First Affirmative Constructive: Mark Weinhardt, Dartmouth
We would like to express our sincere thanks to District I, to Professor Robert Charles and the Cal-Poly staff, Dr. Hazen and his assistants as well as all of the NDT [National Debate Tournament] committee for making this such an hospitable and enjoyable event. On behalf of Cy, Robin, Tom, Steve, Ike, Ken, and Herb5 we support the following example of the resolution to be adopted through normal democratic procedure, and consultation with allies, and appropriate negotiations, and treaties and agreements, and the following will be adopted:
Plank one: Administration. The U.S. will Initiate establishment of the proliferation safety commission. Membership will include the U.S., at a minimum, and will be open to Russia, Britain, France, and China. American delegates will be appointed as ambassadors, with appropriate support, staff, and security clearance.
Plank two: Commitments. Commission nations will make available to nuclear weapons states: information, technical assistance, training, and equipment for: A. Physical and administrative safeguards against accidental and unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, including at a minimum PAL [Permissive Action Links] and detonation controls; and B. Weapons and C3 [Command Control and Communications] vulnerability reduction techniques such as hardening, dispersal, concealment, and submarines and surface ships as vulnerability-reducing delivery modes will be assisted or provided where deemed appropriate; and C. U.S. will initiate arms control agreements and confidence-building measures between proliferant states with commissiOn verification. Appropriate hot line commission links between proliferant states is provided.
A nuclear weapons state is defined as a nation which has demonstrated nuclear weapons capability to the commission states. Commission states will screen assistance to preclude compromise of national security, increased instability, and increased recipient offensive capability. Otherwise, aid will be appropriate and cost-effective. Anti-proliferation sanctions will not be applied to assistance recipients. Confidentiality of assistance and weapons possession will be guaranteed upon request. Recipient choice with respect to accident and vulnerability assistance guaranteed. Similar assistance will be made available for other types of non-conventional weapons systems, including but not limited to chemical and biological warfare.
Plank three: Enforcement. Commission members may withdraw at any time: The U.S. will continue unilateral operation in such an event. Congressional oversight and judicial review will be provided. Judicial finding of violation will result in fines, imprisonment, and removal from office.
Plank four: Funding. Commission members and recipient states will share costs on a sliding scale, non-disruptive of ability to pay. American costs will be financed through off-budget, long term bonds and general revenues, including a reduction in tax cuts or increases.
Plank five: Affirmative speeches will provide legislative intent for the interpretation of plan provisions with emphasis on the 2AR [second affirmative rebuttal].
The rationale for this proposal is developed in three contentions. Contention (I): Proliferation is inevitable. Pittsburgh professor of international affairs, Joseph Coffey noted the capability to produce weapons in his 1977 prediction that: "It is very likely that additional states will seek to produce nuclear weapons, and the technical information and expertise to design and manufacture a nuclear explosive device are readily available."6
The motivation for proliferation was indicated by Waterloo professor of political science, Ashok Kapur, in his on-balance judgement in '79: "Overall, at present, the incentives to go nuclear exceed the disincentives."7 Prospects for the future are no brighter. As Lewis Dunn of the Hudson Institute wrote in August 1980: " ... [V]aried incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons are most likely to increase in future decades."S
Little can be done to reverse this trend. As professor of political science Louis Beres pointed out in 1980: "Whatever incentives present nuclear powers may offer these" potential nuclear weapons "states to change their minds, be they offers of effective security guarantees or assurances of available fissile materials for energy purposes, they are bound to be outweighted b)' the perceived advantages."9
Mr. Dunn evaluated the entire array of antiproliferation policies available, including the NPT [Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons], export controls, sanctions, nuclear free zones, a comprehensive test ban treaty, security guarantees, and a superpower no first use policy, and was forced to conclude in '76: "Notwithstanding such efforts, some future proliferation is likely to occur."lO This virtual!)' ineluctable nature of proliferation was underlined by J. J. Weltman of the Australian National University in 1980: "Unless the system of states undergoes a revolutionary transformation, any suggestion that further proliferation can be stopped borders on the absurd .... In a world of independent states, some proliferation will be inevitable."ll
