The time-span of the period
This topic is concerned with European [ˌjʊərəˈpi(ː)ən] philosophy from the late seventeenth [ˈsɛvnˈtiːnθ] century through most of the eighteenth [ˌeɪˈtiːnθ] —the period of ‘the Enlightenment’ [ɪnˈlaɪtnmənt] as broadly [ˈbrɔːdli] conceived.
Role of British philosophy in the Enlightenment
The attention to English early Enlightenment figures, such as Locke, is easily [ˈiːzɪli] justified, since they were important influences on the Enlightenment elsewhere [ˈɛlsˈweə]. Philosophy flourished [ˈflʌrɪʃt] in Britain [ˈbrɪtn] and Ireland [ˈaɪələnd] in the eighteenth century. Wales [weɪlz] produced Richard [ˈrɪʧəd] Price [praɪs], while Ireland could boast [bəʊst] of George [ʤɔːʤ] Berkeley [ˈbɑːrklɪ] and Burke [bɜːrk]. Ireland also produced Francis [ˈfrɑːn(t)sɪs] Hutcheson, to whom Hume [ˈhjuːm] and the Scottish [ˈskɒtɪʃ] Enlightenment owed [əʊd] a considerable debt [dɛt]. The Scots [skɒts] in turn had a considerable influence on the Enlightenment or Aufklärung in Germany [ˈʤɜːməni], not least on the thought of Kant [kænt].
The Enlightenment
Defenders of what is called ‘the Enlightenment’, such as d’Alembert [dæləmˈbɛər], commonly used the metaphor [ˈmɛtəfə] of spreading light to refer [rɪˈfɜː] to the kind of intellectual [ˌɪntɪˈlɛktjʊəl] and cultural [ˈkʌlʧərəl] progress [ˈprəʊgrəs] they believed in. As a general characterization [ˌkærɪktəraɪˈzeɪʃən] of the movement’s aims, there is much to recommend [ˌrɛkəˈmɛnd] Kant’s definition of enlightenment as “the freedom to make a public use of one’s reason in all matters”.
At the same time it should be acknowledged [əkˈnɒlɪʤd] that histories of philosophy do not always make use of the concept ‘Enlightenment’. Sometimes, rather, they use the term ‘empiricism’ [ɛmˈpɪrɪsɪzm] to characterize [ˈkærɪktəraɪz] the philosophy of the period and to contrast [kənˈtrɑːst] it with the ‘rationalism’ of the earlier [ˈɜːlɪə] period.
The Enlightenment’s conception of the vocation [vɛʊˈkeɪʃən] of the philosophe (not philosopher [fɪˈlɒsəfə], but philosophe [fɪlɒˈsof]).
The entry [ˈɛntri] in Diderot’s [ˈdidərəʊ] Encyclopedia [ɛnˌsaɪkləʊˈpiːdjə] characterized the philosophe as an individual [ˌɪndɪˈvɪdjʊəl] who is chiefly concerned with those “sociable [ˈsəʊʃəbl] qualities” that make individuals useful members of society. “Encyclopedia” stressed the differences between the “geniuses”[ˈʤiːnjəsɪz] of the seventeenth century, who engaged [ɪnˈgeɪʤd] in solitary [ˈsɒlɪtəri] and unconstrained[ˌʌnkənˈstreɪnd] reflection on the nature of things, and the collaborative [kəˈlæb(ə)rətɪv] work of the philosophes of his own century, whose interest lay less in making new discoveries than in organizing and disseminating [dɪˈsɛmɪneɪtɪŋ] the knowledge that had already been attained [əˈteɪnd] by artisans [ˌɑːtɪˈzænz] and other useful members of society.
Deism [ˈdiːɪzm]
John Toland, Anthony Collins [ˈæntəni] [ˈkɒlɪnz], Voltaire [vɒlˈteə], Jean-Jacques [ˈjan ˈjak] Rousseau [ruːˈsoʊ] and many other thinkers of this period were deists [ˈdiːɪsts]. The deists commonly dropped [drɒpt] several [ˈsɛvrəl] of the core features of church Christianity [ˌkrɪstɪˈænɪti] like revelation [ˌrɛvɪˈleɪʃən], miracles [ˈmɪrəklz], the Incarnation [ˌɪnkɑːˈneɪʃ(ə)n], the divine [dɪˈvaɪn] inspiration [ˌɪnspəˈreɪʃən] of Scripture [ˈskrɪpʧə] and a divinely-ordained [dɪˈvaɪnli] [ɔːˈdeɪnd] ecclesiastical [ɪˌkliːzɪˈæstɪkəl] hierarchy [ˈhaɪərɑːki]. At the same time they clung [klʌŋ] onto [ˈɒntʊ] those beliefs they regarded as rationally defensible [dɪˈfɛnsəbl]: for example, in a first cause [kɔːz], an intelligent [ɪnˈtɛlɪʤənt] general providence [ˈprɒvɪdəns], immortality and, sometimes, retribution [ˌrɛtrɪˈbjuːʃən] for wrong-doing [rɒŋ]-[ˈdu(ː)ɪŋ].
Scepticism
Deism involves [ɪnˈvɒlvz] scepticism about traditional beliefs and a demand [dɪˈmɑːnd] for critical [ˈkrɪtɪkəl] reconstruction. Scepticism was widespread [ˈwaɪdsprɛd] during the Enlightenment—especially [ɪsˈpɛʃəli] in relation to metaphysics. Pierre [ˈpiər] Bayle [ˈbeil] used his scepticism to defend tolerance [ˈtɒlərəns] towards [təˈwɔːdz] those with whom one disagreed (still very controversial [ˌkɒntrəˈvɜːʃəl] in religious [rɪˈlɪʤəs] matters in his time) and to underline the necessity [nɪˈsɛsɪti] of faith. Hume links scepticism about ‘systems’ and ‘hypotheses’ [haɪˈpɒθɪsiːz] with a preference [ˈprɛfərəns] for empirical [ɛmˈpɪrɪkəl] arguments.
Empiricism
The term ‘empiricist’ is used broadly of anyone who thinks that all knowledge of the world is based upon experience—or, slightly [ˈslaɪtli] more narrowly [ˈnærəʊli], of anyone who thinks that all substantive [ˈsʌbstəntɪv] knowledge is based upon experience. Those who are empiricists in the broad sense might allow [əˈlaʊ] that there is substantive knowledge not based upon experience if, for instance, they believed (as Locke did) that the existence of a God or the truths of ethics could be demonstrated. They might none the less believe the truths about the natural world could only be established by observation [ˌɒbzə(ː)ˈveɪʃən] and experiment [ɪksˈpɛrɪmənt].
SOURCES
The concise encyclopedia of western philosophy/ edited by J. O. Urmson and J. Rée.—3rd ed. Routledge. 2005
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. In 10 vol./ed. by D. Borchert. Macmillan Publishers Ltd, 2006.
The Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume 5. - British Philosophy and the Age of Enlightenment. Routledge, 1998