Que no se pierda. Eso es lo que pretendo con esta página. Que no se pierda, de lo bueno que se hace, lo poco que yo encuentro.
OCTOBER 17, 2000
These are the notes and citations of books I've read in the last years. I'll be including them here as long as I have them ready to online posting.
Erving Goffman (Canada, 1922 - USA, 1982) is a renowned sociologist, well-known for his 1959 classic The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life and also for Asylums. Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (1961). 'Avant la lettre' ethnomethodologist (and almost always brighter and clearer than any of them), Goffman's main interest has always been to bring common people's everyday interactions into focus, in an effort to highlight how they manage to present themselves in a favorable way to the others, and the means by what they do so —which typically includes verbal and non-verbal strategies in foreground and background stages. The book I'm excerpting here, Forms of Talk, is no exception to this general interest. Goffman, no surprise here, deals with some distinctive, not necessarily conscious, forms of talk —each of them tailored to equally distinctive social situations, to the purpose of allowing participants in them to save their face when awkward circumstances occur. Take this, for example:
An unaccompanied man —a single— is walking down the street past others. His general dress and manner have given anyone who views him evidence of his sobriety, innocent intent, suitable aliveness to the situation, and general social competency. His left foot strikes an obtruding piece of pavement and he stumbles. He instantly catches himself, rights himself more or less efficiently, and continues on.
Up to this point his competence at walking had been taken for granted by those who witnessed him, confirming their assessment of him in this connection. His tripping casts these imputations suddenly into doubt. Therefore, before he continues he may well engage in some actions that have nothing to do with the laws of mechanics. The remedial work he performs is likely to be aimed at correcting the threat to his reputation, as well as his posture. He can pause for a moment to examine the walk, as if intellectually concerned (as competent persons with their wits about them would be) to discover what in the world could possibly have caused him to falter, the implication being that anyone else would certainly have stumbled, too. Or he can appear to address a wry little smile to himself to show that he himself takes the whole incident as a joke, something quite uncharacteristic, something that can hardly touch the security he feels in his own manifest competency and therefore warranting no serious account. Or he can "overplay" his lurch, comically extending the disequilibrium, thereby concealing the actual deviation from normal ambulatory orientation with clowning movements, implying a persona obviously not his serious one.
In brief, our subject externalizes a presumed inward state and acts so as to make discernible the special circumstances which presumably produced it. He tells a little story to the situation. He renders himself easy to assess by all those in the gathering, even as he guides what is to be their assessment. He presents an act specialized in a conventional way for providing information —a display— a communication in the ethological, not the linguistic, sense. The behavior here is very animal-like, except that what the human animal seems to be responding to is not so much an obvious biological threat as a threat to the reputation it would ordinarily try to maintain in matters of social competence. Nor is it hard to catch the individual in a very standard look—the hasty, surreptitious survey sometimes made right after committing a fleeting discreditable deed. The purpose is to see whether witnessing has occurred and remedial action is therefore necessary, this assessment itself done quickly enough so that a remedy, if necessary, can be provided with the same dispatch as occurs when there is no doubt from the start that it will be necessary.
Until now, no verbal behavior has been acted. But consider this other possibility, the actor deciding to engage in some self-talk:
However, instead of (or as a supplement to) engaging in a choreographed accounting that is visually available, our subject may utter a cry of wonderment, such as What in the world! Again he renders readily accessible to witnesses what he chooses to assign to his inward state, along with directing attention to what produced it, but this time the display is largely auditory. More over, if nonvocal gestures in conjunction with the visible and audible scene can't conveniently provide the required information, then self-talk will be the indicated alternative. Suddenly stopping in his tracks, the individual need only grimace and clutch at his heart when the issue is an open manhole at his feet; the same stopping consequent on his remembering that he was supposed to be somewhere else is more likely to be accounted for by words. (Presumably the more obscure the matter, the more extended the self-remarks will have to be and perhaps the less likely is the individual to offer them.)
A smooth interaction needs ritualized forms and ritualized expectations:
Nor are these ritual contingencies restricted to commands and requests. In making an assertion about facts, the maker must count on not being considered hopelessly wrongheaded; if a greeting, that contact is wanted; if an excuse, that it will be acceptable; if an avowal of feeling and attitude, that these will be credited; if a summons, that it will be deferred to; if a serious offer, that it won't be considered presumptuous or mean; if an overgenerous one, that it will be declined; if an inquiry, that it won't be thought intrusive; if a self-deprecating comment, that it will be denied. [...] I have called such units ritual interchanges. Ordinarily each incorporates at least one two-part exchange but may contain additional turns and/or additional exchanges. Observe that although system constraints might be conceived of as pancultural, ritual concerns are patently dependent on cultural definition, so can be expected to vary quite markedly from society to society. Nonetheless, the ritual frame provides a question that can be asked of anything occurring during talk and a way of accounting for what does occur. For example, back-channel expression not only let the speaker know whether or not he is getting across while he is trying to, but also can let him know whether or not what he is conveying is socially acceptable, that is, compatible with his hearers' view of him and of themselves.
