Where Have All The Mfg Engineers Gone?

ASQ (American Society for Quality)                                                                                                     80,000

ISM (Institute for Supply Management)                                                                                              38,974

The American Production Inventory Control Society            (APICS)                                        35,000

Society of Manufacturing Engineers (SME)                                                                                       24,000

The Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP)                                             8500

Assn. for Mfg. Excellence (AME)                                                                                                                  3781

Warehousing Education and Research Council – WERC                                                                  3000

                                                                                              Total                                                                     194,474

We've long held the opinion that the US is unknowingly to blame for its own shortage of manufacturing engineers.  In fact, we've also observed that many managers are unfortunately not clear about just what exactly an industrial engineer is, and what one would expect an IE to do, and where an IE would logically work, and what tools and training an industrial - or manufacturing - engineer would employ. 

How else could one explain the loss of the traditional manufacturing engineering disciplines required in so many critical areas?  I've been thinking about Japan's post-WWII industrial situation - flattened, few if any industrial engineers, no resources - steel, food,  fuel  - and of course one can understand how the American industrial engineering methods exported by Deming, Juran and Shainin - time and motion study, flowcharts, statistical quality methods, etc. - might be translated and then converted for use by untrained workers.  Certainly over the past 30 years we've seen many North American industries unplug the computers and push responsibility for what was traditionally handled by trained industrial engineers down to shop floor people and self-directed work teams.  Some workers can handle doing their own production jobs well, in addition to redesigning work flows and processes and timing and calculating standards - and some of them, as we've seen more recently, cannot.  And I'm not sure that's what we want The Third Industrial Revolution (sm) to look like - a jumble of overworked engineers, workers, some teams, some computers, some robotics, all somehow  integrated into what we hope will prove to be a profitable lean operation. 

Let me illustrate.    My friend Terry Burton, whose latest book (see below) is Out of the Present Crisis, Rediscovering Improvement in the New Economy, is a classically trained industrial engineer. That means during his four undergraduate years, Terry's class load included a lot of math and some heavy Industrial Engineering courses.   Terry has been puzzling over the same crazy question - whatever happened with all that manufacturing know-how? -  but he still believes that industrial and manufacturing engineering are tremendously important to U. S. industrial health and profits. 

“We had a manufacturing process that we thought could be tweaked to reduce costs and make it easier to produce.  We took another look, made a few changes, and voila, we managed to take out 10% of the costs.  One of our team members asked just how we did it, and all I could say was it was basic industrial engineering!  But I think that with outsourcing a lot of formally educated and experienced IEs are a dying breed, and unfortunately some people don’t know what industrial engineering is anymore.”

Most of our respected manufacturing gurus,  including Taiichi Ohno, Shigeo Shingo, Maasaki Imai, Doc Hall, Walter Shewhart, Romey Everdell, Nick Edwards, Deming, Juran,  Dorian Shainin, Ollie Wight, Orlicky, and Plossl had formal Industrial or manufacturing engineering, sometimes chemical engineering,  backgrounds.  Although there is a subtle difference between Industrial Engineering and Manufacturing Engineering, both paths require a heavy concentration in certain technical areas.

       According to my industrial engineer friend Terry Burton, “Manufacturing engineers complete more coursework in mechanical and electromechanical topics, mostly related to process design and control.  Industrial engineers complete more coursework in human factors engineering, time study and methods engineering, organizational behavior, standardized work, production and plant efficiency tools (Lean as we know it), the APICS body of knowledge, IT and systems engineering, quality management, simulation and modeling, and several statistical engineering courses (Six Sigma as we know it).  There are many more required courses and electives in each discipline, but I have totally simplified the difference for you.  Manufacturing engineers can take IE courses as electives, and IEs can take Mfg or Mechanical or other engineering courses (Electronics Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Civil Engineering, etc.) as electives.  Other engineering disciplines can take IE courses as electives too.  With regard to Manufacturing Engineering vs. Industrial Engineering, one is very adaptable (but not necessarily interchangeable immediately) to the other’s discipline because of identical foundation engineering courses.”

