The Official CIA Manual Of Trickery and Deception
https://archive.org/stream/cia-manual-trickery-deception-2009_201804/cia-manual-trickery-deception-2009_djvu.txt 

Summary

This document, likely excerpts from a book, delves into the fascinating intersection of magic and espionage, particularly focusing on the CIA's historical use of deception tactics during the Cold War. It highlights the agency's MKULTRA program, revealing how it sought to acquire unorthodox capabilities through the expertise of magicians like John Mulholland. The text details various covert methods for concealment, identity transfer, and surreptitious actions, emphasizing that successful trickery relies not on speed, but on manipulating perception, managing the "stage," and exploiting human psychology—principles common to both stage magic and clandestine operations. Furthermore, it offers practical advice on adapting these deceptive techniques for different individuals and scenarios, even providing specific instructions for women and team operations.

Here are 200 key takeaway points from the provided sources, formatted as requested:

I. The Official CIA Manual of Trickery and Deception by H. Keith Melton and Robert Wallace This book compiles declassified CIA manuals on deception, offering insights into the agency's use of magic principles in espionage.

The manuals, authored by magician John Mulholland, were part of the MKULTRA program and were believed to have been destroyed in 1973.

II. CIA Manuals' Survival and Rediscovery Only two major research studies from the CIA's decade-long MKULTRA program, Mulholland’s manuals, survived CIA Director Richard Helm’s 1973 order to destroy all MKULTRA documents.

The authors discovered the long-lost CIA manuals in 2007 while conducting unrelated research, finding a complete declassified copy with original drawings and illustrations.

III. Magician's Oath and Secrecy The magician’s oath promises never to reveal the secret of any illusion to a non-magician unless that person swears to uphold the oath.

Magicians recognize the necessity to expose secrets responsibly to students and those desirous of learning magic, balancing revelation with preservation of mysteries.

IV. John Mulholland's Public and Secret Work John Mulholland, a skilled practitioner, revealed many principles of magic in his 1963 popular general market book, Mulholland on Magic, which had been included in his operational manuscript for the CIA a decade earlier.

Mulholland was employed as the CIA's first magician, authoring two illustrated manuals to teach CIA field officers how to integrate magic into clandestine operations.

V. The True Secret: Espionage Application The real secret Gottlieb and Mulholland sought to preserve was not of specific tricks, but that professional intelligence officers, not just performing magicians, would be acquiring the necessary knowledge to apply the craft to espionage.

Mulholland’s manuals were a rare piece of historical evidence that the CIA, in the 1950s through MKULTRA, sought to understand and acquire unorthodox capabilities for potential use against adversaries.

VI. Secrecy and Naming Conventions in Mulholland's Manuals Mulholland’s writing for the CIA contained no reference to the CIA or clandestine operations, with field case officers called "performers" or "tricksters" and covert acts referred to as "tricks".

Mulholland pledged never to divulge, publish, or reveal the information, methods, or persons involved, and was likely not told about other MKULTRA subprojects.

VII. The Genesis of Mulholland's CIA Involvement In April 1953, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb contacted John Mulholland, one of America’s most respected magicians, to develop a "spy manual" describing aspects of the magician's art useful in covert operations.

Mulholland accepted $3,000 to write the manual, approved as MKULTRA Subproject Number 4 on May 4, 1953.

VIII. Content of Mulholland's Manuals Mulholland's first manual, "Some Operational Applications of the Art of Deception," described and illustrated numerous "tricks," primarily sleight-of-hand and close-up deceptions for secretly hiding, transporting, and delivering small quantities of liquids, powders, or pills.

The second, much shorter manual, "Recognition Signals," revealed methods used by magicians and their assistants to pass information among one another without any appearance of communication.

IX. Mulholland's Continued Consultancy with the CIA Mulholland’s work for TSS continued until 1958 when his failing health limited his ability to travel and consult.

In 1956, Gottlieb expanded Mulholland’s role as a consultant to consider the application of magician’s techniques to clandestine operations, including surreptitious delivery, deceptive movements, influencing choices, disguise, and covert signaling.

X. The Legacy of MKULTRA Document Destruction Virtually all of the MKULTRA program’s reports and operational files on behavioral control materials were ordered destroyed by DCI Richard Helms in 1973.

Mulholland’s manuals are among the few remaining documents to reveal MKULTRA’s research, with one CIA officer in the 1970s stating it was the "only product of MKULTRA known to have escaped destruction".

XI. Public Revelation of Mulholland's CIA Role The public learned of Mulholland's covert relationship with the CIA only when the MKULTRA documents were declassified in 1977.

For nearly twenty-five years, the story was largely forgotten until magic historian Michael Edwards published an article in Genii magazine in 2001, followed by other publications.

XII. Magic and Espionage: Kindred Arts John McLaughlin, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, asserts that magic and intelligence are truly kindred arts.

Just as a magician’s methods must elude detection, an intelligence officer doing espionage work must elude close surveillance and pass messages and materiel without detection.

XIII. Convergence of Magician and Intelligence Officer Skills Intelligence officers must be as familiar as magicians with methods of deception, as they often work with incomplete information and adversaries seeking to mislead them.

Mulholland’s manual sought to apply techniques of stealth and misdirection, used by professional conjurers, to aspects of espionage.

XIV. Influence on Espionage Tradecraft Mulholland’s instruction likely influenced mundane aspects of espionage tradecraft, such as how to surreptitiously acquire and conceal various materials.

However, methods designed for more aggressive actions, like clandestinely delivering pills and powders into an adversary’s drink, were never actually used, to the best of current knowledge.

XV. Context of Early Cold War Threats The fact that Mulholland was asked to contemplate such things is emblematic of a unique moment in American history when leaders felt existentially threatened by an adversary with no scruples.

Mulholland’s writing on delivery of pills, potions, and powders was one example of research carried out in diverse fields like brainwashing and paranormal psychology during the formative years of the Cold War.

XVI. The CIA's Formative Years and Intelligence History The American intelligence community was very new in the early Cold War, not organized at a national-level effort until 1947, unlike older countries that had integrated espionage for centuries.

Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist, had written about espionage in sophisticated terms in the sixth century B.C., illustrating its long history in other nations.

XVII. Mulholland's Significant Contribution Mulholland’s essence of contribution was to help the nation’s early intelligence officers think like magicians, a significant contribution given the close kinship between these two ancient arts.

This influence continues in stealthy ways that Mulholland would probably admire, even if many intelligence officers today might not recognize his name.

XVIII. CIA's Primary Missions at Establishment Upon its establishment in July 1947, the CIA received two primary missions: preventing surprise foreign attacks against the United States and countering the advance of Soviet communism.

Officers of "the Agency" were on the front lines of the Cold War, fueled by nuclear stalemate, incompatible ideologies, and a Soviet government obsessed with secrecy.

XIX. The Doolittle Report and Changing Concepts of Warfare The Soviet Union’s successful nuclear weapon test in 1949 created an international atmosphere of fear and uncertainty.

A 1954 top-secret report from a commission headed by General James H. Doolittle concluded that for the U.S. to survive, "long-standing American concepts of ‘fair play’ must be reconsidered," necessitating subversion, sabotage, and destruction of enemies by cleverer methods.

XX. Expansion of CIA's Covert-Action Role As a result of the Doolittle report, the CIA’s covert-action role expanded from Europe into the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and the Far East.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asserted that in the 1950s, only the United States stood between Soviet-led communism and world freedom.

XXI. Formation of the Technical Services Staff (TSS) The CIA formed a special unit, the Technical Services Staff (TSS), in 1951 to exploit advances in U.S. technology in support of espionage operations.

Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, a chemist, headed the chemistry branch within TSS, initially creating and testing "special inks" for secret writing.

XXII. Early TSS Innovations TSS reformulated liquid "disappearing inks" into solid forms resembling aspirin tablets for easier concealment, to be dissolved by spies for secret messages.

TSS also supported forging travel documents, printing propaganda, installing clandestine microphones and cameras, and building concealments for spy equipment.

XXIII. "Advanced Technology Indistinguishable from Magic" To those uninitiated in espionage, the secretive work of TSS scientists and engineers at times appeared to accomplish the impossible.

This phenomenon was akin to Arthur C. Clarke’s third law of prediction: "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic".

XXIV. MKULTRA's Origins in Mind Control Concerns Dr. Sidney Gottlieb and his chemists expanded their research in 1953 to counter an unanticipated Soviet threat: the perceived mastery of "mind control" by the Communist alliance.

Reports reached the CIA about Soviet clandestine successes with mind control and newly discovered capabilities to brainwash, recruit, and operate agents with drugs.

XXV. Authorization and Scope of MKULTRA In March 1953, Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, authorized Dr. Gottlieb to lead MKULTRA, a program for "research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior".

MKULTRA encompassed 149 subprojects, aimed at understanding how drugs and alcohol altered human behavior, and protecting American assets from Soviet psychological or psychopharmaceutical manipulation.

XXVI. MKULTRA Research Activities MKULTRA research included clandestine acquisition of drugs, clinical testing and experimentation with humans (some unwitting), and grant proposals with various institutions.

Scientists investigated topics from truth serums to humane ways of incapacitating guard dogs and explored mind-altering drugs like LSD and marijuana.

XXVII. The Dr. Frank Olson Tragedy Due to the absence of scientific data on effective and safe drug dosages, Gottlieb and his team performed experiments on themselves, including ingesting drugs.

In late 1953, Dr. Frank Olson, assisting the CIA on MKULTRA projects, was secretly given LSD at a retreat and subsequently died by jumping from a tenth-floor window.

XXVIII. CIA's Response to Olson's Death CIA executives, seeking to protect the secrecy of the MKULTRA program, did not fully reveal the circumstances of Olson’s death to his family.

Two decades later, Olson’s widow received a delayed apology from President Gerald Ford and a financial settlement from the U.S. government.

XXIX. Soviet Assassination Operations and U.S. Counter-efforts Soviet intelligence in the 1950s was not averse to death, utilizing "special actions" against anti-Soviet emigre groups.

The KGB used exotic weapons, such as an electrically operated gun hidden in a cigarette pack that shot cyanide-tipped bullets, and a cyanide gas gun concealed in a rolled-up newspaper.

XXX. Development of U.S. Assassination Weaponry Analysis of recovered KGB weapons stimulated accelerated U.S. efforts to create comparable weaponry.

Under Project MKNAOMI, TSS and the Army’s Special Operations Division (SOD) developed ingenious weapons and exotic poisons, including the "nondiscernible bioinoculator," a handgun firing a toxin-tipped dart silently and accurately.

XXXI. CIA's Stockpiling of Lethal Substances The CIA stockpiled eight different lethal substances and twenty-seven temporary incapacitants under the MKULTRA program.

Examples included poison-laced toothpaste prepared for President Patrice Lumumba and a handkerchief treated with brucellosis for an Iraqi colonel, though neither plan was carried out.

XXXII. Operation Mongoose and Castro Assassination Plots Operation Mongoose in the early 1960s considered creative and whimsical plots to discredit or assassinate Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

Ideas included spraying LSD in Castro’s broadcasting studio to cause hallucinations, impregnating his cigars with chemicals for disorientation, and dusting his boots with thallium salts to make his beard fall out.

XXXIII. Unsuccessful Castro Assassination Attempts A Cuban double agent was recruited to offer Castro a cigar treated with botulin, a deadly toxin, but failed to carry out the plan.

Other concepts included planting exploding cigars and an exploding seashell near Castro’s skin diving spot, and presenting him with a diving suit contaminated with tubercle bacillus, none of which were successful.

XXXIV. The Poisoned Pen Plot In November 1963, a CIA officer offered a poisoned pen (a modified Paper Mate ballpoint with a hypodermic syringe for Blackleaf-40 poison) to a Cuban agent to kill Castro.

The agent, Rolando Cubela, disposed of the pen after learning of President Kennedy’s assassination.

XXXV. Prohibition of Political Assassinations In 1976, American policy governing lethal actions against foreign leaders was formalized when President Ford issued Executive Order 11905, prohibiting political assassinations.

This order marked a significant shift in the overt policy regarding such covert actions, despite the historical consideration of various methods.

XXXVI. Gottlieb's Need for Covert Administration From the earliest days of MKULTRA, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb recognized that drugs and chemicals, regardless of purpose, would be operationally useless unless field officers could covertly administer them.

Mulholland’s expertise in sleight of hand, or "close-up" magic, appealed to Gottlieb because it could be adapted for secretly administering a pill or potion to an unsuspecting target.

XXXVII. Confidentiality Measures for Mulholland's Work Confidentiality was essential due to the top-secret nature of MKULTRA and the CIA-Mulholland relationship.

Multiple layers of security included a formal secrecy agreement with Mulholland, "sterile" correspondence using alias names like Sherman C. Grifford and Samuel A. Granger, and nonattributable post office boxes.

XXXVIII. Unpredictability of MKULTRA Materials Dr. Gottlieb noted in 1964 that the general area of biological and chemical control of human behavior had less relevance to complex operations, finding these materials too unpredictable in their effect on individuals to be operationally useful.

This unpredictability contributed to the decision to phase out MKULTRA projects over several years, despite initial large-scale funding.

XXXIX. The Church Committee Investigation In the wake of New York Times articles alleging CIA abuses and misconduct related to domestic spying in December 1974, a U.S. Senate Committee, headed by Senator Frank Church, launched an investigation.

The hearings revealed nonoperational MKULTRA financial and administrative documents that had escaped destruction, including drug experiments like Operation Midnight Climax.

XL. Operation Midnight Climax Operation Midnight Climax involved drug experiments run from CIA safe houses in California and New York, where LSD effects were observed on unwitting "clients" lured by prostitutes.

Their reactions were surreptitiously monitored from behind one-way mirrors to judge the effectiveness of LSD, "truth serums," and other mind-control substances.

XLI. Gottlieb's Testimony and Committee Findings Dr. Gottlieb was questioned for four consecutive days by the Senate committee in October 1975, concentrating on the drug experiments.

The Church Committee cited the CIA for a failure of "command and control" for only two drug experimentation projects, including Olson's death, concluding that officers had not undertaken illegal or criminal activities.

XLII. John Mulholland's Secrecy After Death Keeping his promise of secrecy, Mulholland died in 1970 without revealing his clandestine role as "the CIA's magician".

His covert relationship with the CIA became public only when the MKULTRA documents were declassified in 1977.

XLIII. The Original Manuals and Their Classification Mulholland produced at least two illustrated manuals for the CIA, describing "tricks" for hiding, transporting, and delivering substances, and methods for secret communication.

These manuals were written as general training instructions and were considered too sensitive for wide distribution, with only one copy known to have survived.

XLIV. Illusion and Technology in Clandestine Operations For Gottlieb and his successors, the techniques of deception used by performing magicians, combined with technology, presented intriguing potential to enhance clandestine delivery and secret communications.

Mulholland’s principles of magic were consistent with the CIA’s doctrine of tradecraft, influencing later consultants to provide innovative illusions to mask operations.

