German idealism

Kant as the major figure of German Idealism

The movement Kant set in motion [ˈməʊʃən] inspired [ɪnˈspaɪəd] some of the most creative [kri(ː)ˈeɪtɪv] philosophers in modern times, including G.W.F.Hegel [ˈheɪɡəl] and Arthur Schopenhauer [ˈʃoːpənˌhaver], not to mention the philosophers he inspired in opposition [ˌɒpəˈzɪʃən] to him (Kierkegaard [ˈkɪərkᵻɡɑːrd] and Marx [mɑːrks], for example) and virtually [ˈvɜːtjʊəli] every [ˈɛvri] major [ˈmeɪʤə] movement in the twentieth century, including analytic [ˌænəˈlɪtɪk] philosophy and idealism in Britain [ˈbrɪtn] and America [əˈmɛrɪkə], phenomenology [fɪˌnɒmɪˈnɒləʤi] and existentialism [ˌɛgzɪsˈtɛnʃəlɪzm] in France [ˈfrɑːns] and Germany.

Kant’s twofold [ˈtuːfəʊld] classification [ˌklæsɪfɪˈkeɪʃən] of judgments [ˈʤʌʤmənts]

According to Kant every judgment is (i) either analytic or synthetic [sɪnˈθɛtɪk] and (ii) either a priory [ˌeɪpraɪˈɔːraɪ] or a posteriori [ˌeɪ ˌpɒsteriˈɔːraɪ]. A judgment is analytic if its negation [nɪˈgeɪʃən] results [rɪˈzʌlts] in logical absurdity [əbˈsɜːdɪti]. For example ‘a green thing is coloured’ [ˈkʌləd] is analytic judgment, since its negation (‘a green thing is not coloured’) is logically absurd [əbˈsɜːd]. Its truth is clear from a mere [mɪə] analysis [əˈnæləsɪs] of the terms in which it is formulated [ˈfɔːmjʊleɪtɪd]. Any judgment which is not analytic is synthetic, notably [ˈnəʊtəbli] judgments about empirical [ɛmˈpɪrɪkəl] matters of fact [ˈmætəz] [ɒv] [fækt], in particular those stating empirical laws of nature, such as ‘copper [ˈkɒpə] conducts [kənˈdʌkts] electricity’ [ɪlɛkˈtrɪsɪti]. Such judgments, whether true or false [fɔːls], can always be denied without contradiction [ˌkɒntrəˈdɪkʃən]. A judgment is a priori if it is ‘independent of all experience and even of all impressions of the senses’ [ˈsɛnsɪz]. Thus ‘man has an immortal soul’, which can be neither confirmed nor falsified [ˈfɔːlsɪfaɪd] by experience, is – if meaningful – a priori. Again [əˈgɛn] all analytic judgments are a priori. Their truth, and indeed their logical necessity [nɪˈsɛsɪti], can be made evident [ˈɛvɪdənt] by a mere analysis of their terms, without resort [rɪˈzɔːt] to experiment [ɪksˈpɛrɪmənt] or observation [ɔːr] [ˌɒbzə(ː)ˈveɪʃən]. If we combine [kəmˈbaɪn] these two classifications, and note that all analytic judgments must also [ˈɔːlsəʊ] be a priori, we see that there are three classes [ˈklɑːsɪz] of judgments, namely [ˈneɪmli]: (i) analytic a priori, (ii) synthetic a posteriori, and (iii) synthetic a priori.

Kant’s three Critiques [krɪˈtiːks]

Among Kant’s great works were three remarkable [rɪˈmɑːkəbl] and remarkably difficult [ˈdɪfɪkəlt] Critiques, the Critique [krɪˈtiːk] of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical [ˈpræktɪkəl] Reason, and the Critique of Judgment. The first Critique examined [ɪgˈzæmɪnd] the capacities [kəˈpæsɪtiz] and limitations [ˌlɪmɪˈteɪʃənz] of reason and the necessary [ˈnɛsɪsəri] conditions for knowledge. The second explored and defended [dɪˈfɛndɪd] the concept [ˈkɒnsɛpt] of morality [məˈrælɪti] and autonomy [ɔːˈtɒnəmi] in human action. The third, intended to be a synthesis [ˈsɪnθɪsɪs] of the first two, included wide-ranging [ˈreɪnʤɪŋ] discussions of aesthetic [iːsˈθɛtɪk] taste [teɪst], and the concept of teleology [ˌtɛlɪˈɒləʤi] in the biological [ˌbaɪəʊˈlɒʤɪkəl] sciences. Together [təˈgɛðə], the three Critiques established philosophy as a new profession [prəˈfɛʃən], and it is often said that Kant was its first true professor [prəˈfɛsə].

Johann Gottlieb Fichte [ˈfɪktə]

Fichte invites us to disregard [ˌdɪsrɪˈgɑːd] external objects and our mental states and to focus [ˈfəʊkəs] exclusively [ɪksˈkluːsɪvli] on the I that apprehends [ˌæprɪˈhɛndz] both external objects and mental states. The I is not a thing or substance; it is simply activity, the activity of 'positing' [ˈpɒzɪtɪŋ] itself; it exists only in virtue [ˈvɜːtjuː] of its own awareness [əˈweənəs] of itself.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

Hegel is usually classified [ˈklæsɪfaɪd] as an objective [əbˈʤɛktɪv] idealist. His system is characterized by the use of a dialectic [ˌdaɪəˈlektɪk] of thesis [ˈθiːsɪs], antithesis [ænˈtɪθɪsɪs] and synthesis, and could perhaps [pəˈhæps] be described as an attempt to trace the development [dɪˈvɛləpmənt] or emergence [ɔːr] [ɪˈmɜːʤəns] of ‘spirit’ [ˈspɪrɪt], both systematically [ˌsɪstɪˈmætɪkəli] in a logical doctrine [ˈdɒktrɪn] of categories [ˈkætɪgəriz] and historically [hɪsˈtɒrɪkəli] in the process of world history.

Arthur Schopenhauer

He saw his chief contribution [ˌkɒntrɪˈbjuːʃən] to philosophy as the identification [aɪˌdɛntɪfɪˈkeɪʃən] of the Kantian [ˈkæntɪən] thing-in-itself with the will, and emphasized [ˈɛmfəsaɪzd] the role of will in the world, both animate [ˈænɪmɪt] and inanimate [ɪnˈænɪmɪt]. His treatment [ˈtriːtmənt] of unconscious [ʌnˈkɒnʃəs] willing [ˈwɪlɪŋ] partly [ˈpɑːtli] anticipated [ænˈtɪsɪpeɪtɪd] Freud [frɔɪd]. Schopenhauer combined this with an ethic [ˈɛθɪk] of pessimistic [ˌpɛsɪˈmɪstɪk] resignation [ˌrɛzɪgˈneɪʃən] strongly influenced by Indian [ˈɪndjən] thought.

SOURCES

The concise encyclopedia of western philosophy/ ed. by J. O. Urmson and J. Rée.— Routledge. 2005

Lacey, A.R. A Dictionary of Philosophy. Third edition. London, Routledge. 1996

Oxford Companion to Philosophy / ed. by T. Honderich. Oxford University Press, 1995.

The Age of German Idealism.Ed by R. C.Solomon and K. M.Higgins. Routledge History of Philosophy Volume VI. London, Routledge. 1993