used in statutes include presumptions that the legislature understood their meaning . . . and used them in their ordinary and common meaning ... .''
I would argue one PMN [Plan Meet Need] now. (2) PMN: Can't build the submarines. Subpoint (a): Our capacity is destroyed. From Business Week February 1980: Because of the defense production program, "[a] nearterm change in the Navy's shipbuilding program is unlikely."49 MX Missile Basing, OTA [Office of Technology Assessment] Study, March 1981: "U.S. shipyards which have the expertise and facilities to build submarines are already backlogged, and there are shortages of skilled workers needed for submarine production. The industrial supply base of specialized steel might have to be expanded." The conclusion of the OTA Study, March 1981: "There are logistical and industrial problems which could delay submarine and base construction schedules into the early 1990's." Of course, look at the plan. No effects for expanding the industrial base given; I don't want to hear that answer.
Now, I would argue subpoint (b): Specifically, subs. That is the evidence up above. That means specifically submarines. Business Week [sic] in 1980: Because of the defense production program "[n]either can U.S. industry provide 400 ships for the Navy and the 1,000 tanks for the Army they urgently require this year."
Now, case. Contention (I) they can have. (II A) Contention II, A subpoint: Unsafe. Number (1): What is the statistical significance of the risk? How much of a significant problem is it going to have to hit-like a ten percent, a twenty percent level before we actually have the war? I'll argue number (2): Studies are frivolous. Donald Snow, January 1981: "Viewing the body of deterrence literature, Green concludes, 'The "method" of science has not been shown to be relevant to the study of our nuclear future, nor is there anything "empirical" about available studies of nuclear war.' " I would argue, therefore. number (3): When any of these people make these predictions like this, pulling numbers out of a hat, they downplay optimism. George Quester in October of 1980: "You know, anybody who is looking ahead would rather be wrong on the pessimistic side than on the optimistic side. So we all predict a little worse than happens. Because if we're wrong, and everything turns out for the better, nobody is resentful. If we're right about nuclear war, at least we predicted it."
I would argue, number (4): Insignificant risk. Gary Hanauer, April 1981: "It is considered that the possibility of the accidental nuclear explosion of a nuclear weapon is so remote as to be negligible.'' Lloyd J. Dumas, 1977: "It is technically conceivable that an accidental nuclear war could be generated without the crisis background .... However, the likelihood of so many serious system failures and accidents occurring together is extremely small."
Therefore, I would argue, number (5): Other accidents are more likely, and they don't solve for any of the other accidents that could lead to nuclear war. Lloyd J. Dumas in 1977: [V]ery unspectacular, almost routine failures (e.g. the failure of a depth guage)," on a submarine "can trigger accidental wars. These are far more likely to occur than spectacular events, like the unauthorized launch of a missile.''
I would argue, number (6): Even if it does occur, it leads no first-use doctrines of nuclear missiles. Lewis Dunn, April 1979: "Little is known about what pressures for a more farreaching restructuring of world politics might result from the shock of the first use of nuclear weapons since Nagasaki. Such a dramatic shock even could make feasible, for example, an eventual super power agreement on and enforcement of a global code of nuclear behavior proscribing the first use of nuclear weapons."
Now, the (B) subpoint on vulnerable. These cards are awful. First card, Goldstein, '80 says,liable to be destruction in the early years says,they would contemplate it. One: Evidence only talks about contemplating-never says that they will actually implement the policy and go ahead and do it. Beres card, '80 says that they will always be faced with the incentive. It doesn't say that they're actually going to go ahead and preemptively strike anyone-just says that they are faced with the incentive-not says that the incentive is enough to get 'em to do it. Epstein card says, might be within a decade-create an intolerable burden. One: Just says, might. Two: Doesn't say that they're actually going to overcome this policy restriction and go out and do this and actually preemptively strike anyone. Last card, almost a certainty. One: How do they decide this from Epstein? Number two: Optimism is downplayed. Three: He says, if someone was to go ahead and do all these calculations, so it just proves empirically that this thing is at best a guess.
Now, on contention (III), controls desirable, (A) subpoint, politically feasible: None of the cards say that they will accept. It just says, it's the least controversial, that they'll recognize it's in their interest and they're likely to undrestand the need. However, none of these cards say that they will actually go ahead and accept these things. It just says that they might recognize that it would be nice. None of the cards say they will accept. Dunn card in '77, PALs could go under tight controls. There would be no problems. One: Says that they could do it without problems. That doesn't mean that it would change the perception of the military, and that the military would go ahead and actually accept these things.