 Burton continues, “For our BS in Industrial Engineering we completed general and specialized engineering education in about 40 courses @ 45 hours each.  That’s 1800 hours (225 days) of education.  Our MS in Industrial Engineering was another 16 courses or 720 hours (90 days).  Both included an additional 14 lab or co-op industry projects for another 600 hours (75 days), for a total of about 390 days of formal education on what we now call continuous improvement, Lean, Six Sigma, etc.”  It’s not hard to see the contrast between this type of in-depth education and a two- day Lean workshop or 160 hours of education for a Black Belt.” 

In the past twenty years organization lines have shifted and many groups have consolidated Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering departments into other business areas or new structures.   Some IEs and Mfg Engineers have migrated to other functional areas, like, for example, Honda purchasing, which is well populated with formally trained engineers.  Others head up continuous improvement initiatives.   Many venture capital and turnaround honchos, as well as outside consultants, have the type of deep engineering background and experience that one would expect in especially challenging business situations.  And of course we’ll continue to see engineers migrating into healthcare operations.    

Why does the loss of these engineers matter?  Aren't all these industrial engineering jobs being taken over by robots or outsourced Chinese or Vietnamese or Thai or Japanese factories anyway?  So who cares?

Even if MIT's David Simchi-Levi is right and 14% of outsourced industry comes back to the US, it's safe to say we aren't ready for it.  I take responsibility for not having completed my rough sketch of what an Advanced Manufacturing plant will look like in The Americas.  I'm drawing as fast as I can, but its hard work.  But I can say this much so far - it will take fewer and higher trained workers, and not as much Additive Manufacturing (3D Printing) as we had hoped, and a hell of a lot more computers.  And I don’t think a two day course or a certificate or a belt prepares people to do the nitty-gritty detail stuff Advanced Manufacturing is going to need.    Self-directed work teams executing dozens of monthly kaizens won't replace the very hard and detailed advance work that solid Industrial Engineering will provide The Fifth Industrial Revolution (sm).   

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Out of the Present Crisis, Rediscovering Improvement in the New Economy, by Terence  T. Burton, CRC Press, 2012

I love timelines and chronologies, and this latest Terry Burton book reads easily and well (although the type and the margins are small) a timeline of American industrial progress, starting with Japan’s post-World War II industry struggles, all the way through leadership challenges and cultural transformation.  It’s a joy to glide through the important events and ideas that landed us in our current somewhat frightening situation.  But it’s possible by taking the long view to realize that although only the faint outlines of some of our earlier successes remain, the same kind of clear, courageous thinking that got us here can take us forward. 

Burton casts a critical eye at a number of questionable addictions.  He notes the number of “Certification Factories” that he believes “benefitted most from the Lean Six Sigma movement.” Looking back on a succession of emotionally charged improvement initiatives, Burton advises managers to “… put the keys down and rethink the destination.     Go downtown, rediscover improvement in the new economy, and accelerate our way out of the present crisis.”  

Finally,  in an area that pre-occupies Mill Girl thinking – the search for a perfectly integrated IT enterprise – Burton is a like-minded critic of our lagging technology applications.  He lays out five reasons why more focused attention on technology integration is manufacturing’s next big challenge:

Technology provides a single version of the true facts.  It replaces the kludge of spreadsheets and informal practices with a uniform standard of structured systems, internal controls, and operating data across all transactional streams.

Technology provides the means to automate many previous improvement activities such as electronic kanbans, readily accessible performance dashboards and business analytics, flow coordination and control, real-time quality and reliability tracking, maintenance and facilities planning/management, critical resource and equipment utilization, supplier performance tracking, and the like.

Technology provides the only ability to analyze transactional processes, view the interactions, data flows and transactions in suspense (defect trails) between key business processes.

Technology provides data for sampling plans in improvement projects and the ability to receive real-time feedback (collecting data manually consumes most of the elapsed time in improvement projects

Technology enables the opportunity to set and monitor the correct metrics and productivity indices and makes the necessary corrective actions in real or near-real time.

