The term ‘continental’ philosophy
The term was coined not by European thinkers themselves but by academic philosophy departments in the Anglo-American [ˈæŋgləʊ]-[əˈmɛrɪkən] world eager [ˈiːgə] to differentiate [ˌdɪfəˈrɛnʃɪeɪt] philosophy of continental Europe from ‘analytic’ [ˌænəˈlɪtɪk] thought. This term acquired [əˈkwaɪəd] its current meaning only after the Second World War.
Movements of continental philosophy
Phenomenology [fɪˌnɒmɪˈnɒləʤi], hermeneutics [hɛrməˈnuːtɪks], existentialism [ˌɛgzɪsˈtɛnʃəlɪzm], structuralism [ˈstrʌkʧərəlɪz(ə)m], critical [ˈkrɪtɪkəl] theory, deconstruction—these are some of the salient [ˈseɪljənt] movements which have developed in continental Europe in the twenty century. Term ‘phenomenology’ refers [rɪˈfɜːz] to a movement starting with Franz [frans] Brentano [breˈntɑ:no] and associated [əˈsəʊʃɪeɪtɪd] especially [ɪsˈpɛʃəli] with Husserl [ˈhʊsɛrl]. Hermeneutics now associated especially with Hans-Georg [hɑns ge'og] Gadamer ['gɑdɑmə]. Existentialism primarily associated with Karl [ka:l] Jaspers [ˈjaspers], Heidegger [ˈhaɪdɛɡər], Sartre [ˈsɑːrtrə], Gabriel ['gɑbriel] Marcel [mɑr'sel]. Claude [klɔːd] Lévi-Strauss [ˈleɪvi ˈstraʊs], Michel [mi'ʃɛl] Foucault [fu'ko], Louis ['lui:] Althusser [altu'ser], Lacan [ləˈkɑːn] are structuralists. Critical theory is represented by Max [mɑks] Horkheimer [hork'hɑimɑ], Jürgen [ˈjɜːrɡən] Habermas [ˈhɑːbərmɑːs] and other critical theorists of the Frankfurt [fræŋkfɜːt] school. Introduced into philosophy by the French philosopher Jacques [ʒɑːk] Derrida [ˈdɛrᵻdə], the term 'deconstruction' is now chiefly associated, despite the disclaimers [dɪsˈkleɪməz] of its originator, with a school of literary [ˈlɪtərəri] criticism.
Commitment [kəˈmɪtmənt] to the questioning of foundations
Perhaps the most persistent [pəˈsɪstənt] feature [ˈfiːʧə] of continental philosophy, through all its multiple [ˈmʌltɪpl] mutations [mju(ː)ˈteɪʃənz], is a commitment to the questioning of foundations[faʊnˈdeɪʃənz]. From phenomenology to deconstruction, one encounters [ɪnˈkaʊntəz] the persuasion [pəˈsweɪʒən] that the old foundationalist arguments no longer suffice [səˈfaɪs]. Meaning is not some metaphysical essence or substance; it is a task of intersubjective [ˈɪntə(ː)] [səbˈʤɛktɪv] and intertextual [ˈɪntə(ː)] [ˈtɛkstjʊəl] relations. Truth cannot be grounded on a given system of being (realism [ˈrɪəlɪzm]) or mind (idealism); it must be radically rethought [ˌriːˈθɔːt] as an interplay [ˈɪntə(ː)pleɪ] of differences [ˈdɪfrənsɪz] (intentionalities, situations, structures, signifiers [ˈsɪgnɪfaɪəz], etc.). Continental philosophy thus finds itself renouncing [rɪˈnaʊnsɪŋ] the metaphysical quest for absolute [ˈæbsəluːt] grounds, even if some of its proponents [prəˈpəʊnənts] —Husserl in particular—found this renunciation vexed [vɛkst] and regrettable.
