Populism
what can we do about it

VERÖFFENTLICHT 2. FEBRUAR 2020

see also:  Fake News – what can we do about it?

The German Council on Foreign Relation held a high level conference „After Populism“ on January 31, 2020 in Berlin.
I hope that a report on the conference will be published on the DGAP-Website http://dgap.org soon. Anne Applebaum, Senior Fellow of the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies explained the development in the US and Martin Wolf, columnist of the „Financial Times“ made some sharp comments on populism and the phenomenon of Fake News on both sides of the Atlantic. These were also some interesting contributions at the conference from Jacques Rupnik who is teaching at Science Po, Paris, and the Collège d’Europe in Bruges, from Hillel Ben Sasson from the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. At a second session „After Fake News“ was debated by Peter Pomerantsev, visiting fellow at LSE London, Nataliya Gumenyuk from Hromadske Ukrainian news channel and Professor Claus Offe teaching at Hertie School of Governance in Berlin.

Here I will not repeat the debate, but pick up some of the ideas as an impulse to develop my own view on the question if populism is there to stay with us and where do we go from there.

Will populism stay with us?

Many debates start with defining „populism“. Some people ask if it is a kind of fascism. This debate is rather futile. Populism is an open vessel that can be filled by very different content. For a politician it is important to win elections – to be popular can be very helpful for that purpose. Some politicians even acquire some charisma. But charismatic leadership is not yet populism.

Populism is not an ideology. It is a specific form of making politics. Citizens can believe in communist or fascist ideology, they cannot believe in populism, they can only believe in populist persons. Communist or fascist leaders can also be populist, but not necessarily so. Populists can be ideologues, but in general they tend to adhere to very eclectic and incoherent ideological bits and pieces they deem useful to promote their very personal power and interests.

Juan Perón in Argentina was one of the first real populists, picking up some fascist concepts from Mussolini, but also sucking up leftist concepts to mobilize workers in his country. The far rightist Lopez Rega, who started terror against the left under Isabel Perón in the seventies, and the far left Montoneros, who fought for a social revolution were both part of Peron’s legacy. This incoherence is still felt in Peronist policy in modern Argentina.

Populism is a political supply-side affair – the populist must first be available on the political market, then populism is bought by the voters who are desperate about traditional politicians, who promise too much and do not resolve the burning problems of the man-in-the-street. A serious politician cannot avoid to tell his or her voters that some problems are too complex to be fully understood, that a peacemeal approach may be the only possible way and that compromise is necessary to find majorities.

Populists hate complications, they disdain experts. They are the „terrible simplificateurs“ who have no problem to make incompatible promises, who do not care about logic or objective obstacles. They are voluntarists who make believe – and may believe themselves – that by an effort of will problems may go away.

Since populism is based on a drastical reduction of complexity (as Niklas Luhmann may have called is with a much more positive connotation) it is difficult to nail populists down on their specific policies. However, it would be too simplistic to assume that voters are just stupid and are only seduced by the populist showmasters. The voters have real problems, at least they perceive their problems as real ones. A successful populist cares about the voters. Populism lives from picking up what is really popular.

I find it rather arrogant to treat Donald Trump just as a stupid man with bad manners. He is both, but nobody elected him for that part of his personality. The fact that president Trump is a notorious liar does not make voters turn away from him. We must admit that he fulfils the expectations of most of his voters. That does not mean that what he does is in the best interest of the voters but he does what he promised. In Britain voters elected Boris Johnson for his slogan „Let Brexit be done“ not asking if Brexit is really good for them or not. When Donald Trump is announcing that he keeps Muslims out, gets the wall be built and brings our boys home, the message is the point of his triumph – not the implementation as such..

There are a lot of voters who believe that they were let down by opening up markets for unfair competition that threw them out of their jobs. America has had a protectionist tradition before. One of the effects was that high wages could be defended and compnaies had to embark on technical innovation because they could not rely on cheap labour. It was a horror for liberal free trade economists, but the worker who lost his job may not be convinced that the advantages of liberalization and globalization were also his advantages.