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Do you agree?  Write to us, BlueHeronJournalEditor@gmail.com

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Why We STILL Need Industrial Engineers And The 7 Ways We Lost Them

A reader agrees.... and disagrees with The Mill Girl's "Where have all the Industrial Engineers gone?" 

Donald Wechsler, author of Making History Imperceptibly: Adventures of a Technical Professional, an IE who has worked in numerous varieties of industrial engineering –

"Industrial Engineer, Methods Engineer, Manufacturing Engineer, Production Engineer, System Engineer, System Engineering Manager, Network Administrator, Project Manager, Program Manager, Member of Technical Staff, System Development Manager, Test Engineer, System Support Manager, Technical Department Manager, Process Quality Engineer, Process Improvement Consultant, and Application Release Manager"  -

had a strong reaction to the prospect of American industry minus industrial engineers, and he let us know why -- 

Disappearing IEs? Industrial Engineering is a skill set, not a job title. I never stopped being an IE, despite moving off the production floor into software and other positions.  The IEs are, "out there," operating under a variety of titles, organizations, or initiatives.  They are still adding value using a modernized aggregation of IE tools and techniques. This time, it won't be Frederick Taylor and time studies. So, as you said, ". . . some people don't know what industrial engineering is anymore." But guess what? Many never did.

 Because IEs become engaged in various industries and embedded in different work organizations, their professional society memberships might be a less accurate indicator of the profession's size and growth.

 I agree with your observation that we might not be prepared to re-assume support for an influx of manufacturing jobs. While IEs still have foundation skills, many have moved into other career areas, perhaps not well suited for hands-on modern manufacturing. I believe that, as one moves up to a big picture, longer-term scope, his/her proficiency with particular hands on skills becomes less important. Still, many entry-level skills will be hands-on, and companies have become less willing to invest in training/re-training. As well as company decisions, changes in the working environment and management structure also have caused a shift in training responsibility. Please refer to the following research blog: "Pursue Informal but Absolutely Intentional Learning": 

http://greenlightinstitute.net/article/pursue-informal-absolutely-intentional-learning.  It horrifies me that some managers might perceive automation issues solved solely in terms of Baxter-like robots (produced by Rethink Robotics) that are programmed/trained by a line worker without the need for technical professionals or integration planners.

 I look at the "disappearing IE" issue less as outsourcing/insourcing, and more in terms of our nation's industrial leadership.

1.      By the mid-1970s, serious international competition began to appear. At first, fears were calmed by the belief that high volume automation would counter foreign armies of cheap labor. An automated wristwatch assembly line was set up as a showcase. But, for high volume production, US-based automation couldn't compete with Asian labor economics. Seeking the best combination of resources, US companies began to establish high volume automation in their offshore facilities. Product by product, domestic manufacturing began a trek across borders and oceans.

2.      During the 1980s, the United States weathered a flood of Japanese-manufactured imports. We criticized these arrivals as not innovative. We groused about them as copies, and even thefts of US ideas returning to us as foreign products.

Early opportunities for Japanese industry were provided by - and disregarded in - the United States. An example: Kawasaki Heavy Industries was able to obtain exclusive Asian manufacturing and marketing rights for Unimation's industrial robots. By 1983, Kawasaki had shipped over twenty-four hundred Japanese-made Unimate robots.

Another example: From the 1950s, Japanese industry had heard, absorbed, and embraced the quality teachings of US guru W. Edwards Deming. Astonished by Japan's successes, we then sent study groups to find out what the Japanese had learned from us!!!. Subsequently, the benefits of robotics integration and a quality-infused work culture became clearly understood.

3.      Competition at the ground level had gotten crowded and aggressive. The United States would need to climb the tree of discovery, for a new view of competitive strategy that would better reward education, ability, and initiative.