Next, we discover contention (II): Unmanaged proliferation is dangerous. Two subpoints support this contention. Subpoint (A): Forces will be unsafe. Safety systems like those which have prevented superpower accidents will be missing in the LDCs [Less Developed Countries]. Colorado State's Robert Lawrence explained in '74: " ... [A] reliable program of nuclearweapons safety takes considerable time to develop, is exceedingly costly, and requires the talents of highly trained, imaginative experts in a variety of fields."12
Thus, according to Professor Lawrence: .. . . . [T]here is a very high probability that each" new proliferant "will undergo a series of accidents involving atomic weapons."13 Joel Larus of NYU [New York University] noted the same problem when he wrote: New nuclear states could so exhaust their scientific and technological personnel and available funds in undertaking their programs of atomic and hydrogen weapon development that insufficient or unrealistic safeguards will be designed and adopted for their arsenals.14
Professor Larus described the attendant risks: "Proliferation cannot but create a condition in which there will be diverse opportunities for major and minor nuclear weapon accidents. As the bombs and missiles are transported from one facility to another, we should expect that carrying vehicles will fail to act properly. ... Bombers will crash and burn; missile installations will explode."15 In 1979 Lewis Dunn pointed out: " ... [A]t least initially, the more sophisticated designed-in measures ... may be beyond many of these countries' technical or financial capability. .... If so, a serious risk of accidental detonations has to be assumed present."I6
Mr. Dunn indicated the results in '77: " ... [I]n a world of many ·serious but technically deficient' forces, that risk "of small-power nuclear wars" would increase. . . . [T]echnical deficiencies "in new nuclear forces" could trigger an inadvertant war."17 Purdue's Louis Beres aptly summarized this subpoint in 1980: "Considering both the complexity and cost of such safety systems . . . the prospect of accidental nuclear war is great in a proliferated world."18
Another danger of unmanaged proliferation is the subject of subpoint (B): Forces will be vulnerable. The quality of weapons survivability so essential to deterrence and crisis stability will be missing. Professor Beres described the situation in 1980: "Unlike the super powers, these new nuclear powers are unlikely to have the expensive and sophisticated equipment and methods required to protect their nuclear forces from preemptive attack."19
Martin Goldstein of the Widener University explained the danger in 1980: "Being highly vulnerable, the bombs" of proliferants "are liable to destruction in the early phases of " conflict. ... Therefore, as soon as a diplomatic conflict gives evidence of turning into a military struggle, the leaders of each side will begin to contemplate the use of nuclear weapons."20 Goldstein continues: "To lose these weapons on the airstrip or the launching pad would be a catastrophe beyond the endurance of most political leaders. Hence, the compulsion to launch early would be enormous."21 Beres concurred in '80: "In response to the resultant vulnerability of their nuclear forces, these new nuclear powers will be faced with the constant incentive to preempt. The combined effect of such incentives, of course, is a condition of extreme instability for each new nuclear power .... "22
William Epstein emphasized the risks in '76: "The danger is that a small or middle-sized nuclear power that was involved in an acute crisis and that did not have an invulnerable retaliatory capacity might fear that a nuclear neighbor would launch a first strike against it and, in order to prevent that possibility, might decide to launch a preemptive strike first. Since the advantage would lie with whichever country struck first, this would create almost intolerable pressures to be first to use nuclear arms and could set off a completely unnecessary and unwanted nuclear war."23 He [Epstein] concludes: "In a world of nuclear first-strike powers the dangers become infinitely greater. If one were to try to work out all the possible permutations and combinations of the possibilities for such a war, the probability of its happening sooner or later would become almost a certainty."24
Our alternative to this disaster is the subject of contention (Ill): Proliferation management is desirable. In 1976 Lewis Dunn noted the inevitability of proliferation and suggested the appropriate structural change: "It is . . . necessary to identify policy approaches designed to manage and hopefully reduce the problems of proliferation."25 Again, in '79 Mr. Dunn pointed to the need for policy alterations: ··. . . [Assistance to new proliferators . . ." would entail American "defense planning adjustments and modifications .... "26
