VERÖFFENTLICHT 23. JUNI 2022  

Dmytro Kuleba - How Ukraine Will Win – Kyiv’s Theory of Victory
Foreign Affairs, June 17, 2022

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-17/how-ukraine-will-win

 
DMYTRO KULEBA is Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.

The Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dmytro Kuleba, is no defeatist. Nobody should expect him to write an article about the possibility that the Ukraine could not win the war against Russia. The Ukrainian president and his government have the duty to motivate their soldiers and their population for an utmost effort to defend the country fighting for the mere existence of the Ukrainian nation.

However, this understandable and necessary optimism brings with it the danger that the enemy may be underestimated. In a war realism is a vital necessity. There are some questions the Ukrainian government must answer – if not in public, then internally. Friends of Ukraine must discuss these questions with the Ukrainian authorities, but they should not pretend that they could answer them for the Ukrainians.

The explanations of Minister Kuleba come very timely. It is important to tell the friends of Ukraine how the country may win the war. At the same time the Ukrainian diplomacy must take care not to lose friends.

In the following lines I will mark the words of the Ukrainian Minister of foreign affairs, Dmytro Kuleba, with italic blue letters, my own comments will follow with black letters.

As Russia’s all-out war of aggression in Ukraine drags on for a fourth consecutive month, calls for dangerous deals are getting louder. As fatigue grows and  attention wanders, more and more Kremlin-leaning commentators are proposing to sell out Ukraine for the sake of peace and economic stability in their own countries. Although they may pose as pacifists or realists, they are better understood as enablers of Russian imperialism and war crimes.

Fatigue grows and attention wanders – that is a fact. There is no doubt that Russia wages a war of desinformation against Ukraine. That must be countered forcefully. However, in such a situation it is not helpful, to call all people who have different and possibly wrong views „Kremlin-leaning“ and „enablers of Russian imperialism and war crimes“. It is good to make clear that Ukraine is not for sale. But to win more friends, the Ukrainian government must understand the interests of their partners, accept them as legitimate, take them into account, and try to show, that these interests are compatible with supporting the Ukrainian efforts. This is smart diplomacy!

… Russian President Vadimir Putin does not simply want to take more Ukrainian territory. …. He wants to eviscerate Ukrainian nationhood and wipe our people off the map, He is, in other words, engaged in a campaign of genocide.

Without embarking on the debate about the nitty-gritty of the difference between genocide and ethnocide, it is clear that Putin wants to destroy the independent Ukrainian state and the identity of the Ukrainian people. Even in a world abounding with violent conflicts this is extraordinary, and needs an extraordinary answer from the world community.

This war is existential, and we are motivated to fight.

Before 2014 there may have been doubts, if the Ukrainian people were willing to defend its independence. But the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian army and the Ukrainian people under the vigourous leadership of President Zelensky against the Russian aggression has dissipated all doubts.

Properly armed, our forces can stretch Putin’s troops—which are already exhausted—past the breaking point. … We can counterattack Russian forces in both Ukraine’s south and Ukraine’s east, pressuring Putin to decide which of his gains to protect.

Minister Kuleba wants to make clear that Ukraine CAN WIN the war. He believes that the Russia is not able to advance concentrating their forces on the Donbass front as well as on the southern front at the same time. But the Ukrainian forces are confronted with the same problem. The Russian leadership seems to believe that Russian forces can prevail by sheer numbers, even if the motivation, training and skills of the Russian troops have severe deficits. There is no doubt, that Putin is willing to sacrifice the lives of many of his soldiers using them as cannon fodder. Lamentably in a war of attrition this could be a successful strategy.

To succeed, however, the United States and its European allies must swiftly supply our country with appropriate numbers of advanced heavy weapons.

The Ukrainian strategy can only succeed with advanced heavy weapons from the United States and Europe. But such a success will only be sustainable if the flow of weapons can steadily replace losses through reliable supply lines. The production of weapons in the countries supporting Ukraine must be increased faster than the production of arms replacements in Russia. If the war drags on, the West should soon increase the production capacity for arms and ammunition.

They must also maintain and increase sanctions against Russia.

All kind of effective sanctions will need sacrifices – much less sacrifice than the Ukrainian people give for their freedom but anyway coming with a cost. People in the West must endorse the necessity of such cost. Therefore Ukrainian diplomacy must be careful not to divide public opinion in Germany and other Western countries – the Ukrainian ambassador in Germany, Andrej Melnik, has done a lot to antagonise part of the Germans instead of winning them over.

