The Department of Justice is conducting an investigation to determine how a notebook, which contained national security information gathered on a foreign trip by one of President Ford's key intelligence advisers, was lost and fell into the hands of an ex‐convict and self‐styled journalist, Government officials said today.

The notebook, a three‐by‐five inch Government‐issue tablet, was used by Cmdr. Lionel Herbert Olmer of the Navy to keep notes of the conversations of Leg Cherne, a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, during a fact‐finding mission in March 1975.

Mr. Cherne, who is now chairman of the board, said in an interview that he had been assigned to make the trip by the board's former chairman, Admiral George W. Anderson. A high Administration source said, however, that the trip had been ordered by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger who then was also Mr. Ford's chief adviser for national security affairs.

Three Main Problems to Study

Mr. Cherne said that he was to study three main problems on the mission the growing international energy crisis; the heavy unemployment being suffered by Western nations and the sharp shift of economic power to the oil producing nations.

As a “corollary matter,” he said, he had been asked to determine whether disclosures about domestic activity by the Central Intelligence Agency raised by The New York Times in December 1974 had affected the ability of the United States to gather foreign intelligence.

Commander Omer said in an interview that he had tried to keep careful and complete notes of what was said at each session during the trip, which occurred March 14‐29, 1975. He is an intelligence officer and a specialist in cryptology, or secret language.

Commander Olmer said he was sure the notebook was in his possession the entire time until at least 30 minutes before the Trans World Airlines flight he and Mr. Cherne were aboard on their return trip landed at Kennedy International Airport in New York.

Commander Olmer said he realized the book was missing when he arrived at his home in suburban Maryland the same day. After a search of his house, he immediately reported the loss to Wheaton Byers, executive secretary of the foreign advisory board.

Mr. Byers and Commander Olmer said that they tried unsuccessfully to locate the book through the airlines and other means. Mr. Byers said the loss was then reported to Admiral Anderson and to the. Central Intelligence Agency, which determined that the contents were “classified” and that their publication “would be injuries to the national security of the United States.

Call from a Journalist

Mr. Cherne and Commander Olmer said in separate interviews that the contents might also be “embarrassing,” as Mr. Cherne put it, since they included candid assessments by American officials of their superiors and foreign officials.

On July 24, 1975, Mr. Cherne said he received a call from Michael Casey, who identified himself as a free‐lance journalist and who said he had the notebook.

Mr. Cherne said he had received “guidance” from Federal authorities he would not name (reportedly the F.B.I.) to “string him along, maintain contact, not to set too much value on the book, to see if could be recovered.

Mr. ‘Casey, 32 years old, said in an interview that he had served time at Soledad penitentiary in California for passing forged checks and had been in prison for juvenile violations.

He said that he received the notebook from a man he would not identify aboard an Air‐Vietnam flight between Saigon and Hong Kong on April 23, 1975.

Mr. Casey has a record of helping Vietnamese refugees that has been confirmed by State Department and news officials. Because of this, he was retained by the International Rescue Committee in its Los Angeles office on August 18, 1975, according to Robert devecchi, an official of the committee.

Mr. Cherne was chairman of the'committee's board of directors at the time, but Mr. Casey said he did not realize that.

Mr. Casey pledged to return the notebook and on August 26, 1975, Mr. Cherne received the book by registered mail was at this time that the matter came under F.B.I. scrutiny.

Meanwhile, Mr. Cherne said, he had checked Mr. Casey's background with an official of the rescue committee in Hong Kong and was advised to “sever connections” with Mr. Casey immediately. He recommended that Mr. Casey be dismissed, and he was on September 18, 1975.

Mr. Casey said he met voluntarily with an assistant United States Attorney in New York in April and turned over some copies of portions of the book. He said he still possessed a copy, which he said was hidden. Mr. Casey offered to turn the copy over to The New York Times on the condition that he be retained to investigate its contents. No copy was ever made available to The Times.

Mr. Casey also said he had been interviewed by F.B.I. agents who are seeking the return of any and all copies of the book and the names of any journalists who may have seen the contents.

