JOSEPH KILDALL

Joseph Kildall, president and manager of the Panama Pacific Commercial Company, was born in Norway, in March, 1865. His father, Michael Kildall, was a merchant and a large operator in the fish business in Horstad, Norway, for a number of years. He came to .America in 1888, crossing the Atlantic five years after the arrival of his son Joseph in the new world.

It was in 1883 that Joseph Kildall, then a youth of eighteen years, bade adieu to friends and native land and sailed for the new world, attracted by the favorable accounts which he heard concerning the business chances to be found in America. He made his way

to the Pacific coast, settling first in Tacoma, Washington, where he entered the employ of Hansan & Company, conducting a milling business at that place. Still later Mr. Kildall made his way to San Francisco, but remained in California for only a year. He afterward went to Port Gamble, Washington, and entered the employ of the Puget Sound Mill Company, with which he continued for three years, acting as a salesman in their store. He afterward embarked in general merchandising on his own account at Lynden, Washington, and there continued in business until 1892. He then turned his attention to steamboat interests, operating steamboats between Bellingham, Seattle and Tacoma, and still later he became connected with the fish industry on Puget Sound, making his headquarters at Bellingham. In 1897 he removed to Minneapolis, Minnesota, where he established the Kildall Fish Company, one of the largest wholesale fish houses of the United States, remaining in that city until 1911, supervising the interests of the company. In the meantime he organized the Pacific Coast & Norway Packing Company, with headquarters at Petersburg, Alaska. This company conducted a general merchandise, canning and saw-milling business, owned the town site and built up the town of Petersburg. Mr. Kildall also organized the Kildall-Bright Company of Chicago, Illinois, which did a very large importing business and engaged in the sale of foreign and domestic fish. In 1911. however, he decided to return to the Pacific coast and settled in Seattle. After investigating the Sound country, the geographic location, the climate and other conditions led to his choice. He became identified with several companies in the general fish business, packing, marketing and superintending several fish industries on the coast, operating throughout America and foreign countries in the shipment and marketing of fish. This business has been organized under the name of the Panama Pacific Commercial Company, a corporation which is capitalized for a large amount and which is now conducting an extensive business throughout the Pacific coast country, being one of the foremost concerns of the kind in the west.

In Bellingham, Washington. Mr. Kildall was united in marriage to Miss Mary Jenkins, a daughter of Judge John R. Jenkins, of that city, and one of its early settlers. He served as justice of the peace at Bellingham for a number of years and for a long period was in the hotel business, but passed away about 1907. Mr. and Mrs. Kildall have become the parents of two children, Blanch and Harold, aged respectively twenty-three and twenty-two years, the latter now assisting his father in the office work.

In politics Mr. Kildall has always been a stanch republican, working for the growth and success of the party, but at municipal elections where no political issue is involved he casts an independent ballot, considering only the capability of the candidate for office to which he aspires. He is a member of the Transportation Club of Seattle and he and his family attend the Trinity Episcopal church. Mr. Kildall has been a citizen of the new world for over thirty years and has been numbered among the representative business men of Seattle for five years. He has built up an immense business in his line, his well defined plans having been carried forward to successful completion. Energy and enterprise have enabled him to overcome obstacles and difficulties created by conditions and competition and he is today at the head of one of the foremost concerns of the kind on the Pacific coast. He has had broad experience and his powers have developed with the passing years, making him capable of controlling most important enterprises.

Discovery Park has approximately 644 acres of meadow, walks and trees on a high bluff overlooking Puget Sound and the Olympic Mountains. It is Seattle’s largest and newest park, established on September 1, 1972.

But a few years earlier, it seemed destined to become a missile base, where radars and intercept missiles would be prepared to detect and destroy intercontinental ballistic missiles. The struggle to change that destiny took the dedicated efforts of citizens’ organizations, political leaders and scientists.