Sanctions that are more harmful to the West than they are for Russia make no sense. It may take some time to overcome dependencies of Western countries from Russian energy. Russia may use this for counter-sanctions. However, Kuleba is right insisting that sanctions must be maintained and possibly the enlarged.

And, critically, they need to ignore calls for diplomatic settlements that would help Putin before he makes serious concessions.

President Zelensky himself accepted diplomatic negotiations just after the Russian aggression against Ukraine had started. Obviously Russia did not negotiate in good faith but wanted nothing less than the capitulation of Ukraine, while Russian troops stood at the doorsteps of Kiev. Therefore Ukraine is right to ignore calls for a diplomatic settlement in favour of Putin. This does not exclude the  necessity of continuous efforts to keep some communication channels open, possibly through third parties. But Western politicians should avoid giving any „good advice“ to the Ukrainians about what could be a „compromise“.

Compromising with Russia may seem tempting to some abroad, especially as the costs of the war grow, but bowing to Putin’s aggression will help him destroy more of our nation, embolden his government to carry out attacks elsewhere in the world, and allow him to rewrite the rules of the global order.

Any compromise that makes Putin believe, that his aggression gives him an advantage, will only embolden him to continue an aggressive policy. This is the meaning of: „Putin must not win!“

His approach to talks could change; if we succeed in pushing back Russian troops far enough, Putin may be compelled to come to the table and deal in good faith.

This is the right approach, even if it is difficult to predict where and when the military situation will compel Putin to negotiate in good faith about the lasting peace based on the recognition of the independence, sovereignty, and secure borders of Ukraine.

But getting there will require that the West exercise patient dedication to one outcome: a complete and total Ukrainian victory.

Minister Kuleba wants to convince us that „Ukraine must win!“ I would not expect anything else from any member of the Ukrainian government. But for other countries some questions have to be answered: what does a complete and total Ukrainian victory mean? Does it mean that Russian forces are thrown back far enough to be forced to the negotiation table? Does it mean that all Ukrainian territories are liberated from Russian control, including the Crimean peninsula and including the port of Sebastopol? Or does it mean forcing regime change on Russia and the settlement that makes the future Russia unable to stage a similar aggression in the foreseeable future?

Foreign Minister Kuleba is optimistic, that with advanced Western weapons Ukraine could stop the Russians advancing either in the Donbass or in the South. He believes that at some time Ukraine could push back the Russian forces from Ukrainian territory. I do not see any problems for the West to support that kind of a Ukrainian military victory.

But wars are unpredictable and it may happen that the Ukrainian government comes to the conclusion, that some compromise may help to reach a stable and durable political solution. The West has an interest for the most complete Ukrainian rejection of Russian forces that is possible, but necessities on the ground may lead to a less complete victory.

… In early June, French President Emmanuel Macron told journalists that the West “must not humiliate Russia” so that it can “build an exit ramp” for the country to end the war. Speaking to the World Economic Forum in May, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger went further, arguing that Ukraine should cede territory to Russia in exchange for peace.

Emmanuel Macron is arguing from the historical experience with German French relations. It was the fatal error of the newly founded German Empire to humiliate France in Versailles in 1871, and it was an even more fatal mistake, to humiliate Germany in the treaty of Versailles in 1919, both humiliations leading to deep resentment and the longing for revanche. But such humiliations took place after the country that started the war had been defeated. Certainly President Putin will feel „humiliated“ just by not winning his war. We have no reason to spare him from that self-inflicted humiliation.

At some point of any conflict „building an exit ramp“ to end the war can possibly be helpful. But we are far away from that point today. But it is right to think about it.

The recommendation of Henry Kissinger shows that he is still thinking the categories of the Cold War between two imperial superpowers which need a certain balance of power. Empires need zones of influence. They are incompatible with the independence and freedom of their „near neighbourhood“. Kuleba is right to reject such unhelpful suggestions.

These declarations are premised on the idea that Ukrainians, no matter how well they fight, cannot defeat Moscow’s forces. But that notion is wrong. … Ukraine has proved its mettle by achieving important victories in the battles of  Chernihiv, Kharkiv, Kyiv, and Sumy, causing Putin’s blitzkrieg to fail spectacularly. …

The idea that Russian forces cannot be defeated by any European country, but only by an alliance with the strongest superpower USA in NATO, is another relic from the Cold War. However, Russia is the second biggest nuclear power of the world. Deterrence between big powers is intact even if it’s stability may be shaky. As long as the American nuclear umbrella protects NATO, a Russian attack on NATO-territory would be suicide. But that also excludes any notion of the possibility of „unconditional surrender“ on the Russian side. This makes talking of a „total victory“ against Russia sound like wishful thinking.