XLV. Magician's Craft in Espionage Multiple elements of the magician’s craft are seen throughout espionage, including stage management, sleight of hand, disguise, identity transfer, escapology, and special concealment devices.

These elements were adapted to meet the unique challenges of clandestine operations, where exposure could have disastrous consequences.

XLVI. Stage Management: Spy vs. Magician Mulholland instructed officers that their success, unlike magicians, depended on not being known or suspected as tricksters.

The deceptive techniques for delivering CIA pills, powders, and potions were to be performed clandestinely, in full view of audiences who, if aware, would immediately confront the spy.

XLVII. Managing the Hostile Environment Awareness and "management" of the potentially hostile environment, with culturally diverse, uncontrolled, and sometimes unseen audiences, is as critical to a spy’s success as special devices.

Mulholland's "close magic" style was ideal for CIA actions needing to be performed in close proximity to the target, as "the more of the performer that can be seen, the less his chance of doing anything without detection".

XLVIII. Sight Lines and Concealment Sight lines, which limit what the audience sees, are arranged so a magician’s trick can be executed without exposing secret equipment or maneuvers.

The placement of scenery, props, lighting, and even a distracting assistant further protect the illusion in magic.

XLIX. Practice and Consequences in Deception Sufficient time is allocated for complex illusions, and an unlimited number of rehearsals may be conducted to tweak and perfect a magic performance.

In contrast to espionage, where a single mistake can be deadly for the spy, slip-ups by a magician during a "live show" carry little consequence beyond momentary embarrassment.

L. Plausible Reasons and Diverted Attention To create an effective illusion, spies and magicians employ similar craft and stage management techniques, substituting plausible reasons for reality to conceal true purposes.

Spectator attention is lulled and diverted, and execution must be carefully planned, exhaustively practiced, and skillfully performed.

LI. Planning for Espionage Illusions Magicians plan by asking "what is my stage?" and "who is my audience?" Mulholland taught spies to add "what is my goal for the operation?" and "how can I carry out the operation secretly?".

For the spy, illusion is only a means to divert attention from a clandestine act, and the espionage illusion must withstand both casual onlookers and professional counterintelligence.

LII. Exploiting Self-Rationalization in Surveillance Proper stage management techniques provide reasons for an audience to believe their eyes instead of their reason, exploiting the human capability to self-rationalize.

The CIA learned to exploit this in operations where a spy needed the hostile surveillance team to ignore direct visual observations and rationalize events as non-alerting.

LIII. Dead Drop Signals via Routine Deviation An intelligence officer may always park his car at the curb in front of his house, an observed routine.

On the day a dead drop is left for an agent, the car is parked across the street from the house, signaling the agent while surveillance sees no significance.

LIV. Strategic Misdirection with Camouflage Strategic misdirection becomes even more effective when combined with camouflage and illusion.

During World War II, stage magician Jasper Maskelyne used his skills to support the British Camouflage Directorate, creating inflatable rubber tanks to misdirect enemy attention.

LV. Naval Deceptions: Q-boats In 1915, "Q-boats"—harmless-looking steamers—lured German submarines close by appearing to be easy prey, but they were fitted with concealed guns disguised in collapsible deckhouses.

Naval uniforms were exchanged for old secondhand ones to disguise the crew and captain, maintaining the illusion of a lightly manned, vulnerable vessel until the trap was sprung.

LVI. Modern Naval Deceptions by CIA Reminiscent of the Q-boats, in 1961, CIA officers acquired Chinese junks in Hong Kong for conversion with high-speed engines and camouflaged weaponry.

These boats appeared externally unmodified but could quickly discard their camouflaged superstructure and hull "like magic" before disappearing at high speed.

LVII. Lulling Surveillance in Moscow Retired CIA technical officer Tony Mendez described elaborate stage management techniques used in Moscow against KGB’s Seventh Directorate elite surveillance teams.

By "lulling" surveillance with unvarying daily commute patterns, the alertness of watchers would degrade, allowing the CIA officer to "disappear" for brief clandestine acts unnoticed.

LVIII. Larger Action Covers Smaller Action Mendez explained that when using misdirection, "a larger action covers a smaller action as long as the larger action itself does not attract suspicion".

A CIA officer stationed abroad found that taking a dog out for long walks at night (larger action) provided opportunities to secretly mark signal sites and service dead drops (smaller actions).

LIX. Exploiting Sight Line Weaknesses CIA officer Haviland Smith developed operational techniques in Prague in the late 1950s to exploit weaknesses in the sight lines of surveillance teams.

He discovered that when making a right-hand turn in urban areas he frequented, he would be "in the gap" or clear of surveillance for a few seconds, allowing clandestine activities.

LX. Misdirection in Action: The Mayflower Hotel Demonstration Smith refined his "working in the gap" techniques and consulted a magician for misdirection tips in 1965.

In a demonstration, Smith and another officer used a raincoat movement to divert attention away from a package being discreetly handed off, fooling CIA observers.

LXI. Challenges of the Spy's "Stage" Performing theaters offer stage magicians distinct advantages like controlled lighting, props, and restricted access.

The intelligence officer, however, lacks such advantages, as the location of his performance is dictated by operational requirements, with little control over audience, lighting, or sight lines.

LXII. Hanssen's Stage Management Robert Hanssen, an FBI counterintelligence officer spying for Soviet and Russian intelligence, selected footbridges in northern Virginia parks as his stage.

He controlled the stage by choosing unoccupied times and secluded, heavily wooded locations, minimizing visibility to passersby while allowing him to detect surveillance.

LXIII. Hanssen's Success and Eventual Capture Hanssen exploited the absence of any audience, virtually guaranteeing his success in placing and retrieving secret materials.

His eventual arrest in 2001 was not due to bad stage management or sloppy tradecraft, but rather complacency, as he was observed by neighborhood ladies during a dead drop.

LXIV. Exfiltration Operations: A Dangerous Task Few CIA operations were more dangerous or important than the covert or "black" exfiltration of endangered officers, agents, and defectors from hostile countries or hostage situations.

During the Cold War, the CIA and British intelligence (MI6) employed stage management techniques, similar to those in magic, for over 150 secret operations.

LXV. Oleg Gordievsky's Escape In 1985, MI6 used stage management to save KGB colonel Oleg Gordievsky, a British spy betrayed by CIA turncoat Aldrich Ames.

Gordievsky activated an emergency escape plan, eluding KGB surveillance by traveling to the Finnish border while a pregnant British diplomat drove from Moscow as a cover.

LXVI. Impromptu Misdirection in Gordievsky's Escape At the Finnish border, when a KGB guard dog sniffed at the car concealing Gordievsky, the pregnant diplomat quickly offered it a meat sandwich as a distraction.

This impromptu stage management, employing misdirection, saved the agent’s life, making Gordievsky the only person known to have escaped Moscow while under direct KGB observation.

LXVII. The "Argo" Rescue Operation Tony Mendez adapted exfiltration techniques for the rescue of six U.S. diplomats stranded in Iran after the embassy takeover in 1979.

Mendez and associates formed a notional Hollywood film company, "Studio Six Productions," to produce a science-fiction film titled Argo as a subterfuge.

LXVIII. Establishing "Studio Six Productions" Credibility To prepare the world stage, Mendez opened Studio Six production offices on the Columbia Studio lot in Hollywood and established credibility by running a full-page business advertisement in Variety.

Mendez posed as a European filmmaker, obtained visas from the Iranian embassy in Switzerland, and traveled to Tehran in January 1980.