Reporter Given Documents

In September 1975 after returning the original copy of the notebook to Mr. Cherne, Mr. Casey showed Robert Dietrich, a reporter for The San Diego Evening Tribune, what he described as typewritten copies of the book's contents along with other purportedly secret documents allegedly obtained from the C.I.A.'s Air America office in Saigon.

Mr. Dietrich said he had a copy of the typewritten version, but declined to discuss the contents in detail.

Mr. Casey said he and Mr. Dietrich set out to investigate the contents and that a series of threatening incidents ensued, including the burglary of his home in Los Angeles.

Casey Tells of Robbery

Mr. Casey said he met voluntarily with an assistant United States Attorney in New York in April and turned over some copies of portions of the book. He also said he had been interviewed by F.B.I. agents who are seeking the return of any and all copies of the book and the names of any journalists who may have seen the contents.

On Sept 2, while staying at Washington's Mayflower Hotel, Mr. Casey reported to the police that he had been robbed at gunpoint of “about $850” and a taperecording of a telephone conversation between himself and Mr. Cherne made in August 1976.

Both the Washington police and the major crimes unit of the United States Attcrney's office here are investigating Mr. Casey's allegations.

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President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

President Eisenhower established a Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities in 1956. It was created at the recommendation of the Hoover Commission on the Reorganization of the Government. Its purpose was to offer the president independent, objective, and expert advice on the effectiveness of the conduct of U.S. foreign intelligence. It was also created to head off an attempt by Senator Mike Mansfield to create a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence.14

Appointed to the board were prominent Americans who tried to per- form their part-time function in an unbiased, objective manner. Independent of the intelligence community and free from any day-to-day management or operational responsibilities, the board rendered its advice directly to President Eisenhower.When Kennedy was elected, Eisenhower did not discuss the im- portance of the board, and Kennedy considered eliminating it. But after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy reconstituted the board and renamed it the Pres- ident’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). Kennedy later claimed that PFIAB was one of his most useful advisory boards.15

Over the years, PFIAB members met with leaders of intelligence agencies, examined reports, and visited intelligence installations to identify deficiencies in the collection, analysis, and reporting of intelligence. The board tried to eliminate unnecessary duplication and functional overlaps. Its recommendations influenced the composition and structure of the intelli- gence community, the development of major intelligence systems, and the degree of collection and analytic emphasis. In carrying out its mandate, board members had access to all the information related to foreign intelli- gence that they needed to fulfill their vital advisory role.16

When he was appointed to PFIAB, Cherne had no background in government service or foreign intelligence. His appointment was made at the urging of Casey, in return for Cherne’s participation in Democrats for Nixon.Whatever the reason, Cherne was an excellent choice. In the fall of 1973, economic intelligence was not a high priority within the intelligence community. But the OctoberYom KippurWar in the Middle East, coupled with the shock in the United States over the Arab oil embargo, moved eco- nomic intelligence to the forefront of PFIAB’s agenda. Few people in the the 1930s. Cherne was once again in the right place at the right time.

Cherne came onto the Board knowing some of its members. For years, he had known Edward Teller, the father of the H-bomb. In 1959, the IRC had given Teller the “William J. Donovan Memorial Award,” which was Cherne’s bronze bust of Donovan. Teller often offered Cherne advice. Cherne also knew Clare Boothe Luce, the former U.S. ambassador to Italy and congresswoman from Connecticut. Luce was the first woman appointed to PFIAB. Cherne and Luce had communicated during the 1940s and had co-authored three publications on Hungary. Other members of the board were new to him, for example, Nelson Rockefeller, who regarded his membership on the board as the single most important service he had ever performed for the U.S. government. Cherne and Rockefeller became close friends.18

Lionel Olmer, a U.S. Navy commander with a specialty in cryptology and Soviet naval communications, was the PFIAB staff member assigned to introduce Cherne to the work of the board. According to Olmer, Cherne was like “a kid in a candy store.” Cherne wanted to know about everything, so Olmer made available to him dozens of secret studies on all manner of subjects, people, and places. Olmer communicated with Cherne daily, pass- ing on the latest news and offering suggestions for further study. Cherne soaked up the vast amount of information and still wanted more. He had a compulsion to know more than anyone else about every economic matter that came before PFIAB and possessed an insatiable curiosity about the more exotic aspects of the intelligence system.19