But interactions are not always that smooth:
Failure at competent execution of an act can initiate the workings of social control, the prospect of which is itself, of course, a means of social control. The failing person ordinarily initiates remedial action of some kind, and if not, others may well remind him to do so.
As might be expected from this formulation, remedial action itself takes two directions. First, there are substantive, restitutive acts of an instrumental sort, sometimes codified in civil law, involving repair, replacement, or monetary compensation —all calculated to restore material matters as much as possible to the way they were before the failure. Here the sentiments of the inept actor are not at issue, merely his reparations. Second, there are ritualistic acts, these being commentarylike and self-referring, designed by the doer to redefine the expressive implications of his own maladroit performance. Through gestural and verbal displays, sentimental relief is attempted; the offender typically tries to establish through disclaimers, excuses, apologies, and accounts that the failing performance is not characteristic, or if it was, that it is no longer, or if it is, that the offender is at least alive to his deficiencies and supports social standards in spirit, if not in deed. In brief, misperformance 'expresses' a definition of the actor, one he presumably finds inimical, and the remedial ritual pleads a more favorable way of reading the event.
Ritualistic remedies, more so than substantive ones, have a variable temporal relation to what they comment on. Very crudely speaking, they may be retrospective, occurring immediately after what they are designed to modify the meaning of; or prospective and disclamatory, aimed at controlling the possible implications of something that has not yet occurred; or finally, concurrent, appearing as an overlay on the ongoing dubious activity.
Observe also that remedial rituals tend to be dialogic in character. Once such a remedy is provided, the provider typically requires some response from recipients so that he can be sure his message has been correctly received and is deemed adequate, effectively redefining the breach. Substantive remedy can also have something of a dialogic flavor, for the individual who provides restitution may need to know that what he has offered is deemed sufficient.
Linguistic faults can be categorized:
It appears that a working classification of faults can be made —if indeed, one is not implied in the literature. I divide them into two broad classes, 'knows better' and 'doesn't know better', according to whether or not the speaker's own hearing (on this or other like occasions) would be likely to inform him of his error, causing him to consider a remedy, which, in turn, he would be competent to provide.
Among 'knows better' faults, the following:
(1) Influencies, namely, hitches in the smooth flow of syntactically connected words, as with restarts, filled pauses, stuttering.
(2) Slips, by which I mean words or their parts that have gotten mixed up, or miss-uttered, as in word transposition, phonological disturbance, and the like.[...] Thus, slips are to be seen as a consequence of confused production, accident, carelessness, and one-time muffings —not as ignorance of official standards or underlying incompetence.
[...]
Among 'doesn't know better' faults, I include the following:
(3) Boners, namely, evidence of some failing in the intellectual grasp and achievement required within official or otherwise cultivated circles, this evidence implied in words spoken or others' words not comprehended. [...] The extreme case here is the 'incorrect' use of a word (especially a 'long' one carrying tacit claims to the user's learnedness) or the formulation of a conversational reply that patently indicates a failure to understand prior speaker's use of a 'difficult' word. Nationwide schooling and media-inspired sophistication have given such faults a coercive force in wide populations, in the sense that almost anyone breaching the standards in question can be made to feel ashamed for having done so.
[...]
(4) Gaffes, that is, unintended and unknowing breaches in 'manners' or some norm of 'good' conduct —breaches of the kind that are here realized in speech, but can also be perpetrated through other modes of activity. Thus: indiscretions, tactlessness, indelicacy, irreverence, immodesty, intrusiveness, etc. A very special ignorance is inadvertently displayed, namely, ignorance of what one would have to know about the rights and biography of one's coparticipants in order to conduct oneself with moral sensibility in regard to them'.
Goffman states a rule: no talking to oneself in public. Except when not doing so outweighs its potential risks:
Not all environments which favor self-talk are conventionally understood to do so. For example, podium speakers who suddenly find themselves with a page or line missing from their texts or with faulty microphones will sometimes elect to switch from talking to the audience to talking to themselves, addressing a full sentence of bewilderment, chagrin, or anger for their own ears and (apparently) their own benefit, albeit half-audibly to the room. Even in broadcast talk, speakers who lose their places, misplace their scripts, or find themselves with incoherent texts or improperly functioning equipment, may radically break frame in this way, apparently suddenly turning their backs on their obligations to sustain the role of speaker-to-an-audience. It is highly unprofessional, of course, to engage in sotto voce, self-directed remarks under just those microphonic conditions which ensure their audibility; but broadcasters may be more concerned at this point to show that some part of them is shocked by the hitch and in some way not responsible for it than to maintain broadcasting decorum. Also, being the sole source of meaningful events for their listeners, they may feel that the full text of their subjective response is better than no text at all.