LXIX. "The Impassable Corks" and Diplomat Confidence Mendez used a simple sleight-of-hand trick, "The Impassable Corks," to illustrate how deception and stage management would overcome obstacles, instilling confidence in the diplomats for the escape plan.

He created "new" Canadian passports and forged necessary Iranian exit visas for the diplomats, along with cosmetic "makeovers" to restyle their looks as "Hollywood".

LXX. Airport Stage Management for "Argo" Escape Seats for the escaping diplomats, posing as the film’s "scouting team," were booked on a Swissair flight departing from Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport early on January 28, 1980.

Mendez managed the airport stage at 5:30 AM when departure officials would be sleepy and Revolutionary Guards still in bed, using "Hollywood-talk" to impress onlookers.

LXXI. Sleight of Hand: Illusion vs. Gimmicks Magicians, as sophisticates, learn that mechanical props are no substitute for pure ability in sleight of hand.

A common misconception is that "the hand is quicker than the eye"; in reality, the hand is much slower, and effective illusion is primarily mental, not visual.

LXXII. Psychology of Sleight of Hand Sleight of hand involves skilled manipulation of objects in a manner undetectable to the observer, appearing as natural and innocent gestures.

Effective sleight of hand employs psychology, misdirection, and a natural sequence of steps to create an illusion, controlling the target's visual perception to implant a false image and memory.

LXXIII. Misdirection Example: Match and Pill Mulholland instructed officers that the flaming of a match rising in one hand to light a target’s cigarette would mask the discrete drop of a pill from the other hand.

The target’s eyes, focusing on the match, were incapable of also noticing the pill, the covert action.

LXXIV. Common Objects as Espionage Devices Mulholland realized CIA officers needed small props to enhance their limited sleight-of-hand skills, as spectators were less likely to suspect familiar items.

Commonly seen objects like cigarettes, matchbooks, pencils, and coins could be concealments for hiding pills, potions, and powders, as most onlookers wouldn't suspect their use as espionage devices.

LXXV. Flash Paper and Water-Soluble Paper "Flash paper," a magician's staple, was used by CIA officers to take secret notes in hostile environments, allowing instantaneous destruction with a lit cigarette if danger was sensed.

Later, CIA officers preferred water-soluble paper for covert communications and tasking instructions, which could be quickly and completely destroyed in coffee, water, or by swallowing.

LXXVI. Disappearing Camera: The "Holdout" In the 1960s, the CIA needed an effective way to make a Minox subminiature camera "disappear" quickly after taking a secret photo.

The solution employed sleight of hand and a "holdout" device from a magician’s repertoire—a retractable tape measure fitted with thin black cord and mounted on a leather armband, retracting the camera up the officer's sleeve.

LXXVII. The "Magic Beer Coaster" Infiltration Trick Undercover officers often faced difficulties infiltrating suspicious groups, so one solution was a simple trick, the "magic beer coaster," to attract attention and have the target "come to him".

A folded U.S. fifty-dollar bill was inserted into a sliced and reglued Heineken beer coaster, which the officer would "discover" and celebrate loudly, offering to buy drinks and drawing onlookers.

LXXVIII. Disguise as a Tradecraft Tool Tony Mendez, former CIA "Master of Disguise," stated that disguise is only a tool, and that "before you use any tradecraft tool you have to set up the operation for the deception".

Magicians regularly employ doubles, identical twins, full disguise, or disguise paraphernalia to create effective illusions.

LXXIX. CIA Disguise Techniques CIA disguise technicians employed skills learned in Hollywood to devise effective disguise solutions.

The shorter the time a subject will be studied by observers, the less elaborate the disguise needs to be, ranging from light disguises (wig, glasses, mole) to more elaborate ethnic or gender changes.

LXXX. John Chambers' Contributions to CIA Disguise In the late 1970s, Hollywood makeup artist John Chambers worked with CIA technicians to create a new generation of face masks using techniques developed for Planet of the Apes.

His masks blended articulated facial elements to appear "lifelike" when individuals talked or blinked, and could withstand scrutiny for several hours.

LXXXI. FBI's Use of Disguise in Counterintelligence The FBI used disguise techniques in counterintelligence investigations against U.S. traitors, employing disguised undercover officers with heavy East European accents and Soviet Bloc attire.

These agents sought to "reestablish contact" with former spies, eliciting replies by disarming questions like "do we still owe you money?" and gathering evidence.

LXXXII. Houdini's "Disappearance Through a Brick Wall" Houdini’s famous illusion, "disappearance through a newly constructed brick wall," mystified audiences.

The secret, as described by craftsman R. D. Adams, involved Houdini quickly changing into a bricklayer's disguise behind a screen, making him appear as part of the construction crew to the audience.

LXXXIII. "Identity Transfer" in CIA Operations At the CIA, the identical-twin illusion became known as "identity transfer," where an officer would disappear from one location and reappear elsewhere as the same or a different person.

When properly staged, surveillance teams were unaware of the switch, allowing officers to evade hostile surveillance before performing operational acts.

LXXXIV. Moscow's Dangerous Operational Area Moscow represented one of the CIA’s most dangerous operational areas during the Cold War due to the effectiveness of the KGB’s Seventh Directorate surveillance apparatus.

CIA officers in Moscow, though protected by diplomatic immunity, needed to "go black" (become free of surveillance) before operational acts to protect their agents from arrest and execution.

LXXXV. First Successful Moscow Identity Transfer In one of the first successful identity-transfer performances in Moscow, an American intelligence officer choreographed a swap with a similarly sized fellow worker during a social function.

The officer, dressed normally, swapped clothes and identity with his garishly dressed partner, then left the reception with an injured official (a third party) while KGB assumed he was still inside.

LXXXVI. The "Jack-in-the-Box" (JIB) Another identity-transfer technique allowed an intelligence officer to exit a car in Moscow while appearing to trailing surveillance as if still inside.

The solution was the "jack-in-the-box" (JIB), a three-dimensional human torso sitting atop a spring-activated scissor-lift mechanism with a rotating head, which collapsed into a portable briefcase.

LXXXVII. Control of Environment for JIB Illusion The CIA understood that by controlling the location (empty Moscow street), lighting (unlit area), audience (trailing surveillance car), timing (sufficient distance), and sight line (visible only from rear), they could stage-manage an effective illusion with the JIB.

The driver could unlatch the JIB case and instantly lift it into place, using a trigger grip to rotate the artificial head and create an effective illusion for the KGB.

LXXXVIII. The "Saint Bernard" Identity Transfer Plan One of the CIA’s most unusual plans for identity transfer in the 1970s involved a large dog: an officer abroad with an adult male Saint Bernard.

The plan called for swapping the dog for an agent concealed in a full Saint Bernard skin inside a portable kennel, with a tape recorder and speakers providing sound effects to enhance the illusion.

LXXXIX. World War II Rubber Cow Camouflage The idea of swapping identities with an animal was not completely new, having been developed during World War II.

The British Special Operations Executive (SOE) created a two-piece, collapsible rubber cow, painted to blend with livestock, for parachutists landing in German-occupied France to conceal themselves.

XC. Escapology: The Art of Escape Danger is sometimes an unfortunate consequence of espionage, and even skilled intelligence officers and spies may be caught.

The art and practice of escaping from constrictions like ropes, handcuffs, straitjackets, jails, or even countries is known as escapology.

XCI. Houdini's Moscow Jail Escape In 1903, Harry Houdini challenged the Russian secret police to escape their "Siberian transport cell or carette," a horse-drawn "safe on wheels".

