Tuesday, 15th December
On the 15th December, 1914, the Second Battle Squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender, the Third Cruiser Squadron under Rear-Admiral Pakenham, and the First Light Cruiser Squadron (as we were called until the Galatea class formed a squadron under Commodore Alexander-Sinclair) left Scapa Flow under our Commodore for a sweep.
A great deal of uncertainty as to what did happen exists amongst the officers who were present, and the whole affair lies under a shadow which is due to the disappointment experienced by the Navy in the fact that, whereas at one period of the day it seemed impossible for the Germans to escape action, yet a few hours later they were clear of the coast and steaming unmolested at full speed for Germany.
I intend therefore to make quite plain only what I saw myself, and only what I heard from eye-witnesses after the action was over and one met other officers in harbour.
Wednesday, 16th December
At about dawn on 16th December we were to the north westwards of the Dogger Bank, when we received a signal to the effect that some T.B.D.'s had been in action with German cruisers, and the enemy were now retiring to the eastwards. We proceeded to chase east, as we gathered that the enemy cruisers appeared to be going only about 20 knots.
They had a start of some 30 miles on us, so it did not seem very promising. The battle cruisers and ourselves soon left the Second Battle Squadron and Third Cruiser Squadron behind, and we pushed east at full speed for about an hour, when destroyers were sighted ahead, which proved to be British and on an opposite course. They had been shadowing the Huns since they left the British coast, and the Huns had not appeared to worry about them much for some time, until the T.B.D.'s got rather close, upon which one of the German cruisers had lashed out at them and hit one of them. As at that period we were still 30 miles to the west of them, the destroyers had given it up and come back to us.
Hardly had the party joined up, when we were astounded to get a signal to say that Scarborough was being bombarded. This was at about 9 a.m.
To our astonishment we realized that the main body of the Huns were behind us the whole time, and at the moment we all felt that this detached party which we had been chasing east was a ruse to draw us away from the coast before the bombardment began. I have never been able to ascertain whether this was the German plan, but at all events circumstances worked out in that way.
We were at once ordered by the Lion to alter course 16 points and proceed west at full speed. The situation seemed simple, and it looked as if "the Lord had delivered them into our hands."
One hundred miles east of the English coast, at about the latitude of Hartlepool, were the battle cruisers and ourselves steaming west at full speed. Eighty miles east of England and a little to the southward of us were the Second Battle Squadron and the Third Cruiser Squadron, also going west.
Twenty miles from the coast of England a layer of minefields, about ten miles across in an east and west direction, stretched north and south parallel to the coast. At intervals of thirty to forty miles up and down the coast were gaps in the minefields. Somewhere between these minefields and England were the Germans. As far as we knew, there were only two possible ways through which they could emerge into the open sea.
The sea was flat calm, the visibility extreme. Throughout the ship the feeling was, " Now, my bonnie Huns, we've got you cold."
During the forenoon we pushed west, straight for the gaps in the minefields.
At 10.30 a.m. we had news of the Hun, and we were somewhat "intrigued " to get a signal, 'Light cruisers must penetrate minefields and locate enemy." Paravanes were a thing of the future, and this order made our position look rather murky.
The secretary, ever a philosopher, went down into the waist and selected a wooden door which had been taken off a certain compartment so that the door should not be blown in by gun-blast, sat down on the door, put the catch from "Vacant" to "Engaged," and lit a pipe. He refused to allow me to share it with him, as he mistrusted its power of flotation.
We were not sorry to get a signal shortly afterwards to the effect that light cruisers would not penetrate the minefields.
At 11.20 a.m. the situation was looking very interesting. The Huns had been seen leaving the coast and making for one of the gaps which lay straight ahead of us. The gap was 5 miles broad. We were just passing the Second Battle Squadron and Third Cruiser Squadron as the hands were piped to dinner for half an hour. We went below to the wardroom, leaving brilliant sunshine on deck.
We rushed up fifteen minutes later at the call of the alarm bells, to find it was raining hard, blowing freshly, with increasing force every minute, and a considerable number of Hun cruisers and destroyers emerging out of a bank of driving mist, scarcely 4 miles away.
The light cruiser screen was spread as usual in groups of light cruisers about 5 miles apart, ahead of the battle cruisers. We were the southern group, and the Lion was about 8 miles on our starboard quarter. But a quick look round as I ran up to the after control revealed nothing except the Birmingham shrouded in driving mist about 2 miles on our starboard quarter, bearing down to our support, and the two groups of Huns, which consisted of three light cruisers and a dozen destroyers on the starboard bow, and two light cruisers and an armoured cruiser (the Prinz. Adalbert) and destroyers on the port bow.
We went straight on at 25 knots, head into the sea, and spray flying over the ship in sheets.
The Huns came straight on, with the sea behind them and the destroyers bobbing about like corks. As both the enemy and ourselves approached each other on opposite courses, it appeared as if we were about to pass between the two groups of German ships. In fact, both broadsides were in action for a short period, but when the group on the starboard side were bearing about "on the bow," they altered course approximately seven points to starboard and stood across our bows towards the wakes of the other party, which by this time were bearing on our port quarter. To conform to this movement, the Birmingham having got astern of us in support, we altered course to port, and steered parallel to the two groups of enemy. The foremost group slowed down, and the Germans then assumed one long straggling line which extended from our starboard bow to our starboard quarter, the mean range being about 6,000 yards. Fragments fell on board, but they never hit us, which was a poor display for five ships.
We opened fire with all guns bearing, but the gun layers became confused at the number of targets and each gun was firing more or less independently. This, added to the fact that owing to the sea and spray the telescopes were useless and they had to use open sights, made accurate shooting impossible, and I don't think we hit any Huns, though we managed to straddle the armoured cruiser. We were, however, recalled to the northward, where the Lion was, as at any minute the German battle cruisers were expected to come out of the gap, and as we were short of T.B.D.'s the battle cruisers wanted light cruisers with them in case they were attacked by the German destroyers. Half an hour later we had been in the gap, and to our indescribable rage we had heard that the Second Battle Squadron and Third Cruiser Squadron had sighted the German battle cruisers steaming east at full speed. We rushed after them but it was too late.
Looking back on it all, I think what happened was this. The Germans decided to get out along the southern edge of the gap. They had the amazing luck to get the sudden storm which in an hour rose to a gale from a perfect day.
They sent their light cruisers and destroyers out first, bunched up in two divisions. This was the party we met. About 5 miles behind them, the German battle cruisers came along. Now had we proceeded west we should have run into these big brutes. It may have been lucky for us, but it was unlucky for our side that we did not.
We made a signal, "In action with light cruisers," when we had our affair ; and as the Lion knew we were opposite the southern edge of the gap, it seems to me probable that they assumed we had made contact with one or two isolated light cruisers which might have been the southern wing of the German screen, and that they thought in the Lion that the bulk of the Germans were in the minefields to the west - hence they called us north, to concentrate everyone for the expected action with the German battle cruisers.
Had this fog not arisen, we should of course have seen the Hun battle cruisers behind their light cruisers. But war would not be what it is if it was not for the 'might-have-beens." It is idle to speculate on 'might-have-beens." If we had been able to destroy the German battle cruiser fleet it might have profoundly affected the whole course of the war, then again it might not have done so. Our failure when at one period everything had looked so promising was made the more bitter by the subsequent list of women and children killed in the bombardment.
In its main object the bombardment failed. The people of England and the Press were not panicked, and the Fleet was not dispersed from its strategic position and distributed in small packets along the east coast.
As an exhibition of Teutonic frightfulness, it may be held to have succeeded. Its most permanent result was the stimulus it gave to recruiting.