[...] [I]t must be allowed that when circumstances conspire to thrust us into a course of action whose appearance might raise questions about our moral character or self-respect, we often elect to be seen as self-talkers in preference. If we stoop to pick up a coin on a busy street, we might well be inclined to identify its denomination to ourselves aloud, simultaneously expressing surprise, even though we ourselves are no longer in need of the information. For the street is to be framed as a place of passage not—as it might be to a child or a vagrant—a hunting ground for bits of refuse. If what we thought was a coin turns out to be a worthless slug, then we might feel urged to externalize through sound and pantomime that we can laugh at the fools we have made of ourselves. Trying to open the door of a car we have mistaken for our own and discovering our mistake, we are careful to blurt out a self-directed remark that properly frames our act for those who witness it, advertising inadequate attentiveness to deny we are a thief.
One standard cry is Oops:
[...] This time the central examples, Oops! and Whoops!, are well-formed sounds, although not in every sense words, and again something as much (perhaps even more) the practice of females as males. Spill cries are a sound we emit to follow along with our having for a moment lost guiding control of some feature of the world around us, including ourselves. Thus a woman, rapidly walking to a museum exit, passes the door, catches her mistake, uttersOops!, and backtracks to the right place. A man, dropping a piece of meat through the grill to coals below, utters Oops! and then spears the meat to safety with his grill fork.
On the face of it, the sound advertises our loss of control, raising the question of why we should want to defame ourselves through this publicity. An obvious possibility is that the Oops! defines the event as a mere accident, shows we know it has happened, and hopefully insulates it from the rest of our behavior, recommending that failure of control was not generated by some obscure intent unfamiliar to humanity or some general defect in competence.
[...] Another reason for (and function of) spill crying is that, a specific vocalization being involved, we necessarily demonstrate that at least our vocal channel is functioning and, behind this, at least some presence of mind. A part of us proves to be organized and standing watch over the part of us that apparently isn't watchful. Finally, and significantly, the sound can provide a warning to others present that a piece of the world has gotten loose and that they might best be advised to take care. Indeed, close observation shows that the oo in Oops! may be nicely prolonged to cover the period of time during which that which got out of control is out of control.
Another one is the threat startle:
3. [...] [N]otably Eek! and Yipe! . [...] Surprise and fear are stated—in lay terms, "expressed"—but surprise and fear that are very much under control, indeed nothing to be really concerned about. A very high open stairwell, or a walk that leads to a precipice, can routinely evoke yipes from us as we survey what might have been our doom, but from a position of support we have had ample time to secure. A notion of what a fear response would be is used as a pattern for mimicry. A sort of overplaying occurs that covers any actual concern by extending with obvious unseriousness the expressed form this concern would take. And we demonstrate that we are alive to the fearsome implications of the event, albeit not overthrown by them, that we have seen the trouble and by implication will assuredly control for it, and are, therefore, in need of no warning, all of this releasing others from closely tracking us. And the moment it takes to say the sound is a moment we can use actually to compose ourselves in the circumstances. In a very subtle way, then, a verbal "expression" of our state is a means of rising above it—and a release of concern now no longer necessary, coming after the emergency is really over.
And who can say he or she has never used a floor ('right to speak') cue?
A worker in a typing pool makes a mistake on a clean copy and emits an imprecation, this leading to, and apparently designed to lead to, a colleague's query as to what went wrong. A fully communicated statement of disgust and displeasure can then be introduced, but now ostensibly as a reply to a request for information. A husband reading the evening paper suddenly brays out a laugh or a Good God!, thereby causing his wife to orient her listening and even to ease the transition into talk by asking what is it. (A middle-class wife might be less successful in having her floor cues picked up.) Wanting to avoid being thought, for example, self-centered, intrusive, garrulous, or whatever, and in consequence feeling uneasy about making an open request for a hearing in the particular circumstances, we act so as to encourage our putative listeners to make the initial move, inviting us to let them in on what we are experiencing. Interestingly, although in our society married couples may come to breach many of the standard situational proprieties routinely when alone together—this marking the gradual extension of symmetrical ritual license between them—the rule against persisting in public self-talk may be retained, with the incidental consequence that the couple can continue to use response crying as a floor cue.
Response cries can be uttered even 'at the expense of smooth speech production':
In addition to the filled-pause phenomenon, consider the very standard form of self-correction which involves the breaking off of a word or phrase that is apparently not the one we wanted, and our hammering home of a corrected version with increased loudness and tempo, as if to catch the error before it hit the ground and shattered the desired meaning. Here the effect is to show that we are very much alive to the way our words should have come out; we are somewhat shocked and surprised at our failure to encode properly an appropriate formulation the first time round, the rapidity and force of the correct version presumably suggesting how much on our toes we really are. We display our concern and the mobilization of our effort at the expense of smooth speech production, electing to save a little of our reputation for presence of mind over and against that for fluency. Again, as with filled pauses, one has what is ostensibly a bit of pure expression, that is, a transmission providing direct evidence (not relayed through semantic reference) of the state of the transmitter, but now an expression that has been cut and polished into a standard shape to serve the reputational contingencies of its emitter.
And a sharp nice ending excerpt: between silence and talk:
Just as most public arrangements oblige and induce us to be silent, and many other arrangements to talk, so a third set allows and obliges us momentarily to open up our thoughts and feelings and ourselves through sound to whosoever is present. Response cries, then, do not mark a flooding of emotion outward, but a flooding of relevance in.
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