On September 18, 1967 Defense Secretary Robert McNamara announced that the U.S. would build a light anti ballistic missile (ABM) system as a deterrent against expected Chinese missile attack in mid-1970's. The "Sentinel" ABM system would consist initially of ten radar and missile sites along the northern tier of states. It would be adequate to defend against a light attack by a small number of simple missiles, but it could not defend the country against a massive attack such as USSR could launch, An ABM defense against the USSR was impractical, and perhaps unnecessary in view of the effectiveness of the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction, whereby each country held the other's cities in hostage.

Skeptics thought that Sentinel might actually be the thin end of a wedge, a start for a much larger, eventually anti-Soviet system. Indeed, John Foster, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, testified that while politically the system was designed to protect against a Chinese attack, it would actually have some degree of effectiveness against Soviet missiles. And on the day after the announcement Senator Henry M. Jackson hailed the decision as a step toward a massive ABM system.

When more details of the ABM system were described, Fort Lawton in Seattle was mentioned as a possible choice for its westernmost base.

The fort was an army base originally intended for a coastal gun battery, but never activated. This came as a shock, for Seattle had been looking forward to acquiring all or a substantial part of Fort Lawton for a city park. Mayor Dorm Braman said that it was disappointing news, but if the system needed Fort Lawton to make Seattle safer, it would be worth the loss.

The idea of turning the base into a park had a long history. In 1910 the Olmsted Brothers, who designed many of the country’s parks, included Fort Lawton in their plans for a Seattle park system. In 1917 an editorial in the Seattle Post Intelligencer called for the city to acquire the Fort, and the Mayor and city officials supported the paper’s position.

In the mid 30’s U.S. Representative Warren G. Magnuson proposed a bill to offer the entire site to Seattle for $1.00. However, what might have been a gift in normal times was then seen as a liability, for it was during the worst years of the Depression. The city declined the offer because it could not afford the cost of maintenance.

In 1964 the Secretary of Defense, announced that 85% of the site would be declared surplus. The citizens voted $3 Million in a Forward Thrust proposal to acquire the land for a public park. At the time of the Sentinel announcement it seemed that the conversion was close at hand. And so it came as a great disappointment, when a few years later the Army named Fort Lawton a prime candidate for one of the ten Sentinel bases.

Seattle's Mayor Braman, who had been trying to wrest Fort Lawton away from the Army, complained, "I am in no position and would not, under any circumstance, oppose the judgment of the qualified authorities if in fact ...Fort Lawton... is (needed to defend) the sector of the country.... On the other hand, if the mere fact that the property is currently owned by the government and that the amenities of the base in this location ...are the governing factors, I would strenuously object to the choice."

However, a Pentagon spokesman replied that "The missile hardware has to go in at Fort Lawton if it is to defend Seattle properly".

To a few scientists at the University of Washington, the case was not so obvious. Their opposition rested on two principles. The first was a conviction that missile defense was unwise. The second was that, if an ABM base were to be built in the Northwest, Fort Lawton would not be a necessary or desirable location.

The issue of missile defense had been debated within high level Defense Department advisory committees and in public for several years. The considered judgment of non- governmental defense experts was that there was no foreseeable technology for an effective antimissile system. Therefore, an ABM system built with currently available technology would be ineffective and wasteful. Furthermore it could actually increase the risk of war. At that time, we and the USSR opposed each other with thousands of intercontinental missiles. The sure knowledge that an exchange would destroy both countries led to a state of mutual deterrence.

But if one country could ward off an attack, or even if it prepared to defend against it, that would threaten the other's security. So if the Sentinel system were built, although it might be only a thin defense against a Chinese attack, it could give rise to Soviet fears that it would lead to a larger and more advanced anti Soviet ABM, and that would compromise the Soviet defense. In response to the threat, the Soviets were likely to increase the number of its missiles targeting the U.S., to be sure that an adequate number would get through.

Along with the national debate, these arguments were discussed in University of Washington seminars. Newell Mack, a Physiology graduate student, had been so concerned by signs that national policy seemed to be leading toward missile defense, that he had convinced members of a graduate seminar on Conflict Studies in the University of Washington to study the issue. He was joined in leading the discussions by Philip Ekstrom, a Physics graduate student.