Houdini, stripped naked and searched, was manacled and locked inside, but emerged minutes later, having cut through the wooden floor, not the inaccessible door locks.

XCII. Houdini's Concealed Tools Houdini managed to conceal his escape apparatus during searches in a small "sixth finger," switching the hollow finger between his trousers and hand.

His escape abilities were credited to technical skills, physical ability, and trickery in concealing the necessary equipment.

XCIII. Houdini's Influence on British Intelligence Houdini's escaping skills attracted the attention of William Melville, head of Britain’s Scotland Yard Special Branch, who was amazed by Houdini’s self-extrication from handcuffs.

When British agents trained for operations against Germany in 1914, MI5 spy school lectures included "how to pick locks and burgle houses" taught by Melville.

XCIV. Clayton Hutton and the Houdini Challenge Clayton Hutton volunteered his services to British military intelligence in the late 1930s due to his interest in magicians and escapologists.

Hutton had accepted Houdini’s challenge in 1913 to construct an inescapable wooden box, which Houdini escaped by bribing Hutton’s assistant to gimmick the case.

XCV. MI9's Evasion and Escape Aids MI9, a division of British military intelligence, was responsible for helping service personnel evade capture and escape.

Clayton Hutton worked to invent, design, and adapt aids for evasion, escape, and secret communication with prisoners of war at the secretive Intelligence School 9 (IS9).

XCVI. Concealment in Everyday Objects for MI9 Hutton adapted Houdini’s methods to hide MI9’s gadgets from searches, concealing escape maps within false backs of playing cards or printed on silk/rice paper.

Miniature telescopes were hidden inside cigarette holders, and smoking pipes, belt buckles, and magnetized razor blades were used to hide compasses.

XCVII. The Button Compass Deception A standard brass uniform button unscrewed to reveal a hidden compass, one of Hutton’s most effective deceptions.

When German guards learned of the standard left-hand thread, Hutton changed the design to a right-hand thread, making the buttons tighten when guards tried to "open" them conventionally.

XCVIII. Advanced Escape Kits and Footwear An escape kit fitted within a pocketknife contained wire cutters, saw blades, and a lock breaker.

Hollow shoe heels, like the "Mokana shoe" used by Houdini, became a favorite for spies throughout the Cold War to hide escape tools accessible through a hinged flap.

XCIX. World War II Gadgets by Charles Fraser-Smith Charles Fraser-Smith, a one-time missionary, created gadgets and tricks for Britain’s SOE and MI6 to deceive the Axis.

These included pocket-size radio receivers, a device thought impossible when home radios were large, purposefully manufactured crudely for smuggling into POW camps.

C. Concealed Blades and Clothing Transformations Tools like the Gigli saw, capable of cutting through a one-inch steel bar, could be concealed within a British pilot’s shoelace.

Military uniforms were designed for "quick change" conversion into civilian clothes using dye concealed in fountain pens, and leather flying boots could be instantly converted to civilian shoes with a small hidden blade.

CI. Cold War Spy Gadgetry and Body Concealment Houdini’s secret escape apparatus influenced Cold War spy gadgetry, such as his method of hiding small lock picks in the back of his throat.

The CIA created an escape-and-evasion suppository, a portable "tool kit" with nine escape tools packed within a waterproof black plastic shell.

CII. Lock Picking and Key Impressioning Lock picking has always been a useful skill for spies, taught with the magician’s principle to "beg, borrow, bribe, or steal" the master key if possible.

The OSS and later the CIA issued key-impressioning kits using modeling clay in pocketable aluminum molds, and improved on concealable pocketknife designs with six small tools.

CIII. Concealments: Craftsman, Artist, Magician A CIA concealment specialist combines the skills of a craftsman, the creativity of an artist, and the illusion of a magician.

Conjurers’ clothing is tailored to incorporate special pockets for concealing paraphernalia, distributing weight and bulk while keeping items accessible.

CIV. Avoiding Suspicion with Clothing If a conjurer’s attire is noticeably large to accommodate a hidden item, suspicions will be raised.

"Any variation from the norm attracts undesirable attention from the viewpoint of the magic," emphasizing the need for naturalness in appearance for both magicians and spies.

CV. Richard Jacob's Raincoat Concealment CIA officer Richard Jacob wore a specially tailored raincoat in Moscow in 1962, which included a slit inside a pocket.

When about to be detained after retrieving Minox film, he dropped the matchbox through the slit to the inside of the coat, letting it fall to the floor to avoid being apprehended with stolen secrets.

CVI. Shoe Concealments for Spies Shoes were ideal concealment cavities for both conjurers and spies, with the hollow Mokana shoe being a favorite throughout the Cold War.

East German agents used concealment heels to transport Minox film cassettes in men’s and women’s shoes.

CVII. Eavesdropping in Shoe Heels In the 1960s, Czechoslovakian intelligence (StB) technicians placed an entire eavesdropping transmitter in the heel of an unsuspecting U.S. ambassador’s shoe.

When activated, the ambassador became a "walking broadcasting station" bugging his own secret meetings.

CVIII. Concealment Coin for U2 Pilots In the late 1950s, the U.S. Army Special Operations Division and Technical Services Staff created a concealment coin for U2 pilots overflying the USSR.

This silver dollar coin contained a hollow straight pin with a poison needle, designed for quick suicide, which was issued to Francis Gary Powers.

CIX. Powers' Coin Recovery and Trial On May 1, 1960, after his U2 was shot down, Francis Gary Powers hid the pin in his pocket and discarded the coin.

Both the coin and pin were recovered by the KGB and used as evidence against Powers at his subsequent trial for espionage.

CX. Subminiature Radios and Ear Concealments In the 1970s, subminiature radios could be hidden inside a performer's clothing with wires to a concealed earpiece, initially hidden by long hair.

Later, hearing-aid-size receivers fitted directly into the ear canal, and the CIA developed a color-matched silicon covering camouflaged to replicate inner ear contours.

CXI. Martha Peterson's Earpiece The CIA-developed ear concealment was so effective that the KGB missed it during a search of CIA officer Martha Peterson after her detention in Moscow in 1977.

Although Peterson’s surveillance radio, attached to her bra, was discovered, the absence of visible wires caused the KGB to ignore the concealed earpiece.

CXII. False Scrotum for Escape Radio In the late 1960s, the CIA fielded a military request for concealing a subminiature escape radio on a downed pilot likely to be captured.

CIA engineers created a false rubber scrotum, matched to skin color and anatomically detailed, which fit over the wearer’s testicles and formed a cavity large enough to conceal the radio.

CXIII. Concealing Larger Objects: Car and Luggage Magicians consider any object on stage, from tables to props, as a partial concealment cavity.

The CIA smuggled a spy concealed within a new Mercedes by redesigning its fuel tank to fit a person, appearing factory-new externally.

CXIV. Stacked Concealments Intelligence services used stacked luggage on a hand dolly, with hidden openings allowing a person to sit inside, appearing as unmodified luggage.

Another technique involved stacking cases of bottled water side by side, which appeared to allow light to pass through but contained a hidden cavity for a person.

CXV. New Generation of Hollywood Illusionists These ingenious concealment illusions for spies had been constructed using designs from a new generation of Hollywood illusionists brought to the CIA in the mid-1970s.

The same principles of optical illusions that amazed audiences in Las Vegas stage performances paved the way for more daring and successful CIA clandestine operations.

CXVI. Dead Drop "Host Carcasses" Cold War operational requirements led the CIA to create a category of dead drop concealments using "host carcasses".

Pigeons and rodents were attractive hosts because they were small enough to be carried and found worldwide, with eviscerated and preserved body cavities large enough for money, instructions, cameras, or notes.