After several weeks, Olmer recommended that Cherne write up his findings as a way of drawing attention to the importance of economic in- telligence. For seven days Cherne dictated his report, which ended as a forty-page document. Olmer believed that the result was an artful, literate, but verbose critique of several intelligence agencies’ programs. With some trepidation as to how Cherne would respond, Olmer told him that the re- port had great content, but that its style was off base considering its audi- ence: it lacked the appropriate “bureaucratese” essential for government reports. Much to Olmer’s surprise, Cherne was open to frank criticism, al- though Cherne cringed when Olmer red-lined some of his favorite ex- pressions.They worked over the weekend, and in the end, Cherne mastered governmentese while losing nothing of what he believed was really impor- tant for the president of the United States to understand.

page 163 - 164

According to Olmer, Cherne’s revised report was a huge success: it changed the future course of economic intelligence collection, analysis, and reporting. Equally important, it drew the attention of senior government policymakers to the enormous significance of economic intelligence and the array of resources that could be directed to answering their needs.20

Cherne’s specific expertise was economic intelligence; but he par- ticipated actively in all PFIAB’s activities. Throughout the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Soviet Union was building up its military forces. Several observers had begun to express dissatisfaction with the National Intelli- gence Estimates, particularly those related to the military power of the Soviet Union. PFIAB chairman, Admiral George W. Anderson, a retired four-star admiral and chief of naval operations at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and PFIAB board member John S. Foster, a former deputy secretary of defense for development, research and engineering, sug- gested the development of an outside competitive analysis using the same information as that available to the CIA. President Nixon did not sup- port the recommendation, mainly because the director of the CIA, William Colby, opposed it. When Ford became president, Anderson re- stated his concerns and recommended that the competitive analysis be conducted through the National Security Council. Colby demurred. When George Bush took over from Colby, things changed. Bush was receptive to PFIAB’s proposal.

PFIAB established “Team B” as an experiment in competitive analysis. The idea was to use nongovernment experts on the Soviet Union to second-guess the CIA’s estimates of Soviet intentions and ca- pabilities. The PFIAB Board and staff involved were: Edward Teller, William Baker, Edwin Land, Robert Galvin (chairman of Motorola), Bill Casey, and Lionel Olmer. Many more private sector experts were re- cruited to this project, and they reported their findings to PFIAB.

The “Team B” conclusions projected a more powerful and dangerous Soviet threat than the intelligence establishment had reported to the presi- dent. Perhaps the most significant conclusion was that the accuracy and power of Soviet strategic missiles could potentially overwhelm U.S. missile forces and thereby negate the fundamental premise of America’s nuclear de terrent: that enough would be left, even after a first-strike, to retaliate and destroy the Soviet Union.21

At this time, the nation as well as the intelligence community were in disarray. The Watergate scandal had engulfed the Nixon administration. Congressional investigations uncovered a variety of unsavory practices, up- setting many Americans, including Cherne. President Nixon resigned in his vice president Nelson Rockefeller, a member of PFIAB.

Coming on top of the Watergate scandals, the American defeat in Vietnam led to public cynicism and distrust of the government. Watergate also led to increased scrutiny of the American intelligence community, which was tangentially connected through Nixon’s effort to blame the CIA to cover his misdeeds. Most Congressmen were unfamiliar with the Amer- ican intelligence operations. Like all large bureaucracies, the intelligence community had made its share of mistakes; though unlike other large bu- reaucracies, the intelligence community’s mistakes had been hidden. When Congressional committees examined and critiqued intelligence practices, mistakes were exposed. Senator Frank Church’s committee focused on in- telligence abuses. Otis Pike’s House Select Committee on Intelligence ex- amined and reported on intelligence failure in the Middle East. President Ford attempted to head off these investigations by creating a blue-ribbon commission chaired byVice President Nelson Rockefeller. One member of the Rockefeller Commission was the ex-Governor of California, Ronald Reagan.22