Term ‘Analytic philosophy’
‘Analytic philosophy’ is a name for the ˈdominant tradition in academic [ˌækəˈdemɪk] philosophy in the English-speaking world. Analytic philosophy relies heavily on logical and linguistic analysis [əˈnæləsɪs]– from which it derives [dɪˈraɪvz] its name. The method of analysis is the method of seeking to understand a subject matter by coming to understand its composition. Philosophical analysis is preeminently [priˈemɪnəntli] a style, not a body of doctrine.
History of Analytic philosophy
Analytic philosophy began with the arrival [əˈraɪvəl] of Wittgenstein [ˈvɪtɡənˌstaɪn] in Cambridge [ˈkeɪmbrɪʤ] in 1912 to study with Russell [ˈrʌsəl] and, as it turned out, significantly [sɪgˈnɪfɪkəntli] to influence [ˈɪnflʊəns] him. Between the wars, through the influence of Russell's writings and Wittgenstein's own Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922), analytic philosophy came to dominate [ˈdɒmɪneɪt] British philosophy. In the 1930s the ideas of Russell and Wittgenstein were taken up and put forward more radically [ˈrædɪkəli] and systematically [ˌsɪstɪˈmætɪkəli] by the Logical [ˈlɒʤɪkəl] Positivists [ˈpɒzətɪvɪsts] of the Vienna [viˈɛnə] Circle. There were sympathetic [ˌsɪmpəˈθɛtɪk] groups in Poland [ˈpəʊlənd] and Scandinavia [ˌskændɪˈneɪvɪə] and some scattered [ˈskætəd] but distinguished adherents [ədˈhɪərənts] such as Quine [kwaɪn] in the United States (to which many of the European positivists fled from Hitler [ˈhitlə]). The very different ideas of the later Wittgenstein, who came back to Cambridge in 1929, closer to those of Russell's original ally [ˈælaɪ] G. E. Moore [mʊər], became increasingly influential [ˌɪnflʊˈɛnʃəl] and, under the label 'linguistic philosophy', prevailed in most of the Englishspeaking world from 1945 until about 1960. In the post-positivist era [ˈɪərə] from then until [ənˈtɪl] the present English-speaking philosophy has been mainly analytic in the older, pre-linguistic sense [priː]-[lɪŋˈgwɪstɪk], but with large variations [ˌveərɪˈeɪʃənz] of method and doctrine [ˈdɒktrɪn].
‘Analytic philosophy’ and History of philosophy
Like continental philosophy, analytic philosophy recognizes Descartes [ˈdeɪˌkɑrt] as the rationalist father of modern philosophy, followed by the empiricist triumvirate [traɪˈʌmvɪrɪt] of Locke [ˈlɒk], Berkeley [ˈbɑrklɪ] and Hume [ˈhjuːm], and then by Kant’s [kænt] attempt to synthesize [ˈsɪnθɪˌsaɪz] rationalism and empiricism at the end of the eighteenth century. After this, however, analytic philosophy’s version of history diverges [daɪˈvɜːʤɪz] from the Continental one. Hegel [ˈheɪɡəl] and Nietzsche [ˈniːtʃə] have no place in the analytic pantheon [ˈpænθɪən], and such twentieth-century philosophical movements as phenomenology, hermeneutics and structuralismare regarded as philosophically unimportant. For analytic philosophy, the first major [ˈmeɪʤə] philosopher after Kant is Frege [ˈfreɪɡə], at the end of the nineteenth century. Frege’s crucial [ˈkruːʃl] contribution to philosophy was to show that the theory of meaning is the foundation [faʊnˈdeɪʃən] of all philosophical investigation.
SOURCES
Lacey, A.R. A Dictionary of Philosophy. Third edition. London, Routledge. 1996
Oxford Companion to Philosophy / ed. by T. Honderich. Oxford University Press, 1995.
The concise encyclopedia of western philosophy/ ed. by J. O. Urmson and J. Rée.— Routledge. 2005
Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy / Ed. by R. Kearney. Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume VIII. London, 2005.