The Ukrainian resistance against the Russian aggression has been heroic. But winning battles does not mean winning a war. Ukrainian forces can defeat Moscow’s forces, but they definiteley cannot crush Russia. For a successful strategy it is sufficient to make the aggression as costly as possible for the Putin regime. Hope for regime change may be remote, but it is still a possibility. It is also necessary to keep the West united against Russia – and Ukraine must help to keep that unity.

The greatest danger for Western unity will be another presidency of Donald Trump or his cronies in the United States. Putin knows this and may be tempted to drag on with the war until the „dealmakers“ (who made the bad deals on Afghanistan or Syria, making America small again) come to power and may also make a deal with Putin.

… Putin has begun comparing himself to Peter the Great—perhaps the Russian empire’s most famous conqueror. It’s an ominous declaration, one that suggests that Putin will not settle for control over the Donbas or for control over Ukraine as a whole. … The most effective way to end Putin’s expansionism, of course, is to stop it in eastern Ukraine, before he can go further, and to kick his occupying forces out of southern Ukraine, which he plans to annex. This fact requires helping Ukraine defeat Putin on its own battlefield. …

Powerful intellectual dwarfs tend to megalomania. When Putin compares himself with Peter the Great he is not only serving a powerful historic myth, but he is also showing a strong loss of reality. In June 2022 it is important to stop the Russian forces in the Donbass and in southern Ukraine. But Ukraine and the West must be prepared that Russia may open up other battlefields, military and political. Guerilla warfare behind the Russian lines may show Putin that even if his troops are advancing he will not be in control of any occupied Ukrainian territory. The West must prepare itself for an intensified information and cyber war.

This assistance has been a crucial first step, for which we are grateful. Yet we wish it had been provided much earlier, and it is still too little. Now it is time to turn political decisions into real game-changing actions. Russian artillery outguns ours by one to 15 at the most crucial parts of the frontline, so a few U.S. rocket systems will not be nearly enough for us to gain the upper hand. We urgently need more heavy weapons from various sources to turn the tide in our favor and save lives. Our most pressing needs are for hundreds of multiple-launch rocket systems and various 155-mm artillery pieces. These weapons would allow us to suppress Russia’s artillery barrage. … But stopping artillery is not Ukraine’s only concern. We also need antiship missiles, tanks, armored vehicles, air defense, and combat aircraft to be able to launch effective counterattacks. … In short, we need weapons that prove that the West is committed to helping us actually win—rather than to just not letting us lose.

There is a basic fact that must not be neglected: the Western countries that guaranteed Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity with the Budapest protocol in 1994 have always been and still are unwilling to fight a war against Russia for the sake of Ukraine. When Chancellor Merkel did not agree to have a NATO membership action plan (MAP) for Ukraine in 2008 the reason had not been to please Russia. But Ukraine had not been ready politically while the majority of the population was still not in favour to join the alliance, and it had not been ready militarily to resist destabilisation and an attack from Russia at that time, which Merkel feared to happen in that case.

The United States and NATO were as unwilling in 2008 as they are today to extend the full guarantees of article 5 of the NATO treaty to Ukraine. However, any ambiguous policy towards any member country of NATO, and even towards a country having a MAP, would have destroyed the unambiguous trust in NATO. It is the principle of the Western alliance never to give guarantees which cannot and will not be fully honoured.

However, even if Ukraine is not a formal member of any alliance, the Russian aggression violated the principles of European security. Remember the consequences of the German violation of the neutrality of Belgium in 1914. Russia broke the post-cold-war order – Scholz and Macron had warned Putin of the consequences – but like all dictators he underestimated the resilience of democrats.

Russia has been told, that the United States and other NATO members are not part of the war in Ukraine, but Russia has also been told in clear terms, that an attack on any inch of NATO territory would be an attack against all NATO member states including the United States of America.

Putin’s aggression from 24 February 2022 is an attack against the international order, against Western values, and against the innocent population of a neighbouring country. The Russian president has threatened other neighbouring countries, even traditionally neutral states like Finland and Sweden. It’s imperialist and expansionist ideology threatens world peace. Therefore the aggression must not be successful. Therefore the West must support Ukraine not only politically but also with weapons.