CXVII. Preventing Animal Disturbance of Dead Drops A problem arose when deployed rats used as dead drops unexpectedly went missing due to hungry cats.

The solution was a liberal dousing of hot pepper sauce on the rodent before the operation to deter animals.

CXVIII. "Active" vs. "Passive" Concealments The CIA designed "active" concealments where an item retained its original function but masked a concealed cavity, like a Cricket cigarette lighter concealing a tiny document camera.

"Passive" concealments perform no function other than to conceal a cavity, such as a large wooden storage cabinet masking an escape tunnel entrance.

CXIX. Magic Coins: Deception Tools Coins provide objects for magicians and spies that can easily deceive and confound audiences and targets.

A spy’s coin can mask the presence of an attached pill, conceal a hidden powder, or contain a secret message.

CXX. "Close-up Magic" for Espionage Magicians refer to performances with coins as "close-up magic" due to the small size of objects and short distance from the audience.

For intelligence officers, performing a trick in close proximity to the target minimized exposure to onlookers and limited the target’s sight lines.

CXXI. Familiarity and Lack of Suspicion with Coins Coins create no suspicion due to their universal presence, unlike other magical apparatus that arouse curiosity.

Most people do not assume coins will be modified or used in deception, a perception that can be readily exploited.

CXXII. Mulholland's Use of Unmodified Coins Mulholland understood that maximum audience deception occurred when real coins were used for espionage "magic".

Most coins in his manual were unmodified, with a pill affixed to the back of a real coin with gum Arabic or magician’s wax.

CXXIII. Gimmicked Coins vs. Spy Coins Professional coin manipulators use gimmicked coins for quick manipulation in illusions, but these would not survive close examination or satisfy intelligence service requirements for clandestine communication.

Spy coins, especially hollow ones, were primarily used for transporting and exchanging information.

CXXIV. Soviet Hollow Coins and Microdots Soviet agents used hollow coins as early as the 1930s to conceal secret information on microdots, "soft film," or "onetime-pads".

"Soft film" is the thin, fragile emulsion layer of film stripped from its backing, while "microdots" are optical reductions of photographic negatives to a tiny, illegible size without magnification.

CXXV. The Hollow Nickel Case In the early 1950s, attention was drawn to Soviet spy coins in the U.S. during the famous Hollow Nickel Case.

In 1935, a young Brooklyn newspaper boy dropped a nickel that split open to reveal a tiny piece of ciphered film, part of a covert communication exchange between Soviet spy Rudolph Ivanovich Abel and his assistant, Reino Hayhanen.

CXXVI. FBI Investigation and Hayhanen's Defection FBI Special Agent Robert J. Lamphere examined the nickel in 1953, correctly concluding a Soviet "illegal" was operating in New York City, though he couldn't identify the owner or break the cipher.

The mystery was unresolved until Hayhanen defected in Paris in 1957, revealing Abel’s use of the coin and leading to Abel's conviction.

CXXVII. Risk of Losing Spy Coins The effectiveness of coins as hiding places also made them easy to lose, as they were small and could be dropped, mistakenly spent, or mixed with other coins.

Valeri Mikhaylovich Makayev, another Russian "illegal," lost a hollow Swiss coin containing operational instructions on microfilm, leading to his career ending.

CXXVIII. East German Concealment Coins The East German foreign intelligence service, HVA, produced concealment coins with three different opening methods, each appearing externally unmodified but requiring distinct techniques to access.

These included the "pinhole coin" (similar to KGB designs), the "screw-top coin" (with a threaded inner face), and the "bang-ring coin" (requiring a machined ring and impact to open).

CXXIX. KGB Loginov's Indian Rupee Coin In 1966, the KGB sent Major Yuri Nikolayevich Loginov, posing as a Canadian businessman, to South Africa with a small Indian rupee coin concealing soft film.

The coin, machined at the KGB’s OTU, was constructed from two rupee coins fitted together, appearing unaltered and opening with a tiny needle inserted into a small hole.

CXXX. Threaded Coins for Reuse Most coins for clandestine operations employed threaded openings, which screwed together and were reusable by the agent for storing or transporting cipher material.

Finely cut threads fit snugly and were less likely to come loose, though some agents had difficulty opening them without sticky tape to improve grip.

CXXXI. "Onetime" Non-Threaded Coins In rare circumstances requiring extra scrutiny, a "onetime," non-threaded coin was constructed, loaded, and sealed like a dead drop, with weight identical to an unmodified coin.

Opening such a coin required special knowledge, such as a temperature-sensitive seal activated by mild heating in coffee or tea to release glue or a low melting alloy.

CXXXII. The CIA Museum's Eisenhower Silver Dollar The CIA Museum displays an Eisenhower silver dollar described as a concealment device for hiding messages or film, almost undetectable as ordinary pocket change.

The origin of this coin is uncertain, but its method of quick access (squeezing near the edge) makes it an unlikely candidate for secure message concealment, favoring a magician’s use.

CXXXIII. Mulholland's "Dope Coin" Magician Ben Robinson’s research into John Mulholland’s papers discovered a "clever 'dope coin' that Mulholland machined for the Agency in 1953" from a 1921 Silver Dollar.

This coin opens when the word "peace" is gently pushed between thumb and forefinger, identical to the CIA silver-dollar hollow container, suggesting Mulholland transferred his magic knowledge to the CIA.

CXXXIV. Invisibility Cloak: The Ultimate Tool The principles of magic learned from Mulholland and conjurers like Houdini and Maskelyne, combined with twenty-first-century technology, continue to influence espionage.

An "invisibility cloak," the ultimate tool for both magicians and intelligence operations, now appears possible, with scientific experiments confirming light waves can be bent to make objects invisible or appear as something else.

CXXXV. Impact of Electronic Invisibility Cloak on Operations The effect of an electronic cloak of invisibility on clandestine operations would be sweeping.

Sensors, listening devices, cameras, and data intercept devices could be hidden in plain sight, and dead drops could be serviced with impunity.

CXXXVI. Goals of Espionage and Magic Remain Unchanged New technologies, however amazing, provide only additional methods for creating deceptions and illusions.

The goals and objectives of both spies and magicians remain unchanged, focusing on achieving their respective outcomes through deception.

CXXXVII. Purpose of Mulholland's Manual The purpose of Mulholland's paper, "Some Operational Applications of the Art of Deception," is to instruct the reader in performing various acts secretly and undetectably.

In short, it provides instructions in deception.

CXXXVIII. Deception Relies on Attitude of Mind Successful deception depends significantly on one's attitude of mind.

Holding even one erroneous belief about deception can make it difficult to attain the proper mental approach.

CXXXIX. Practice is Essential for Deception While practice is essential to successful deception, much less is needed than imagined if a person knows exactly what to do, how, and why.

The success of the act becomes more a matter of memorization of details than of physical repetition.

CXL. Fallacies About Magicians' Methods Popular opinion wrongly attributes a magician’s success to "the hand is quicker than the eye" for small tricks, or to mirrors for large ones.

Such beliefs are fundamentally incorrect, as even the fastest human movements are discernible to the average eye, which is a hundred times faster than a highly trained finger movement.

CXLI. Magicians Do Not Use Speed Magicians do not use speed in their actions; rather, they perform secret movements with deliberation.

Movement of any kind attracts attention, and trickery depends upon not attracting attention to the method of performance.

CXLII. Limitations of Mirrors in Magic Mirrors have limited effective use in magic, capable of hiding only one object by reflecting another.