The meetings had begun with one or two sessions on the technical aspects of missile defense, when the Sentinel ABM was announced, and Fort Lawton was mentioned as a possible choice for the key site for the West Coast. As a bonus, it was said to protect Seattle.

The seminar members were disappointed in the national decision, but they felt that perhaps not all was lost; Fort Lawton might be saved for a park if the Pentagon spokesman was wrong, and that Seattle's defense could be based somewhat outside of the city. To determine that, one would have to know the technical characteristics of the Sentinel system. Fortunately, the details had been published, in an issue of Aviation Week.

Each installation would have a large Perimeter Acquisition Radar, to detect an ICBM attack at long range, while the missiles were on their inertial trajectories well above the Earth's atmosphere. The PAR would alert the system to fire Spartan interceptor missiles, which would target the incoming ICBMs while they were still in space. The Spartans, guided to their targets by the PAR, would be able to destroy them with their 1 megaton nuclear warheads even if they didn't make contact. The PAR radars would be protected by a "last ditch defense", a battery of short-range high acceleration Sprint missiles, which could intercept and destroy ICBMs penetrating the Spartan shield. In fact, it might be necessary to hold fire until the ICBMs entered the atmosphere, so that air resistance could discriminate between actual missiles and decoys. The Sprints carried 'small' nuclear warheads, about a kiloton.

Dr. Philip Ekstrom, with help from Physics Prof. Edward Stern, calculated the "footprint" of the protected zone. Ekstrom's calculation had as input data the speed and range of the Sprints, and the probable trajectories of the attacking ICBMs. The physics problem was a bit like finding the area that can be kept dry by an umbrella in a driving rain. The footprint turned out to be so large that the ABM base could be placed well outside of Seattle, and yet include the city in its protected area. His colleague, Physics Prof. Greg Dash, described the good news in a March 31 The Seattle Times story; Fort Lawton could be saved for a park, and Seattle could have both missiles and picnics. Dash pointed out that the PAR site for the Northwest would be the key detection unit for the entire West Coast. If it were placed at Fort Lawton, Seattle would become a prime target. An enemy intending to attack San Francisco or Los Angeles would have to take out Seattle's radar unit in order to assure that its missiles could get through. Furthermore, having 1 kiloton warheads explode at close range could be suicidal, with fallout from airbursts.

The news gave a great boost to the public campaign, which became known as The Battle of Fort Lawton. The campaign had remarkably wide support, with twenty-five citizen and professional organizations, such as the Seattle chapters of the American Institute of Architects, the Federation of American Scientists, the Magnolia Community Club, the League of Women Voters, and The Mountaineers. They were joined into one group, Citizens for Fort Lawton Park, headed by Donald Voorhees, a prominent Seattle lawyer, who was a leader in Seattle's improvement activities. Strong support came from Senators Henry Jackson and Warren Magnuson, and Congressmen Thomas Pelly and Brock Adams, Mayor Braman, other city officials and The Seattle Times editor Herb Robinson and reporter Svein Gilje. The campaign was carried out in letters to newspapers, editorials, radio interviews, and personal contacts between the senators and the Sentinel system's director Gen. Alfred Starbird, for over a year. Yet the Army Defense Command and Gen. Starbird continued to claim that Seattle's defense required the an-city location.

The public campaign now was intensified by the realization that an ABM at Fort Lawton would increase the city's vulnerability.

As the criticism increased, Defense Department officials tried to explain that the dangers were overdrawn, but their arguments were unconvincing. In an October interview John Foster scoffed at the scientists' concern at having nuclear weapons based in the city. Foster claimed that the explosion of a Spartan warhead outside the atmosphere would be hardly noticeable, and the atmosphere would filter its fallout over a long period. The Sprint's one-kiloton warhead would be too low to cause damage. The group found his claims incredible and his breezy dismissal infuriating.

Senator Jackson then asked the scientists' group for detailed data showing alternative sites that could satisfy Sentinel's strategic plan. Ekstrom and Stern supplied it in late August. A few days later Jackson met with Gen. Starbird, and extracted a promise that the general would meet with a representative of the scientists and listen to arguments for alternate sites. Stern flew to Washington in mid September and offered three alternate sites.