I am no military expert. But the debate, especially in Germany, about „heavy weapons“ is awkward. The Ukrainian army knows best what it needs to stop the Russians and to make the agression fail. Whatever weaponry Russia is using against Ukraine should be countered by better weapons.There is a debate if there should be limits for the delivery of certain weapons to Ukraine. Behind that debate is a fear that Russia could escalate the war if core Russian territory is directly attacked or even invaded by Ukrainian forces. International law gives the attacked country the right not only to defend itself on its own territory, but also to counter-attack the territory that was the origin of the aggression. When Moscow sends missiles into the centre of Kiev, that gives Kiev the right to send missiles into the centre of Moscow. But the West does not want to support such an unlimited war.

Supporting a limited war is triggering a debate about the limits. Dmytro Kuleba fears that this could mean that the West will give Ukraine just enough weapons not to lose the war without any chance to win it. It has been said that Putin would lose the war if he does not win it. But I am not so sure about this if the campaign becomes a war of attrition. There are certainly some limits for Western support, but they should not be too narrow. The debates about limits is delicate: if Russia knows the limits in detail it could shape its military campaign according to these limits. Therefore Ukraine should be very careful not to press for a public debate (even if this may help to win some sectors in the West), but keep this debate very confidential.

Since the invasion began, Ukraine has repeatedly tried to find a diplomatic settlement with Russia. But Putin has rejected any meaningful talks because he expects that Western support for Ukraine will wane as the war grinds on.

… But Russia’s war is driven by genocidal intent, and so Ukraine and the whole of the West simply cannot agree to Russia’s demands. As Putin declared two days before the invasion, Ukraine’s very existence is a mistake—the Soviet Union, he said, “created” Ukraine by casually drawing boundaries on a map—and our country must be erased. In his view, Ukrainians can either become Russians or die.

Ukrainian diplomacy must actively work together with Western governments to avoid the effects of waning public support. I believe that the genocidal intent of Russia’s brutal war must not be forgotten. The explanations of the Ukrainian Foreign Minister in his article are very important to keep up support.

… We in Ukraine are not surprised by this brutal campaign. We have a deep knowledge of Russia and have watched for centuries as Russian intellectuals and state-controlled media incited hatred toward our nation.

During any war black and white stereotypes about the enemy are no surprise. However, the role of Russia in European history has been very complex. Russian armies helped to liberate Europe from the yoke of Napoleon’s empire. The Soviet army, including many Ukrainian soldiers, helped to crush the horror of the Nazi regime, while at the same time enlarging the zone of influence of the Stalin regime. Russian literature, art and music have enriched European culture.

We have also seen how Moscow’s animosity extends beyond our borders. Russian media routinely condemns other neighboring states, the West more broadly, and a variety of minority groups—including Jews and LGBTQ people. The Russian political elite has a generalized, deep-seated loathing of others.

The Russian media are mainly state-controlled, the ruling Russian political elite under Putin is a narrow group of corrupt, nationalist and imperialist kleptocrats. But this is not all of Russia. There have always been divisions between Slavophiles and Westerners, parties of war and parties of peace, autocrats and democrats, „kulturnye ljudy“ and brutes, KGB torturers and Helsinki groups and so on. Therefore the war is also a war inside of Russia. Hatred against the Putin regime is understandable, but any national hatred between Russians and Ukrainians would certainly alienate the Western public from supporting Ukraine.

This hatred is yet another reason why the West cannot afford to wave the white flag. A Russian military victory would not just enable the torture, rape, and murder of many more thousands …It would free up Russia to menace central Europe. … Indeed, it would allow Russia to threaten the Western world at large. Thankfully for Europe and the United States, Ukraine is fighting this dark force, and it is motivated to keep doing so until it wins. …

Those in Russia who hate Ukraine and hate the West must not prevail. Europe and the United States should be grateful to Ukraine for its heroic resistance. But at the same time it is very clear that the Western support for Ukraine is only possible as long as NATO-deterrence is functioning. That means we need a strong and united NATO and a strong and united bond between Europe and the United States of America. As we saw during the Trump administration, this link can also be threatened from the other side of the Atlantic. It is also in the interest of Ukraine not to undermine that unity by playing off one Western country against the other for short-term political gains.

It is unrealistic to suggest that Ukraine sacrifice its people, territory, and sovereignty in exchange for nominal peace, and these recent calls for compromise are merely a byproduct of a growing fatigue.