Shortly after Gerald Ford became president, several White House staff members solicited Cherne’s advice. During this difficult period for the intel- ligence community, President Ford appointed Cherne chairman of PFIAB. At the time, Cherne was a registered Democrat, and he asked why he had been appointed chair. Ford’s response was: “I worked with you and watched you for some time, and I reached the conclusion that you would be the one most likely to tell me what I might not wish to hear.”23As chairman, Cherne con- tinued to meet with the White House aides concerned with intelligence, and he met several times with the president. Through these meetings, Cherne shaped the board agenda. PFIAB met on the first Thursday and Friday of every other month, with ad hoc committee meetings as required. Intelligence agency leaders, Cabinet officers, and others were invited to attend as necessary.

On the same day that Cherne became chairman of PFIAB, President Ford expanded the board from ten members to seventeen. PFIAB increased in importance when, as a result of the Rockefeller Commission report, it was given responsibility for policing the intelligence community.24 Most PFIAB members contributed actively during meetings and offered advice outside of meetings as their schedules permitted. Cherne saw PFIAB as his primaryjob. He estimated that he worked the equivalent of 94 days on PFIAB business during the first half of 1976.25

By all accounts, Cherne was an excellent chairman. He possessed great skill in running the meetings of this board composed of individuals of great distinction. Cherne skillfully organized presentations of complicated and diverse material outside his own area of expertise, then involved mem- bers and staff in their areas of expertise or responsibility. Cherne did not himself pontificate, but led the meeting to ensure that PFIAB’s busy agenda was met. He had the ability to listen and comment without hurting feelings or egos. Edward Bennett Williams, one of the top lawyers in Washington, said at the end of the first one-and-a-half day meeting Cherne chaired: “That’s the best meeting I’ve ever been to in my life.”26

Although the “Team B” work had been launched by the previous PFIAB chairman, Admiral George W. Anderson, its work became public during the time that Cherne chaired the board. This publicity upset the new director of the Central Intelligence Agency, George Bush.27 Subse- quently the concept of a competitive analysis was discontinued. However, the “Team B” concept reemerged in 1986, when SenatorJesse Helms raised the issue in the Senate for a competitive analysis focused upon the Soviet Union. Helms’s views were adopted by a Senate resolution, but PFIAB did not conduct further competitive analyses.28

In the days before George Bush left the position of director of the Central Intelligence Agency, he wrote to Cherne reporting that the year 1976 had been a good one for the U.S. foreign intelligence community.The CIA and other intelligence agencies introduced innovations and restored confidence in the integrity of their foreign intelligence function. Bush be- lieved that PFIAB under Cherne’s leadership had contributed significantly to these changes. Handwritten at the bottom of Bush’s note to Cherne was, “I hope our paths cross in the future.”29

Pages 171 - 178

Chapter 11 : The Falling Curtain

In addition to being a humanitarian, Leo has been an economist, political scientist, sculptor, and advisor to presidents for over 40 years. His extra- ordinary service to his country and to mankind are inspiring and deserv- ing of recognition from his fellow citizens. . . . Although he has never held elected office, Leo Cherne has had more influence on governmental pol- icy than many members in Congress. Since the late 1930s, Leo Cherne has stepped forward and with brilliance, energy, and moral passion to help this nation overcome countless challenges.

—Citation for the Presidential Medal of Freedom, given to Leo Cherne by President Ronald Reagan, 1984

Throughout most of his adult life, Cherne worked full-time at the Research Institute of America. The Institute was a privately owned corporation, with Carl Hovgard the majority stockholder, and Cherne plus another employee minority stockholders. In 1964, the owners sold the Institute to the Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company in Buf- falo. Cherne became vice chairman of the Lawyers Cooperative Board of Directors, and the following year, chairman.1This role permitted Cherne’s active participation in the International Rescue Committee, Freedom House, and the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, with a bit of time left over for his other interests.The Lawyers Cooperative eventually sold the Research Institute to Thompson International. Cherne’s relation- ship with the Institute ended in 1990, after 54 years of service.2

Awarding Medals

By the early 1980s, Cherne’s life had reached a peak. His office walls had for decades been covered with awards and photographs testifying to his extraor- dinary achievements.They included many decorations from foreign govern- ments. Friends and colleagues thought Cherne deserved public recognition from the United States—specifically, that he should be awarded the Presi- dential Medal of Freedom.