Migration had been the backbone of the American dream – not to forget: that the indigenous population had been marginalized in favour of the immigrants from Europe. Several waves of immigrants led to strong resentments. The Irish, the Italians, Jews and Asian immigrants met with rejection when the wave was at its height – and the African slave import was no voluntary migration at all. A similar resentment has recently evolved against the Hispanic immigration, especially from poor Central American countries. But there is a difference: this is mainly an illegal immigration over the southern border. It is uncontrolled migration that leads to a sense of loss of control. This makes Trump’s populist talk about a wall against Mexico popular.

The only other migration to the US that makes people feel not in control is islamic immigration. Before this has only been a marginal factor in the American migration statistics. People coming from islamic countries became Americans nearly as fast as other immigrants. However, the events of 9/11 changed the view. It gave way to fears for inviting enemies into the United States, comparable to the situation that arose during the Second World War when Japanese immigrants were treated very badly because of fears to have a fifth column of enemies in the country.

In Europe and especially in countries where there has been a considerable Muslim population we know that fully integrating a living and fighting religion opposed to our prevailing religion and opposed to many of our values is not so easy. First generation immigrants of all kind often lived in separate communities in New York or tother big cities. But the second generatiion normally felt American and only American without any other loyalty. Muslim communities often isolate themselves from the rest of the population and form a permanent separate entity. The supportes of Donald Trump believe that those who detest the „American way of life“ should not come to the United States of America. Trump’s migration policy is not only populist, it is also popular.
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All political decision making takes place under insecurity – wrong decisions are always possible. An important aspect of democracy is that mistakes can normally be corrected. Parliamentary debates and democratic elections offer a mechanism to control the effects and a feedback to amend decisions.

Populists do not care about truth, they acquire legitimacy like a feudal leader by personal loyalty and cut off politics from the feedback of critical control. If „anything goes“, if „god is dead“ and „truth is relative“, then lying for a good purpose is no problem at all. This makes populist policies very vulnerable to gross mistakes. Criticizing those mistakes is a breach of loyalty and is sanctioned by exclusion from the feudal court of the leader. Making those mistakes is not at all sactioned by voters who believe that great men are entitled to great lies.

Anne Applebaum made clear that Trump’s policy is not as new as it seems. The traditional isolationism and protectionism has always been a part of the American political landscape. Many people do not trust the elites, hate Washington and big government. These are not just fringe movements and they will stay on.

However, I think that Trump’s specific style is more than just a revival of old traditional populism. He is very aggressive and irresponsible because he makes irrationality a respected form of government. Like many populists he also likes to project difficulties to the outside world and to follow an aggressive foreign policy.

That makes even the most traditional policy a dangerous gamble. Trump’s voters from Middle America, from evangelical or far right circles, from the rust belt to the Midwest farmers, are certainly believing that in the end they have got a representative of their traditional domestic aspirations to keep America out of foreign troubles and make it great again by protectionism. But with Trump they also bought an irresponsible foreign policy.

Why do populists win elections?

The world has become complex and threatening. Confidence in the traditional elites has broken down. Each country has its own story about that, but the essence is always the same. Before 2008 the business elites were trusted to provide jobs and a successful economic performance. The magicians in the financial markets were seen as detached but somehow useful to create prosperity. Before 2003 politicians were trusted to provide internal and international security, a stable social and healthcare system, helping business to provide jobs and representing their voters. Before 2010 the press and electronic media were the gatekeepers of truth, they were trusted to report what really happened, to give wise comments and recommendations.

