III. Alleged Attempts To Delay the Release of the American Hostages

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3. Persons Claiming or Alleged To Have Second-Hand Knowledge

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C. William Herrmann

William Herrmann was born in Danzig, Germany in 1936. He arrived in the United States in 1950 and settled in Michigan. After graduating high school he joined the United States Army, specializing in ordnance and transportation. He was honorably discharged in 1959. From 1962 to 1964 he worked for an air freight company, Worldwide Services, at Kennedy Air port in New York. In 1964 he started his own air freight forwarding company at Kennedy Air port, Continental Air Transport. Continental had offices throughout Europe and the Middle East.154 Continental operated until 1964, when "complications at Kennedy Airport" 155 forced him to close down. In 1970, Herrmann established International Resources Development Company (IRDC).156 IRDC was engaged in the arms business, specializing in small arms: pistols, submachine guns and revolvers.157 IRDC shipped directly out of Brazil to its clients worldwide.158 Herrmann operated IRDC in New Jersey and Frankfurt, Germany between 1970 and 1985, when it closed.159 Herrmann unconvincingly claims that no records of IRDC's business dealings exist because they were destroyed by the warehouse people that housed them for non-payment of bills. (160)

Herrmann first started selling military arms to Iran 161 in 1980, following a meeting with Hamid Nagashian who was, at the time, the authorized arms procurement official for the Revolutionary Guard in Iran.162 Herrmann was introduced to Nagashian in the fall of 1980 by Otto Schaller, another arms dealer and friend of Manuchehr Ghorbanifar. 163 During the meeting, Herrmann testified, Nagashian told him that he was interested in purchasing arms for the Revolutionary Guard. Herrmann showed Nagashian brochures from Taurus International, a Brazilian manufacturer licensed by Baretta.

Nagashan placed orders for three models of guns.164 The guns were then shipped to Iran by Taurus, and Herrmann collected a commission.165

Nahshan and Herrmann thereafter established an ongoing business relationship. According to Herrmann, whenever nagashian needed additional guns he would conact Herrmann, who would plae an order with Taurus (166). This arrangement lasted from 1981 to 1985 (167), when Herrmann got out of the business (168).

Herrmann stated that in January, 1981 he was invited to Tehran by Deputy Minister of Defense, Ahmed Azzizi.169 The purpose of the trip was to negotiate arm purchases for the Iranian Army. According to Herrmann, Nagashian had arranged the Azzizi invitation.170 Herrmann stated that he arrived in Tehran on approximately January 18, 1981 171 and was provided accommodations at the Hilton Hotel.172 Herrmann said that Nagashian came to the Hilton on January 21, 1981, to discuss the release of the hostages. Herrmann stated that Nagashian told him that the timing of the hostage release was the result of a deal with Reagan campaign people; some of his testimony follows:

• Q : And tell us, if you would, what Nagashaian told you, if anything, about the release of the hostages ?
• A : Well, he told me that a deal had been negotiated by some people in the Reagan administration and that the hostages would be released at the time Reafan was sworn in
• Q: Did you ask Nagashian how he came to know this?
• Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980 ("October Surprise Task Force")

160

A: Yes. Well, I didn't ask him, he told me.

OjAndwhatdidhetellyou?

A: That he was aware and he had been in Europe at the time when the negotiations took place.

Oj He, Nagashian, was personally in Europe at the time?

A: He was in Europe at the time, yes.

Qj And tell me specifically what he said with respect to how that agree ment came to take place?

A: He said for some time the Irani ans had been negotiating with senior officials in the Reagan administration on the release of the hostages and also the delay in releasing them earlier.

Oj Did he indicate to you at this time who, on behalf of Iran, was in volved in these discussions?

A: Mohammed Beheshti, Hakim, Rafsanjani, Mohsen Rafiqdust. Meet ings with Casey, Allen and McFarlane. These were the three people that were involved.

Qj So from Iran's standpoint, Naga shian says the three individuals in volved in the negotiations concerning the hostages for the [Iranians] were Beheshti, Hakim, Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rafiqdust, and the people working or negotiating with them on behalf of the United States were Wil liam Casey, Richard Allen and Robert McFarlane. Where did he say the ne gotiation took place?

A: He said the negotiations took place in Paris.

Oj Where in Paris, do you recall? A: He didn't say.

Qj When in Paris?

A: October, September, October, 1980.

Oj Did he indicate that he, himself, had attended these meetings?

A: No, he didn't say that, but he was in Europe at the time and he knew that these people were in Europe at the time, also.

Oj Did he indicate to you how he knew that they were in Europe?