Any peace settlement may need compromise. Any such compromise will certainly reflect the result of the military relation of forces. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine is right to insist that this military relation of forces has to be shifted in favour of Ukraine because otherwise there could really be nothing but nominal peace, where Ukraine as well as the West remain under the permanent threat of extortion.

I have spoken with a number of decision-makers in African, Arab, and Asian states. Some of them … making a hard pivot, politely proposing that we simply stop resisting. It’s an unthinkable proposition, but their reasoning is simple: they want the grain trapped in our ports by Russia’s naval blockade, and they are willing to sacrifice Ukrainian independence to get it. Other policymakers peddling concessions have expressed concerns about similar Russian-provoked economic crises, including spiraling inflation and energy prices. …

A warfaring country has to concentrate all its attention to winning the war. But Ukraine should be realist: other countries have their own interests, some of them vital. And these interests are not automatically the same as Ukrainian interests. It is extremely important that Ukrainian ambassadors all over the world explain these interests to the Ukrainian president and government. I have the impression that ambassador Melnik in Berlin is just unable to fully understand these interests. Smart ambassadors know how to find the crucial link, the combination of interests, that convince other countries that it is in their own interest to help Ukraine.

It makes no sense and is even counter-productive to attack the position of countries, that prioritise feeding their population. They are not interested in questions of who is guilty, but just to get their grain delivered. For many governments in Africa and Asia Ukrainian independence is no priority, it is no justification to risk hunger. With the sanctions against Russia the European Union does in fact risk economic crisis, spiralling inflation and energy prices. Ukraine should not underestimate the political cost this means for the EU governments. I believe to pay this political cost is necessary. But Ukraine should help Western governments justifying this cost and avoid divisive polemics. Ukraine should be careful. For some countries, like India or Brazil, it is already a good start if Ukraine can convince them not to support Russia actively. Ukraine needs more friends. Polemics will not win them over.

If he succeeds in conquering Ukraine’s south, he may march deeper into the continent by invading Moldova, where Russian proxies already control a slice of territory.

I think the West is very aware about the dangers for Moldova.

He could even trigger a new war in the western Balkans, where increasingly antagonistic Serbian elites have looked to Russia for inspiration and support.

However, I think the danger from the Western Balkans is underestimated. Kuleba mentions the increasingly antagonistic Serbian elites who look to Russia for support. Serbia could become the Troian horse of Russia in the middle of the EU. Therefore it was a very bad decision, to leave the Western Balkans in the waiting room and not give them the status of EU candidates. At the same time it is very important, that there is no doubt that a candidate status does not automatically lead to any discounted membership.

The West must therefore not suggest peace initiatives with unacceptable terms and instead help Ukraine win. That means not just providing Ukraine with the heavy weaponry it needs to fight off Moscow’s forces; it also means maintaining and increasing sanctions against Russia.

I can only support this!

Critically, the West must kill Russian exports by imposing a full energy embargo and cutting off Russian access to the international maritime shipping industry. … These economic measures are key. … so the West cannot afford any sanctions fatigue—regardless of the broader economic costs.

The more Ukraine is asking for sanctions, that hurt the West, the more sanctions fatigue may become a problem. Therefore the Western governments must keep the balance between the necessary sanctions and the necessity to keep up public support, that is definitely not „regardless of broader economic costs“. And Ukraine should not ask for sanctions that weaken the West, because only a strong West can really support Ukraine.

Despite Ukraine’s early successes, it may be hard for Western policymakers to envision how we can defeat Russia’s larger and better-equipped forces. But we have a pathway to victory. With sufficient support, Ukraine can both halt Russia’s advance and take back more of its territories. In the east, Ukraine can gain the upper hand with more advanced heavy weapons, allowing us to gradually stall Moscow’s crumbling invasion in the Donbas.

Hopefully this will happen. But wars are unpredictable.

…The pivotal moment will come when our armed forces use Western-provided multiple launch rocket systems to destroy Russia’s artillery, turning the tide in Ukraine’s favor along the entire frontline. Afterward, our troops will aim to take back pieces of land, forcing Russians to retreat here and there.

Nobody can predict how the Russian side is reacting on their own mistakes – do they learn? How much reserves can the Russian side still throw into the battle? How long will the Russian population tolerate that their soldiers are used as cannon fodder? How long can the Ukrainian forces hold out in a war of attrition? I cannot answer these questions, but an enemy should never be underestimated.