Now, the following underview-they can have the (B) subpoint on technically feasible-I would argue number one: Military doesn't like these things. Military doesn't like. Manchester Guardian in July 1962: The PAL " ... system 'might not be entirely acceptable to the military' because it would undermine the capability to retaliate and might lull control authorities into a false sense of security." Joel Larus in '67: "To generalize ... military personnel and weapons engineers are reluctant to accept complicated and elaborate systems of safety control." He [Larus] concludes: "The injection of every safety lock, switch, or convoluted mode of operation, they believe, compromises the firing cycle and to some indeterminate degree lowers the system's reliability factor when actual hostilities are underway." Notice the perception card will become important later.
I'll argue number two: They can circumvent. Manchester Guardian again in '62: "[T]here is no reason why the safety mechanism could not be short-circuited in the way that car thieves can make an auto go without an ignition key."
I would argue, number three: They're going to urge the bureaucratic leaders to get rid of them. Joel Larus in '67: "As safety nominalists," generals and admirals, "they can be expected to urge the elimination of all safety devices that they believe unnecessarily shackle the bomb or missile's readiness and workability." Above card says. they perceive every switch, lock, and convoluted method as a decrease in effectiveness. No evidence in the 1AC says that they're going to get rid or change the perception.
I would argue, number four: The military certainly isn't going to lose this bureaucratic struggle. Larus, '67: "Also, as second echelon countries achieve nuclear status, the more conservative, safety-minded groups in these states might not be able to prevail in an intergovernmental tug of war, especially if speed in developing an operational supply of weapons should become a prime consideration." [and] "The disagreement between the group favoring nominal or minimal interference from safety devices and regulations and those troubled by the paucity of controls and who seek systems that cover a greater number of possible mishaps never can be resolved."
I will argue, number five: All countries of the world must agree before you decrease the risk from a nuclear weapon. Joel Larus, '67: Lessening the accident danger (although never eliminating it altogether) requires a collective effort on the part of all governments that possess a national nuclear deterrent." Means to get solvency in the round Dartmouth's going to have to show that every country that's got a nuclear weapon is going to accept these PAL systems-therefore-otherwise you don't reduce the risk at all.
I'll argue, number six: Give an example of China. Make 'em prove China will accept it. Joel Larus, 1967: "At the beginning of 1967 Communist China was reported to have a stockpile of 100 nuclear bombs. Some of these weapons were either designed or manufactured during the chaotic frenzy of that country's Cultural Revolution .... [T]he development of quality safety systems for their nuclear weapons could easily have been a casualty of the upheaval."
I will argue, therefore, number seven: Secret countries. Geoffrey Hodgson, January, 1981: "Already there are, perhaps, two secret nuclear nations today; next year a couple more, six more by the middle 1980s."
Of course, I would argue, number eight: No time to test. Joel Larus in 1967: "The expenditure necessary for testing anti-accident theories and detonating atomic devices in order to gather data about tolerable maximum stresses and strains is considerable." He [Larus] concluded, 1967: "Further, as they rush to become credible nuclear powers, they may not allow a sufficient amount of time for their safety engineers to check out anti-accident procedures." He [Larus] finally remarks in 1967: "In weapons technology. as in more mundane employment . . . the trade-off point between safety prudence and safety luxury never can be determined with precision or without vigorous disagreement." Now, the importance of this card is that even if they adopt PALs there's no time due to the frenetic and chaotic things that go on in the third world to actually test to see if these devices work. Therefore, Dartmouth, even if they get acceptance of the PALs could have all these PALs sitting around that don't actually work and no one knows it. Therefore, I would argue, number two: The most important thing is that the card says you can never determine in a debate whether or not safety has been reached. Therefore, they can never determine in the debate between the bureaucratic groups whether or not there is not enough safety or they have too much safety which ties in with the perceptions of the militarv leaders abroad.
Now, this debate isn't going to be nearly as fast or have as many arguments as prior debates in these elimination rounds, but on solvency there's no card saying any of these countries will accept or that the perceptions of the military would be changed.