As automation became globally dispersed, a call arose for greater product sophistication. We would simply out-design the competition. The country moved swiftly to adapt Computer-Aided Design and Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAD/CAM) technology and systems. Through the 1980s, it seemed that personal computer production would become US-based. But again, international competitors proved adept at mimicking designs and even improving them.

4.      In the 1990s, a US service economy came to the forefront. Call centers and customer service operations flourished. Although pay scales were lower, jobs were plentiful. Meanwhile, manufacturing plant closures, which elicited sharp concerns in the affected regions, were generally discounted.

5.      On January 1, 1994, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into force. In 2001, the World Trade Organization (WTO) approved China's admission. By October 2011, the United States had enacted free trade agreements with twenty countries. Global trade seemed good for the national economy, when measured in terms of company profits. But, these gains sometimes resulted from the relocation of production outside the United States, where huge wage differentials and workplace concessions could be realized. We had climbed higher in the tree of discovery, but there, its trunk become narrower.

6.      NAFTA's initial effects might have been masked by the dot-com bubble. From the mid 1990s until 2000, Internet companies' capital values soared, buoyed by adventurous speculations. Yet, beneath more ludicrous propositions, serious companies recognized the technology's potential, and pressed ahead. Service industry companies recognized that online capabilities could reduce customer service labor costs. When online customers accessed information and desired services themselves, less human mediation was needed. For customers, human contact was replaced with often effective, but indifferent, information systems, unable to intervene with sage advice.

7.      With the 2007 economic downturn, we began to decimate the nation's professional workforce with job stacking, contracting, outsourcing, and visa schemes. Ceding service industries as well as manufacturing, we looked from our tree skyward, pointing vaguely toward innovation as the next incarnation of our industrial leadership.

Competition for innovation has become worldwide. Will other countries wrest away innovation leadership? Or, would international collaboration make competition among nations a non-issue? As we reach out from the tree of discovery, have we become treed? Or, will new growth be revealed?

Note:  Items 1 through 7 above are contained in Making History Imperceptibly: Adventures of a Technical Professional (ISBN 978-0-9832658-7-0), by Donald Wechsler

A Take on Takeback: Outsourced manufacturing operations could either remain lost or become repatriated. 

1.     Lost jobs. These jobs are likely either to remain abroad, and even migrate to more competitive areas. Such jobs are labor-intensive, and simple enough to deal with their coordination issues.

2.      Jobs taken back. Candidates for takeback are jobs more complex and prone to recurring coordination problems, either with operations, quality, logistics, or communications. Decisions to repatriate such jobs involve not only direct costs, but also considerations for doing business, such as taxes and duties, freight and transportation, exchange rates, incentives, the availability of skilled labor, suppliers, and infrastructure, and integration with existing stateside operations.

    For examples see "8 Employers Buck Outsourcing Trend, Bring Jobs Back To America," AOL Jobs,

http://jobs.aol.com/articles/2012/06/13/8employers-that-are-bringing-jobs-back-to-america/.  These companies have chosen to shift operations back to the U.S. from China and elsewhere:  Starbucks Coffee Co., Master Lock Co., NCR Corp., The Coleman Co., Ford Motor Co., Peerless Industries Inc., Sleek Audio Inc., Outdoor GreatRoom Co.

See these links for details:

(News Release) "Master Lock Highlighted in State of the Union Address for Moving Jobs Back to U.S.," Master Lock, http://www.masterlock.com/about_us/Master_Lock_Highlighted_In_2012_SOTU_Address.jsp;

Made in America, Again, Boston Consulting Group, "Repatriating Jobs: U.S. Manufacturing Gains Momentum," Bloomberg Businessweek, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-04-20/repatriating-jobs-u-dot-s-dot-manufacturing-gains-momentum

3.     New opportunities. Although some jobs will be lost overseas, add to existing and repatriated US jobs the possibilities for new growth opportunities. A new US potential could spring forth from fresh ideas, products, and enterprises. Smaller start-ups are better positioned to take advantage of the  "Baxter/Rethink" type of automation previously described, for which less technical support would be required.

                                                                                          Donald Wechsler, dbwechsl@gmail.com