A: He didn't give me any indication how he found out, but, apparently, he knew what was happening at the time due to his position ..,173

Thus, Herrman said Nagashian told him that the deal was negotiated in Paris in the Fall of

1980 (probably September or October), and that the participants in the negotiations were Mohammed Beheshti, Albert Hakim, Rafsanjani and Mohsen Rafiqdust for the Iranians and William Casey, Richard Allen and Bud McFar lane for the Reagan Campaign. 174

Task Force counsel asked Herrmann whether he told anyone about the Nagashian conversa tion contemporaneously. Herrmann said that he confidentially advised the CIA of the infor mation obtained from Nagashian. Having told the government his tale, Herrmann said that he felt no other responsibility to raise the subject elsewhere. 175

The Task Force was concerned about Herr mann's connection to Richard Brenneke who had been shown to be untruthful. The Task Force questioned Herrmann about how he had surfaced as an October Surprise witness. Herrmann was evasive about his contacts with Richard Brenneke and Barbara Honneger.176 This evasiveness led the Task Force to question Herrmann's veracity:

Oj During this time period did you have contact with Barbara Honegger herself?

A: Yes, she contacted me before her book was published. That is how I got in there. How she got my name was through London, I believe, if I recall correctly.

Oj You see, that strikes me as odd. How would she get your name through London? What happened in

Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980 ("October Surprise Task Force")

London that she could possibly get your name?

A: Because of the publicity I re ceived.

Qj What publicity did you receive with respect to October Surprise-relat ed activities?

A: None. None.

Oj So how did she get your name?

A: I don't know. It could have been through Brenneke. I don't know.

Oj Well, how did Brenneke get your name? You say maybe through Bren neke. How would Brenneke have gotten your name to tie you into the October Surprise to get you to Bar bara Honegger if you have not gone public with any statements about Oc tober Surprise-related activities?

A: I don't know. I don't know. Oj Did you ask Brenneke that? A: No Ididn't.

OjImean

A: As I said, I don't want to know. I don't want to get involved.

Oj But it is quite a puzzle. I mean, here you have remained silent about this October Surprise matter, and then all of a sudden two people, Brenneke and Honegger, are calling you up and saying, I hear you have information relevant to October Surprise. It would strike me the first question out of my mouthiswhatareyoutalkingabout.

And if it wasn't, why would you choose to go public with them for the first time; Brenneke, a person about whom you felt was less than honest; and Honegger, a person you didn't know? Why would you do that?

A: Well, as I said, I didn't know Brenneke either. I had never met the man personally, and, you know, Bren nekeisverygoodwithcollectinginfor mation, whether it is through newspa pers, news media or whatever, and

maybe he picked up my name through the news media. I don't know.

Oj But your name isn't in the news media relating to October Surprise.

A: I know that. I know that. OjSohowcouldhepickitup? A:Idon'tknow ...177

Herrmann's answers were disingenuous, at best. At worst he completely fabricated his knowledge of and participation in the October Surprise allegations. It is difficult to believe that Herrmann was contacted out of the blue by Honegger or Brenneke. It seems more likely that he affirmatively sought them out from his prison cell in an effort to insinuate himself into the October Surprise theory in much the same way as did Oswald LeWinter and others. Herr mann might also have been motivated by a desire for revenge against the United States Government or for a shorter prison sentence. In any case, Herrmann's story is factually flawed, especially in light of the CIA contact report and the testimony of Nagashan, dis cussed below.

The Task Force spoke with the CIA agent who Herrmann contacted. The agent indicated that during late 1981 or early 1982, FBI's Newark office advised the CIA that William Herrmann with various offenses, including smuggling and theft of motor vehicles. As a result of these charges, Herrmann determined that it was in his best interests to cooperate with the U.S. Government. Among other things, he made statements concerning Iraq. The FBI notified the CIA of Herrmann's coop eration and suggested that an interview con cerning the international matters he had raised should be arranged.178

A CIA agent was assigned to contact Herr mann and evaluate his utility as an intelligence source. Background checks revealed that Herr mann had been arrested on several other occa sions, in addition to his current charges. As a result, the CIA concluded that Herrmann would not be a useful source.179 During the ini tial screening process, however, Herrmann fre quently telephoned the agent to volunteer in formation. Most of the information was vague and unusable. The agent characterized Herr mann as elusive and hard to pin down. He indi

Joint Report of the Task Force to Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning the Holding of American Hostages by Iran in 1980 ("October Surprise Task Force")

cated that Herrmann only provided information on Iraq, and was only able to produce a list of arms requirements from the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. According to the agent, Herrmann never discussed Iran or the October Surprise allegations.180

The agent's last conversation with Herrmann occurred just before the holidays, when Herr mann was to report to Leavenworth Penitentia ry. Herrmann was desperate to avoid incarcer ation. He said he would do anything for the United States Government, including being air dropped into the Soviet Union. The agent con sidered Herrmann to be an unreliable source and the Agency did not rely on him.

Finally, without success, the Task Force in vestigated the relationship among Herrmann, Brenneke and Honegger.

Given Herrmann's implausible statements re garding his contacts with the CIA, his failure to bring these allegations to the attention of law enforcement authorities and the CIA at the time he faced incarceration, and his contacts with Brenneke and Honegger, the Task Force considered his testimony to be untruthful. In addition, as demonstrated below, testimony of Hamid Nagashan further undercuts Herrmann's testimony.