I took these pivot years from the events that made confidence in the United Kingdom break down: the way Tony Blair lied to the people leading Britain into the Iraq war in 2003 destroyed confidence in the good judgement and ethical behaviour of the government. The financial crisis of 2008 destroyed the view that investment bankers were „the masters of the universe“ when they were even not mastering their own greed and violated all business ethics. The scandal of the press, especially the Murdoch press, tapping the mobile phones of normal people, politicians and even Royals using it for dirty news business destroyed the belief in the press as a reliable source of information governed by professional ethics. The anti-EU movement in the UK is not new, but the Brexit referendum came at the moment when the anti-London and anti-elite resentment was very high because of the crisis of confidence and deep fears over an uncontrolled immigration.

Many other countries in Europe and the Americas had similar problems, the years to be earmarked may be different. In Germany the migration crisis from 2015 led to a severe breakdown of political trust, reflected in the steep rise of the populist AfD-party. In France the Socialist party was nearly annihilated because Francois Hollande had disappointed the majority that brought him into power five years earlier. Emmanuel Macron won the election in 2017 with a completely new party – and is now confronted with several rebellions, the most famous one from the yellow-vests. In Italy the two extremes of the political spectrum represented by Salvinis Lega and Beppe Grillos Five Star Movement went into an awkward coalition against the centre. Migration and social conflicts were pivotal for that. This coalition did not last – but it may come back because the underlying problems remain unresolved.

There is a sense of loss of control – in America, in Britain, but also in other European countries. It is too easy to make globalization responsible for the populist movements. There is no uncontrollable mechanics of politics at work, it is the ruling political, business and cultural elites that were responsible for the loss of confidence and with that the loss of the necessary legitimacy. Populists only have a chance because traditional parties and politicians have failed.

What to do against populism?

Some people find populism nothing to worry about. Politicians have always lied to their voters. Truth is a fuzzy concept, for each truth there is a counter-truth, and what counts is to have forceful people at the helm of the nation who steer us through troubled water. And in the end the populists are the only ones who address the real problems.

If this is your opinion there is no need to do anything against populism. But if you believe that this is destroying political democracy and our cultural and ethical substance, if you learn from history that longing for strongmen ends up with unsavoury dictatorships, if you do not want, that all assertions, true, half-true or lies, are treated equal, putting witchcraft and science on the same footing, then populism has to be defeated.

Jacques Rupnik said that left wing populism can still be absorbed in left-liberal parties, while right wing populism cannot – particularly because it is so concentrated on the topic of migration.

I do not agree with that assessment. Both populisms can and cannot be absorbed by traditional parties depending on circumstances. Left wing parties may absorb populist voters if they embark on populist strategies themselves. But they may not be successful without a charismatic leader who may then transform the party into a populist movement. The British Labour Party and other parties who introduced internal referenda called member’s votes to elect leaders are running into that trap.

Right wing parties can also be absorbed by populists – the case of the British Conservatives is a good example. The German far right was utterly unsuccessful over the last decades. But when a populist movement like the AfD came up, it got much more support. The more the old far right absorbs the AfD the less votes it will mobilize, if the populist movement absorbs the far right parties it can continue to win over disaffected voters.

The topic of migration offers itself for populist temptations because it is one of the challenges where traditional governments and parties do not meet expectations of their voters. Each party, left or right, that opens up to populism may absorb it or be absorbed by it – depending mainly on who offers sustainable solutions. But it will only be successful if the populism prevails over old party structures.

Martin Wolf said that populism is anti-pluralism, but even more it is anti-elitism, which is rather well-deserved by the elites. Cultural elites believe the people are fascist, business eleites believe the people are incompetent, while they themselves just have proven their incompetence in the financial crisis. Elites must get more competent and more humble.

I share this view: If there is any strategy against populism this has to be taken into account. The elites are normally convinced that they know better. The behaviour towards the population is paternalistic and arrogant. If they do not know better, their position becomes unsupportable. Only proven competence over a considerable time can win back confidence.