President Truman had initiated the Medal of Freedom, which was awarded for meritorious war-connected acts or services. General Lucius Clay had first proposed this distinction for Cherne to President Eisenhower, citing Cherne’s postwar work in Europe, Japan, and Hungary. Clay’s proposal did not succeed, but sporadic attempts were made to place Cherne’s name in nomina tion. President Kennedy replaced Truman’s award with the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation’s highest civilian honor given in the United States. It was awarded for meritorious contributions to security or national interest, world peace, or cultural or other significant public or private endeavors.3

When Ronald Reagan was elected president, renewed efforts were made to obtain the Medal of Freedom for Cherne, but the campaign was blocked by Michael K. Deaver, Reagan’s Deputy Chief of Staff in theWhite House, who believed the award should go to individuals who had greater visibility and public recognition than did Cherne.4 Then fate intervened. Fred Demech, a naval lieutenant commander who was assigned to the White House and who had known Cherne when he was appointed to PFIAB, was asked to write President Reagan’s speech for the IRC’s fiftieth anniversary celebration, scheduled for November 15, 1983. Demech wrote into Rea- gan’s speech the following announcement: Cherne’s “extraordinary service to his country and to mankind are inspiring and deserving of recognition from his fellow citizens. It is with great pleasure that I announce tonight that I am awarding the Presidential Medal of Freedom, our nation’s highest civil- ian award, to Leo Cherne. Congratulations, Leo, on a well-deserved honor.” Unable to attend the ceremony, Reagan videotaped his speech, which had been cleared by his staff. It was played for an enthusiastic audience at the IRC’s fiftieth anniversary ceremony at the Waldorf in NewYork.When the list of recipients for the Presidential Medal of Freedom was drawn up in February 1984, Demech made sure that Cherne’s name was on the list. Deaver again objected. Demech pointed out that President Reagan had al- ready announced that Cherne would receive the award. Deaver was furious with Demech, but could do nothing.5 On March 26, 1984, President Rea- gan delightedly conferred upon Cherne the Medal of Freedom in the White House; some of the others who received the same honor on that day were Reverend NormanVincent Peale, Louis L’Amour, and James Cagney.

Predicting the Future

Before the concept of “futurist” was born, Cherne was one. For over fifty years he publicly projected what would happen—economically, politically, and socially—during the upcoming year. His first speech to forecast the future was given at the Sales Executive Club of NewYork in 1940.The club had been started by ThomasWatson, Sr., the founder of IBM, in 1932.Wat- son required all his top sales executives to belong. His idea, at the height of the Depression, was to get the economy rolling again by starting a selling crusade. The club focused on improving salesmen’s methods and morale. The club published newsletters, held seminars, and invited big-name speak- ers for its events. Over the years five presidents, Wendell Willkie, Henry Ford II, Bob Hope, Eddie Cantor, Alan King, NormanVincent Peale, and Ann Landers addressed the club.6

Cherne was one of the club’s speakers in January 1940. His talk was such a success that the club invited him back.This continued annually for the next fifty years. His speeches were often given in the grand ballroom at the Waldorf-Astoria, which would be packed with thousands of executives. Cherne used these occasions to predict what was going to happen during the upcoming year. His presentations started with his predictions of the previous year, which he graded for accuracy. He usually gave himself a grade of 90 percent or higher and few participants disagreed with his self-assessment. Then he proceeded into what he projected for the upcoming year. His speeches were widely attended by a broad segment of America’s political and business leaders.7 In addition, newspaper and magazine reporters often covered his predictions.