The desirability of such a topical modification in foreign military commitments is examined in two subpoints. Subpoint (A): Management is politically feasible. The acceptability of the approach was pointed out by Colin Gray of Hudson Institute in '77: "Nuclear weapon safety is probably the least controversial, and arguably is the most important, field for arms control effort in the nuclear-armed world."27
The self-interest rationale was emphasized by Professor Lawrence in '74: "It is in the interest of every state to participate in programs of" nuclear weapon "accident prevention .... "28
Some proliferators may be forced by military urgency to build weapons without safety systems. Others may fail to realize the difficulty of safety systems development. But when offered safety assistance, all would willingly accept it. As Lewis Dunn wrote in 1976: "For several reasons, new nuclear-weapon states are likely to understand the need for controlling against unauthorized and unintended use."21l
While there is some evidence indicating that proliferators would oppose safety because of reduced force readiness, such statements refer not to the type of safety systems offered in the plan, but to the crude safety measures proliferators might be able to develop on their own. This distinction is clear in Mr. Dunn's comment in '77: "Within existing nuclear-weapon states, ... development of . . . (PAL) systems has permitted them to purchase tight control without sacrificing operational readiness or accepting an increased vulnerability to surprise attack. Conversely," for proliferators " ... fear of attack by a local nuclear rival and limited technological sophistication could force ... " them "not to follow their likely initial preference for tight control of their nuclear arsenai."SO
W'ith assistance the chances of nuclear holocaust would be reduced. This is proven in subpoint (B): Management is technologically feasible. Two further subpoints parallel the dangers we examined earlier. Consider, (1): Accident reduction. Albert Wohlstetter of the ACDA [U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] wrote in '77: "The great powers possess the technological resources capable of reducing these hazards in the form of devices for locking, fusing, remotely controlling and releasing warheads. Making these available to small forces would reduce the dangers of unauthorized use."31 Professor W. F. Biddle explained in '72: ". . . [S]witches may be incorporated in the weapon" of proliferators "in such a way that they wiii close only some time after launch or at a predetermined altitude. Precautions such as these are more particularly designed to safeguard the launch system, whether it be a bomber or a missile."32 Robert Mullen of Brown described the PAL approach in '78: "To prevent accidental or unauthorized firing, protective systems called permissive action links have been devised to increase assurance that a nuclear weapon may be armed only by following a coded sequence of events which, in some weapons, is followed by another series of events which occur during the weapon's flight to its target. ... "33
A good indication of the safety level was noted by Mr. Dunn in '77: "Current American weapons can be dropped accidentally without producing a nuclear yield and can survive the heat and impact of air crashes."34
Robert Lawrence pointed to the benefits of 'afety assistance in '74: "By offering such" nuclear safety "data freely and without requiring concessions in return, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, England, France, and China would help insure that no Phase II nuclearweapon country would be forced by circumstances to rely on inadequate, inefficient, or poorly tested accident-prevention systems."35 Joel Larus concurred: "Once the exchange was in operation, ... [e]ach nation would have the information necessary to apply proven standards of accident prevention .... There would be a sharp reduction in the possibility of an accident because no nuclear power would have to depend on an ineffectual or a faulty system."36
The other benefit is, (2): Vulnerability reduction. Lewis Dunn suggested in '79: ''Assistance efforts might encompass helping new proliferators to design and develop more stable, less vulnerable nuclear forces, that therefore would be less likely to be lightning rods for conftict."37 Professor Martin Goldstein agreed in '80: ''AdYanced nuclear regimes could lessen this hair-trigger attitude by assisting these states in rendering their weapons less vulnerable. Aid could be provided in the techniques of harden· ing, dispersal, concealment, and so forth."38 Goldstein continues: "In possession of a certain number of secure nuclear weapons, a govern· ment need not launch at the outset of a crisis in order to ensure that its nuclear weapons will play a role."39 Dunn concluded in '76: " ... [P]roviding technical assistance to the Nth countries ... on ... force invulnerability could lead to a more stable nuclear force."40
In summary, management policies can make proliferation safe. As Professor Weltman noted in 1980: "In the absence of a technological impetus to instability, any assertion that regional nuclear balances would, as a general rule, be unstable for political reasons ... must be regarded to be of questionable validity."41