A mirror cannot reflect nothing, and it becomes visible if not abutting a solid object; larger audiences further restrict their use due to angle of reflection.

CXLIII. Multiplicity of Secrets in Magic There is no single secret to magic or any part of it; it is the multiplicity of secrets and variety of methods that make magic possible.

The proper secret for a magician to use is the one best suited to the conditions and circumstances of the performance.

CXLIV. Tricksters' Advantage: Undetected Identity All tricksters, other than magicians, greatly benefit from not being known or even suspected of being tricksters.

This allows them to perform trickery only when advantageous and when conditions are favorable for success, and to choose the most suitable trick at the moment.

CXLV. Gamblers' Tricks: Probabilistic Advantage, Not Certainty Gamblers' tricks are intended to give enough advantage to increase the probability of winning above chance expectation, not to guarantee a win.

This probabilistic approach also minimizes the possibility of the gambler’s tricks being discovered.

CXLVI. Misconceptions About Card Sharks Popular belief holds that skilled card sharks can deal themselves any desired card, but this is not possible.

A professional gambler relies largely on thorough knowledge of the game, memory of cards played, and a full understanding of mathematical probabilities.

CXLVII. Marked Decks and Card Marking The common belief that demanding a new deck ensures cards are unmarked is false; new decks can have marks, or marked decks can be substituted.

It is also quite possible to mark cards while the game is being played.

CXLVIII. Pickpockets: Accustoming the Victim Pickpockets are often credited with a delicacy of touch that allows them to steal without the victim feeling it, but for sober individuals, deftness alone is not enough.

The method generally used is to accustom the victim to being touched (usually in a crowd) so they are unaware of the extra touch during the theft.

CXLIX. Role of Pickpocket Confederates Confederates are sometimes used by pickpockets, not primarily for jostling, but to prepare the victim by accustoming them to touch.

The chief task of a confederate is to accept the loot and leave the vicinity, freeing the pickpocket of incriminating evidence.

CL. Confidence Men and Victim Cupidity Sellers of "goldbricks" or confidence men rely mainly on the cupidity (greed) of their dupes.

The victim’s avarice leads them to ignore the obvious fact that the "bargain" offered must be untrue or illegal.

CLI. Psychological Basis of Trickery The public largely holds untrue beliefs about how trickery is accomplished, failing to grasp the actual methods.

One not aware of these false beliefs will be subconsciously bothered and unable to perform false actions smoothly.

CLII. Choosing a Trick Method There is never a single secret for any trick; the sole criterion is that the chosen method ensures the trick’s success.

Two main reasons for choosing a particular method are its fit with the performer’s physique, mannerisms, and personality, and the conditions at the time of performance.

CLIII. The Trick Fools the Brain, Not the Eye The basic principle in performing a trick is to do it so that secret actions are not observed, because "One can only see what one observes, and one observes only things which are already in the mind".

A trick does not fool the eye but fools the brain, as secret parts are not noticed because they are minor additions to other actions done for legitimate reasons.

CLIV. Naturalness in Secret Actions The "secret" actions must fit in with the openly done actions and not be emphasized more than others.

The success of a trick relies on the naturalness with which the performer acts out their role, as if no thought were needed and it's an automatic action.

CLV. Example: Secretly Taking Salt To secretly put salt into a coat pocket, the trickster openly handles the saltcellar as if it’s clogged, then discreetly transfers salt to their hand.

The wait before putting the hand in the pocket ensures no obvious connection between the salt going into the hand and the hand going into the pocket.

CLVI. Timing in Tricks: When and Cadence Timing is crucial, involving when the trick is done (e.g., not immediately after someone else used the saltcellar successfully) and the cadence of actions.

The accent is given to what is wished to be noticed, with little attention paid to unstressed actions.

CLVII. Simplicity in Trick Design In planning a trick, first determine exactly what is to be accomplished, as planning from generalities leads to complication.

A good trick must be simple in its basic idea, even if details of performance are elaborated.

CLVIII. Masking Actions with False Premises After determining what to do, decide the easiest way to do it without secrecy, and then add a detail that keeps the action from being noticed.

The trick often relies entirely on a false premise induced in the minds of spectators, such as the pretense that a saltshaker is clogged.

CLIX. Pantomime and Distraction in Deception False ideas that mask essential actions are often suggested by routine pantomime rather than words.

Relying on simple pantomime allows actions to be minimized by talking on a totally unrelated subject while the actions are made.

CLX. Trickery as Acted Lie Trickery primarily depends upon a manner of thinking; it is a lie acted.

More thought and care are needed to act out a lie than to tell one, as false actions are more obvious in their incongruity than words.

CLXI. Avoiding Attraction of Attention The oblique thinking of the trickster must be acceptable to spectators, not violating manners or customs, nor attracting special attention.

Anything unusual in action or speech will attract attention and should be avoided, as it might arouse suspicion later even if not discovered during the trick.

CLXII. Knowing the Audience Before planning a trick, the trickster must know the kind of people their audience will be, including their nationality.

This knowledge prevents planning a trick that relies on an object or action (e.g., borrowing a watch, slapping a back) that might be unsuitable or offensive to the specific audience.

CLXIII. "At-a-Tangent Thinking" "At-a-tangent thinking" describes how a trickster plans, doing or saying something that touches the subject but actually shoots off from it, making the deviation unnoticeable.

The false action must be so natural as to be acceptable.

CLXIV. Spectator Attention: Expected vs. Surprising Actions No action which is expected will be noticed, but all actions which are surprising to a spectator will be noticed.

Many surprising actions will be immediately forgotten if followed at once by a rational explanation.

CLXV. Naturalness in Unexpected Actions Pouring liquid on food will be noticed but not remembered if it seems accidental, accompanied by a twitch as if in pain and a statement like "There must be a pin on the chair," especially if a pin is then produced.

Natural and normal actions excite no interest and are not observed, while unnatural actions attract attention unless a simple, satisfactory explanation is given.

CLXVI. Focused vs. Wandering Interest A person seemingly interested in what they are doing will not be noticed.

One whose interest is directed toward what others are doing, or who seems interested in everything except their own activity or companions, will always attract attention.

CLXVII. Posture and Conspicuousness Posture is important in avoiding conspicuousness; a person at ease, showing no physical effort and confident in their right to be there, attracts little attention.

Stiff or slouched postures will be noticed.

CLXVIII. Avoiding Fidgeting Fidgeting attracts attention quickly, including constantly shifting position, repeatedly putting hands in and out of pockets, tapping, or playing with items like watch chains or coins.

The calm, quiet, relaxed person (if normal in appearance) does not attract attention.

CLXIX. Describing Imaginary Persons for Deception When attributing actions to an imaginary person, avoid describing someone unusual and striking, as it's easy to ascertain their nonexistence.

Instead, describe an average person with some minor, unlikely but easily noticed oddity (e.g., missing finger joint, large mole) to make the description acceptable and difficult to disprove.

CLXX. Performer's Naturalness and Confidence A successful trickster should be so normal in manner and natural in actions that nothing about them excites suspicion.

Confidence, a direct result of preparation and certainty of being ready, is nothing to be exhibited as cockiness, but a feeling of being prepared for the job.

CLXXI. Adjusting for Distance in Performance When appearing before a large audience, natural mannerisms can seem false due to distance, so stage actors make gestures broader and slower.

However, for tricks performed "right up close" (for few people), there is no need to alter actions or manner, as only part of the performer is within the spectator’s vision.

CLXXII. Simplicity and Preparation in Tricks Simple tricks require only knowledge, understanding, confidence, and a small amount of ingenuity, without needing to develop manual skills or intricate sleight of hand.