Cherne’s fiftieth “Consecutive and Final First-of-the-Year Forecast Luncheon Program” was titled: “Millennium: A Reach into the Future,” and was attended by more than 2,000 executives in the ballroom at the Wal- dorf. The program co-chairs included Alan Greenspan, Henry A. Kissinger, Happy Rockefeller, and Liv Ullmann. Malcolm Forbes, Jr., and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Jr., gave special introductions.8 Kissinger uttered admiring ac- colades: “What courage it has taken each year for fifty years to polish your crystal ball before a roomful of the country’s brightest and best-informed leaders. Surely the entire world pauses early each January to learn from you what is expected of it!”9

Retiring Chairman

Cherne prodded the IRC to seize new opportunities for assisting refugees. He advocated for new programs during the 1980s and early 1990s. For in- stance, he encouraged the IRC to become involved in Africa; after pro- grams were launched, he traveled to inspect them.

Cherne was also deeply worried by the plight of the Afghan refugees. Tens of thousands had fled the country when the Soviet invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Throughout the 1980s, more refugees poured into Pakistan. During the Cold War, the United States supported the refugees and those groups who opposed the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union agreed to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan ten years later, about 3.5 mil- lion Afghan refugees lived in Pakistan. With Soviet forces no longer in Afghanistan, Cherne was worried that the United States would give signifi- cantly reduced attention to their refugees in Pakistan.The U.N. High Com- missioner for Refugees (UNHCR) at the time, Saddrudin Aga Khan, issued statements to this effect, urging continued attention to the refugee situation.

During an IRC Board trip to Pakistan led by Olmer, which included meetings with the president of Pakistan and with the UNHCR, these mat- ters were discussed. On return to the United States, Cherne urged that a Citizens Commission be created to sustain a worldwide focus on the Afghan refugees, notwithstanding the apparent end of military conflict. As a result of the commission’s work, the IRC was the first foreign operation to assist Afghan refugees.

The IRC’s Citizens Commission had unintended positive conse- quences for the IRC. While trying to select commissioners, Olmer met Sadako Ogata, then the director of the Institute of International Relations at Sophia University in Tokyo. She previously represented Japan on the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and in 1990 was selected as the independent expert of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on the human rights situation in Myanmar. She declined Olmer’s invitation to join the commission when the General Assembly elected her to the position of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. How- ever, she worked closely with the IRC for the following ten years on many refugee matters including those connected withYugoslavia. In 2001, after her retirement as UNHCR, she became an IRC board member.

By 1990, IRC programs operated on five continents and was the largest nonsectarian, nongovernmental refugee operation in the world. Much of IRC’s success can be attributed to Cherne’s work. It was notjust his promotional activities or his fundraising prowess. This phenomenal suc- cess derived from the board and staff he recruited, encouraged, and men tored. John Whitehead, who Cherne brought on to the IRC’s board after the Hungarian uprising in 1956, had risen to the top of the investment banking profession and then served as deputy secretary of state. He was the obvious choice to succeed Cherne when the infirmities of age made him realize in 1991 that it was time to step down.

Tributes flowed in from Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush and from many others. In his tribute to Cherne, Henry Kissinger remarked that it had always “meant a great deal to me to know there was a Leo Cherne in this world, always ready with advice, always ready to give his time and his compassion in difficult circumstances.” He continued: “Any- body can project the familiar into the future. But the greatest role of a leader is to take a people from where they are to where they have never been.That is ajourney that requires faith and dedication and we honor Leo Cherne, above all, for the faith and dedication he has always shown in our journey towards a world in which the just can be free and the weak, se- cure.”10 Characteristically, it didn’t occur to Cherne, in his new role as chairman emeritus, to stop working. Flashes of the old eloquence, the old brilliance, the old fire, still continued to inspire, move, and persuade his board, staff, and colleagues.

Emerging Refugee Emergencies

Throughout most of its history, the IRC has had limited private funds, and has been forced to rely heavily on U.S. government funds and those of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. In refugee emergencies, some- times hours and days were lost while funding was sought.Yet refugee emer- gencies required quick and effective responses. Mobilizing at the first sign of a serious refugee problem saves lives and enhances the ability of the refugees to survive in the long term. Failure to take quick and effective action in such crises often results in social turmoil and political instability within the country to which refugees have fled, and sometimes the strife spreads to neighboring countries, exacerbating unstable and chaotic situations.

