First Negative Rebuttal: Michael Alberty, Pittsburgh
[Observation 2 on Affirmative Plan from INC] One: Cy grants no naval capability. Number two: No efficacy given in the 2AC [Second Affirmative Constructive] to any of these arguments. All assertions. Number three: Commercial shipyards have the capacity. Never done. On his third argument, other means. Number one: no solvency given. Number two: We'll turn it. It means increased first strike. Gene Rochlin in April '79: "However, the forces being considered for most of our list in the 1990s will be relatively vulnerable aircraft or similar systems, and secrecy and concealment in deep mines or caves are likely to be the dominant protective mode. This does slow response, however, and may make a pre-emptive strike more attractive to opponents." I will argue, number three: Cement shortage. Takes out any of the hardening. Time, October 1978: "For more than a year, one of the strengths of the U.S. economy has been the building industry, which has now been booming as a result of high demand for new homes. . . . Alas, times are are so good that they are turning bad: builders are now grappling with a severe cement shortage."
July, 1980: "On top of that, new defense projects, such as the MX missile, would require untold tons of cement. When the economy starts up, the demand for cement would far outstrip the industry's ability to produce it." Gene Marcia in August 1980: " ... capacity isn't going to keep pace with demand of the 1980s, when a cement shortage in this country will develop, says Jonathan Goldfarb, vice president of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &: Smith Inc."
Now, I would pull through underview one. Takes out vulnerability. No guaranteed solvency. Number two: Affirmative burden on solvency, and they've never read it. All assertions in 2AC. Don't let them get away with this, please. On contention (III), on control desirable. (A) Subpoint, politically feasible: He says, without disincentives they would. Number one: Asserted. No evidence given. Number two: no evidence says they would accept these things even if they were without disincentives.
Now, drop to the Dunn card in '77. He says they assume stupid and irrational leaders. Number one: Affirmative burden of solvency. Never given to you. Number two: Show that they would accept. Three: No solvency with the Qaddafi types that they will ever accept these PAL systems. None given to you. There must be documented solvency. Affirmative burden.
Now, on the (B) subpoint on the underviews. On (1), military doesn't like. He says, assumes bad systems. One: Wrong. Card says, any system is perceived as bad, and that isn't critical.
Number (2), he says, empirically denied, and gives the example of the developed countries. One: make him show that developed countries have the same conditions that would go on in the third world countries, and just because developed countries would accept it hardly means the third world nations would, especially when you're dealing with Hanafi-types. [sic] I would argue number two: France is a horrible example. They are a developed country. They could afford to do it on their own. They didn't have to accept it from anybody.
On (3), we'll urge elimination. He says, one: Show that they can do it unilaterally. One: Card says, they can be expected to go ahead and urge elimination. Very important. Says, they can be expected to. He says, two, perceptions change. One: no evidence. No solvency given to any perception change just by informing these people.
On (4), military won't lose. He says, one, no real risk, and, two, civilians will bribe. One: If you have to bribe these people the military will simply take the money, run, and don't put in the PALs. If you have to bribe, that's all they'll do is take the money and run. Number two: no solvency given incentives of these types. Number three: no guarantee that the pro-safety people will win the war, and that the military people will win the bureaucratic struggle. That evidence from Larus is dropped. Number four: Equals blackmail. Gene Rochlin, April '79: "Yet another dilemma is likely to be posed if military, security, or political concerns are so great that larger powers insist upon the adoption of command and control measures or the fitting of PAL. If the transfer of this technology is insisted upon, smaller states could extract a considerable price-ranging from assistance with weapons or delivery system design to alliance and security agreements-for their adoption. " Political blackmail.
I would argue, (5): All countries of the world must decrease. He says, it's irrelevant. Only get a certain comparative advantage. One: Examine the card. It says, to lessen the risk you have to have all countries in the world go along. No solvency shown for all countries going along. Very important. Please read the card. His 2AC response is not enough.
On (6), China. Steve took it. On (7), secret countries, he says, they don't get rid of secrecy. One: If these countries are secret, how do you know that all of the countries of the world have PALs if these people are secret. No guarantee, and that ties in with the card about must have 100 percent.
On (8), no time to test. They can have it. On the underview, not apply to invulnerability. One: All the harms in invulnerability are blurbs. We'll get to that in a minute. Number two: The PMN takes that out.
Now, on contention (IIA), on the (I) risk, on the top. What is the significant risk? He says, a regional escalation. Grant. That means he must have 100 percent solvency, because if even one country doesn't do it and you have one accident, total escalation means world war - gone.
Now, on (3), optimism downplay. He says, doesn't talk about proliferation. One: It's talking about the third world. We have the Next magazine here; you can look at it. Talks about things like India, Pakistan, the Middle East - third world. Please examine the evidence. Talks about third world. Number two: It says, therefore, there is no certainty. There is no certainty that if the optimism is downplayed that any of these things or that it's inevitable that these actions will occur.
On the (4) argument, insignificant risk. Says, talking about the Soviet Union. Number one: says, other accidents are more likely-like a Russian or an American submarine accident. Number two: Absolute PMN. Up above he says, any accident escalates; therefore, if you have these other accidents they can't possibly get rid of the plan-means PMN, total escalation, nuclear war.
On (6), no first use. Now, grant 'em escalation. Therefore, you must have a hundred percent of solvency giving you on two independent levels that you must have total one hundred percent of solvency or otherwise one accident equals escalation.
On the (B) subpoint on vulnerability, on one, on the contemplation card from Goldstein - he says, at the beginning, then they go ahead and first strike. One: Asserted. I don't see any card saying that it only occurs in the beginning that they contemplate, and then they go ahead and do it. The card just says that they would contemplate doing it, not that they would actually first strike. On the Beres card '80, he says, constant and overwhelming urges. Number one: Still not prove they'll first strike or even adopt this policy. Number two: Turned above. That when you hid'em in caves you increase the risk of a first strike, because the people get really paranoid and know that they've got to take these things out of the caves. Increase the risk of a first strike. It's turned at that level.
Now, drop down to the bottom on the card from Epstein. He says, one, Epstein is an expert. I don't think that answers the argument on how did he decide. I think it points out pretty well that this is just a guess out of his hat which ties in with the third argument saying that if somebody actually calculated these things out, they might find it. Just a guess. No methodology given. He says on the second argument on optimism decrease-says it doesn't apply. Talked about up above. The card is talking about nuclear war risk, talking about third world and developed nations. The most important thing is they've gotten too far with this case without reading one solvency card saying that every country in the world will accept. And if they don't do that-he's granted me the Larus card; it says that you have to have 100 percent solvency to just lessen the risk.