The easier the manipulation in a trick, the more essential it becomes for the performer to have every detail clearly in mind, as simple trickery depends entirely upon an idea and a routine.

CLXXIII. Mindset for Learning Deception To approach deception properly, one's mind must be free of all commonly held, erroneous ideas about how tricksters operate.

Starting with a clear mind eliminates 75 percent of the difficulty in learning to do tricks.

CLXXIV. Deceiving the Mind vs. The Eye Trickery basically depends upon elementary psychology; the objective is to deceive the mind rather than the eye.

When the mind has been deceived, it is almost impossible to work backward and discover the deception, even if the eyes were misled.

CLXXV. Importance of Time Element The performer must have a realization of the element of time, knowing the proper time to start trickery and the importance of time in each detail of the performance.

Confidence comes from thorough mental and physical practice, making actions and words smooth and unhesitant.

CLXXVI. Thorough Preparation Prevents Failure The performer must accept that they cannot know too much about what they plan to do; every detail beyond the bare essentials eliminates the possibility of failure.

Worry, error, and detection can all be eliminated by thoughtful, careful preparation, similar to a scientific expedition avoiding "adventures" through proper readiness.

CLXXVII. Flexibility and Knowledge in Execution The performer's knowledge must be so complete that they know each detail of how and why each point in the trick is done.

They must also know when conditions demand a change and how to make such change without being disturbed, which requires flexibility of mind coupled with knowledge, not manipulation.

CLXXVIII. Handling Tablets: Matchbook Method The first trick described involves handling tablets using a paper matchbook, a natural action for any smoker.

A small pill can be stuck to the back of the match packet where it is easily knocked off by rubbing the tip of the third finger, remaining hidden from sight.

CLXXIX. Matchbook Trick Performance Routine The routine for a smoking spectator involves taking matches, tearing one off, and holding the packet close for lighting, a courteous gesture.

As the spectator lights up, the performer leans back, bringing the left hand (holding the pill) over the glass/cup, dropping the pill into the liquid with a continuous, slow motion.

CLXXX. Psychological Basis for Pill Dropping The pill is dropped as the arm is brought back to the body because secret moves performed as part of a broader action are less obvious when the main action is completed.

The psychological basis is that a small action is unnoticed when done during a broader gesture with an obvious, dissociated reason.

CLXXXI. Nonsmoker Routine: Wallet/Notebook Carrier For a nonsmoking spectator, the pill can be affixed to the back of a wallet, notebook, or small paper pad.

The object is brought close to the spectator while taking out a paper with a question, allowing the performer to drop the pill into the drink as the left hand is brought back.

CLXXXII. Pill Carrier Protection and Handling To prevent a pill from accidentally loosening in the pocket, a stiff, open-top box should be used to hold the carrier object, ensuring easy grasp and withdrawal.

For larger pills (3/8 inch diameter), it may be easier to hold the pill directly in the fingers at the base of the third and little fingers, curled to mask it from sight.

CLXXXIII. Pill Container for Finger Grip When holding a pill directly in the fingers, a small container with an open end is advisable to carry the pill in the pocket, preventing crushing or contamination.

The pill is tipped from the container into the hand in the pocket and pushed into position by the thumb before the main object (e.g., matchbook) is taken.

CLXXXIV. Coin as Pill Carrier A pill can be stuck to the center of one side of a coin, carried with other coins, with the loaded coin placed pill-side down on the palm of the other hand.

The purpose of taking coins out is ostensibly a minor purchase, allowing the performer to show the coins and drop the pill when the spectator's attention is diverted.

CLXXXV. Mental State During Performance Physically, at the moment of concentrated thought during an action, there is a noticeable alertness.

Assuming a mildly stupid appearance (relaxing facial muscles, throwing eyes out of focus) during a trick gives the appearance of disinterest and avoids wariness from the spectator.

CLXXXVI. Gum Arabic as Adhesive for Pills Powdered gum arabic mixed with water makes an excellent adhesive for pills, simple to apply, holding firmly, dissolving quickly in any beverage without residue, and easily obtained.

A minute quantity mixed to a thick gruel consistency is enough to hold even a large pill.

CLXXXVII. Handling Powders: Pencil Containers Loose, salt-like material (powders) requires a container that safely holds it, can instantly release it, and does not appear to be a container, having a common use.

Instructions for powdered solids are based on using a pencil as the container, which normally excites no suspicion.

CLXXXVIII. Appearance of "Loaded" Pencil Common objects are less apt to be suspected if not new; thus, a "loaded" pencil should not be new.

A pencil from four to five inches long, appearing sharpened and resharpened, will not attract attention; a stub (1-2 inches) is too awkward and noticeable.

CLXXXIX. Three Ways to Prepare a Pencil Container Pencils can be prepared in three ways depending on the amount of powder: 1) by removing the eraser and using the metal tube for 1-15 grains.

2. by drilling out the center after eraser removal for up to a cubic centimeter; 3) by using glazed colored paper to create a larger tube for up to a half teaspoon.

CXC. Pencil Container Routine The performance routine for pencils is similar to pills: secretly putting powder into a spectator’s beverage.

The duplicate pencil (unloaded) is introduced first, then replaced with the loaded one from the pocket, and used as a pointer.

CXCI. Pencil Grip and Powder Release An easy and natural way to hold the pencil as a pointer is between the first and second fingers, like a cigarette, with the thumb pressed against the rubber end.

The powder is released by twisting the wrist to turn the pencil point towards the ceiling and simultaneously removing the thumb from the open end, allowing the powder to fall into the liquid.

CXCII. Exchanging Pencils After Release Immediately after the powder falls out, the performer casually returns the prepared pencil to the pocket and picks up the duplicate.

This substitution ensures the spectator can pick up a pencil later without calling more attention to it.

CXCIII. Liquid Containers: Polyethylene Tubing A liquid requires a non-absorbent container constructed to easily and quickly release all liquid.

Polyethylene tubing, being flexible, can be flattened and cut to make containers that hold and release liquid by pressure, with a small hole (1/32 inch) for an almost invisible stream.

CXCIV. Matchbook Concealment for Liquid A liquid container can be hidden inside a paper matchbook by removing some matches and a section of cardboard, then inserting a sealed polyethylene tube.

The container’s tip, with a pinhole, protrudes slightly, held firmly by the bottom fold of the packet and secured with Scotch tape.

CXCV. Filling and Handling the Liquid Matchbook The container is filled by compressing its walls to exclude air, then putting the point into liquid and releasing pressure to suck in the liquid.

The matchbook is held with the thumb on the face and fingers on the back, exerting pressure on the container to eject the liquid.

CXCVI. Cover Stories for Deception It is unnecessary for the writer to devise a story for each container, as the reader can fit their own story to the circumstances of performance.

The story must be rational and simple, avoiding elaborate complications that cause doubt, and its details must be correct even if the story is untrue.

CXCVII. Conviction in Storytelling Telling a story with conviction is merely a matter of acting as if the story were gospel.

It is easy to act as if one believes a story if its details have been thought through, allowing it to be told without hesitation or fumbling for words.

CXCVIII. Coin with Liquid Container A container holding eight or ten drops of liquid can be stuck to the back of a coin the size of a quarter, shaped like an uppercase letter O.

It should be aligned with the coin’s design, with the hole at the bottom, allowing proper direction of liquid release by looking at the coin’s face.

CXCIX. Hand-Held Liquid Containers for Gestures A container for two to five drops can be made small enough to be hidden invisibly between the first finger and thumb for liquid release and a thread to pull the cork.