When Yugoslavia imploded in 1991, the IRC was one of the first agencies to respond; quickly it was heavily committed, assisting tens of thousands of Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian refugees, who struggled for survival in the heart of Europe. Hence, when Kurds fled into northern Iraq after the GulfWar, the IRC had no reserves to assist the refugees who were fleeing Iraqi military forces. Still, the IRC sent a team to help and was the first voluntary organization to arrive to help these refugees.

IRC Board members Lionel Olmer and Jim Strickler went to Turkey and northern Iraq to review the IRC’s efforts. The person running IRC’s program was doing wonderful work alongside the U.S. and other NATO military forces that were engaged for almost the first time in a major human- itarian effort. The trouble with the IRC’s effort was that it lacked money, communications equipment, shovels, and supplies. Eventually, the IRC was able to provide shelter and bring medical, public health, and sanitation specialists into the situation, professionals drown from the IRC's worldwide pool of refugee emergency experts and volunteers. But the time lost early in the crisis meant that many Kurds died or became ill due to exposure and the lack of water, food, and proper sanitation.11

While in Turkey, Olmer phoned Cherne, who was delighted with the on-the-spot report and was only saddened by the fact that he could not be there with them. On the return trip, Olmer and Strickler discussed what the IRC could do in the future to be better prepared for emergencies. Olmer suggested that the IRC pre-position kits of supplies for future emer- gencies. This led to the thought that U.S. companies might be cajoled into donating an emergency radio system to the IRC.While this would be use- ful, better still, they concluded, would be an emergency rescue fund that could meet whatever the next critical situation required.12

Upon his return to the United States, Olmer asked Cherne if he would mount a major effort to help deliver the IRC from its dependence on governmental funding sources by putting together a fund to be used only in emergencies. Cherne approved the concept, as did the IRC board. Cherne agreed to begin contacting individuals in hopes of establishing a $1 million fund—which everyone thought was very ambitious.13

With a $1 million corpus, the emergency fund was expected to gen- erate an annual income of $50,000, enabling the IRC to take immediate action in one or two emergency situations should they arise. Decisions to draw on the fund were to be made by the IRC Executive Committee, which must declare that a refugee emergency had arisen.The fund’s princi- pal could be invaded only by a decision of the IRC board, and only when the severity of the emergency required such action.The principal would be then replenished as expeditiously as possible following any withdrawal.14

Cherne was delighted to help raise money for the fund, which was named in his honor, “The Leo Cherne Emergency Refugee Fund.” The IRC board and staff worked out the details. Cherne approached Peter Drucker, who agreed to chair the fund. Drucker had worked as a volunteer with the International Relief Association during the late 1930s. Drucker had worked at the Research Institute as a consulting editor to their associate member’s program from 1950 to 1953.15 Drucker and Cherne had stayed in touch and Cherne had involved Drucker in IRC activities. Much to every- one’s surprise, the fund exceeded $1 million within six months and doubled again a few years later.16This was the crucial first step toward financial stabil- ity as well as an assured capability for rapid and effective response to refugee emergencies.When refugees fled Kosovo a few months after Cherne’s death, the Leo Cherne Emergency Fund helped them survive.

1967-1968

Da Nang Air Base Under Attacked

By 1967, the BIG LOOK operations tempo was well established.

At least one Big Bird mission (EC-121) flew daily, supplemented by Whales (EA-3B), and/or a second Big Bird as needed. By March 1967, 54 enlisted personnel were assigned on TAD from NCSP, over half of which were designated crew. Additional personnel were TAD from Kamiseya. Living conditions were improving as well, with new barracks and other facilities under construction. Government messing became available effective 25 May 1967, and somewhere about that time NCSP Det Bravo was inaugurated, with LCDR Donald R. Larson as Officer-in-Charge. However, much of this “forward movement” came to an abrupt halt the night of July 15.

“Shortly after midnight on 15 July, the Da Nang Air Base was struck by enemy rockets. Eight military personnel were killed during the attack and 155 others were wounded. The enemy barrage, which lasted approximately 45 minutes, started numerous fires and resulted in extensive structural damage to U.S. Navy, Marine and Air Force facilities. In addition, eight aircraft were destroyed and 45 were damaged during the attack.” (NAVFOR Command History, July 1967, p. 45)

Note: the featured Image is a photo of the attack.