On the battlefront in the south, the armed forces of Ukraine are already carrying out counterattacks, and we will use advanced weapons to further cut through enemy defenses.

… If we advance in both the south and the east, we can force Putin to choose between abandoning southern cities, including Kherson and Melitopol, in order to cling onto the Donbas, and abandoning newly occupied territories in Donetsk and Luhansk so he can hold the south.  … When we reach this moment, Putin will likely become more serious about cease-fire negotiations.

It is also quite unpredictable how Putin would react when his position is severely weakened. To ask this question is absolutely legitimate.

… Propaganda can also help Putin present the withdrawal as a sign of his humane treatment of Russian soldiers and as a wise step toward peace in general.

This could really be the bridge, offered to Putin to get out of the war without humiliation,  something Kuleba rejected at the beginning of his article. He is right that such no bridges must be built that let Putin win the war. But third parties talking to Putin should sound out if and when the military situation is such, that any bridge building makes sense.

But if Putin remains intransigent, Ukraine can proceed farther into Luhansk and Donetsk until he is willing to negotiate in good faith or until our army reaches and secures Ukraine’s internationally recognized border. … Ukraine will be able to speak with Russia from a position of strength. We can seek a fair diplomatic settlement with a weakened and more constructive Russia.

This scenario leaves two questions open: is Ukraine able to push Russian troops back from Ukrainian territory? There is some hope, but even with much more Western equipment it is a very difficult military operation. And we still do not know, if Putin will be rational enough, to enter into serious negotiations. His Imperial fantasies and his belief to be someone like Peter the Great does not speak for such rationality.

Some Western decision-makers … are scared of what Putin might do if he is roundly defeated on the battlefield. In their view, an angry, isolated Russian president might start new campaigns of international aggression. They worry that he will generally become more dangerous and difficult to deal with. Some fear that he might even use his country’s formidable nuclear arsenal. But Putin is not suicidal; a Ukrainian victory will not lead to nuclear warfare. Such fears may be deliberately fueled by the Kremlin itself for strategic purposes. Putin is a master of gaslighting, …

To fear nuclear war is absolutely rational and every strategist must take this possibility into account. I agree that Putin is not suicidal today, but there is no guarantee that he does not become suicidal one day. It is true: he is a master of gaslighting. But there are good reasons not to test it. Nuclear deterrence is based on the assumption, that all sides could become irrational enough to prefer a nuclear holocaust before being totally defeated. Russia must know that this is also true for the West.

… Finland’s and Sweden’s applications for NATO–membership for example, were a clear political defeat for Putin, … But it wasn’t followed by any escalation. Instead, Russian propaganda minimized its significance.

The West should not be too fearful. Finland and Sweden have always been in the Western sphere. Threatening them in such a way that they are now giving up neutrality in favour of NATO-membership was one of the most stupid moves of Putin and Lavrov. But this is not comparable with the effect of losing the war on the Putin regime.

… Instead of focusing on Putin’s feelings, the United States and Europe should focus on practical steps to help Ukraine prevail. …

Lamentably Putin’s feelings are relevant for the war. They do not deserve any sympathy even not any pity, but it is advisable for Ukraine as well as for the rest to analyse them carefully. Practical steps to help Ukraine must certainly not be hindered by such an analysis.

… They will see that our mission—substantially weakening Russia—will enable them, and the rest of the world, to seriously negotiate with a humbled and more constructive Moscow.

Historic evidence shows that a humbled country is generally unable to be constructive. It was a mistake to tell Russians that they lost the Cold War. Instead we should have congratulated them for winning against the communist, totalitarian dictatorship. It is Putin and his regime that must be humiliated, but President Macron was right in the long run: it would be a fatal mistake to humiliate the Russian people.

We look forward to this day; any war ends with diplomacy. But that moment has not yet come. Right now, it is clear that Putin’s path to the negotiating table lies solely through battleground defeats.

Even if the moment for diplomacy has not yet come it is no mistake to prepare for that day. As long as Russia is continuing only to propose the capitulation of Ukraine there is no base for negotiations. But in the end peace has to be concluded between enemies, not between friends.

Dmytro Kuleba’s article is very helpful to clear the air. The West must continue to help Ukraine to  win more battles and must refrain from giving unhelpful advice for concessions which only embolden the aggressor. But Ukraine must not give up on diplomacy for winning more friends and not losing the support of Western public opinion. War fatigue is a real danger but it must not necessarily happen.