The cultural elites, gate-keepers in the press, celebrities in popular or elitist culture alike tend to teach the people about the right things to do, they feel ethically and politically superior. This is generally not well founded and also comes over as arrogance. Mechanically using the politically correct words without reflecting the concepts is very widespread between cultural elites who never admit they could be wrong. Arrogance is incompatible with a decent debating culture. Only a much more humble approach may win back that culture.

Financial elites believed that handling immense flows of cash was a proof to deserve to be remunerated 500 times the salary of the nurse they expect to care for them when in need. They even continued to claim bonuses when they ran their financial institutions against the wall. This was a complete loss of reality. At the same time the financial elite continued to tell politicians and the people that they were the competent experts for reforming the system they themselves ran on a sandbank. Trust in such experts is unfounded.

Populism cannot be fought by slogans like fighting the far right (and excusing the far left) or fighting the extreme left (neglecting the far right) because this does not attack the substance of populism, which does not depend on right or left but on phoney power.

In education there must be an enhanced awareness not only for facts but for the critical review of facts and assumptions. We need epistemic rejection, not social rejection of prejudices. Using new media must be trained in preferring disbelief to one-sided belief.

The press must come back to some traditional standards, especially separating news, that can be proven, from comments, that can be criticized. The fact that for four days the German media did not cover the nasty events on New Years Eve 2015 in Cologne were a complete desaster for politics and the media in Germany. Trust has never be reestablished to its former standard – there has to be an active effort to make good on that behaviour. It did not really happen, especially not in the public TV.

The teaching of children is a pedagogic effort, to try to teach the demos is a demagogic effort. The limit between a pedagogic explaining of facts to TV viewers as if they were children and a demagogic effect of delivering one-sided or self-censored news is very narrow and is sometimes blurred in German public TV – helping populists to denounce it as „Lügenpresse“ – lying press. Donald Trump is using the same topic to fight the critical press in the US.

It is often said that politicians must better explain what is happening and what is done. But explanations do not help if people do not trust politicians to be sincere, and explanations do not help if the struggle is about substance. Talk shows are unhelpful for explanations, they often look like trials instead of debates. The parliamentary debate and the public debate must open up and not exclude those who are politically incorrect. We must fight to get back everybody who fell prey to populists. Populists fight by resentment. But we must fight back with arguments, not with counter-resentment.

Anne Applebaum was undecided about the two possible ways of answering that challenge: either liberals fight back with all instruments: press and the media, power positions etc. or the other way: to revitalize the institutions and try to convince people with arguments, asking yourself how to steal the populists best ideas.

Our media, the political parties, and the state already try to use the media and state power to counter populism in Germany. But that is failing because the problems that made populism rise are ignored. As long as the problems of globalization, precarious jobs and migration are not convincingly confronted by the democratic parties this will remain the recruiting ground for populist votes. In case the state falls prey to a populist leader this strategy hits back severely. When the monopoly of talking tough was left to Donald Trump he won the monopoly of presidential power.

The second strategy seems to me more promising: fighting back with convincing arguments and strengthening the institutions and eventually steal the populists‘ best ideas. The precondition for such a strategy is high competence and a code of humble conduct of the people who implement that strategy. Martin Wolf is right: if the institutions are not led by convincing persons they may be hollowed out by populists and will be very unhelpful.

Stealing the populists ideas is sometimes denounced as adapting to the populists. This is not necessarily so. Populists normally do not have any own ideas. Their ideology is eclectic and unclear. But they have a genuine feeling for what the voters see as failures of the political system. They show us the symptoms and we have to learn from that. We have to steal the questions from the populists and find the answers ourselves.

Populism is today a revolutionary movement, violent revolts and violent attacks against all countervailing forces and institutions are the symptoms. Therefore anti-populism has to be somewhat conservative and even „reactionary“ – coming back to old-fashioned ethical standards, and at the same time it has to be counter-revolutionary picking up the reasons for the revolution, but resolving problems differently than the populists try to do and fighting populists out of positions of power.