Major Casualties, but None Were CT Spooks

This rocket attack was the most extreme experienced during life of the detachment. Out of a total of 163 casualties, 44 were VQ-1 and NSG Det Bravo personnel, but none were spooks. Luckily no one was killed, but all three VQ-1/NSG Detachment barracks were destroyed. This was not due to a direct hit on the barracks, but rather to a hit on a nearby ammo dump. The dump exploded and rained shrapnel down onto recently constructed bunkers, which at the time, did not have roofs. Additional damage/injuries were caused by the shock waves of the exploding ammo. The fires from this attack were so intense that former BLS CTR2 Gary Hughes, then stationed 40 some miles away at Phu Bai, could see the glow on the horizon. Most of the detachment was evacuated from Da Nang, with only a skeleton crew remaining behind. When they returned, det personnel were temporarily billeted at Camp Tien Sha, located at the base of Monkey Mountain, east of the base, until new barracks could be built. In addition to the destruction of the barracks, all the aircraft were damaged to some extent, and VQ-2 had to temporarily supply EC-121M aircraft from Rota, Spain, so that operations could continue. Two people enroute to the det from the Philippines, Sgt G.R. Wright, USMC and CTRSN Lowell “Wilkie” Wilks, were at Clark Air Base waiting for a flight when they were told their orders were on hold. They finally arrived in Da Nang two weeks later.

In the fall of 1967, LT(jg) Ike Cole joined the detachment as an evaluator, TAD from San Miguel for several months. Ike remembers flying a lot, almost every day, and the highly-skilled enlisted operators.

The Tet Offensive

January 30, 1968, marked the start of the Tet offensive by the North Vietnamese. LCDR Carl Strobel, Det OIC at the time, recalls the planes being sent to Udorn Air Base in Thailand because of the increased rocket attacks. Flights continued over the GOT as usual, though, staged from Thailand. As always, a core team stayed behind in Da Nang. CTR3 Bill Erhardt, recognizing a deficiency in the det’s supply of weapons, took the initiative in true Spook fashion. According to his own account, Bill “…took a couple cases of booze up to Hill 327 and brought back a jeep load of rifles, ammo, and hand grenades. The Chief wanted to kill me!”

New crypto systems installed April – June 1968 further improved the capabilities of the detachment.

Two Spooks Who Made Extraordinary Contributions

Late 1968 marked the departure of two experienced operators, Chuck Dibble and Joe Wagner. Both had flown in Da Nang for over two years, and their contributions were significant. In a personal message to Commander Johnson, the NSG Department head at NCSP, Captain De Lorenzi, Commanding Officer of VQ-1, cited both Petty Officers, stating in part,

“Both of these outstanding Petty Officers have made extraordinary contributions to the detachment operation over a sustained period of time. Their professionalism, devotion to duty and perseverance has on numerous occasions resulted in the development of extremely valuable intelligence, which under other circumstances could have gone unnoticed.”

He then added in a later paragraph,

“Regret that I did not personally have the opportunity to speak with CT2 Dibble and

Wagner prior to their departure from Da Nang. Would be most appreciative if you would convey to each of them, on behalf of myself and all VQ-1 squadron members who have served with them a sincere ‘Well Done’ and best wishes for every success in the future.”

Thus, despite the belief of some, VQ-1 recognized the efforts of the Spooks as a vital part of its mission, and was appreciative of what we did.

VQ-1 wasn’t the only group who appreciated our work. Joseph A. Haran, Jr., a radio intercept analysis specialist with the 6924th Security Squadron (USAFSS) at Da Nang from 1968 to 1969, stated “…the NSG linguists with whom I worked while at the 6924th Security Squadron were much more receptive to my efforts and were at the same time of immense help: “Mr. Dibble” and Ed Dobarro come to mind. The NSG guys were much more laid back and more job-as-top-priority oriented than the USAFSS turfdefenders. But, we were all in the same bunker (or roadside ditch) when the bad guys’ rocket artillery and mortars said hello.”

By LCDR Robert E. Morrison, USN (ret.)

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