A week later a Pentagon source informed The Seattle Times’ reporter, Svein Gilje, that the alternate sites would not be feasible. Besides, he added, why look for others when the Army already owns a perfect site, Fort Lawton?

Senator Jackson suggested that perhaps the Army had not done all its homework. Senator Magnuson complained that Fort Lawton "would be the worst possible site that anyone could imagine."

On Dec.12, 1968 a crucial meeting was held in the Mayor's Office on the fate of "Ft. Lawton: Anti-Ballistic Missile Site or City Park?" Attending were 16 representatives of civic and environmental groups, Donald Voorhees, chairman of Citizens for Ft. Lawton Park, Senator Jackson, General Starbird, and Mayor Braman. Robert Kildall represented the Magnolia Community Club, a district surrounding Ft. Lawton. He said, in part, "General Starbird, I represent those citizens who would be most affected by an ABM site at Ft. Lawton.... We are overwhelmingly opposed to the placement of ABMs here." "The will of our citizens- as represented by these sixteen civic and environmental organizations around this table- is that if Ft. Lawton is the only place we can defend those things that are dear to us, so be it! But if there are other sites, move it! A park represents one of those important values we have that are worth fighting for."

On the next morning, Sen. Jackson had breakfast with Defense Secretary Clark Clifford in the Secretary's office. Jackson had flown in minutes before from Seattle in a military plane. He was there to transmit the strong feelings that had been expressed in Mayor Braman's meeting. Clifford told him that he was aware of Seattle's desire to preserve the open space, but he had not yet heard from Gen. Starbird; he promised that he would ask for a report from the General over the weekend and have a decision a few days later. Starbird, in turn, was reported to have been convinced that Seattle's arguments for open space were valid, and official policies for retaining Ft. Lawton for missiles were contradicted with technical arguments showing the feasibility of alternate sites.

On Dec. 22nd, the day promised for the decision, Sen. Jackson telephoned Secretary Clifford, who told him the good news: the ABM would go to an alternate site.

But there was still one more hurdle before the Army could turn over the property; there was a question of price. Under current federal law, the city would have to pay $37.5 million, equal to one-half of fair market value, to receive the land. The problem was solved by an amendment to the Land and Water Conservation Act, which enabled state and local governments to acquire surplus property free or at less than 50 percent of fair market cost. The Senate's bill was sponsored by Senator Jackson, and the House bill was shepherded by Congressmen Adams and Pelly. Together, the legislation became known as the 'Fort Lawton bill'.

Epilogue

This account has focused on Seattle's campaign, but there were other local groups that waged campaigns against Sentinel. In Berkeley and the Bay Area, Minneapolis, Chicago, Detroit, New York, Pittsburgh and Boston, groups opposed the establishment of nearby sites, or fought against the system as a whole. The opponents were partially successful. In March 1969 President Nixon announced that Sentinel's city defense would be abandoned in favor a "Safeguard" system, a defense of Minuteman ICBM sites. The change, in an influential paper by Harold Agnew, the Leader of Los Alamos' Weapons Division, was advisable because "...defense installations are primarily located in areas of existing military bases thus minimizing problems presently being posed by citizens worried over safety matters or angered over dislocation problems." However, Safeguard failed to get strong political support and adequate financing, and in the end, only two sites were constructed.

In 1971 Anne Cahn earned her Political Science Ph.D. from M.I.T. with a study of the scientists' influence in the struggle. She concluded, in part, "Across the country scientists, mostly Outer (i.e. non Defense Department), younger, not scientifically prominent men took it upon themselves to alert, inform and educate the public about ballistic missile defense."

"The important event, in our opinion, was that scientists took their case to the people."

Missile defense was proposed again by President Reagan on March 23, 1983. The initial design of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was to provide a nearly perfect "astrodome" defense. It would rely on space-based laser or electron beams to disable attacking ICBMs. The system would be powered by orbiting nuclear power reactors. Vigorous opposition came from scientists. Particularly cogent criticism came from a committee of the American Physical Society, in a paper analyzing beam weapons. In an effort to answer the criticism the design was changed to "kinetic energy weapons", which would rely on direct impact. A furious national debate over the technical feasibility and the political effects of SDI eventually led to its failure to get congressional support.

In 1996, the Secretary of Defense announced a new program, National Missile Defense. NMD was begun as a technology development effort leading to deployment of system that would protect all 50 states from a limited strategic missile attack by a rogue nation. The system would detect the launch of enemy missiles and track them by surveillance satellites and ground based radars, and then guide-defending ABM's to intercept the incoming missiles. In response to the opposition to the previous two ABM system designs, nuclear warheads and nuclear reactors in orbit would be replaced by ground based defending missiles, and they would be kinetic energy, "hit-to-kill" weapons. However, a succession of tests has shown the difficulty of achieving direct impacts. Many attempts to hit the incoming missile have largely failed, in spite of advance knowledge of the launch time and trajectory of an incoming missile, even when carrying a beacon. Nevertheless, the administration of Pres. George W. Bush has decided to begin preparing the first site. But the system is already aiming at its first target: the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. In 1972 the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to forego missile defense, in order to avoid threatening each other's deterrence forces. But defense policy makers are now preparing to discard that policy for an unproven NMD system. Although the current system is far from ready, in the words of a Defense Department official. "We do not have the luxury of waiting" until the system is proven to be effective."

In a crowning bit of irony, the chairman of the Defense Science Board, reported last year that the continual test failures with the 'hit-to-kill' method has caused the Bush administration to consider putting nuclear warheads on the interceptor missiles.

But meanwhile, Seattle can look back at its fight against an ABM system 38 years ago, (in 2006) and take pleasure in its victory, which won it a beautiful city park.

The Seattle World’s Fair created all kinds of legacies that still resonate, starting with the Seattle Center campus.

For Bob and Ruth Kildall of Magnolia, memories of the fair take on a more personal meaning: It’s where they met.

Ruth, who grew up in a small town near Copenhagen, arrived in Seattle in 1962 as a 28-year-old hostess for the Denmark Pavilion. Back home, Ruth had worked as a translator of business documents — moving between Danish, English, French and German. Boring stuff, she said.

She jumped at the chance to work at the World’s Fair.

“It was exciting,” Ruth recalled. “We didn’t know what we were getting into.”

Copenhagen was Ruth’s measure of a big-time city; Seattle struck her as a little provincial. Still, there were cultural nuances she had to learn the hard way.

Ruth and two of her hostess friends rented a cramped space on Taylor Avenue for $90 per month — nothing to sneeze at in those days. Rent gouging was part of the World’s Fair scene. The trio finally changed quarters.

There was more.

“Back in Denmark only people invited to parties showed up,” she laughed. But not in America: “We were shocked.”

American gregariousness had its upside: “We were struck by the hospitality of the American people,” Ruth said. “There were people we could have visited in every single state.”

The Denmark Pavilion showcased Danish wares: furniture, industrial design, jewelry and other goods.

“I was so impressed that little Denmark exported this to the country of IBM,” she noted. “Little did we know IKEA would be taking over 50 years later.”

Bob Kildall, owner of Olympic Distributors, Inc., carried a Danish-made electronic stencil cutter, which was cutting edge in its day. Bob was a regular in the Danish venue.

Their relationship remained Platonic as the fair wore on. Meanwhile, Ruth took in fellow Dane Victor Borge’s piano-comedy show, but the classical music lover skipped a chance to see Elvis. She’s still kicking herself.

The Fair ended on a warm Sunday, October 21, 1962. “We went wild in the fountain outside the Pavilion,” Ruth said.

And she headed back home.

There are different versions of what happened next, but this version, which reflects Bob’s dry sense of humor, is a good bet.

Workers in the Denmark Pavilion, including Bob, had been given fine, Danish tea sets. Not long after the fair ended, he called Ruth in Denmark.

“Why don’t we put our tea sets together so we can entertain more people?” he asked.

And they did.